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Preface
Dear Readers, 
Right-wing extremism is not a national phenomenon. Xenophobia, anti-
Semitism and racism exist in many countries and the extreme right is 
continuously  extending its cross-border networks. Attitudes towards parts 
of society which are based on the premise that humans are unequal, 
discriminating actions and structures, or open hatred and violence refl ect 
an alarming extent of group-related enmity in many countries of Europe 
and worldwide. 
As shown in a recent study by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung titled “Intoler-
ance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report1”, anti-democratic 
attitudes are dramatically spreading in European mainstream societies. 
Ac cording to this study by the University of Bielefeld, about 50 percent of 
respondents from eight European countries take the view that there are 
too many immigrants in their countries, and wish for an employment 
 prerogative for locals in times of crisis.
In many places, right-wing extremists try to use these discriminating atti-
tudes to establish themselves in politics and in society through different 
strategies and structures. They organize parades and revisionist commemo-
rations, establish loose comradeships or mobilise voters to support their 
parties in entering parliament – unfortunately not without success. In 
 recent years, Europe has rather seen a boost in right-wing extremism.
 
1 German: “Die Abwertung der Anderen: Eine europäische Zustandsbeschreibung zu Intoleranz, 
Vorurteilen und Diskriminierung” (Zick et al., published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011). 
Download: http://library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/do/07908-20110311.pdf
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Particularly in times of crisis, right-wing extremists and right-wing popu-
lists in many places are trying to use the fears of European citizens to pro-
mote their “cause“ by providing simple answers to complex social chal-
lenges. As a result, not only were 29 right-wing representatives elected to 
the European Parliament in 2009, but in Sweden, Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Austria and Eastern Europe, too, they scored in national elections 
with slogans of scapegoatism and exclusion. 
What danger does the extreme right therefore pose? How does it show 
and organize itself in Europe and her regions? What manifestations and 
strategies can we identify and what counter-strategies can we develop? 
What role do politics and civil society play in the work against right-wing 
extremism and what are the next essential steps? Is Europe on the “right” 
path? 
These lead questions both shape and structure this anthology and form 
the basis for the work against right-wing extremism which the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is deeply committed to. The central FES-Project ”Com-
bating right-wing extremism”2 has therefore continuously worked for 
many years on different strategies for democracy and against right-wing 
extremism, and has offered dialogue platforms for experts and  activists 
from the fi elds of science, politics and civil society. Additionally, the pub-
lications and studies of the FES serve to inform and shape poltitical debates 
on a regular basis.
Since 2009, the international dimension of right-wing extremism consti-
tutes an individual working line of this continious work of the FES. With-
in the framework of the XENOS special programme “Ausstieg zum Ein-
stieg”3, the German Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Issues, the 
European Union, and the European Social Fund assist the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung in its efforts for a European debate and networking building. 
2  German: FES-Projekt “Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtsextremismus”.
3 German for “Quitting for a new start”.
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With their help, two international large-scale conferences have been or-
ganized since 2009 with experts from all over Europe. Following a fi rst 
conference in November 2009 focussing on analysing the problem by 
European countries and regions, an OPEN SPACE conference for democ-
racy took place in November 2010 searching for joint socio-political 
 solutions. 
This anthology combines the insights gained at these events in the form 
of scientifi c analyses of manifestations of the extreme right in different 
parts of Europe. Additional articles document the resulting discussions and 
conclusions for the socio-political debate. The photos and images con-
tained in this book demonstrate how dramatic this issue is, but as well 
document the extensive interest in and awareness of it, as well as the crea-
tivity of democratic resistance witnessed at our conferences. 
This publication of the Project “Combating right-wing extremism” of the 
FES wishes to contribute to the socio-political debate on right-wing 
extremism as a threat to Europe’s democracies and societies. With this 
book, we would like to give constructive impetus for the fi ght against right-
wing extremism, xenophobia , and racism, and for a  Europe of democracy 
and solidarity. We of course hope that you will enjoy reading it. 
Our heartfelt thanks go to Britta Schellenberg, co-editor and -author as 
well as to the other authors for their articles, along with thanks to all those 
involved in completing this publication. This anthology (in both German 
and English language) as well as other publications and information on 
the FES’ work for democracy and against right-wing extremism can be 
found online at http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de.
Nora Langenbacher
Project “Combating right-wing extremism”
Forum Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
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Introduction: An anthology about the manifestations 
and development of the radical right in Europe
1 Defi ned by Michael Minkenberg: Thus, the radical right includes the extreme right, xenopho-
bic right, populist right, and fundamentalist-religious right. Further on the concepts and terms 
used, please see the article by Minkenberg in this book, page 37. 
Goal, structure and content of this anthology
This book pools authoritative analyses by recognised scholars on mani-
festations, strategies and topics of the radical right1 in the light of the 
increasing threat by right-wing extremism and right-wing populism to 
European democracies and societies. The anthology looks at different 
 European countries and regions, giving an impetus for the development 
of effective counter-strategies. 
The authors of the 13 country analyses address the structures of the 
organized radical right in Europe and analyse their topics and target 
groups. With a glance at the attitudes in the mainstream of society they 
elabo rate on the question of whether and by which strategies right-wing 
populist and extremist players have been so far “successful”, and which 
role  ex panding trans-national networks play in this process. The articles 
at the beginning and at the end of this book address the title question, 
whether Europe is “on the ‘right path’”, and which socio-political steps 
are to be taken in order to maintain a democratic Europe based on soli-
darity.  
As this book contains a collection of texts by different authors, the fol-
lowing chapters vary in style and approach. The fi rst one is a polit ical 
article written by Martin Schulz, Member of the European Parliament, on 
the basis of a speech he delivered at a conference of the Friedrich-Ebert- 
Stiftung. While Martin Schulz answers the question “Is Europe on the 
Nora Langenbacher & Britta Schellenberg
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‘right path’?“ from the European policy point of view, the subsequent 
 article by professor Michael Minkenberg introduces the topic perspective. 
By defi ning concepts and terms, this article provides a framework for the 
European analysis and the country studies in this anthology. 
The book closes with two contributions addressing the question of which 
socio-political strategies result from the analysis on hand. They are based 
on discussions conducted with representatives from the fi elds of politics, 
science, and civil society at two international conferences hosted by the 
 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. These fi nal articles aim to enrich the future aca-
demic and political debate about further steps to promote democracy 
and human rights throughout Europe. 
Right-wing populism and right-wing extremism in Europe
The analyses in this anthology make it clear that right-wing extremism 
and right-wing populism have regionally different characteristics while 
at the same time displaying similarities in terms of strategies and con-
tents. In the following, some core similarities of the phenomena de-
scribed in this anthology will be summarized since they are of central 
importance for an indispensible European debate. As a result, common 
topics, strategies and typical causes and prerequisites for the success of 
right-wing populist efforts can be elicited from the studies.
There are three core far-right topics and mobilisation strategies that con-
stitute the main success factors of right-wing extremist and right-wing 
populist players: their attempt to make use of social issues, to picture 
politics per se as corrupt and to propagate ascriptions of national identi-
ty. Three related socio-political crises – described as the crisis of distribu-
tion and access, the crisis of political representation, and the crisis of 
identity2 – point to unsolved problems of democracies, and at the same 
time remind us of the imperative of innovative and modern societies.
2 See Frank Decker: Die populistische Herausforderung. Theoretische und ländervergleichende 
Perspektiven, in: Frank Decker (Hrsg.): Populismus in Europa. Bonn 2006, 9-32, p. 22.
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The radical right acts as a defender of current “social issues”– or: 
Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism as a result of the 
crisis of distribution and access 
Analyses of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in different 
countries show that the radical right appeals to those on the losing side 
of current social processes. Be it the British National Party, the Progress 
Party, or the Danish People’s Party 3: the target groups always comprise 
people who are, in the course of economic and social processes of change, 
threatened by losses in terms of labour, income, prestige, access to edu-
cation and leisure time. The main target groups in Western Europe are 
therefore people from the lower and lower middle class. Additionally, a 
broad middle class might also be a target group in Eastern Europe. This 
correlation is not new or unexplored. Eventually only a fraction of the 
population in European societies profi ts from the increasing liberalisa-
tion of the markets and global interconnectedness, while others feel 
barred from economic and technological gains. 
Right-wing extremist and right-wing populist players make use of these 
fears of relegation and loss to act in many places as so-called advocates of 
the common people or of the losers of globalised economic processes. 
Despite the fact that not long ago the right-wing parties of today wel-
comed neo-liberal economic ideas (some of these parties, such as the Aus-
trian FPÖ, continue to favour market liberalisation and medium-sized 
enterprises), today they propagate a “national and social” policy welcom-
ing the welfare state taking care of (only) its ethnic-national citizens. This 
is refl ected by slogans conjuring “Socialism” or by calls to “safeguard the 
welfare state“, or “jobs for Germans fi rst“. It is especially in the Nordic 
states, where social justice is a highly cherished value, that the radical 
right aggressively criticises the dismantling of the welfare state. It is also 
a nostalgic glance to the past: A longing for the economically prosperous 
3 For further information on the listed parties and their abbreviations here and elsewhere in the 
text, please consult the chart on page 25.
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times of the 1950s and 1960s, for a country where public welfare was 
about  to be established, for a high level of employment, for progress, and 
– this is where the far right makes the connection – for an ethnically ho-
mogeneous society without immigrants. It is against this background 
that parties such as the British National Party (BNP) emerge as “represent-
atives of the British working class”. In post-communist Eastern European 
countries the extreme-right’s call for state control over the  liberalised 
market is much stronger than in the West.  
Even if there is no direct causation between a low social status and the 
support for right-wing extremism, a strong relation between “subjective 
deprivation”, i. e. the subjective feeling of being unprivileged, and extreme-
right orientation is documented.4 In some population groups, the “sub-
jective” feeling of being disadvantaged often has a real basis. It is not 
only since the fi nancial and economic crisis that educationally deprived 
population groups from the lower classes have had to put up with heavy 
losses and with the deprivation of social prestige.5 But while these de-
prived groups have so far traditionally voted for the left (see article on 
Sweden in this book), they have now lost confi dence in leftist politics – 
not least because they were held responsible for the negative develop-
ments not only of the conservative, but also of the liberal and of the so-
cial democratic governments. In some countries, these groups today turn 
to radical-right parties (see article on Norway in this book). 
As a result, the latest success of radical-right parties is also a result of a 
crisis of distribution. Voters act as “angry (young) (wo)men”, experienc-
4 The correlation between economic deprivation and disintegration or their threat and extreme 
right attitudes is examined among others by the study “Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme 
Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010” (Decker, Weißmann, Kiess, Brähler 2010) published by the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
5 This is refl ected by the situation of unskilled people on the labour market: While the employ-
ment rate in the EU is 84 percent among the highly skilled, it is 70 percent among those with 
medium qualifi cation, and 49 percent in the case of low-skilled people. See New Skills for New 
Jobs: Action Now. A report by the Expert Group on New Skills for New Jobs prepared for the 
European Commission. European Union 2010. 
 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=568&langId=en 
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ing themselves more and more as marginalised groups. This crisis goes 
beyond the merely economic level, being therefore a “crisis of access”, 
too, extending to all aspects of life: Many economically deprived people 
have fewer possibilities to participate in social and cultural terms, and 
have poorer access to education. 
Right-wing populists as advocates of the common people – 
or: Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism as a result of 
the crisis of political representation 
 
The second core topic or style element of the radical right in Europe is to 
disdain politicians, political parties, and democracy as such. Their slogans 
and campaigns challenge the fact of “the people” being represented by 
the politicians in power. They characterise them and other socio-political 
players as corrupt and not authentic and accuse them of “representing 
only their own economic interests” and of being “elitist”. By moaning 
about the population’s social problems they call for taking tough action 
in order to uphold the interests of the people. The so-called “party cor-
ruption” and “criminal foreigners” or “welfare parasites” are the established 
concepts of the enemy. At the same time, right-wing politicians, such as 
Jean-Marie Le Pen of France, draft the vision of something like a police 
state,  where security and the fi ght against immorality are central issues. 
Nonetheless, right-wing parties often present themselves as the “true 
voice” of the people and as representatives of “the man in the street”. In 
Switzer land, for instance, they emphasize their politics by cleverly or-
chestrated referendums such as that on “the minaret ban” (see article on 
Switzerland in this book). Pleas by the radical right for more direct de-
mocracy – and less parliamentarism – are not unusual in other European 
countries, either. Right-wing extremist parties in Western Europe, for in-
stance, organize different initiatives against “Islam” and “the Muslims” on 
a regular basis, in particular against the building of mosques, which often 
interact with each other (see article on Germany in this book). The ex-
treme right, however, varies in different European countries in terms of 
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its understanding of state and politics: While right-wing extremists in 
young democracies of Eastern Europe have a nationalist/fascist and com-
munist past, and refer to authoritarian political ideas of the early 20th 
century (see articles on Poland and Hungary in this book), right-wing 
radicals in the old democracies (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden in this book) assertively stand in the democratic tradition of their 
countries. Hence the Swedish Democrats, the Danish People’s Party or Geert 
Wilders‘ Party for Freedom see themselves as the actual represent a tives of 
the democratic values of their country. Their campaigns making a stand 
against allegedly authoritarian Muslim immigrants discriminating against 
women are one example for their self-staging as “advocates” of liberal-
democratic values. In doing so, the parties knowingly place themselves 
into the democratic discourse demanding freedom of opinion for them-
selves and attacking opponents as racists, denying them an equal partici-
pation in the country’s political process.
By depreciating politics in general – especially with the reproach that 
“the people’s” voice remains unheard by an elitist parliamentarism – 
right-wing players nourish anti-democratic and anti-parliamentarian 
feelings. They use people’s frustration and disenchantment with the per-
formance of the political system for their own purposes. Thus, in many 
countries, right-wing extremism is a product of a crisis briefl y called a 
“crisis of representation” by political scientist Frank Decker.6 
Following the assumption of a crisis of representation of democratic 
politics, it might be interesting to compare the voters of radical-right par-
ties with each other. According to the above-described crisis of distribu-
tion, this fi rstly involves the losers in the current changes in society. Sec-
ondly, in some countries, it is striking that the number of young men 
among those voting for right-wing parties is above average.7 The follow-
6 See Frank Decker: Die populistische Herausforderung. Theoretische und ländervergleichende 
Perspektiven, in: Frank Decker (Hrsg.): Populismus in Europa. Bonn 2006, 9-32, p. 22.
7 In Austria, for instance, the right-populist FPÖ became strongest among the those in their 
thirties (Sept. 2008). In all, the party achieved 17 percent of the votes; among fi rst-time voters 
(16 to 19 years) they attained 44 percent.
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ing argument also supports the thesis of a crisis of distribution and repre-
sentation being a cause for the right-wing’s success. Young men feel ad-
equately addressed by H.C. Strache (FPÖ, Austria) or Gábor Vona (JOBBIK, 
Hungary) leading very modern electoral campaigns (featuring visits to 
discos and raps in the case of Strache) and believe that they are able to 
come to grips with their precarious social situation. 
Right-wing populists as “conveyors of meaning” 
or: Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism as the result of 
a crisis of identity 
The subject of “identity” or identity policy constitutes a third cultural 
topic and fi eld of agitation for the right-wing extremists. It is especially 
connectable to the mainstream of society because it can be made an exis-
tential subject of debate in the fi rst place and because it affects all mem-
bers of (the majority) society: In times of rapid social changes, new global 
communication, information, and job opportunities, issues of identity 
become more relevant and pertain to everyone. While processes of change 
are mostly welcomed by some segments of the population, others feel 
overtaxed or simply reject them.8 The latter are in danger of losing  reference 
points for their identity by the perceived or actual deprivation or disinte-
gration. This so-called “crisis of identity and meaning” in terms of the 
individual as well as the whole of society is taken up by right-wing 
players who offer a regressive utopia: They cling to the concept of nation 
and people, superelevating it and marginalizing everything that seems 
“alien”. The goal of right-wing radicals is an ethnically homogeneous 
society. Thereby, the right-wing utopia of a homogeneous community 
promises to resolve social and individual problems by excluding “the 
guilty” or “the others”.  In this logic, all that is alien must be identifi ed 
and ruled out in order to ensure the nation’s/the people’s survival. 
8 Britta Schellenberg, Dispersion and Differentiation: The Structures and Trends of the Radical 
Right in Europe, in: Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.): Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Ex tremism 
in  Europe. Gütersloh 2009, S. 531– 546, p. 531.
18 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
Le Pen and the French Front National realised the signifi cance of the iden-
tity issue for the right-wing radicals at a very early stage, and propagated 
the “white race” as a core concept of European identity (see article on 
France in this book). In this context, however, it must be pointed out 
that the reference to and the distinction or depreciation of the so-called 
“others” is also popular among different social forces.9 At the same time, 
the defi nition of “others” is rather mutable and subject to the zeitgeist. In 
today’s Western Europe, it is “the Moslem” culture and religion in partic-
ular that are considered “others”. Anti-Semitism, however, continues to 
be one of the core elements of the radical right. Yet, it has different guis-
es for different right-wing players: from open hatred calling for violence 
among the extreme right and the fundamentalist Catholic right (e. g. in 
Poland) to codes and secondary allusions (such as in the reference to the 
“American East Coast”) among the moderate right-wing radicals. In the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, such developments are rather con-
tradictory: They either exclude anti-Semitism or even seek proximity to 
Jews or the state of Israel. They recognise the Holocaust as a historic and 
national point of reference.
Along with the isolation of groups on the basis of their religious affi lia-
tion, “others” apostrophized  as aliens comprise minorities such as Roma, 
disabled or homeless people, the poor or the unemployed. In Eastern 
Europe, the roster of enemy groups is clearly larger and they are rejected 
much more violently: Not only the Roma, but also Jews, ethnic minori-
ties (such as the Turks in Bulgaria), and homosexuals are targeted by 
right-wing hatred (see articles on Bulgaria and Poland in this book). 
Considering the theory of a crisis of identity as one of the causes for the 
right-wing radicals‘ success, and their strategy of identity-offers based on 
exclusion, it becomes clear that, especially in the light of the high level 
9 See the studies by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung on extreme right attitudes in Germany 2006, 
2008, and 2010. The most recent study is titled  “Die Mitte in der Krise. Rechtsextreme Einstel-
lungen in Deutschland 2010” (Decker, Weißmann, Kiess, Brähler 2010).
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of prejudice against the so-perceived “others” as documented by the re-
cent FES-study “Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European 
Report”10, politics and society are facing an exigent challenge. 
With a glance to Eastern Europe, the crisis of identity, as an explanatory 
approach, offers an interesting framework of analysis, since the processes 
of social change have been and are much more profound there: The often 
traumatic experiences of the Eastern European transformation after the 
end of the Cold War and of the collapse of the Soviet Union brought 
about social tensions and frustrations, political confl icts and crises of 
identity everywhere, leading, among others, to an increase of national-
ism. People complain about solidarity having been eliminated and about 
an overall political alienation. Anxieties with respect to the new, acce-
lerated, and global world are particularly widespread here.11   
This overview of the core strategies and topics of the radical right 
suggests that the success factors of right-wing extremism are, among 
others,  to be found within the unsolved problems and confl icts of 
our modern democracies: with the instrumentalisation of the crisis of 
distribution, representation and identity by right-wing extremists 
and right-wing  populists. It will be decisive for Europe’s future de-
velopment whether these crisis phenomena can be counteracted by 
enforcing social democ racy, and whether it will be possible to react to 
the right-wing radicals‘ attempts to profi t from these crises, with 
 active commitment against exclusion and right-wing extremism.  
10 In German: Die Abwertung der Anderen: Eine europäische Zustandsbeschreibung zu Intol-
eranz, Vorurteilen und Diskriminierung (Zick et al., published by Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 
2011).
11 Józef Bayer: Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus in Ostmitteleuropa, in: Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP), vol. 31, 2002 (3), p. 265 – 280.
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The role of the media, of the local level, and of international networks 
Three further aspects responsible for the success or failure of right-wing 
extremism and right-wing populism in Europe shall be mentioned here: 
the role of the media, the signifi cance of the local level, and the en-
hanced international interconnectedness of right-wing extremism. 
The role of the media
Looking at the interaction between the radical right and Europe’s socie-
ties we should not forget about the central signifi cance of the media in 
this debate. Not only representatives of democratic parties make use of 
the fact that the media strongly affect public and political debates. Ex-
treme-right players have therefore emerged as media professionals in 
many places. They stage themselves to suit the media and utilise the 
 media’s natural interest in drama and confl ict, not without success. The 
authors of this book mention the media’s infl uence on the election suc-
cess of right-wing extremist parties (see especially the articles on Bulgaria 
and the Netherlands in this book). Especially in countries where indi-
vidual political players have a strong infl uence on the press and tele-
vision stations (such as Italy and Bulgaria) the media can strongly affect 
the different political trends. The analyses of the Netherlands and Bul-
garia trace the interaction of media attention to Wilders (Party for Free-
dom) and  Siderov (Ataka) and their election successes. The open debate 
on Nick Griffi n and his British National Party (BNP) in the British media 
(in particular his interview with BBC) rather seems to harm the BNP (see 
article on Great Britain in this book). If media companies ally with other 
players of society as in the case of Poland and the extreme right Radio 
Maria, it leads to an even more dramatic connection between mainstream 
society and the extreme right (see article on Poland in this book). 
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The signifi cance of the local level 
The role of the local level in the radical right’s development and success 
should not be underestimated. First, extreme-right outbreaks of violence 
and subculture activities can take place on a local level. Secondly, it is the 
local level where the right’s electoral political success is rooted. Germany, 
for instance, has undergone an alarming development in recent years 
with respect to the sub-cultural “local” side of right-wing extremism. Not 
least because of the high pressure of repression on their structures, 
 extreme-right organizations have become increasingly autonomous: They 
developed the concept of “comradeships” and “coalitions for action”, 
loose associations of right-wing extremists that are active on a local as 
well as on a regional level, and the autonomous nationalists, young 
 people dressed in black opposing society and its representatives in a vio-
lent way (see article on Germany in this book). Meanwhile, these groups 
exist in other countries, too, (e.g. the Czech Republic) and co-operate 
across borders (see below). In Eastern Europe, local paramilitary groups play 
a specifi c role. With the Hungarian Guard or the “Militia” for instance, the 
Jobbik party created an instrument to fi ght against, expel, and even kill 
the Roma population in particular. This “Militia” is especially active in 
rural areas and has spread in Eastern Europe in recent years. The exist-
ence of these paramilitary organizations shows that the radical right in 
Eastern Europe accepts violence more than the right in other parts of 
Europe.
The relevance of the local level, however, should not only be highlighted 
in terms of the subculture: Elections on a local and regional level are also 
crucially important for a long-term success in national elections. The 
subtle expansion of the radical right originating from the local level is 
best shown by countries where right-wing extremist parties have been 
successful only recently (see articles on Sweden and Great Britain in this 
book) or have not been successful on a regional level yet (see article on 
Germany in this book). In Italy, too, the regionally focussed Lega Nord 
constitutes a stable political force in the Italian party system with a blend 
of right-wing extremist ideology and regional chauvinism (see article on 
Italy in this book).
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International networks of the extreme and the populist right 
Transnational processes of exchange and learning play an important role 
in the success of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in 
Europe. Here, it is especially the subculture which is highly infl uenced by 
global or at least European right-wing extremist networks. Right-wing 
extremist music is listened to, produced, imitated, and adapted across 
national borders. Not only has the sheer amount of music available in-
creased but it is also more easily accessible on the internet. Additionally, 
tourism to concerts and demonstrations links right-wing ex tremists 
across borders and results in international movements all over Europe. 
Thereby, the internet plays an increasingly important role in the radical-
right scene: A seemingly endless number of web pages and internet fo-
rums arise as means of communication for political information and 
propaganda, and as a medium for music and fashion. 
Nonetheless, the level of networking does not only increase in the sub-
cultural milieu: The analyses in this book show that right-wing extremist 
parties and organizations look for international alliances through mod-
ern communication channels. In ideological terms, these transnational 
net works are based on the presumption of a similar collective identity 
between the “allies”. The essence of this “basic identity”  is expressed by 
the following “14 words” formulated by David Lane, an American right-
wing extremist, which have become a code and cult in the right-wing 
scene: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white 
children.” Thus, right-wing extremists defi ne their identity as “white” and 
people-related, believing it to be existentially threatened. 
In Western Europe, jointly organized protests against “Islam” and “the 
Muslims” constitute the main focus of European party political activities. 
The alliance “Cities against Islamization” is an example of trans national 
cooperation comprising initiatives from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
many, Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and England. With the help of 
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the “Alliance of European National Movements“, right-wing ex tremists 
 additionally try to gain infl uence in the European Parliament and 
beyond. It comprises right-wing extremist parties from dif ferent Europe-
an countries, but only the French Front National, the British National  Party, 
and the Hungarian Jobbik have managed to enter the  European Parlia-
ment so far.
Along with networking potential, however, there is suffi  cient potential 
for confl ict that stands in the way of a joint ideology and of interna-
tional affi liation: Along with continuous latent border confl icts (owner-
ship claims of territories of a neighbouring country, in particular but not 
only in Eastern Europe), this mainly includes the depreciation of a poten-
tial partner of transnational exchange (e. g. of the Romanians by Italian 
right-wing extremists) as well as ideological differences (e. g. the varying 
signifi cance attached to anti-Semitism and historical revisionism).
Conclusion: Identifying commonalities, perceiving differences 
The country analyses in this book show that right-wing populists and 
right-wing extremists are able to achieve partial successes in Europe (for 
recent electoral success see table 1). They highlight how strongly histori-
cal developments and current social processes of change affect their man-
ifestation in different countries (in political terms: Eastern and Western 
Europe, but also in geographical terms: Northern, Southern, Western, 
and Central Europe). The articles also underline how important the 
 regional context and particularities are for understanding right-wing 
 extremism and right-wing populism. 
Also, the analyses in this book show the extent of interlinkages between 
the different players of the extreme right in Europe. Therefore, a pan-
European  approach is both necessary and expedient when – in the light 
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List of countries presented in this publication. Representation of right-wing 
extremist parties in the European and national parliaments.  Table 1
EP elections 2009 last national elections
Bulgaria (BG): Ataka 11.96 %, 2 seats 9.36 % (7 / 2009)
Switzerland (CH): Swiss People’s Party (SVP) * 28.9 % (10 / 2007)
Germany (de) National Democratic Party 
of Germany (NPD)
– (municipal and regional 
election successes)
Denmark (DK): Danish People’s Party (DPP) 15.3 %, 13 seats 13.9 % (11 / 2007)
Spain (ES) – –
France (FR): Front National (FN) 6.3 %, 3 seats 4.3 % (6 / 2007)
Hungary (HU): Jobbik 14.77 %, 3 seats 16.7 % (4 / 2010)
Italy (LT): Lega Nord (LN)** 10.2 %, 9 seats 8.3 % (4 / 2008)
Norway (NO): Progress Party (FRP) * 22.9 % (9 / 2009)
the Netherlands (NL): Party for Freedom 17 %, 4 seats 15.5 % (6 / 2010)
Poland (PL) – –
Sweden (SE): Swedish Democrats (SD) – 5.7 % (9 / 2010)
United Kingdom (UK): 
British National Party (BNP)
6.2 %, 2 seats (municipal election 
successes)
*  non-EU
** The extreme right Alternative Sociale (AS) and the Alleanza Nationale (AN) have been amalgamated by Berlusconi 
to become the Popolo della Libertá.
of counterstrategies – it comes to the question whether “Europe is on the 
‘right path’”. Here, it is of importance to pay attention to the above-
mentioned European “crises” that serve, among others, as a basis for the 
radical right’s success and strategies. These and other conclusions drawn 
from the subsequent articles can also be found in the fi nal chapters of 
this book, which focus solely on strategies. 
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If this anthology enhances the debate on right-wing extremism – up to 
now conducted mainly in national context – by adding a European 
 dimension, if it triggers and contributes to a transnational analysis and if 
it enriches the search for common European strategies for democracy 
and against right-wing extremism, it will have served its purpose. 
Nora Langenbacher & Britta Schellenberg
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As chairman of a large multinational group in the European Parliament, 
I am confronted in daily political life with the question that gives the 
present volume its title: “Is Europe on the ‘right’ path?” Sometimes in the 
European Parliament we have the feeling that Europe is more on the ‘right’ 
than on the ‘left’ path. Regrettably, this was illustrated by the most recent 
European elections in 2009. Right-wing extremism in Europe is a phenom-
enon we increasingly have to tackle in everyday parliamentary life. 
Right-wing extremists in the European Parliament 
A fascist group was represented for the fi rst time in the European Parlia-
ment in the previous electoral period. As a result, my colleague Kristian 
Vigenin, deputy chairman of our parliamentary group, was commis-
sioned to direct an “Extreme Right Watch” Group. We set up this “obser-
vation centre” because racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic statements 
have become part of daily affairs in the European parliament. At the be-
ginning of this conference, the organizer, Ms. Langenbacher, stressed 
that anybody making this kind of statement at meetings organized by 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would be excluded from these events. This is 
not the practice, however, in the European Parliament: whether in the 
general assembly or in the corridors or committees, in the recent past 
such statements have not led to expulsion or sanctions. Meanwhile, such 
remarks have become so frequent that we have simply not been able to 
follow up who said what, and where and when, and to what extent this 
Combating right-wing extremism as a task for 
European policy making1
Martin Schulz, MEP
1 This article summarizes an opening speech delivered by Martin Schulz at the FES Conference 
“Is Europe on the ‘right’ path? Right-wing extremism in Europe” on November 30,2009.
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was covered by the rules of procedure. The new fascist parliamentary 
grouping perpetrated permanent breaches of convention in a way that 
has become systematic. When no sanctions were imposed for racist, xen-
ophobic or anti-Semitic statements, they were presented as permissible 
and therefore no longer subject to prosecution or sanction in the future. 
By deliberate breach of taboos, racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic re-
marks were thrust into normal daily parliamentary affairs. In our opin-
ion, this is an extremely dangerous development.
 
Success and failure of European defence mechanisms
I will now attempt to explain the problem of right-wing extremism in 
Europe and the creeping normalisation of extreme-right statements in 
politics from the perspective of everyday parliamentary affairs in the 
European Parliament. At the same time I will try to factor in the level of 
the national parliaments and governments in the European Union. We 
have come to accept that openly xenophobic, extremist or even anti-
Semitic parties are part of EU governments without an outcry from the 
democratic camp. Yet the situation was different not long ago, in 2000, 
when Austrian Christian Democrat prime minister Wolfgang Schüssel in-
vited Jörg Haider’s party, the FPÖ, into the Austrian government. When 
Schüssel made Haider respectable in Austria, there was an outcry across 
Europe and the European Union imposed sanctions on Austria. At that 
time, the Austrian president of state, Thomas Klestil, from the Austrian 
People’s Party, felt compelled to make Mr. Haider sign a declaration sup-
plementary to the coalition treaty stating that the future government 
would uphold all European and international human rights conventions. 
This was a unique procedure: the president of a democratic country, an EU 
member state, having to specifi cally commit the governmental parties to 
these basic principles. The Sonderpapier that was added toto the coalition 
pact in Austria in 2000 is actually what every democratic government has 
to commit to as a matter of course!
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In Poland, when the League of Polish Families (LPR) received the culture 
minister’s portfolio, the chairman of the party, Maciej Giertych, made 
the following remark during a debate in the European Parliament on the 
liberation of Spain, Portugal and Greece from the fascist dictators Salazar, 
Franco and the colonels in Athens: “We must build monuments to Fran-
co and in Europe. These heroes protected our continent from Bolshe-
vism.” Mr. Giertych’s son, deputy chairman of the LPR, was the former 
Polish culture minister who wanted to make creationism compulsory in 
biology textbooks and dismiss homosexual teachers from school teach-
ing. Meanwhile, in Italy, during a debate in the Italian Parliament about 
the boat refugees in the Mediterranean, Umberto Bossi, chairman of one 
of the government parties, the Lega Nord, declared, “When I see those 
little boats, I want to hear the cannon roar.”  
At the beginning of this electoral period we anti-extreme-right members 
of the European Parliament successfully combined our forces – not with-
out controversy – to prevent Jean-Marie Le Pen from becoming senior 
president of the European Parliament. Le Pen was legally convicted of 
hate crimes several times in France, and coined the phrase, “Auschwitz is 
a mere detail of world history” – to which his deputy, Bruno Gollnisch, 
added, “And a forgotten one to boot.”
Avoidance and habituation in confronting 
right-wing extremism
We have to record a disturbing process of habituation to the breaching 
of taboos – not merely in the extreme-right scene, but at the core of 
democratic institutions. This, in my opinion, is the really dramatic devel-
opment in Europe. It is also dangerous for another reason:  for some time 
now, West European politicians have sat back comfortably and tried to 
present the development of new anti-Semitism and racism as an Eastern 
European phenomenon. In their view, the expansion of the European 
Union has meant that immature democracies from central and eastern 
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Europe have been brought into the Union. For the moment, the argu-
ment goes, we have to live with the idea that in these societies the demo-
cratic institutions on one hand, and the population’s democratic con-
sciousness on the other, have not been as well developed as in the western 
countries of the EU. Consequently, we have to live for a while with 
 phenomena that are against basic rights, anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, 
homophobic and Islamophobic. 
I have rejected this kind of argumentation from the very start, because 
I am aware of the statistics: the biggest extreme-right-wing party in Eu-
rope is the Front National in France. In fact, its leader actually reached the 
second round of the presidential elections in 2002 and already gained a 
bigger share of the vote in the fi rst round than the strife-ridden French 
left. Le Pen even won 18 percent of the vote in the second round against 
Chirac! – 18 percent for a man who claims that Auschwitz is a mere detail 
of world history! The situation in Belgium is similar: in Antwerp, the big-
gest city in Flanders, the biggest party is Vlaams Belang, which is openly 
xenophobic, racist and partially neo-fascist.
Right-wing extremism – a phenomenon across Europe
Right-wing extremism is a European-wide phenomenon. We can ascer-
tain a disturbing extent of anti-democratic attitudes – from the extreme-
right-wing margins of society to the solid bourgeois centre – as well as a 
drastic rise in open manifestations of violent, aggressive extremism. The 
latter is dangerous, but identifi able and consequently easier to combat. 
What worries me more is the persistent, permanent breach of taboos that 
makes extreme-right-wing ideology respectable by clothing it in the garb 
of democratic legitimacy. I regard it as particularly dangerous when 
people who work in democratic institutions help towards making this 
ideology acceptable. The “minaret initiative” in Switzerland in Novem-
ber 2009 is a good example of this. 
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Attitudes like this, however, are barely quantifi able for researchers be-
cause in a large part of our society underlying fears can no longer be ex-
pressed, not even in opinion polls. In Switzerland these subterranean 
fears were channelled by the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s 
Party), an openly xenophobic, far-right party led by Christoph Blocher, 
which is generally perceived as right-wing conservative. Its goal is to de-
fend the “Christian West” and its values against the alleged threat of Is-
lamisation. Poster campaigns such as that of the “black sheep” or the 
woman in a burqua standing in front of a minaret illustrate this in a de-
liberately shocking way. To quote Blocher, “We had the Turks at the gates 
of Vienna once, we don’t need that again.”  
The need for a broad alliance locally and across Europe
As democratic parties from the left, we are, together with the democratic 
parties of the centre and the christian social parties of the centre-right, 
not in as position to stop these parties that are called right-wing con-
servative but are actually extreme-right wing, in their campaign to over-
simplify politics by fi xating on fear. One of our greatest challenges is how 
to reach the people susceptible to this fear-fi xated politics. How do we get 
to the Muslim-haters, the homophobes, the anti-Semites? This is a diffi -
cult question, but we have to tackle it.
After serving for years as mayor of a city on the Rhine, I am well aware of 
the challenges this issue poses for a politician. Back in 1989 was the fi rst 
occasion when I had to contest an election against the Republikaner (Re-
publicans) in my home city in North-Rhine Westphalia. For the fi rst time, 
the Republicans fi elded their own candidates right across the lists in two 
cities in the Aachen district. One of them was my home, an industrial 
city near Aachen with 37,000 inhabitants. Why did they choose to stand 
in our city? – because it was a place where, in the course of 6 months in 
1989, the population of 37,000 was rapidly increased by the arrival of 
1,000 refugees from Zaire. As a result, as mayor I had to organize the use 
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of school sports halls, homes for children and young people, sports club 
premises etc. to accommodate the refugees. This provoked an outcry in 
the city. The mood could be summed up by the angry question: “Why 
don’t you do anything against the ‘niggers’?” 
At that time I was 33 years old, North-Rhine Westphalia’s youngest mayor 
and still active in the Young Socialists. I declared, “My duty is to follow 
the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. As long as I am mayor of this 
town, the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany will be respected here. 
The law on accepting refugees does not require me to ask why somebody 
is coming here – other institutions are responsible for that. I am obligated 
to ensure that anybody who comes here is looked after.” The mayors of 
nearby towns pointed to my willingness to provide assistance, and kept 
away. The result was an accommodation project that stretched our ca-
pacities beyond the limit. Within a few weeks the Republicans had spotted 
the budding potential: they whipped up people’s fear of being “swamped 
by foreigners” in order to profi t from a possible rise in xenophobia.
I stood up against this and attempted to discuss the issue with people, 
day and night. During the local elections in October 1989 we were even-
tually able to keep the Republicans out of the city council – but only be-
cause the churches and trade unions backed our campaign. The whole of 
public life was dominated by a single question. The so-called opinion 
makers stood up against the Republicans and supported me as mayor. A 
wrench occurred in the society of a small city where everybody – from the 
vicar to the trade union offi cial, from the sports club chairman to the 
leaders of the opposition on the city council – said, “We’re not going to 
put up with that!” In other words, there was social mobilisation for the 
maintenance of shared basic values, and against racism. If this kind of 
social mobilisation works, it can shut out right wing extremists.
It does not work if the silent majority fails to get involved, or even goes 
as far as concealing personal opinion. This was the case with the opinion 
polls in Switzerland in 2009, when respondents in telephone surveys 
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said, “No, I don’t want anything to do with it,” and then went to the 
polling booths and said, “No to minarets!”
To combat right-wing extremism in Europe we need to be conscious of 
specifi c basic values – values that have to be regarded as inviolable across 
the spectrum from right to left! If these basic values are challenged, they 
have to be communally defended. The civilising advance of the European 
Union consists in its recognition and shared defence of precisely these 
basic values as common property. This applies to society as a whole, not 
just individual commissioned representatives. If we take this challenge 
seriously across every population group, across all social strata and across 
all the opinion makers from various social groupings, then we can keep 
Europe on the “right path”. If this fails, if parts of society do not fi ght back 
because deep down they secretly accept the theses of the right-wing ex-
tremists, or even agree with them, then the far right has already won.
We need a debate about values!
The debate about our values is consequently our key task. This should 
not be delivered like a sermon, but should be the subject of everyday 
discussion. Article 1 of the German constitution states: The dignity of 
human beings is inviolable. Our ex-party chairman, Franz Müntefering, 
is fond of quoting former German president Johannes Rau, who pointed 
out that this does not mean, “The dignity of German people is inviola-
ble.” Every citizen of our country who acknowledges the basic values of 
this country has an obligation to this particular phrase: The dignity of 
human beings is inviolable.  It is easy to say this on a Sunday, but what 
matters is the Monday when you happen to meet your neighbour of 
colour, or a Muslim woman, a disabled person or anybody else from a 
minority obviously in need of protection by the strong majority. In a 
nutshell, civic courage. In my view, civic courage is one of the key values 
for protecting and implementing the aspiration, “The dignity of human 
beings is inviolable.”
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Yet when do we actually discuss civic courage in this society? When do 
we discuss civic courage in any European society? The lack of social de-
bate on basic values is something that increasingly characterises every 
European state – to a disturbing extent, I think. We do not talk enough 
about the values that should defi ne our democratic society.
The extreme-right senses this and is launching an attack on democratic 
institutions. We have already seen this twice in the European Parliament 
when it tried to build its own parliamentary group. The far right wanted 
to have its own parliamentary group in a multinational parliament – 
whose existence is the expression of the will to institutionalise these 
common basic values – in order to destroy those very values. This re-
minds me uncannily of the situation in the Weimar Republic when the 
Nazi parliamentary group openly admitted that it wanted to use the in-
struments of Parliament to destroy democracy by means of that parlia-
ment. The goal of far-right parties in the European Parliament is to de-
stroy the European Union. Fortunately, all their efforts to date to build a 
permanent parliamentary group have failed, either due to their own in-
ternal contradictions or simply because they are incapable.
Problems of the far right in Europe – 
opportunities for counter-strategies
I would like to conclude with an example that can inspire hope. In 2007 
a fascist group was formed in the European Parliament, led by Bruno 
Gollnisch, whom we mentioned above as describing Auschwitz as a de-
tail of world history that could be forgotten.  The group collapsed within 
its fi rst year of existence because the deputy chairperson, Alexandra Mus-
solini, refused to acknowledge an objection by the extreme-right-wing 
party Romania Mare, which also belonged to the fascist parliamentary 
group. Romania Mare, which stands for Greater Romania, protested 
against the “stigmatisation” of Romanians in Italy and their being treated 
as equivalent to Roma. This clearly illustrates that the building of an in-
ternational grouping of ultranationalists does not work.
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This is just the point where we can intervene to make such parties iden-
tifi able as extremist, ultranationalist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, anti-
Muslim and homophobic. We can record that to date these parties have 
barely been able to network in the political arena in such a way as to en-
able them to apply the instruments of a transnational democracy against 
the transnational democracy itself. This also reveals an opportunity that 
we have to grasp. In saying this, I certainly do not want to underplay the 
networking of violence-prone and fl exible fascist groups that is already in 
existence and has the capacity to mobilise relatively fast in free Europe. 
Obviously, we have to react to this as well.
In the democratic spectrum we have a great opportunity: we can stop the 
forward march of these groups by separating out individual groups and 
exposing their internal contradictions, along with advancing clear de-
mands for a decisive line of defence for the basic democratic values of 
everybody. These are the main starting points that we, as the Social Dem-
ocratic grouping in the European Parliament, want to implement along 
with the other democratic parliamentary groups. 
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“The spectre of Fascism is constantly hovering over America, 
but always seems to land in Europe.” (Tom Wolfe)
Tom Wolfe’s dictum is indeed true: more than sixty years after the end of 
the  Second World War, with Europe largely reunited, radical-right-wing, 
 ultra-nationalist and xenophobic movements and parties have become 
part of the normal political scene. While no signifi cant far-right party has 
emerged in the United States, the phenomenon seems to be multiplying 
in Europe. Countries such as the Netherlands and Bulgaria, which have 
long been distinguished for their lack of such parties, are now following 
the general European trend. Especially noteworthy in this respect is that 
a variety of radical-right-wing movements and parties can be seen in the 
new EU member countries in central and eastern Europe – and this 
despite the fact that immigration, the key topic of the West European far 
right, is not yet on the agenda here at all. By ‘yet’, I mean that something 
is changing in the new EU member states. My analysis will focus on this 
East-West relationship of the European far right. It will demonstrate that 
we are concerned with a large variety of widely different ideological and 
organizational forms of right-wing radicalism that require a differen-
tiated approach. 
The radical right in Europe today: 
Trends and patterns in East and West
Michael Minkenberg
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Key insights on the topic
1. Present-day European right-wing radicalism is a modern pheno m-
enon that has undergone several phases of renewal. These phases 
were either visible as the consequence of modernisation spurts in 
postwar Western societies, or appeared as newly constituted forms 
in the wake of the regime changes in Eastern Europe. 
2.  Present-day right-wing extremism in Europe is an international 
phenomenon that should always be examined comparatively. This 
is not an argument against country-specifi c approaches, but against 
studies whose criteria derive from national traditions rather than 
comparative concepts. 
The term ‘radical right’ 
To start with, I would like to propose a defi nition of right-wing radicalism 
based on modernisation theory, which refers to specifi c mechanisms and 
semantics of inclusion and exclusion. Ultimately, these arise from an ex-
aggerated, radical concept of nation as the primary We-group that exhib-
its a tendency to closure, particularly in periods of accelerated social and 
cultural change. I defi ne right-wing radicalism as a political ideology or 
tendency based on ultra-nationalistic ideas which tends to be directed 
against liberal democracy – although not necessarily directly or explicitly 
so. The ultra-nationalist core of radical-right-wing thought consists of 
the fact that in the construction of national affi liation, specifi c ethnic, 
cultural or religious criteria of inclusion or exclusion are accentuated, 
condensed into collective ideas of homogeneity and linked to authoritar-
ian political models. In other words, this is top-down politics claiming to 
act in the name of the people. The Schweizer Volkspartei (SVP) already 
gave us a vivid preview of what this can look like some years ago. The 
events in Switzerland show how close we are to a development that un-
derscores the dramatic import of the question “Is Europe on the ‘right 
path’?” – although the label ‘right-wing extremist’ certainly does not ap-
ply to everybody who voted for banning minarets in November 2009.
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This poster (on the left) comes from the election campaign for the Swiss 
National Council in 2007. The legend reads: “People’s initiative for the 
deportation of criminal foreigners.” This draws a clear demarcation line 
between “inside” and “outside”: there is a boundary between those who 
belong inside – the white sheep – and those who do not belong inside – 
the black sheep. The poster has become an export hit. The idea was 
adopted by a German party with which Mr. Blocher (the SVP leader – 
editor’s note) certainly did not want to be associated; in fact, he sued the 
NPD for plagiarism. The NPD had copied Blocher’s poster for the state elec-
tions in Hesse in 2008. The Hessian National Democrats omitted the crimi-
nal for eigners and concentrated instead on the slogan “Social must be na-
tional!”  – i.e., they linked social issues with nationalism. This is a fairly 
old phenomenon in the history of 20th century radical-right-wing move-
ments. 
Advantages of the term “right-wing radicalism”
My concept of right-wing radicalism differs from other commonly used 
concepts in several respects, without excluding them as variants of right-
wing radicalism. The term fascism, for example, refers to specifi c histori-
Election poster of the NPD: 
“Social must be national! 
The Nationals.”
Election poster of the SVP: 
“People’s initiative for the deportation of 
criminal foreigners. Creating security.”
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cal phenomena.1 In my defi nition it represents a subgroup and cannot be 
used as a synonym for right-wing radicalism because it only concerns a 
group of the radical-right-wing that relates explicitly to these specifi c his-
torical models. Conversely, right-wing populism is a category that often 
remains analytically unspecifi ed in the defi nitions, and is highly inclu-
sive, with movements such as the German Republikaner, the Italian Forza 
Italia, the BNP in the UK, the Canadian Reform Party and the American 
Ross Perot ranked side by side.2 However, I would argue that right-wing 
populism is rather an expression of a political style – transcending party 
boundaries, perhaps even partially transcending camps – and in this re-
spect is not useful for the analysis of specifi c groups. I would distinguish 
the term right-wing extremism – which is particularly popular in Germany 
– from my concept of right-wing radicalism, because in Germany at least 
it often includes an anti-constitutional element3 that involves interpreta-
tion and exclusion on a state-operated normative basis: an extremist is 
somebody who positions himself or herself against the free democratic 
constitutional order and outside the democratic consensus. Perhaps this 
defi nition makes sense when state authorities are concerned with the 
phenomenon, but sociologists and political scientists should not be so 
quick to let the state determine who and what should be analysed. 
My argument is that right-wing radicalism occupies social space in both 
organizations and media, and in orientations and environments within 
the population. The concept of right-wing extremism held by the Ger-
man secret service, the Verfassungsschutz, does not cover the latter – and 
defi nitely should not cover it. In this context, organized right-wing radi-
calism should be differentiated yet again with regard to its organizational 
formation – and this should be done using the criteria of party or non-
1 Griffi n, Roger. The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1991).
2 Decker, Frank. Parteien unter Druck. Der neue Rechtspopulismus in den westlichen Demokra-
tien (Opladen: Leske + Budrich 2000).
3 Backes, Uwe and Jesse, Eckard. Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 1989); Backes, Uwe and Jesse, Eckard. “Die ‘Ex-
tremismus-Formel’ – Zur Fundamentalkritik an einem historisch-politischen Konzept.” Jahr-
buch Extremismus und Demokratie 13 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001) 13-  29.
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party forms. Again, the non-party forms of the radical right should be 
further distinguished according to the degree of organization. On the 
one hand are manifestations that take the form of movements, that is, 
organizations or ‘networks of networks’ that are not highly structured 
and not geared towards elections or public offi ces, but nonetheless aim to 
mobilise the public in general and develop a specifi c mobilisation poten-
tial in particular. On the other hand, there is a conglomeration of small 
groups in the sense of a subcultural environment. This operates relatively 
autonomously from larger groups, organizations and parties, and is more 
violence-prone than groups on the other two levels. 
Phases of right-wing radicalism in Western Europe: 
Reinterpreting old political concepts
Three phases of radical-right-wing mobilisation can be distinguished in 
 Europe (and North America) after the end of the right-wing dictatorships of 
the interwar period of the 20th century: 
1) The immediate postwar period (McCarthyism in the USA, Poujadism 
in France, SRP und DRP in the Federal Republic of Germany, MSI in 
Italy); 
2) The 1960s and early 1970s (Wallace movement in the USA, NPD in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Powellism and the National Front in 
the UK); 
3) The 1980s and 1990s, when radical-right-wing parties distinct from 
their predecessors were established in almost all the democracies (see 
Table 1 below).  
In this context we can speak of a renewal of right-wing radicalism  after 
1968. It can be observed on both the ideological and the organizational 
level.
42 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
Ideological and organizational renewal after 1968
Ideological renewal: From an ideological viewpoint, the concept of 
“ ethnopluralism”, which contrasts with the traditional, biologically 
based hierarchy of racial differences, has spread in Western Europe since 
the 1970s. Yet at the same time it accentuates the incompatibility of 
 cultures and ethnicities, which not infrequently leads to a naturalisation 
of social relations. Ethnopluralism is therefore an updated defensive 
strategy against immigration and integration. 
The philosophical circles, political entrepreneurs and think tanks of the 
“New Right” have played a particular role in the ideological renewal. This 
New Right is notable for its efforts to develop a counter-discourse to the 
“ideas of 1968”. The key point here is the attempt to initiate a “culture 
war from the right” and cultural hegemony in the pre-political arena. 
This “culture war” was closely linked to a political vision of Europe that 
understood Europe as a unifi ed cultural space. Based on the slogan of the 
“third way”, it was directed against both the capitalist USA and the com-
munist Soviet Union. The radical right gave these opponents the joint 
label “vodka-Coke imperialism”.
At the level of discourse between parties, we should emphasise that hard-
ly any of the present-day radical-right-wing parties presents clearly 
dictatorial or autocratic political concepts. This applies most of all to the 
highly successful parties in Belgium, Austria, France and Italy. They do 
not want to abolish democracy but to reinterpret it into an “ethnocracy” 
in their sense of the term. Almost all the parties share an exclusive con-
cept of the nation. With slogans such as “Les Français d’abord!” and 
“Deutschland den Deutschen”, they aim to link affi liation to the nation, 
and to tie rights to participate in the goods and services of the system, in 
particular the welfare state, to ethnic criteria. These slogans differ from 
earlier demands by groups such as Algérie française, or the NPD call of the 
1960s, “Breslau, Königsberg, Stettin – German cities just like Berlin!” In 
the case of the German parties, however, revanchist ideas of a return of 
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lost territories still persist. The French Front National is the most advanced 
party of the ideological renewal. It has come to terms with the loss of 
Algeria and has adopted populism from the Poujadism of the 1950s, but 
not Poujarde’s anti-modern economic programme.
Organizational renewal: The ideological renewal is accompanied by an 
organizational renewal. A wave of newly-founded radical-right-wing par-
ties and groups can be observed in almost all West European democracies 
since the mid-1980s. Between 1965 and 1995, 19 far-right parties were 
established in Western Europe. From the beginning of the 1980s, half of 
these parties achieved an average of more than 4 percent in national 
elections. The electoral successes of individual parties vary, at times con-
siderably, depending on the political culture of the countries and the 
opportunity structures. 
Factors for the success of the radical right
We can generally say that far-right parties in Europe were successful in 
situations where they succeeded in creating the following “renewal cock-
tail”, consisting of three elements: 
1.  Modernisation of their ideology and strategy (renunciation of fascism, 
biologistic racism and open hostility to democracy), as well as 
2.  adaptation to the political opportunity structures while preserving 
connectivity to the idea of the nation and, resulting from this
3.  the development of an individual profi le in distinction to other po-
litical players. This has succeeded better in France than in Germany, 
because in France there is apparently more scope for this type of de-
limitation strategy in the sense of a populist ultra-nationalism while 
such a strategy was more severely discredited in Germany during the 
postwar development and has consequently constricted the political 
space for parties of this kind. 
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Election results of radical-right-wing parties (%) in selected EU member countries, 
national parliamentary elections (averages) and election to European Parliament 
(EP) 2009* Table 1
1980 –
1984
1985 –
1989
1990 –
1994
1995 –
1999
2000 –
2004
2005 –
2009
EP 2009 
Belgium (B) 1.1 1.7 6.6 1999 13.8 14.0 10.1
Denmark (DK) 6.4 6.9 6.4 9.8 12.6 13.9 14.8
Germany 
Federal Republic (D)
0.2 0.6 2.3 3.3 1.0 2.1 1.7
France (F) 0.4 9.9 12.7 14.9 12.4 4.7 6.3
Great Britain (GB) -.- 0.6 0.9 -.- 0.2 0.7 8.3
Italy (I) 6.8 5.9 17.8 15.7  4.3** 8.3** 10,2**
Norway (N) 4.5 8.4 6.0 15.3 14.7 22.5 --
Austria (A) 5.0 9.7 19.6 24.4 10.0 28.2 17.8
Sweden (S) -.- -.- 4.0 -.- 1.5 3.0 3.3
Switzerland (CH) 3.8 6.3 10.9 9.3 1.3 30.0 --
Average (Ø) 2.8 5.0 8.7 10.4 7.2 12.7
The following parties were included in the calculations: 
Belgium: Vlaams Blok, Front National; Denmark: Fremskridtsparti, Dansk Folkeparti; Germany: Republikaner, DVU, NPD; 
France: Front National, Mouvement National Républicain; UK: British National Party, National Front; Italy: Movimento 
Sociale Italiano, Alleanza Nazionale, Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore, Lega Nord; Netherlands: Centrumpartij, 
Centrumdemocraten, List Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders PVV; Austria: FPÖ, BZÖ; Sweden: Ny Demokrati, Sverigedemokraterna, 
Nationaldemokraterna; 
* Minkenberg, Michael. “Rechtsradikalismus/Rechtsextremismus“. Kleines Lexikon der Politik. Ed. Nohlen, Dieter.     
   3rd revised ed. (Munich: Beck 2003), 425 – 431. http://electionresources.org/ (last accessed: 17.7.2010).
** without AN, but incl. Lega Nord, Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore, Mussolini, Rauti
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The players of the radical right in Western Europe
However, we should differentiate and supplement the fi eld of the radical 
right in Europe yet again, because in terms of organizational form we are 
not only concerned with parties, and not only with a single ideological 
type. According to which fi gures are targeted for exclusion in radical-
right-wing discourse, we can identify different ideological playing cards 
(see below Table 2, fi rst column):
• an autocratic-fascist right wing characterised by its ideological prox-
imity to the fascist and autocratic regimes of the interwar period; 
• a racist or ethnocentric right wing distinguished by an agenda of eth-
nic segregation and the belief in the superiority of their own respect-
ive ethnicity or by an “ethnopluralist” argument for the incompatibil-
ity of cultures and ethnicities; 
• an authoritarian-populist right wing that is less clearly defi ned than 
the other variants but is characterised by internally authoritarian 
structures focused on a charismatic leader and some kind of  populist 
discourse that excludes specifi c groups; and fi nally 
• a religious-fundamentalist right wing that uses primarily religious ar-
gumentation to defend the “purity” and superiority of its own culture 
or own people. 
All these variants are dominated by an anti-pluralist concept of nation 
that aims for internal homogeneity and/or communitisation. All the var-
iants also display a populist style targeted against the established elites. 
There are undoubtedly overlaps and fl uid transitions in the different in-
dividual versions. If we add the three organizational types to this to 
achieve a rough structuring of the fi eld of players and organizations in 
the radical-right-wing “family of players”, the result is a matrix with 
ideological and organizational variations; in Table 2 this is applied to 
selected West European countries.
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Players in the West European radical-right family (1990s) 
(respective countries abbreviated as in Table 1 shown in brackets) Table 2
Party and election 
organizations 
Social movement 
organizations (SMO)
Subcultural 
environments
Fascist/autocratic right NPD/DVU (D)
MSI/AN (pre-‘95)(I) 
MSFT (I)
BNP (GB)
ANS/FAP, NPD (D)
Den Danske Forening 
(DK)
FANE (F)
neo-Nazis (all)
skinheads (all)
“Kameradschaften“ (D) 
Dansk Front/
White Pride (DK)
FNE (F)
Racist/ethnocentric right Vlaams Blok/Belang (B)
NPD/DVU (D)
Republikaner (D)
Dansk Folkepartiet (DK)
Front National (F)
Lega Nord (I)
ANS/FAP (D)
NPD/DVU (D-Ost)
Aarhus Mod Moskéen 
(DK)
Neo-Nazis (all)
skinheads (all)
“Kameradschaften“ (D) 
GUD (F)
Authoritarian-populist 
right 
FPÖ/BZÖ (A)
MSI/AN (from ‘95) (I)
Religious-fundamentalist 
right 
New Era (DK)
Comités Chrétienité-
Solidarité (F)
Abbreviations/translations:
AN: Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)
ANS: Aktionsfront Nationale Sozialisten (National Socialist Action Front) 
BNP: British National Party 
BZÖ: Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for Austria‘s Future) 
DVU: Deutsche Volksunion (German People‘s Union) 
FANE: Fédération Action National-Européen (Nationalist European Action Federation) 
FAP: Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Free German Workers‘ Party) 
FNE:  Faisceaux nationalistes européennes (Nationalist European Fascists)
FPÖ:  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party) 
GUD: Groupe Union Defense (Union Defence Group)
MSI: Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement)
MS-FT: Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement-Tricolour Flame)
NPD:  German National Democratic Party  
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Variations in the radical right in Western Europe
The groupings vary in strength in the different countries. In comparing 
the relative strengths of individual types of organization in Western 
 Europe, a pattern emerges that we shall briefl y summarise here. Firstly, 
there is a group of countries where the radical-right party sector is strong 
but the movement sector rather weak. This includes especially Denmark, 
Austria, France, Italy and Belgium (taking into account that in Belgium 
the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang does not stand for election in the 
Walloon part of the country, and consequently only the election results 
in Brussels and Flanders are counted. In contrast, Germany, the UK and 
Sweden make up a group of countries where the situation tends to be 
reversed: a weak or fragmented party sector corresponding with a strong 
movement sector or environment of violence.
As I have shown elsewhere4, these variations can be better explained by 
cultural than by structural factors. All four countries with strong radical-
right party sectors are largely Catholic – in the case of Denmark, Protes-
tant – and exhibit a mainly cultural concept of nation. Additionally, 
in these countries, Islam – a non-Christian relig ion – forms the second-
largest religious community. Conversely, the three countries with weak 
party and strong movement sectors are largely Protestant and historically 
infl uenced by an ethnic image of the nation. This is confi rmed once 
again in comparing East and West Germany: in the new Federal German 
states (formerly part of the socialist German Democratic Republic – edi-
tor’s note), which can be categorised as Protestant or even completely 
non-ecclesiastical, the movement sector is particularly distinctive, where-
as the party sector is especially strong in the states of former West Ger-
many, particularly in the predominantly Catholic south of the country. 
4 Minkenberg, Michael (2003a): The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Mod-
eling the Impact of Cultural and Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mo-
bilization. In: Comarative European Politics 1, Nr. 2, S. 149–170; Minkenberg, Michael (2008): 
The Radical Right in Europe: An Overview. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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In comparing these countries, the impact of structural and institutional 
factors such as polarisation in party competitions or election systems 
(proportional representation or majority vote) is less clear.  Under the 
political opportunity structures the reaction of other political players to 
the radical right has a bigger infl uence than factors like the election sys-
tem. Repression or exclusion constrains radical-right parties but cannot 
prevent the movement sector from developing comparatively strongly 
This raises important questions about the correct approach to right-wing 
radicalism and the choice of methods in relation to the intended goals. 
Eastern Europe: Authoritarian past and radical system change
The perspective on Eastern Europe is somewhat marred by the fact that 
here we are analysing new democracies that, unlike the West European 
countries, have not been intensely researched previously. Nonetheless 
there is now a series of data providing information on the extent to which 
the phenomena in Eastern Europe are comparable with those in Western 
Europe. The starting point for this observation is that we are dealing with 
fairly young democracies, generally without a history of democracy. 
Aside from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all the post-Warsaw Pact 
states have an authoritarian past, even in the interwar years. Most of the 
East European countries experienced a radical change of system with the 
construction of relatively new political structures including open party 
competition.
 
Eastern Europe – Regional comparison
In Eastern Europe one should look both at the regional specifi cities of the 
phenomenon and its causes, and at its qualitative and quantitative 
variance in the era of system change and consolidation of young democ-
racies. For example, the spectrum of average radical-right-wing election 
successes in Eastern Europe fl uctuated considerably in the 1990s and 
shortly afterwards.  
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The success of radical-right parties in East Europe indicates the following 
regional specifi cities:
• There were no signifi cant radical-right parties in the Baltic countries 
(and in Bulgaria up until the emergence of Ataka in the June 2005 elec-
tions), although the conditions for them were defi nitely favour able.  
• In the Czech Republic, support for the Republicans almost totally 
 evaporated at the end of the 1990s. 
• In Hungary the decline of Csurka’s Truth and Justice Party (MIÉP) and, 
more recently, the successful emergence of Jobbik (17 percent of the 
vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections) indicates an interchange in 
the radical-right party camp.  
• Conversely, in Romania and, to a lesser extent, Poland, extreme-right 
parties, taken together, have frequently totalled percentage results in 
double fi gures, achieving unprecedented electoral success.
Election results of radical-right parties (%) in selected Eastern European 
countries: national parliamentary elections 1990 – 2004 (averages) and 
election to European Parliament 20096 Table 3
1990  – 1994 1995 – 1999 2000 – 2004 2005 – 2009 EP 2009 
Bulgaria (BG) -.- -.- -.- 8.7 11.9
Poland (PL) 14.1 8.0* 7.9 11.1 1.5
Romania (RO) 5.8 9.2 20.9 3.2 8.6
Slowakia (SVK) 5.4 9.1 7.0 11.7 5.5
Slowenia (SLO) n.a. n.a. 4.4 5.5 2.9
Czech Rep. (CZ)      6.8 6.0 1.1 -.- -.-
Hungary (H) 0.8 5.5 4.5 1.7 14.8
The following parties were included in the fi gures: Bulgaria: Ataka; Poland: KPN, ZChN, LPR, NOP (EP 2004); 
Romania: PUNR, PRM; Slovakia: SNS; Slovenia: SNS; Czech Rep.: SPR-RSC; Hungary: MIÉP, Jobbik.
* estimated vote share for the ZChN and KPN, which contested in 1997 as partners in the Solidarnosc AWS  
   electoral alliance (overall result: 33.8%)
** Czech National Council
Source: see Table 1.
**
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• The situation in Poland is particularly fl uid. The restructuring of the 
party system and reorganization and renaming of individual parties 
are on the agenda. Additionally, we should emphasise the specifi cally 
Polish feature of the presence of clerical-nationalist parties. In the 
period from the Polish parliamentary elections of 2001 to the elec-
tions of 2007 the newly founded religious-fundamentalist League of 
Polish  Families (LPR) was represented in parliament. The party was 
oriented to the right-wing ideologue of the interwar years, Roman 
Dmowski, and is linked to the ultra-Catholic anti-Semitic radio 
station, Radio Maryja. The LPR also draws on the tradition of older 
radical-right parties such as ZChN, ROP and SN.
Radical-right players in Eastern Europe
In evaluating election success we also have to distinguish which type of 
party within the radical-right camp we are dealing with. 
• In Romania up until EU accession, there was a powerful autocratic-
fascist right wing borrowing from the ideology of fascist and right-
wing authoritarian regimes of the interwar period, but it has since 
suffered considerable losses. 
• The right-wing parties in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are less fascist or nationalist-communist and rather more 
ethnocentric/racist. 
• In Poland there is also a religious-fundamentalist tendency. 
Aside from this, it is important to make the organizational distinction we 
have already mentioned between parties, movements and subcultural 
environments. There are undoubtedly overlaps and fl uid transitions in 
individual cases, especially with regard to historical orientations (fascist/
nationalist-Communist) and present-day orientations. The table below 
gives an overview of radical-right players in Eastern Europe:
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Dominant players in the radical-right family in Eastern Europe (post-1989):  
Russia (R), Romania (RO), Poland (PL), Czech. Rep. (CZ), Hungary (H) Table 4
Alignments of the radical 
right 
Parties / Election 
campaign organizations
Movement organizations Subcultural
environments
Fascist-autocratic right R: LDPR
CZ: SPR-RSC
H: MIÉP
R: Pamyat, RNE
PL: PWN-PSN,        PNR
Skinheads
Ethnocentric/racist right PL: KPN, SN, SO
CZ: SPR-RSC
H: MIÉP
RO: Vatra Romaneasca
PL: PWN-PSN,
      Radio Maryja
Skinheads
Religious-fundamentalist 
right  
PL: ZChN, LPR PL: Radio Maryja
Abbreviations: 
KPN: Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation for an independent Poland)
LPR: Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
MIÉP: Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) 
MPR: Miscarea pentru Romania (Movement for Romania)
PDN: Partidul Dreapta Nationala (National Right Party)
PNR: Polish National Rebirth
PRM: Partidul Romania Mare (Party for Greater Romania)
PSM: Partidul Socialist al Muncii (Socialist Workers‘ Party)
PUNR: Partidul Unitati Vatra Romaneasca: Romanian Cradle
ZChN: Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe (Christian National Union)
Unlike the party spectrum, the sector of radical-right movements and 
small groupings in Eastern Europe has largely not been researched, and 
there is very little reliable information available. What exists, however, 
conveys a picture of a lively and to some extent violent movement sector 
in most of the countries in the region. This sector is heavily infl uenced 
by certain key organizations such as Vatra Romaneasca in Romania or the 
PWN-PSN and PNR in Poland, as well as the Hungarian Guard (which is 
linked to the Jobbik Party). The ideology of these groups can be classifi ed 
largely as fascist-autocratic. Aside from this, we should mention “ideas 
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generators” such as the ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja in 
Poland, which has been broadcasting since the mid-1990s. Along with its 
standard  Catholic messages, this station reaches several million listeners 
with its religious-fundamentalist, anti-modern, nationalist, xenophobic 
and  periodically anti-Semitic content. Beyond these organizations there 
is a growing scene of violent right-wing groups and skinheads. For exam-
ple, in Polish cities there are regular gatherings of hundreds of militant 
supporters, while anti-Semitic or fascist graffi ti on buildings is not an 
unusual sight. In the Czech Republic and Hungary there is also a scene of 
violence-prone right-wing extremists who often seek out Roma as victims 
and can count on a certain degree of sympathy among their fellow-citi-
zens. The Hungarian skinhead scene was estimated at around 4000 sup-
porters in the 1990s. 
Comparing Eastern and Western Europe
The dominant radical-right forces in the East European countries differ 
from the majority of Western variants with regard to both organization 
and ideology: 
The Eastern European radical right is less developed organizationally 
than its Western counterpart – a fate it shares with most of the political 
parties in the region. Consequently, we should not confi ne our view of 
this phenomenon only to the right-wing parties, but should also con-
sider their relationship to the movements and environments of the far 
right. From this perspective we can clearly see that the extreme-right 
party sector – assessed both in terms of degree of electoral success and 
organization – in the consolidated democracies of Eastern Europe (the 
Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic etc.) is weaker than in 
most Western democracies, notably Austria, Belgium and France.
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On the other hand, it is diffi cult to estimate the militancy and violent 
tendencies in the movements and small groups sector in Eastern Europe. 
It seems to be at least as extensive as in those western countries where it 
is particularly prevalent (Germany, Sweden, USA). In this context the top 
country on the international list seems to be a non-EU country, Russia, 
whose quality of democracy is open to question in any case. 
The radical right in Eastern Europe is more oriented to the past than its 
western counterpart, which means it is more anti-democratic and more 
militant. In most of the countries where democracy is not yet “the only 
game in town” (Juan Linz), this opens up opportunities to the radical-
right-wing that it does not have in the West.
At the same time the political space is relatively constricted, at least for 
radical-right parties, because nationalism pervades the ideology not only 
of the right-wing parties but of most of the mainstream players as well. 
This can be ascribed largely to the process of nation building in Eastern 
Europe, the dominant concept of nation and the special circumstances of 
regime change after 1989.  
In large parts of the region, national consciousness crystallised without 
the state; the ethnic idea of the nation evolved as the dominant type. 
State continuities are consequently of shorter duration than for most 
Western European states, and have developed with great variations (e.g., 
with Romania and Hungary at one pole and the Baltic states or Ukraine 
at the other). Another feature of post-socialist Europe to be highlighted is 
the complex confi guration of nations between nation building processes, 
national minorities on home territory, and groups from the home nation 
in “external” regions. In some states like Hungary and Romania they play 
an important role, not only for the radical right.
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Alongside this, specifi c cultural factors have their effect on the qualita-
tive impact of the radical right. In Poland the importance of Catholicism 
means there is the additional variant of religious-fundamentalist organi-
zations. The Catholic Church’s ambivalent role towards anti-Semitism 
may help to explain why the election results for far-right parties in 
Poland were fairly high until recently, although the general context was 
not particularly favourable. 
Finally, fascist-autocratic parties tend to dominate the far-right scene in 
countries where regime confl ict has not been resolved (Russia; Romania 
until the beginning of the 21st century).
Conclusion
Comparative research on right-wing radicalism across Europe offers re-
vealing perspectives on the functioning of established and new democra-
cies, and the degree of threat from the radical right. In general, a com-
parative treatment offers perceptions particularly in the fi eld of 
radical-right-wing players and groups and their supporters – about the 
different impacts in the comparison of individual countries, for instance. 
It is also very important to look at the radical-right’s interaction with its 
environment – for example, the possibility of its being tolerated by other 
players in the democratic spectrum. There has, in fact, been a shift here. 
Various studies show that from the 1980s up to the present day, the 
framework conditions have shifted towards a higher rather than a lower 
degree of tolerance. This has led to adaptation or familiarisation mecha-
nisms. Last but not least, comparison between East Central Europe and 
the “West” provides important insights about democracy in general. 
 Beyond the obvious differences in the history and current situation of 
individual countries, we can also identify overarching similarities, for 
 example, in terms of the relations between the party and movement 
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forms of right-wing radicalism or in the patterns of interaction between 
radical and moderate political players.
The question of the appropriate way to deal with the radical-right-wing 
at the level of the state, politics and society cannot be answered if we fail 
to differentiate between organizational and ideological variants and 
 ignore the relevant social and political context of the conditions of mo-
bilisation. The range of variations of this phenomenon, as well as the 
variations in electoral success, argue against monocausal explanations 
such as the belief that it is possible to identify immigration in the West 
or the authoritarian past in Eastern Europe as unique causal factors.   
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The radical right in Germany: Its prohibition and 
reinvention  
Because of its Nazi past, Germany as a nation is associated with the topic 
of right-wing extremism. Nazi Germany propagated the ideology of ine-
quality and implemented the extermination of people regarded as unfi t 
to live. The Holocaust and its systematic planning, along with the delib-
erate refusal of many people to acknowledge what was happening, has 
become inscribed into European history as a nightmare image and a 
terrible warning. Why has no extreme-right-wing party today succeeded 
in entering the Bundestag, the German parliament – whereas radical-
right-wing parties have won seats in the national assemblies of many 
other European countries? How has German right-wing extremism de-
veloped in the recent past? How is it currently manifested and what 
trends can be discerned?
The fi rst part of this contribution analyses the key players in the radical-
right-wing sphere in Germany.1 Firstly, we shall look at the political par-
ties and their voters, then at movement-type organizations and the sub-
cultural milieu. Secondly, we shall elucidate popular attitudes and public 
discourse that show affi nities with right-wing radicalism. The third sec-
tion considers the extent to which a transnational network of radical-
right-wingers is real and sustainable. Finally we shall draw conclusions 
and discuss the present threat to plural, democratic German society from 
the radical right.
1 My defi nition of  the radical-right is based on that of Michael Minkenberg. On the ideological 
level the radical-right-wing “family” encompasses: the extreme right, the xenophobic right, 
the populist right and the religious-fundamentalist right. On the organizational level it covers 
political parties, movement-like organizations and the subcultural milieu. Cf. the article in the 
present book by Michael Minkenberg.
Britta Schellenberg
Germany
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I. Actors
1. Political parties: 
Radical-right-wing players in the Federal Republic of Germany have 
 always taken their cue from Nazism; to date, any attempts to create a 
modern radical-right-wing party have failed.2 Germany’s most successful 
radical-right-wing party today is the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (National Democratic Party of Germany — NPD). The party’s image 
and situation are characteristic for the development of the present-day 
radical right. We shall also describe the DVU, the Republicans (REP) and 
the Pro parties.  
NPD: The NPD was set up in 1964. Twelve years after the Sozialistische 
Reichspartei (Reich Socialist Party), the successor to the Nazi Party, was 
prohibited, the NPD emerged as an amalgamation of several splinter 
groups and the Deutsche Reichspartei (German Reich Party), which had 
already been banned in Rhineland-Palatinate. Many NPD functionaries 
and members were former Nazis. The initial NPD programme was a het-
erogeneous mix of Nazi, anti-communist and, initially, conservative 
Catholic elements. Core demands were German reunifi cation and revi-
sion of the Oder-Neisse border. Between 1966 and 1968 the newly found-
ed party won seats in seven regional assemblies. In the 1969 general elec-
tion the NPD unexpectedly failed to reach the 5 percent requirement for 
entry to parliament (it won only 4.3 percent of the vote), and was sub-
sequently weakened by internal policy quarrels. 
The NPD has been led by its present chairman, Udo Voigt, since 1996. 
Under his leadership the party succeeded in breaking out of the margin-
alisation since the 1970s. In the year Voigt was elected, the party pub -
2 Schellenberg, Britta. “Strategien gegen Rechtsextremismus. Bezüge zum Nationalsozialismus.” 
Vor 60 Jahren Kriegsende – Befreiung oder Niederlage für die Deutschen? Gedanken über die Hinter-
gründe des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ed. Gehl, Günter (Weimar: Ber-
tuch Verlag 2006) 97 – 114, esp. 97 – 100.
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lish ed a new programme it has maintained to this day.3 It is nationalist 
and populist, includes elements of anti-capitalist and nationalist revolu-
tionary thought, and advocates a form of national socialism. The party is 
openly hostile to the ruling system and propagates a biological concept 
of race with ensuing political demands (including dispossession and 
expulsion of Germans with migrant backgrounds). Under Voigt, the NPD 
has formed new networks, especially in “central Germany” — the party’s 
term for the fi ve former East German federal states — and gained access 
to the extreme-right subculture that spread from the 1990s on. In 1998 
the party’s national conference decided on a “three-pillar” concept 
designed to end its traditional role as a purely electoral party. Three 
strategic campaigning areas were defi ned for the medium-term political 
struggle: the “battle for the streets”; the “battle for minds”; and the 
“battle for voters/representative assemblies”.4 The idea behind this 
concept was that the NPD could only achieve political power if it fi rstly 
mobilised sympathisers “on the street” and secondly, if it stepped up its 
populist and nationalist educational work, trained party members and 
created intellectual networks. Thirdly, and on the basis of the fi rst two 
goals, the party wanted to win elections – starting with local and moving 
on to regional and national elections. A fourth “pillar” was added at the 
end of 2004: the notion of unifying the extreme right with the “battle for 
organized will”. This was based on recognising that electoral success 
could only be achieved by cooperation with other right-wing parties and 
the Freien Kameradschaften (Free Associations). Today the former old 
men’s party is particularly active in reaching out to young people in 
various ways including leisure activities or distribution of free CDs. The 
NPD’s “School Playground” CD, which has appeared in various versions 
since 2006, promotes right-wing ideology and boastfully describes the 
party as “the movement”. 
3 See http://www.npd.de/parteiprogramm/ (31.08.2010)
4 Apfel, Holger. “Alles Große steht im Sturm”. Tradition und Zukunft einer nationalen Partei (Stuttgart 
1999) 469f., 359f.
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5 Schellenberg, Britta. “Strategien gegen Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland, Analyse der Ges-
etzgebung und Umsetzung des Rechts.” C·A·P Analyse 2/2008 
 http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2008/CAP-Analyse-2008-02.pdf (31.08.2010).
6 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
7 Liberal parties such as the Greens have spoken out against prohibition because they see other 
concepts for combating right-wing extremism as more effective (e.g., boosting people‘s in-
volvement in civic counter-campaigns).  
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The NPD’s strategic development from a classical political party to an 
organization with features of a movement, and its foray into the subcul-
ture, is not only in tune with the times and particularly attractive to the 
young. The integration of subcultural and movement-type right-wing ex-
tremism is also a response to the constitutional treatment of right-wing 
players in the Federal Republic of Germany, which is carried out very re-
pressively.5 In its interplay with the repressive state, right-wing extrem-
ism in Germany has largely abandoned its fi xed, institutional structures. 
By now the NPD has effectively taken up the “cat-and-mouse” game: it 
has entered the subculture and is trying to participate in the creation of 
a “counter-world” aimed at provocation. Moreover, it is increasingly 
open in its principled rejection of Germany’s Basic Law.6 The party is 
anti-constitutional – that it is not banned is primarily because the fi rst 
pro hibition procedure (2001 – 2003) failed because of procedural errors, 
and because some interior ministers feared an NPD ban could lead it to 
agitate even more strongly underground, where it would be more 
diffi cult to control.7
Cover of the NPD 
Schoolyard CD 2005: 
“Here comes the 
horror of all leftist 
petit bourgeois and 
crammers!“
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Nowadays, however, the NPD, like some other extreme-right-wing par-
ties, is endeavouring to win acceptance in mainstream society. Operating 
in environments and regions seen as neglected and marginal because of 
structural weakness and population decline, they have succeeded in at-
tracting broader segments of voters with nationalist social romanticism 
and counselling programmes. In 2010, particularly in some areas of the 
East German federal states, the party had a fairly active and stable base; 
this was confi rmed by electoral mandates in municipal and local coun-
cils. Moreover, it recently had electoral success in Saxony (2004 election: 
9.2 percent; 2009: 5.6 percent) and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (2006 
election: 7.3 percent). In Thuringia in 2009 the NPD just missed entering 
the federal state assembly (2009: 4.3 percent), but in Saarland in 2009 it 
failed to repeat the relatively good result it achieved in 2004 (4 percent). 
The NPD recently experienced an “existential crisis”, for various reasons. 
In early 2009 the German parliamentary administration authority im-
posed a fi ne of 1.7 million euros on the party for serious defi cits in its 
2007 annual accounts. At the same time the party treasurer made a vol-
untary declaration that there had also been irregularities in 2006.  From 
2009 onward several federal state interior ministers — especially in states 
governed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) — began preparing a new 
prohibition procedure against the NPD. However, despite being shaken 
by the heavy pressure of the repressive state as well as in-fi ghting be-
tween radical and more moderate tendencies, and scandals (including a 
child pornography scandal involving an NPD deputy in Saxony), in 2010 
the NPD was Germany’s most successful radical-right-wing party. 
Aside from the NPD, the main right-wing parties to achieve election suc-
cess in recent years were the Republicans (REP) and the Deutsche Volks-
union (German People’s Union — DVU). However, their importance is 
now diminishing.
Germany
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Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union – DVU) – Cooperation with 
the NPD: The founding of the DVU should be seen in the context of a 
fragmentation and partial radicalisation of radical-right-wing extremism 
in the 1970s and ‘80s. The DVU, which draws on nationalist conservative 
traditions, was founded in 1971 as an association and in 1987 as a party. 
The DVU has been described as a “virtual party” because it has no active 
grassroots base and is largely run by its founder, fi nancier and former 
party chairman, a millionaire named Gerhard Frey. In the 1990s party 
membership was relatively high (1992: 26,000), but this has been shrink-
ing dramatically for years (2008: 6,000). The party’s work centres on 
northern and eastern Germany. It successfully contested elections in 
 Schleswig-Holstein (1992: 6.3 percent), Saxony-Anhalt (1998: 12.9 per-
cent) and Brandenburg (1999: 5.3 percent; 2004: 6.1 percent). Branden-
burg was the only place where it succeeded in winning seats in the  federal 
state assembly for the second time in 2004. In 2009 the DVU lost its seats 
in the Brandenburg Assembly; since then it has becoming increasingly 
insignifi cant. The steady success of the DVU in the Hanseatic City of 
Bremen (1991: 6.2 percent; 1999: 3.0 percent; 2003: 2.3 percent; 2007: 
2.7 percent) can be explained by the specifi c electoral law in this city (an 
electoral victory in Bremerhaven suffi ces for entry to the state assembly), 
and not by wide support from the residents of Bremen. 
Before the state assembly elections in Brandenburg and Saxony in 2004, 
the DVU and NPD made an electoral agreement, the so-called “Germany 
pact”. By eliminating competition between the radical-right-wing parties, 
they intended to improve the chances of meeting the 5 percent barrier 
requirement for entering state and regional assemblies. In fact, the DVU 
won seats for the fi rst time in the Brandenburg assembly, and the NPD in 
the Saxon assembly.  However, the Germany pact ended in 2009 when 
the NPD campaigned in the Brandenburg assembly elections without 
mutual agreement. 
In June 2010 the present DVU party chairman, Matthias Faust, conclud-
ed a joint agreement with the NPD leadership for a fusion of the two 
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parties. After fi erce internal criticism and attempts to deprive Faust of his 
powers, the DVU and NPD eventually conducted a membership poll on 
the fusion; 90 percent of members of both parties voted in favour.8 At the 
time of writing, in August 2010, the fusion of the two parties seemed im-
minent. Parallel to the fusion talks came the foundation in June 2009 of 
a DVU youth organization, the Junge Rechte (Young Right-wingers), which 
attracted attention with its up-to-date Internet presence.
Die Republikaner (Republicans – REP): The REP was set up in 1983 by 
neo-conservatives dissatisfi ed with Germany’s mainstream conservative 
parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU). 
Their aim was to usher in a right-wing conservative turn. Particularly 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the Republicans were successful 
under the leadership of Franz Schönhuber, a charismatic Bavarian TV 
moderator, but their success was confi ned to the regions of former West 
Germany, and especially southern Germany. In Baden-Württemberg the 
party won around 10 percent of the vote (1992: 10.9 percent; 1996: 
9.1 percent). Under the present party chairman, Rolf Schlierer, who has 
led the REP since 1994, the party has settled into a fairly conservative, 
less radical position. Today it is almost insignifi cant. It acknowledges 
Germany’s Basic Law, but demands “preservation of the German home-
land” and opposes what it calls a “multicultural society” and a “multina-
tional state”.
Other radical-right-wing parties. The civic action group Pro Köln (Pro 
Cologne): The civic action group Pro Cologne is, perhaps, the most mod-
ern European variant of radical-right-wing extremism in party form, be-
cause it originates from right-wing populism. It describes itself as “popu-
list”, as a “citizens’ movement”, and puts the topic of Islam with its 
widespread connotations of fear, at the heart of its political agenda, with 
slogans like, “We oppose the Islamisation of Cologne”). The party’s other 
8  NPD: clear vote for fusion of NPD and DVU. http://www.npd.de/html/247/artikel/detail/1655/ 
(30.08.2010). The NPD members agreed on condition that  no additional debts would be in-
curred through the fusion. 
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hate targets include Roma and migrants in general, who are described as 
“criminal elements”. Pro Cologne was set up as an association in 1996 and 
survived into the new millennium through the efforts of activists from 
the extreme-right-wing scene. In 2004 it succeeded in winning 4.7 per-
cent of the vote and took four seats on Cologne city council. Its offshoot, 
Pro NRW, is the geographical extension of Pro Cologne. These parties at-
tract attention particularly through initiatives against the building of 
mosques.9 Pro Cologne is currently the most successful of the various 
right-wing  populist and extreme-right-wing electoral alliances. 
Similarly, the publicity of the Bavarian action group, Bürgerinitiative Aus-
länderstopp (Citizens’ Initiative to Stop Foreigners), focuses on the “anti-
Muslim“ issue. In 2008, the party, which has been described as an NPD 
“cover organization“, managed to win two seats on the city council in 
Nuremberg, and one seat in Munich. 
The importance of local and regional elections. Compared to gains in 
Europe as a whole, the electoral success of radical-right-wing parties in 
Germany is relatively small. While the parties register some success in 
federal state assembly and local elections, to date they have made no 
impact at the national level and in elections for the European Parlia-
ment. (The exception is the Republicans, with 7.1 percent in the 1989 Euro-
pean elections.) 
It is at the local and regional level that Germany’s radical-right-wing par-
ties can make gains. Deputies from the DVU, NPD, REP, and the Stop 
Foreigners action group and Pro-Cologne hold seats in several local assem-
blies, and in municipal and parish councils. Taking advantage of the 
local electoral regulations that waive the customary 5 percent barrier 
requirement in many places to award seats at a municipal level on only 
2 percent or 3 percent of the vote, radical-right-wing parties are steadily 
9 Häusler, Alexander (ed.). Rechtspopulismus als “Bürgerbewegung”. Kampagnen gegen Islam und 
Moscheebau und kommunale Gegenstrategien (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 
2008).
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extending their base. By now, a total of over 200 deputies from radical-
right-wing parties hold seats in German district councils. The NPD re-
cently achieved great success in percentage terms (in individual cases 
around 10 percent or even 20 percent) in local elections in Saxony (2004: 
26, 2009: 72), Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt 
and Saarland. In the latest federal state elections in Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania, the NPD won over 30 percent of the vote in some localities. 
Taken as a whole, however, the success of the radical-right-wing parties 
remains limited.
Germany’s radical-right-wing parties are scarcely able to participate di-
rectly in shaping politics. The cordon sanitaire maintained by all the other 
parties excludes the radical-right parties from cooperative action and 
denies them posts in working groups and decision-making bodies. The 
cordon sanitaire is unlikely to be lifted in the near future, as radical-right-
wing parties are generally regarded as unacceptable. Yet there are cases of 
joint action at local level on a short-term basis, such as when the NPD takes 
up issues like school closures or public funding cuts in youth projects.  Here, 
the NPD can score by picking up issues that lead to joint action.
It remains to be seen whether this success can be sustained in the longer 
term – or even heralds the establishment of the radical right on the na-
tio nal level. In fact, the NPD’s entry into the federal state assemblies in 
Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania indicates a disturbing degree 
of widespread and more enduring support for the party. The latest 
general election results support this trend: although the radical right is 
generally seen as having no chance in national polls, in 2009 the NPD 
achieved 4 percent of the vote in Saxony and 3.3 percent in Mecklen-
burg-West Pomerania, and a national average of 1.5 percent.
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Entry of right wing parties into federal state assemblies (1990 – 2010) Map 1
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Voter structure: A representative statistical survey of elections to the fed-
eral state assembly in Brandenburg reveals a characteristic overall picture 
of DVU and NPD voters. In 2004 the DVU achieved its best results among 
young voters: the party gained 13.5 percent of the vote in the 18-25 age 
group and 11.2 percent in the 25-35 age group compared with a total 
voter share of 6.2 percent. In general, twice as many men as women 
voted for the extreme right; in fact, among the 18-25s, 17.6 percent of 
male voters chose the DVU.10 Characteristic data on the voters’ educa-
tional level, social environment and profession are as follows: lowest sec-
ondary school certifi cate, mostly job training/apprenticeships, working 
class, and (less frequently) unemployed.11 To sum up: in broad compari-
son, voters for radical-right parties are generally young, male, and belong 
to lower or lower middle class strata of society. Even in federal states such 
as Saxony-Anhalt, where the DVU failed to win seats in the federal state 
assembly, around 10 percent of under-29s voted for a radical-right party. 
The election campaigns for young people seem to have an impact. 
Extreme right wing supporters are young – they respond to the far-right’s 
rejection of existing conditions and the use of propaganda terms like 
“nationalists” and “socialists”. In terms of regional distribution, up until 
the mid-1990s radical-right-wing parties achieved better results in west-
ern Germany than eastern Germany. Since the end of the ‘90s support for 
the radical right has been higher in eastern than in western Germany. 
2. Movement-type organizations and the subcultural milieu
There is now a heterogeneous network of extreme-right groups and pro-
grammes in Germany that increasingly evades traditional state control. 
The developments in the subcultural and movement-type area show the 
innovative power of (activist) far-right extremism in Germany. The frag-
mentation and radicalisation in the 1970s and ‘80s led not only to the 
10 Representative election results. Landtagswahl 19.09.2004. (Potsdam Brandenburg: Landesbetrieb 
für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik January 2005)  http://www.statistik.brandenburg.de/six-
cms/media.php/4055/BVII2-5_04_online_LTW2004_repräWS_ebook.pdf (25.08.10).
11 http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundeslaender/sachsen-anhalt/wahlre-
port/1998/ (31.08.2010).
Germany
68 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
formation of new parties such as the DVU and Republicans, but also to 
the emergence of an activist wing of neo-Nazi paramilitary groups, in-
cluding the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann founded in 1973. After the politi-
cal system change at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the ‘90s, 
everyday radical-right-wing violence increased signifi cantly. “Fascho” 
(neo-fascist) groups that had already formed by the end of the 1980s in 
former East Germany began to agitate more openly, and organized West 
German neo-fascists also used the opportunity of the dissolution of com-
munist East Germany to build new structures in the newly integrated 
East German states. A number of extreme-right organizations were pro-
hibited following successive waves of attacks on hostels for asylum seek-
ers in Hoyerswerda and Rostock and racist murders in Solingen and 
Mölln. The radical-right scene reacted by restructuring, and stopped ap-
plying for offi cial status (e.g. as registered associations). Instead, the con-
cept of the locally based society Kameradschaft (Free Association), a group 
of around 10 -30 persons in a loose network, was developed. The Free 
Associations or their regional units, the Action Alliances, regard themselves 
as part of a “national resistance”, a “radical right united front”.  There are 
around 150 regional and supra-regional Free Associations in Germany. 
Their bastion is Saxony, which houses around 40 Free Associations. The 
self-styled Free Nationalists, for instance, stage pagan festivals (solstice 
parties), gather at concerts, and travel together to demonstrations and 
other radical-right events. Many of them are responsible for violent at-
tacks and the establishment of “no go areas”.12 The loose, autonomous 
structure of the Free Associations has largely enabled them to evade state 
repression, and it is only recently that a few of these groups were prohib-
ited (e.g., the Kameradschaft Oberhavel and the skinhead grouping, Skin-
heads Sächsische Schweiz). 
 
12 “Fear zones” is another term for areas where members of specifi c (population) groups are at 
particularly high risk of violent attacks, and their safety is not guaranteed.
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Since around 2002 a new group has become an established part of the far 
right in Germany – and an export: the Autonomen Nationalisten (Autono-
mous Nationalists). Originating from Berlin and Dortmund, they have 
now spread throughout the country. Their supporters are mostly very 
young (around 14 years of age) and adopt the clothing styles and some of 
the habits of left-wing groups, particularly the autonomous Schwarze 
Blocks (Black Blocs). They dress in black, often with Palestinian scarves, 
and use the Internet for recruitment and propaganda. Their videos, chats 
and blogs are up-to-date. They usually dissociate themselves from Nazism 
and focus primarily on present-day social issues, posing questions from 
the perspective of young people in today’s society. The group is attractive 
to some young people in precarious situations, offering temporary 
accommodation (e.g., beds for homeless children), and work. This gives 
their social criticism a genuine basis. However, the group fl uctuates con-
siderably, with many supporters leaving the scene again after a few 
months.
Germany
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Aside from these structured organizations, there is another widespread 
phenomenon: young people infl uenced by radical-right-wing ideas but 
without specifi c group membership. There is a fairly large range of 
radical-right music, clothing, fashion accessories and codes available, 
which attracts numbers of young people, although it is diffi cult to esti-
mate exactly how many. These young people cannot (yet) be counted as 
part of the hardcore right.  They are fascinated by the far-right subculture 
with its products and range of services. Over the past few years, radical-
right-wing music has become better known and more popular – not least 
because it is qualitatively better, more professional and varied, ranging 
from Heavy Metal to Rock and sentimental ballads. The most popular far-
right “rockers” include the Zillertaler Türkenjäger, Landser, Annett and 
Faustrecht;13 but the far-right scene does not listen exclusively to German 
bands. In addition, far-right shops and mail order fi rms have been set up, 
to sell fashionable scene outfi ts. Current popular styles include dark 
T-shirts and hoodie shirts, sneakers and shirts with radical-right-wing 
labels, codes and symbols. Trade names such as Thor Steinar, CONSTAPLE 
and Walhalla indicate membership in the far-right scene. Practised 
experts can spot radical-right codes in many locations: on street signs, at 
subway entrances, or on house walls and as accessories worn even by 
young people who are otherwise not obviously from the far right.
Offences and violent crimes: Whereas political parties in Germany are 
usually less successful than their European counterparts, radical-right 
subculture in Germany is seething.  After the political system change of 
1989, the number of radical-right offences and crimes of violence in-
creased dramatically. The trend only reversed slightly in the second half 
of the 1990s, but resumed signifi cantly upwards in 2000. The number of 
offences almost doubled from 2002 to 2008, and violent crimes rose by 
around 16 percent (see fi g. 1). At present the number of reported offences 
has achieved a deplorable record: almost 19,894 offences, of which 1,042 
13 Schellenberg, Britta. Demokratie und Rechtsextremismus. Auseinandersetzung mit rechtsextremer 
Musik. (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag 2010).
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involve violence.14 This means that on average, every day in the Federal 
Republic of Germany there are at least two to three violent attacks by 
radical-right-wingers. The chances of falling victim to a radical-right-wing 
attack are three to four times as high in the area of former East Germany 
than in the west.
Germany
14 If not otherwise indicated, this refers to: Bundesministerium des Innern (ed.), Verfassungsschutz-
bericht 2009. 24-33. I am referring to the year 2008 because the data for 2009 were still not com-
plete by press date. Only limited comparison is possible with the situation prior to 2001 because 
the Federal German Statististical Offi ce changed its data collection methods in 2001. 
Extreme-right offences and crimes of violence Fig. 1
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Around half of the far-right crimes of violence recorded by the German 
Offi ce for Protection of the Constitution for the year 2008 are xenopho-
bic (395) or anti-Semitic (44). Another considerable strand of violence 
targets (supposedly) left-wing extremists (358) and other political oppo-
nents (76). These crimes of violence almost all involve bodily harm. A 
study published in September 2010 in the Berlin daily “Tagesspiegel” and 
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the weekly “Die ZEIT” recorded 137 victims killed by far-right and racist 
violence in the 20 years since Germany was reunited  (1990-2010).15 Ger-
many scores high in European comparisons of extreme-right wing and 
racist violence.
The great majority of offences are propaganda felonies (14,262), includ-
ing activities such as use of anti-constitutional symbols. Prohibiting such 
actions has to be seen as the characteristic response of Federal Germany’s 
“watchful” democracy; this kind of prosecution has not been taken up 
on a European level.16 However, in comparison with other western Euro-
pean countries, cases of coercion/threat (144) and damage to property 
(1,197) are also relatively high in Germany. These incidents involve a 
signifi cant proportion of hate crimes (including incitement to racial 
hatred). On average, a new far-right crime is reported almost hourly in 
Germany.
II. Attitudes and discourse 
The spread of radical-right attitudes in the population
Attitude surveys indicate that around 8,2 percent of the population shares 
hard-core right-wing extremist views. After extreme-right-wing views 
have been declining continuously since 2002 recent opinion polls show 
renewed growth in 2010. According to the study by the University of 
Leipzig, “Die Mitte in der Krise”, commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, almost 35 percent of the population believe that “the presence 
of so many foreigners is a threat to Germany”. There is a rise in the 
categories ‘assent to dictatorship’ (5,1 percent), ‘chauvinism’ (19,3 per-
cent), ‘xenophobia’ (24,7 percent) and ‘social Darwinism’ (3,9 percent). 
In eastern Germany some of the categories found much more 
approval than in the West (‘agreement of dictatorship’ 6,8 percent, 
Germany
15 In a further 14 fatal incidents there is suspicion of extreme right-wing or racist motivation. Jour-
nalists responsible for information: Frank Jansen, Heike Kleffner, Johannes Radke, Toralf Staud. 
http://www.zeit.de/themen/gesellschaft/todesopfer-rechter-gewalt/index (27.09.2010). See also 
Forner, Rebecca in cooperation with Opferperspektive e.V. and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, n.d., 
Wanderausstellung Opfer rechter Gewalt seit 1990 www.opfer-rechter-gewalt.de (27.09.2010).
16 See the relevant discussions prior to the enactment of the EU framework decision of 2007 
under German European Council presidency. 
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‘xenophobia’ 35 percent, ‘social Darwinism’ 6,2 percent).17 The study on 
“group-focused enmity” (GMF) by social scientist Wilhelm Heitmeyer 
records similarly high acceptance of xenophobic statements. The study, 
which collects data on an annual basis, illustrates a sharp rise in Islamo-
phobia in the German population. Despite the relatively low proportion 
of Muslims in the German population (around 5 percent), the study 
shows 46 percent agreement with the statement, “There are too many 
Muslims in Germany”, and 52.2 percent of respondents held the view 
that Islam is an intolerant religion. Germans’ opinion on Muslims and 
Islam therefore largely corresponds to that of the rest of the European 
countries covered by the study (average country samples: 44.2 percent; 
54.4 percent). However, German respondents agreed least frequently 
with the statement, “Muslim culture fi ts in well in Germany” (16.6 per-
cent) – which means the Germans are the most critical about Muslim 
culture (country sample average: 31.3 percent).18 The study also shows a 
connection between various different hostile attitudes: the homeless and 
jobless are also targets of “enmity”.19 Another development can be ob-
served in the spread of “new anti-Semitism” which differs from “old anti-
Semitism” in that it does not openly admit to anti-Semitic attitudes but 
expresses anti-Jewish prejudice in the form of criticism of Israel, espe-
cially in equating Israel with Nazism and fascism (even when the issue is 
not about Israel and Israelis, but about Jews).20 While this “new” anti-
Semitism is quite widespread, the levels of agreement with openly anti-
Semitic statements are still fairly high. Almost 15 percent of respondents 
agreed positively with the statements, “Jews operate through nasty tricks 
more than other people“, and “Jews simply have something special and 
unique about them, and don‘t fi t in so well with us“.21
Germany
17 Decker, Oliver; Weißmann, Marliese; Kiess, Johannes; Brähler, Elmar. Die Mitte in der Krise: 
 Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010. Ed. Nora Langenbacher. (Berlin: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung 2010). 
18 Zick, Andreas and Küpper, Beate. Meinungen zum Islam und Muslimen in Deutschland und Europa. 
Ausgewählte Ergebnisse der Umfrage Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit in Europa (Bielefeld 
University December 2009). http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/zick/Islam_GFE_zick.pdf 
 (31. 08.2010). Countries studied: D, GB, F, I, NL, P, PL, HU.
19 Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (ed.) “Deutsche Zustände”. Series 1-9 Frankfurt am Main 2002-2010.
20 Schellenberg, Britta. “Die Zähigkeit von Vorurteilen. Holocaust-Gedenken immunisiert nicht gegen 
Antisemitismus.” Internationale Politik 2 (February 2005) 48-55.
21 Decker, Oliver et al (see note 17).
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A threat to political culture: ethnicising and biologising discourses 
The present political, media and public discourses about the issue of “mi-
gration”, “foreigners” and “Islam” can be described as particularly prob-
lematic because they encourage radical-right-wing attitude patterns. 
Whereas German law today with the reformed regulations on nationality 
(2000) contradicts a purely ethnic defi nition of German nationality, and 
the immigration law of 2002/2004 refl ects Germany’s new perception of 
itself as a land of immigration, sections of the media and the population 
persist in maintaining a biological idea of nations. The emphasis on mi-
grant status in relation to certain Germans who, although they are Ger-
mans, are picked out as “the others” in contrast to “us Germans”, is often 
part of a widespread biological concept of the nation. It is notable that 
groups that appear “strange”, such as migrants, or foreigners, are signifi -
cantly overrepresented in media reports in relation to their statistical 
share of the population. They are also particularly often subject to nega-
tive judgement. In many cases the actions and attitudes of migrants 
themselves are held responsible for the “foreigner problem”, for example 
by categorising their attitudes or marginalising them.  They are repre-
sented as being involved more than average in criminal activity or caus-
ing confl icts, and less often as people living “normal” lives in Germany. 
The ethnicisation or biologisation of problematic social relations or indi-
vidual dispositions creates favourable conditions for an extreme-right-
wing perception of reality. Confl icts are interpreted as battles for survival 
between specifi c groups of people or races”, and individuals are attribut-
ed a specifi c value by virtue of their categorisation into ethnic or cultural 
groups, thus denying them opportunities for development as a whole. 
Radical-right-wingers also latch onto the provincial desire for sameness 
and homogeneity of judgement and exclusion of heterogeneity and indi-
viduality, as well as a general scepticism about democracy (as a system 
and a way of life).22
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22 On xenophobic discourse in Germany see, Schellenberg, Britta. “Country Report: Germany.” 
Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann 2009) 179-248, esp. 215f.
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The current social and demographic change arouses fear in many people 
in Germany. Whereas some people profi t from the opportunities of the 
information era and the global world, others are afraid of being left be-
hind by these changes. This fear has a real basis, because almost a quarter 
of today’s school-leavers fi nish school lacking skills in reading, arithme-
tic and science subjects, and are ill equipped to cope with everyday life. 
Their level of competence is regarded as insuffi cient for further education 
or training. Given these statistics, there is a basic pool of almost 25 per-
cent of so-called “unemployables” who hardly have a chance of ever 
fi nding work.23 Members of a growing segment of the population not 
only feel that their personal future is insecure, but suffer very real eco-
nomic losses and loss of status. Radical-right-wing players can make 
points with protests against these developments – even if only in a lim-
ited way in Germany because the Left Party (DIE LINKE) continues to be 
seen as the political representative of societal issues, and is correspond-
ingly able to win the trust of voters.  
Creeping local expansion
Recent publications have examined the expansion of right-wing extrem-
ism at the local level. Dirk Borstel attests to the fact that “diverse region-
al analyses” give “clear indications of growing establishment of far-right 
structures at local level”, and confi rm that people are increasingly accept-
ing right-wing extremist manifestations (organizations, parties etc.). In 
some areas, right-wing extremists are seen as “normal” political players; 
this trend is quite advanced in two east German regions, the eastern part 
of West Pomerania and the Saxonian Schweiz.24 As early as 2005, Toralf 
Staud spoke of right-wing extremism dominating everyday culture in 
parts of the rural areas of eastern Germany, and described this phenom-
Germany
23 For results of comparative studies on education see, Schellenberg, Britta. “Integration ist In-
tegration ist Integration. Deutschlands Einwanderungspolitik: Bildung ist der erste Schritt.” 
Internationale Politik 11/61 (Nov. 2006) 90-96, esp. 94.
24 Borstel, Dierk. “Der immergleiche braune Sumpf? Neuere Entwicklungen der rechtsextre-
men Szene.” Strategien gegen Rechtsextremismus. Die Grünen/Europäische Freie Allianz ed. 
 Albrecht, Jan Phillip, MEP (Berlin 2010)  9-20, esp. 16. http://janalbrecht.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/20100615_strategien_GE_fi nal04-web.pdf (30.08.2010).
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enon as the “process of the east German provinces becoming fascist”.25 
Aside from electoral success, one sign of the racist infl uence and a test of 
the extreme-right-wing mood is the welfare of groups of potential vic-
tims of far-right violence. Victims’ action groups complain of a climate of 
 radical-right-wing violence in specifi c areas, and tacit agreement among 
the local population with acts of violence. The work of associations that 
counsel victims reveals that in some areas victims of far-right violence 
receive no support from within their communities, and there are great 
inhibitions about openly discussing problems of right-wing extremism 
and racism.26 
“Nazism” – a losing formula – and pluralism: Despite the evident poten-
tial for extreme-right-wing attitudes among the German population, so 
far radical-right-wing parties have had considerable diffi culty in gaining 
credibility and acceptance. Firstly, they are frequently accused of having 
incompetent staff, of corruption, and of personal defi ciencies. Secondly, 
they are discredited in most people’s eyes by their close relationship to 
Nazism. In addition, the generally growing support for plurality and in-
dividualism should be seen as a “losing formula” for right-wing extrem-
ism. Attitude surveys show that the oldest generation (people born before 
or during the Nazi era) tend towards right-wing extremism more strongly 
than people born and socialised in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Younger generations tend to be more liberal and cosmopolitan, even if 
not free of extreme-right-wing attitudes.27 The Shell Youth Study (2010) 
showed that the majority of young people have a generally positive 
attitude towards social change. Some 84 percent of them actually associ-
ate globalisation with the freedom to be able to travel, work and study all 
over the world. However, some sectors of young people are sceptical 
about social change, and 10 percent of them already feel a depressing 
lack of opportunity at a young age.28
25 Staud, Toralf. Moderne Nazis. Die neuen Rechten und der Aufstieg der NPD (Cologne 2005).
26 Grell, Britta et al (ed.). Hate Crime Monitoring and Victim Assistance in Poland and Germany, publ. 
Nigdy Więcej and Opferperspektive. Warsaw/Berlin 2009. See also http://www.opferperspektive.
de/ (4.9.2010).
27 Bergmann, Werner. “Wie viele Deutsche sind rechtsextrem, fremdenfeindlich und antisemitisch? 
Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1990-2000.” Auf dem Weg zum Bürgerkrieg? Rechtsextrem-
ismus und Gewalt gegen Fremde in Deutschland ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt a. M. 2001) 41-62.
28 http://www.shell.de/home/content/deu/aboutshell/our_commitment/shell_youth_study/
downloads/#subtitle_1 (17.09.10).
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III. The radical right’s transnational networks – 
 Sustainable alliances?
As well as becoming increasingly established locally, the radical right has 
also formed a denser network in the 21st century. One particularly rele-
vant aspect of global interlinking is the medium of the Internet. Exchange 
between radical-right-wingers both within Germany and across Europe is 
becoming more and more commonplace. Observers note the far right’s 
increased use of the Internet and websites like MySpace and YouTube. Mu-
sic groups (e.g. the Nazi Black Metal groups) also use the Internet to make 
their music accessible to a wider public. In Germany the growing number 
of extreme-right-wing German-language Internet sites presents a special 
challenge to the Offi ce for the Protection of the Constitution. The Ger-
man state apparatus is not able to suppress this activity because of the 
cases where radical-right-wingers (cooperating, for example, with foreign 
servers) are not subject to the legal regulations of the German constitu-
tional state.
In Germany, events like the commemoration of Rudolf Hess (which was 
held annually in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, until its prohibition in 2005), the 
“People’s Festival – for a Europe of fatherland fans” in Jena or Pößneck 
(Thuringia), or May Day in Berlin (2010) show how right-wing radicalism 
is becoming increasingly international. The NPD leadership is not only 
involved in subcultural events; it also tries to improve and deepen rela-
tionships with extreme-right-wing parties abroad. For example, in No-
vember 2004 NPD chairman Udo Voigt visited the European Parliament 
as the guest of Alessandra Mussolini (then chairwoman of the extreme-
right-wing party Alternativa Sociale, which is now part of Berlusconi’s Po-
polo della Libertà). The purpose of the visit was to pave the way for im-
proved future cooperation between Europe’s radical-right-wing parties.29 
However, up until now some infl uential European parties have main-
Germany
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Grünen/Europäische Freie Allianz im Europäischen Parlament ed. Albrecht (Berlin 2010) 26.
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tained a strategic distance from the extreme right German party – not 
least for fear of losing prestige. To date, the NPD has not been accepted as 
a member of the network of electorally successful far right European par-
ties, but only as a member of an extreme form of the radical-right move-
ment: the European National Front, La Falange (Spain), Noua Dreaptă (Ro-
mania) und Forza Nuova (Italy). 
Germany
In thematic terms it is clear that anti-Islamism is an issue that provides a 
starting point for European cooperation among the extreme right. For 
instance, Pro Cologne participated in the European network “Cities against 
Islamisation”, which also included the Belgian party Vlaams Belang and 
the Austrian FPÖ. Leading fi gures from the European far right travelled to 
Cologne for the anti-Islam conferences in 2008 und 2009 – although 
they could hardly make any effective publicity out of it because of the 
thousands of counter-demonstrators in Cologne. In March 2010 Pro NRW 
organized an “international conference for a European-wide minaret 
ban” in Gelsenkirchen; as in Cologne, representatives from Vlaams 
Belang and the FPÖ attended. In addition, a particular characteristic of 
Germany’s Nazi-infl uenced extreme right is the international exchange 
with Holocaust deniers – a position shared with Muslim anti-Semites, 
which stands in sharp contradiction to the anti-Islam stance of the radi-
cal right.
Poster of 
„Anti-Islam 
Congress“
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Conclusion and prospects
The development of German right-wing extremism is heavily infl uenced 
by governmental agencies’ highly repressive treatment of extreme-right 
activities. Radical-right-wing organizational structures and activities have 
steadily changed, adapted and taken up fl exible forms. Moreover, by us-
ing the Internet and transnational networking, radical-right-wing players 
are transferring their activities to more liberal countries abroad and evad-
ing suppression in Germany. These developments, particularly against 
the background of radical-right-wing programmes available and acces-
sible everywhere and at all times, present new challenges to German 
 society and its institutions.30
Unlike the situation in most European countries, radical-right parties in 
Germany have so far failed to make breakthroughs on the national level. 
However, a certain degree of stabilisation is becoming apparent in 
specifi c groups and areas. Today, radical-right-wing groups are particu-
larly strong at local levels – and in some places they already infl uence the 
interpretation of reality. As a result, for some years now the NPD has in-
creasingly won local and regional mandates, especially in rural areas of 
eastern Germany. It is also worth noting the common developmental 
phases of the NPD and the extreme-right subculture since the end of the 
1990s. Since that time, right-wing radicalism in Germany has been 
marked by a lively subculture and diverse movement-type organizations. 
The Free Associations and the Autonomous Nationalists are groupings that 
emerged in Germany and have since become established in other Euro-
pean countries. A high level of violence is also characteristic of the 
extreme-right scene.
Germany
30 Schellenberg, Britta. “Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Populism and Racism. Steps to-
wards a pluralist and humane Europe.” The Roma: A thorn in the side of new Europe? ed. OSCE/
ODHIR (forthcoming); Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.). Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extrem-
ism in Europe (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009); Georgi et al. (ed.) Strategien gegen 
Rechtsextremismus vol 2: Handlungsempfehlungen für Politik und Praxis (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertels-
mann Stiftung 2005).
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On the ideological level, anti-Semitism and the belief in an existential 
threat to German identity from conspiratorial powers still play a domi-
nant role. Social issues are used as pegs for campaigns and demonstra-
tions, both by the radical-right-wing parties and by far-right organiza-
tions and subcultural groups. The radical right could gain strength if 
prejudices, fears and the feeling of being at the mercy of unfair develop-
ments grow among the population, and political counter-measures fail to 
achieve the necessary momentum. Another trend from which radical-
right-wing parties (particularly Pro Cologne) have only partially been able 
to benefi t so far is hostility towards Muslims and other population groups 
such as migrants and the homeless. These attitudes occur considerably 
beyond the far-right spectrum. The trend towards ethnicisation and bi-
ologisation of social problems by the media and representatives of public 
life is highly problematic. In these discourses, prejudices against migrants 
and foreigners are often intermingled with prejudices against people with 
little education and lower social status – the so-called lower class. It will 
be relevant for the development of radical-right-wing parties and for 
right-wing radicalism as a whole whether democratic parties prevail in 
social debates with arguments for human rights and democracy, or 
whether these discourses are conducted in a way that is overwhelmingly 
xenophobic and allows xenophobic prejudices to be easily transformed 
into support for radical-right players. 
Aside from the developmental factors favourable to the radical right, we 
should also point out that in the past few years a sector of society has 
become increasingly vigilant about radical-right aspirations (or at least, 
those of neo-Nazis), especially in the national public political arena. This 
is due to the tireless commitment of some individuals with an infl uence 
on public opinion and decision-making, such as journalists, lawyers and 
politicians, as well as the continuous work of civic initiatives that have 
been able to develop and professionalize with the help of state funding 
programmes. In all, German society has not only become more hetero-
Germany
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geneous but also more open and liberal. For the present, we can assume 
that critical public awareness of the radical right and the internal prob-
lems of radical-right-wing parties, along with the ongoing force of repres-
sion, will succeed in preventing widespread electoral success by the 
radical right. 
Germany
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The extreme right in France: 
Redrawing of the map to be expected
The record of the extreme right in France
A strong extreme right has been a permanent feature of French political 
life since the election of the fi rst local councillor for the Front National 
(FN) in the city of Dreux, in September 1983, after the Conservative Party 
led by Jacques Chirac had made an agreement with the FN. Following the 
FN’s fi rst nationwide success in the 1984 European election, the main-
stream right-wing parties decided to ban any kind of agreement with 
Jean-Marie Le Pen. Nevertheless, the FN’s ideas have reached a very wide 
segment of the French electorate and have had an infl uence on the 
political agenda of the right on issues such as immigration, law and or-
der, multiculturalism and the defi nition of national identity. Despite a 
brief period of decline following the election of President Sarkozy in 
2007, the FN recovered in the polls in 2010.
Founded in October 1972 by former militants of the neo-Fascist move-
ment Ordre Nouveau, the FN is the fi rst far-right party since 1945 to 
achieve electoral success over such a long period. This is partly due to Le 
Pen’s personal charisma and his ability to unite the different and often 
confl icting factions of this political family. In late 1998, before the split 
between Bruno Mégret and Le Pen, the party had 42,000 paid-up mem-
bers. Figures for 2010 are not available: although the FN claims a mem-
bership of 60,000, the real fi gure is unlikely to exceed 15,000. Attendance 
at the annual FN rally on May 1, which previously attracted up to 10,000, 
has fallen to around 2,000.
Jean-Yves Camus
France
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The electoral situation 
From 1984 on, the FN steadily gained 10 to15 percent of the vote, a very 
damaging situation both for the left (which lost many of its working-
class voters) and for the conservative right, which lost seats in Parliament 
because the FN candidate succeeded in reaching the second ballot in the 
legislative elections in many constituencies. The party’s electoral success 
peaked in 2002, when Le Pen was runner-up to the incumbent president, 
Jacques Chirac, in the fi rst ballot of the presidential election, polling 
16.86 percent, a total of 4.8 million votes. However, Le Pen was defeated 
in the second ballot, receiving 17.79 percent to Chirac’s 82.2 percent1. 
What seemed at the time like a thunderbolt should be understood in the 
light of two factors. Firstly, Le Pen took second place in the fi rst ballot 
because there was an unusually high number of candidates (16), and 
 because the votes for the left and the extreme left were scattered among 
8 candidates. Secondly, the FN leader did not get many more votes on the 
second ballot than he did on the fi rst: all the mainstream political par-
ties, including the majority of the far left, asked their supporters to vote 
for Chirac to avoid Le Pen victory – despite their strong opposition to the 
incumbent President’s policies. This sums up the major problem of the 
FN to this day: it has never been able to build a coalition or enter an alli-
ance with a mainstream right-wing party, and it has remained an  irritation 
and a haven for the protest vote. The “cordon sanitaire” the other parties 
imposed on it from 1984 onwards kept the FN out of power, from city 
council to the national government. The result was that it failed to gain 
credibility and some of its supporters began to think that their FN vote 
was a lost vote. Opinion polls throughout the period from 1983 to 2002 
estimated that more than 80 percent of voters in France did not trust the 
party and did not wish to see it in Government2.
1 On the second ballot, Le Pen received 5.525 million votes, comprising his votes on the fi rst 
ballot plus the 666,000 cast for Bruno Mégret, plus 55,000 votes.
2 Mayer, N. Ces français qui votent Le Pen. (Paris: Flammarion) 2002.
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The election results for FN in the period 1992-2007 were as follows:
In 2007, when former minister of the interior Nicolas Sarkozy decided to 
contest the presidency, he opted for a strategy of siphoning votes away 
from the FN by using a populist rhetoric that “stole“ some aspects of the 
extreme-right programme, especially ideas on law and order, immigra-
tion, multicultural society and moral values. As a result, the ageing Le 
Pen (then aged 79) received only 10.44 percent on the fi rst ballot and was 
heavily defeated by Sarkozy (then 52), who polled 31.18 percent.
The election results for FN in the period 1992 – 2007 were as follows:
Regional 1992 13.8%
Local (cantonal) 1992 12.31%
National 1993 12.7%
EU 1994 10.5%
Local (cantonal) 1994  9.67%
Presidential 1995 15.3%
National 1997 15%
Regional 1998 15.4%
Local (cantonal) 1998 13.9%
EU 1999 5.69%
Local (cantonal) 2001 7.12%
Presidential 2002 (second ballot) 16.9%
National 2002 11.34%
EU 2004 9.8%
Regional 2004 14.7%
Local (cantonal) 2004 12.1%
Presidential 2007 10.44%
National 2007 4.29%
European 2009 6.47%
Regional 2010 11.42%
France
Table 1
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Approximately 70 percent of those who had voted for Le Pen in 2002 
voted for Sarkozy in 2007 on the second ballot. This particularly applies 
to the middle class and those in the professions, but the FN retained a 
signifi cant part of its base among the working class and the jobless, espe-
cially in the areas hit by the industrial crisis, such as northern and eastern 
France. Prior to the 2010 regional elections it seemed very unlikely that 
the party could come back to national prominence, because of Le Pen’s 
age and the factionalism within the FN, and also because the Union pour 
un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) strongly dominated the conservative 
right.
Events proved this wrong. The FN made an unexpected comeback, re-
ceiving 11.42 percent of the national vote, with peaks at 20 percent for 
Le Pen in the Provence-Côte d’Azur area and 18.3 percent for his daugh-
ter,  Marine, in Nord-Pas de Calais. This result can be explained as follows: 
fi rstly, mid-term elections are always risky for parties in government, and 
the UMP paid a heavy price for Sarkozy’s waning popularity (positive 
opinion poll responses of 32 percent in January 2010, below the 37 per-
cent positive responses for the prime minister, François Fillon). Sarkozy’s 
popularity has been undermined by his personal style, persistent high 
unemployment, economic recession, unpopular tax-cuts for the better-
off and strong opposition to his call to postpone retirement age. Conse-
quently, the FN was again able to mobilize the protest vote. Secondly, it 
is important to understand that there is an intrinsic ideological differ-
ence between the UMP and the FN, and this refl ects on the electorate. 
While the UMP has adopted a restrictive immigration policy and the 
government has trie to pass legislation that would ban the full Islamic 
veil in public places, the average FN voter not only wants an end to im-
migration, he wants the state to order compulsory repatriation of immi-
grants to their “countries of origin” and, in the wake of the Swiss referen-
dum on minarets, he simply wants Islam to be banned. The same applies 
in relation to law and order: FN voters are not satisfi ed with tougher sen-
tences for offenders – they demand the return of the death penalty. As for 
a multicultural society, there is actually a huge difference between stress-
ing the need for immigrants to assimilate into French mainstream cul-
France
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ture and the far right’s belief in the superiority of the “white race” as the 
core value of European identity. This explains why most of the ethnocen-
tric and authoritarian FN voters who switched to Sarkozy in 2007 have 
returned to the fold. 
In line with much of Western Europe, France has extreme-right-wing 
 political parties other than the Front National. The Mouvement pour la 
France (MPF), led by Philippe de Villiers, is an arch-conservative party 
that opposes Islam, multiculturalism and the European Union, but does 
not belong to the extreme right. Under the banner of Declan Ganley’s 
Libertas movement, it polled 4.8 percent in the 2009 European election 
and  acted as a bulwark against the FN vote. The fact that in 2010 the MPF 
aligned with the UMP in the regional elections certainly helped the FN to 
gain votes. Two distinct alliances of parties from the far right end of the 
political spectrum contested the 2010 elections. The Parti de la France 
(PDF) ran in four regions under its own banner and in two others on a 
common slate with the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) and the 
Nouvelle Droite Populaire (NDP) led by the former FN MP, Robert Spieler. 
On its own, the PDF polled between 1.46 percent and 3.71 percent. On 
the common slates with the slogan, “No to minarets”, it received 2.46 
percent and 3 percent. In three regions the Bloc Identitaire fi elded candi-
dates who were joined by former FN and MNR dissidents. They polled 
4.98 percent in Alsace, 2.69 percent in Provence and 0.61 percent in 
Languedoc. In local by-elections candidates from the Bloc Identitaire re-
ceived more than 5 percent in the Nice area.
The organization of the extreme right
Political parties
Front National
The extreme right is divided into a myriad of rival groups jostling for the 
leadership of this party family when Jean-Marie Le Pen steps down from 
the FN presidency in January 2011. What is now at stake is the ideo-
France
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logical identity and tactics of the FN in the presidential election of 2012 
and beyond, and the outcome will differ greatly depending on whether 
Marine Le Pen or Bruno Gollnisch takes over the party. New alliances will 
emerge then, either with the “modernist” outlook of Marine Le Pen or 
the “traditionalist” approach of Gollnisch. The basic principles, however, 
will not change. As always, they will be: populism; xenophobia with a 
social agenda of “priority for the French”; opposition to the European 
Union and the euro currency; and fi nally, opposition to the “Big State”, 
but with the demand for better social services for French “natives” only. 
What may change is the style of leadership. Marine Le Pen is much less 
prone than her father or Gollnisch to utter blatantly racist statements or 
even propagate anti-Semitism or Holocaust denial – but that does not 
make her the French Gianfranco Fini.
Marine Le Pen                                   Jean-Marie Le Pen                        Bruno Gollnisch 
The offi cial campaign for the election to the FN party presidency opened 
in September 2010. For the fi rst time in the history of FN, its leader will 
be elected by all paid-up members in a secret ballot. In June 2010 two 
candidates were offi cially endorsed by at least 20 local federations of the 
party, and were allowed to stand. Bruno Gollnisch (b. 1950) is an MEP 
and the secretary-general of FN. Marine Le Pen (b. 1968), also an MEP, is 
a party vice-president. On 30 June 2010, Jean-Marie Le Pen announced in 
the daily newspaper France-Soir that he would back his daughter’s candi-
dacy. But even after he steps down he will undoubtedly continue to keep 
watch on the party’s internal affairs.
France
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Other political parties and extreme-right groups
Apart from the FN, the extreme-right consists of the Mouvement National 
Républicain (MNR), the Parti de la France (PDF and the Bloc Identitaire. The 
MNR was founded in 1999 by Bruno Mégret, the FN’s former second-in-
command, as the result of a split. Led by Annick Martin, it polled only 
0.39 percent in 2007 and is almost defunct. The Parti de la France is led by 
Carl Lang, a former top executive of FN who left in 2008. It is a splinter 
party that was launched in January 2009, mostly as a group trying to gear 
itself to Le Pen’s prospective retirement. The PDF is a mix of ex-FN arch-
conser vatives, Catholic fundamentalists and neo-fascists. The Bloc Identi-
taire, launched as a political party in October 2009, is headed by Fabrice 
Robert. Originating in the family of nationalist revolutionary sub-parties, 
it evolved into a populist movement rallying around slogans of European 
nationalism such as those propagated by the Lega Nord, and opposition 
to Islam. Dissociating itself from the traditional extreme right, it focuses 
on cultural or ethnic identity values. The inaugural convention of the 
Bloc Identitaire was attended by foreign delegates from the Lega Nord, the 
radical wing of the Swiss SVP and Plataforma per Catalunya. Bloc Identitaire 
is certainly the most innovative far-right formation in terms of ideology 
and political tactics. It is attempting to break away from French “Jacobin” 
nationalism and to promote local regionalist groups, while keeping its 
distance from the populist and racialist orientation of movements such 
as Pierre Vial’s Terre et Peuple. In June 2010 it attracted considerable media 
attention by staging an event in Paris with the secularist, alternative left 
group Riposte Laïque, with the aim of alerting citizens to the “Islamisa-
tion” of the French capital. Among other groups, we should mention the 
Nouvelle Droite Populaire, which has been part of the “ Cities against 
islamisation” grouping since January 2008, and has contact to the Pro 
Cologne movement.
Every time the FN rose in the popular ratings, the extra-parliamentary 
extreme right lost militants. The uncertainty about the FN’s future has 
led to a limited revival of neo-fascist groups: the violence-prone street 
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brawlers of the Groupe Union Défense (GUD) which was re-founded in 
October 2009, the Renouveau Français, a Catholic-fascist group linked to 
Austria’s Nationale Volkspartei, and the Oeuvre française led by Pierre Sidos. 
The annual street rally of the radical far right in Paris on 9 May 2010 
confi rmed the emergence of a small but growing independent nationalist 
group, Nationalistes autonomes (Autonome Nationalisten) in the capital and 
in Eastern France, under the infl uence of the kindred German movement. 
The French extreme-right comprises the following distinctive features: a 
Nazi skinhead movement, currently numbering less than 1,000 but gain-
ing ground in northern France and represented mainly by the Hammer-
skins, and to a much lesser extent by Blood and Honour affi liates; the re-
sidual intellectual infl uence of monarchist and Catholic fundamentalist 
groups, embodied in the remnants of the royalist Action française and the 
ultra-traditionalist Fraternité Sacerdotale St. Pie X; and the fact that the 
New Right, and especially its major thinker Alain de Benoist, have 
expressed their opposition to the FN3 and want to act solely on a meta-
political level. Despite this dissociation, we can say that the agenda of the 
New Right had a tremendous infl uence on the shaping of the Front 
National’s ideology in the 1970s and up until the mid-80s. Several 
prominent leaders of the New Right think tank, GRECE (Groupement 
d’études et de Recherche pour la Civilisation européenne), switched to the 
FN, including Pierre Vial, Yvan Blot, Jean-Claude Bardet and Jean-Yves 
Le Gallou. They brought with them an articulated and intellectual de-
fi nition of ethnicity, anti-egalitarianism and organicist socio-economic 
ideas.
3 Although a regular contributor to “Junge Freiheit”, de Benoist is not a nationalist conservative 
and tries to distance himself from the political right wing. The Conservative Revolution is, how-
ever, the major infl uence on his thought.
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Social movements
The extreme right has almost no infl uence on social movements: FN’s 
attempts in the mid-90s to launch trade unions and professional associa-
tions quickly ended in dismal failure due to lack of support and lack of 
legal recognition. The youth wing of the party (Front National de la Jeu-
nesse), which serves as a training school for future party executives and 
has always been a hotbed of radical ideologies, never numbered more 
than 1800 members. Currently led by David Rachline, it mainly supports 
Marine Le Pen. The FN has no infl uence in academic life or in the media, 
and does not maintain a think tank. However, in May 2010, Louis Aliot, 
the former secretary general of FN and a supporter of Marine Le Pen, an-
nounced that he was launching an FN think tank, Idées-Nation, in sup-
port of her candidacy. Fondation Polemia, led by Jean-Yves Le Gallou, 
can be regarded as the think tank of the Identity movement, while the 
Club de l’Horloge disseminates the ideas of the nationalist conservative 
right wing. The number of far-right publications sold at newsstands, as 
well as far-right bookshops (aside from mail order or online), is falling 
but still remains larger than in most European countries (6 publications; 
a dozen bookshops). The Front National, affected by cuts in public fi nanc-
ing following its poor elections results in 2007, has completely stopped 
publishing newspapers except for two subscription-only publications 
 issued in the specifi c context of the internal contest for the party presi-
dency: Nation Presse Info is supporting Marine Le Pen, while Droite  Ligne 
is supporting Gollnisch, who also has the backing of the weekly Rivarol, 
which has sold at newsstands since 1951 and is an extreme anti-Zionist 
publication that allows freedom of speech to Holocaust deniers. The 
number of extreme-right websites does not seem to be growing signifi -
cantly; only a few are professionally designed and offer innovative con-
tent. These include: http://www.nationspresse.info; www.voxnr.com; 
http://fr.novopress.info and http://zentropa.splinder.com.
The extreme right is a kind of counter-society with its own codes and 
traditions, but the overwhelming majority of FN voters have no connec-
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tion to it. The average FN voter feels deeply alienated from the elites and 
the social movements; he/she tends to drift away if denied the chance to 
vote for FN (as in the 2008 municipal elections, when the party failed to 
fi eld candidates in all the major cities). In any case, all the surveys show 
that the average FN voter is not religious, although many FN party execu-
tives in the 1980s and ‘90s were Catholic traditionalists.
International networks
The FN was the driving force behind the wave of similar parties that rose 
in Western Europe, and it eventually succeeded the former Italian far-
right party, MSI, as the leader of the far right in Western Europe. Emerg-
ing from the lunatic fringe to become an important party, the FN soon 
took over as the bright star of the European extreme right. This partly 
explains why, following its fi rst electoral success in 1984, Le Pen began 
contemplating the idea of building a transnational network both within 
and beyond the European Parliament. The most recent grouping of this 
kind was Identité, Tradition, Souveraineté, which existed in the European 
Parliament from January until November 2007 but, like similar previous 
groups, collapsed because of internal in-fi ghting. These attempts to 
create an umbrella group in Strasbourg, as well as a transnational net-
work of parties under the name “Euro-Nat”, have generally been misin-
terpreted. In the 1970s, when the MSI sponsored the Eurodroite network, 
it had very little to gain from this, and the move was primarily motivated 
by a genuine commitment to “spreading the faith” in countries where 
the far right was weak, or keeping it alive where it was threatened, such 
as in Greece and Spain after the collapse of the dictatorships. By contrast, 
FN-led groups were only launched in order to compensate for the party’s 
complete lack of credibility on the “home front”, in an attempt to appear 
as a party with numerous high-level or mainstream connections abroad. 
FN’s international contacts were forged without reference to their 
ideological validity or practical relevance, and the party seems to have 
known very little about some of its foreign partners: in 1996, the FN staff 
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member in charge of handling contacts for the youth wing of Euro-Nat 
was incapable of properly defi ning the ideological affi liation of the 
Portuguese movement that belonged to the network. In fact, the FN has 
not made a serious effort to build a transnational network on an ideo-
logical basis. It is well aware that this is an impossible task, and in any 
case, the real reason for these contacts was for Le Pen to boost his ego by 
meeting kindred politicians who were part of ruling coalitions, notably 
in Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Russia or, in the case of Flanders, who 
could potentially become the main political force in government. The 
only serious aspect of the grouping in the European Parliament is that 
the assembly granted the FN important fi nancial and administrative re-
sources that it used to hire staff members and publish propaganda or or-
ganize events; this was actually useful to the party on the national level.
The FN’s current transnational network is the Alliance of European Na-
tional Movements, formed in Budapest on 24 October 2009 under the 
chairmanship of Bruno Gollnisch. The Alliance’s founding members are 
Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary, the Italian Fiamma Tricolore, 
Sverigedemokraterna from Sweden, the Front National from Belgium, the 
British National Party, the Partido Nacional Renovador (Portugal), the Movi-
mento Social Republicano (Spain) and the Ukrainian Svoboda Party. Under 
new European Parliament regulations, the network needs 25 MEPs from 
7 different member states to be able to form a parliamentary group. Nor 
are the activities of the Alliance likely to boost the party’s popularity at 
home4: in August 2010 the Alliance was due to meet in  Japan at the in-
vitation of a local far-right party, Issuikai. Apart from the Alliance, the FN 
maintains close relations with several like-minded parties across Europe, 
such as the FPÖ (especially through Andreas Mölzer). Other successful 
parties such as Geert Wilders’ party in the Netherlands and the Scandi-
navian populists reject cooperation with the FN because they see it as 
being outside the mainstream. In 2009 Vlaams Belang un offi cially dissoci-
ated itself from the FN after having worked with it very closely since the 
1980s.
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The international networks of the extra-parliamentary extreme right are 
informal. The neo-fascist umbrella organization European National Front 
(ENF), which included the Renouveau Français, Forza Nuova and the NPD, 
seems to have become inactive. 
Social attitudes 
The activity of the extreme right should be seen in the context of the 
growing number of racist/anti-Semitic incidents as compared to the 
1990s. The annual survey of the Commission Nationale Consultative des 
Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH) recorded 467 racist incidents in France in 
2008 and 1026 in 2009, mainly aggression and threats towards the Arab/
Muslim and African/Caribbean communities. 
France
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Paradoxically, this does not mean that French society is becoming more 
intolerant. The same report shows that in 2009, 54 percent of respond-
ents claimed they were “not racist at all”, an increase of 2 percent over 
2008. On the other hand, 49 percent agreed that “there are too many im-
migrants in France”, and 50 percent said that when integration failed, 
the immigrants were mainly to blame for not adopting the French way of 
life. Nevertheless, some ethnic minorities are still victimised by specifi c 
prejudices: the survey reported 69 percent of respondents as saying that 
the Roma are “an insular group” and 44 percent holding similar opinions 
about Muslims. 29 percent consider the Jews to be a group isolated from 
the rest of society, and Jews are facing a rise in violence perpetrated by a 
minority of the migrant population of North African origin. When asked 
about their biggest problems in everyday life, 60 percent of French 
respondents mentioned unemployment and the fear of impoverishment 
(terrorism: 11 percent; religious fundamentalism: 10 percent; immigra-
tion: only 7 percent). The infl uence of the extreme right can be seen in 
the negative image of the Muslim faith: 30 percent of respondents had a 
negative attitude to Islam and 73 percent saw the wearing of the hijab as 
a problem. In every case, prejudice against minorities is strongly corre-
lated to voting for the far right or traditional right, but also with being 
male, a senior citizen, or working class with a low educational level and 
below-average income. The report also noted a sharp increase in the 
number of anti-Semitic incidents, which rose from 459 in 2008 to 815 in 
2009, mostly as a result of mass mobilization by the extra-parliamentary 
left and the Islamist movement against Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 
Gaza. While a signifi cant proportion of the racist incidents against 
 Muslims seem to be perpetrated by young people from the extreme right 
who make use of neo-Nazi symbols, the overwhelming majority of anti-
Semitic incidents have no far-right background. However, as French law 
prohibits recording the ethnicity and religion of citizens and using them 
in statistics, it is impossible to prove that the majority of perpetrators of 
anti-Semitic incidents come from the Muslim community. In relation to 
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the long tradition of strident anti-Semitism within the French extreme 
right, a sector of the extremist groups is now anti-Jewish and anti-Israel, 
but others, such as the Bloc Identitaire and even Marine Le Pen herself, 
have struck anti-Jewish/anti-Zionist prejudice off their agendas. Con-
versely, the Parti Antisioniste (PAS), which contested the 2009 European 
election in the Paris area (polling 1.23 percent of the vote) was an unfa-
miliar new mix of Islamists, radical left anti-Zionists and neo-fascist anti-
Semites gathered under the leadership of the comedian Dieudonné. 
Although the so-called Red-Green-Brown alliance does not really exist, 
there are increasing links between the radical-right and extreme anti-
Zionists. In April 2010 the Iranian ambassador to France gave a lecture to 
a mixed audience of leftists, Islamists and neo-fascists in a Paris meeting 
room owned by a leader of Renouveau Français. The meeting was set up by 
“Flash”, a fortnightly national-revolutionary magazine, and was attend-
ed by Thomas Werlet, the leader of the tiny Parti Solidaire Français, a 
strident anti-Jewish activist group.
Target groups and their approach
In sociological terms, voters for Le Pen or FN in elections between 2002 
and 2007 had the following background:
France
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France
 
Presidential 88 Presidential 95 Presidential 02 Presidential 07 
Total 15 15 17 11
Sex
Male 18 19 20 12
Female 11 12 14 9
Age
18 – 24 14 18 13 10
25 – 34 15 20 17 10
35 – 49 15 16 18 11
50 – 64 14 14 20 12
65 and over 16 10 15 9
Occupation
Farmer 10 10 22 10
Manager 19 19 22 10
Middle-level executive  14 4 13 7
Low-level employee 14 18 22 12
Worker 17 21 23 16
Unemployed 17 28 20 11
Sector
Private 16 16 20 12
Public 14 14 14 11
Education
Primary school 15 17 24 13
Secondary school 17 20 21 13
Lower school leaving 
certifi cate
13 12 15 8
Higher school leaving 
certifi cate 
10 13 11 3
University degree 9 4 7 4
Catholic Observance* 
High 13 8 12 5
Low 13 13 18 10
No observance 16 19 20 12
No religion 10 14 15 12
Numbers represent percentage of total votes.
* There are no data for other religions.
Table 2
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France
The chart can be interpreted as follows: fi rstly, the FN is predominantly a 
male party – the gender gap is not narrowing with time, although Marine 
Le Pen is now the FN media representative and main spokesperson. The 
party‘s main constituency is middle-aged and retired people, and its im-
pact on young people is limited by its negative image as a party led by an 
old man who is the only surviving elected politician to have been an MP 
under the Fourth Republic. The average FN voter has a low income, low 
educational level and low social status. He/she is not religiously observ-
ant. The overwhelming majority of FN voters come from a Catholic back-
ground, although there are some Protestant strongholds in the Alsace 
region. The numbers voting for FN within the Jewish and the Muslim 
populations remain below 5 percent, despite Le Pen’s efforts to attract the 
second-generation immigrants’ vote in the suburbs during his 2007 cam-
paign. It is likely to decline further because of the party‘s emphasis on the 
issue of “Islamisation” in the 2010 elections campaign.
The major themes of FN propaganda have barely changed since the party 
was founded in 1972. Immigration and mobilization against the “de-
cline” of the nation are the priority issues, alongside rewards for hard 
work and the policy of granting social benefi ts to “native” French people 
only. Showing appreciation for small business entrepreneurial skills and 
meritocracy comes second, as befi ts a party with its constituency in the 
working class and the professions. Law and order (including the re-intro-
duction of the death penalty) come third. The FN has also gained votes 
by posing as anti-elite and against corruption, presenting itself as the 
only alternative to the “bande des quatres” (Gang of Four) made up of 
the Conservative/Liberal Right, the centre-right and the Socialist Party.
Prospects for the extreme right
The Front National has declined recently due to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s poor 
showing in the 2007 presidential election and the subsequent cuts in 
public funding for the party. In 2010 it was forced to sell its oversized 
headquarters, lay off a section of its permanent staff and keep its cam-
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paigns low-key. The party’s image has been damaged by the internal strife 
over Le Pen’s successor as chairman. However, Sarkozy’s victory over the 
FN proved short-lived because the conservative right underestimated 
voters’ anger at a government that is not delivering on the promises it 
made in 2007 for improving the social and economic situation. Although 
it is unlikely that the FN candidate in 2012 will succeed in reaching the 
second ballot, it is now clear that the party will survive the change of 
leadership. The fi rst (and most likely) scenario is that Marine Le Pen will 
become chairperson and will try to change the image of the party in a 
way that many supporters see as “moderate”. This means she could lose 
the really diehard ideologues and militants and would have to attract 
new voters from the mainstream right, especially among women and 
young people. The second scenario is that Bruno Gollnisch will take over 
the chair. In this case the FN will remain an ostracized movement, loyal 
to the basic principles of the extreme right but unable to develop beyond 
its present state. Whoever wins, there is the possibility of a split – 
although the failure of MNR and PDF indicate that probably no splinter 
party could survive outside the Front National, at least as long as Jean-
Marie Le Pen is still alive. It is important to understand that if Marine Le 
Pen succeeds her father she does not intend to follow a Fini-type strategy; 
while differing from her father on topics such as anti-Semitism or the 
Second World War, she has no intention of changing the fundamentals 
of FN ideology on issues such as immigration, opposition to Islam, multi-
culturalism, and law and order. However the FN develops, its politics will 
probably be a mix of traditional extreme-right positions and the main-
stream tactics of parties like Lega Nord or the Dansk Folkeparti.
Whatever happens, Le Pen’s retirement will undoubtedly redraw the map 
of the French extreme right.  
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The situation of the extreme right in Great Britain
Traditional perspectives for the analysis 
of the British extreme right
Until a few years ago, the position of the extreme right in Great Britain 
was usually analysed within a paradigm of supposed ‘British exceptional-
ism’ – that, in contrast to many other countries of Europe, Great Britain 
(which excludes Northern Ireland) had been largely inured against ex treme-
right politics. Such parties that were active in the 1930s, the 1950s, and 
the 1960s and 1970s had some contemporary support and political 
 impact, but they proved evanescent and did not put down any social 
 roots.1
The need for a new perspective?
While it is true that the British situation is not that of countries such as 
France or Belgium, any claim to exceptionalism may now need qualifi ca-
tion in the light of the emergence since 2000 - 01 in some localities of the 
British National Party (BNP), albeit the only British extreme-right party of 
any present-day importance. The party was founded in 1982 as one of 
the spin-offs from the disintegration of the earlier National Front (NF) but 
1 This argument and the supposed reasons for Britain’s distinctiveness in this respect are rehearsed 
in several sources; for example, Eatwell, R (1992), ‘Why has the extreme right failed in Britain?’, 
in Hainsworth, P (ed), The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA (London: Pinter), 175 - 92; 
Eatwell, R (2000), ‘The extreme right and British exceptionalism: the primacy of politics’, in 
Hainsworth, P (ed), The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream 
(New York: Pinter), 172 - 92; and Husbands, C T (1994), ‘Following the “continental model”?: 
implications of the electoral performance of the British National Party’, New Community, 20(4), 
563 - 79.
Christopher T. Husbands
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only with the election in 1999 of Nicholas Griffi n as its Chair to replace 
the aging John Tyndall (1934-2005) has it achieved a degree of political 
credibility as well as support, despite persisting factionalism within it and 
the defection at various times of some of its locally high-profi le activists. 
Griffi n has a long history of activism in the British extreme right, from 
his early days in the NF. The BNP’s voter base, disproportionately male 
and largely but not exclusively white working-class or petit-bourgeois, 
has similarities to that of the old NF and until recently was very specifi -
cally concentrated in certain locations: towns in Lancashire such as 
Burnley and Oldham; towns in Yorkshire such as Bradford, Keighley and 
Dewsbury; Stoke-on-Trent in the northern west Midlands; Birmingham 
and some towns around it, such as Dudley; certain parts of London, espe-
cially inner and outer East London; and parts of neighbouring Essex. Un-
til 2008 this success, in terms of seats won, was limited to victories in 
lowest-tier local-authority elections and by-elections.
The level and basic features of current BNP 
support in Great Britain
However, in May 2008 the BNP achieved the election of a member of the 
London Assembly in an election based upon a proportional-representa-
tion principle this seat was won on the basis of 5.3 percent of the vote 
across Greater London as a whole (3.9 percent of the eligible electorate). 
In the constituency covering the BNP’s London heartland of inner and 
outer East London, the level of BNP support was 9.8 percent, with an ad-
ditional 1.3 percent for the NF (3.9 and 0.5 percent respectively of the 
eligible electorate).
Then, in June 2009, albeit partly assisted by the lack of popularity of the 
governing Labour Party and by a general disillusion with the major 
parties, the BNP succeeded in the European Parliament elections in elect-
ing two MEPs, Griffi n himself from the North West constituency and 
Andrew Brons from the Yorkshire & Humber constituency. This was 
achieved on the basis of 8.0 and 9.8 percent respectively of the votes cast 
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(2.6 and 3.2 percent of the relevant electorates). Rather more worryingly, 
whereas in the past one would have said that the nation-wide support for 
the extreme right was probably no more than about 1 percent, the level 
of BNP electoral support in the 2009 European elections even in the 
party’s weaker locations shows that it managed to spread to a degree from 
beyond its heartlands. Its overall national support in the 2009 European 
elections was 6.0 percent (2.1 percent of the eligible electorate). In the 
South East constituency, where it is not a political force, it nonetheless 
managed 4.4 percent of votes cast (1.7 percent of the eligible electorate).
Most standard published opinion polls do not report BNP support sepa-
rately and, in any case, there is evidence that such polls that do specifi -
cally report the BNP’s support substantially underestimate its potential 
strength. One national poll taken (probably by Internet or telephone) in 
exceptional circumstances in October 2009 on the day immediately after 
the appearance of the BNP leader on a highly publicized BBC television 
programme [see below] reported support at 3 percent, in contrast with 
the previous month’s 2 percent.2 The same poll also reported that 22 per-
cent of respondents would ‘seriously consider’ voting for the BNP in a 
future local, general or European election. Forty-three (43) percent shared 
some of its concerns but ‘had no sympathy for the party itself’. A high 
12 percent said that they completely agreed with the BNP, but 38 percent 
completely disagreed and two-thirds said that they would under no cir-
cumstances vote for it. Some of these fi gures may seem alarming, but the 
circumstances of the poll mean that they should probably be regarded 
with at least some circumspection, if not scepticism. The ‘true’ fi gure – 
putting together the evidence of the 2009 European Parliament results 
but also by-election results of the time – for BNP support in late 2009/
early 2010, if measured accurately and at a time without particular sensi-
tivity to the BNP, would probably have been around 4 percent in Great 
Britain, and very slightly higher in England alone.
2 Prince, R (23 October 2009), ‘One in fi ve “would consider voting BNP” after Nick Griffi n Ques-
tion Time appearance’, Daily Telegraph online, www.telegraph.co.uk, accessed 1 November 
2009.
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As it happens, the national and local elections that took place on 6 May 
2010 give an excellent and very recent opportunity to assess the genuine 
level of current voter support for the BNP in Great Britain; this was a 
contest that lacked the somewhat artifi cial context of a second-order 
election, as was the 2009 European Parliament election. More analyti-
cally helpful is that these results also give an excellent indication of 
where the BNP’s relative strongholds now are, and hence what factors 
may be relevant in precipitating support for it. In the 2010 general elec-
tion the BNP fi elded candidates in 338 of the 632 constituencies in Eng-
land, Wales and Scotland – the widest general-election appearance ever 
by an extreme-right party, exceeding even that of the NF in 1979, which 
had run in 303 constituencies. Almost all the BNP appearances were in 
England, but 12 were in Wales (out of 40 constituencies there) and 13 
were in Scotland (out of 59 constituencies there). Overall, the party won 
3.8 percent of votes cast in seats fought, though the fi gure in England was 
slightly higher (3.9 percent). All the performances in Scotland and most 
of those in Wales were below the national average fi gure, whose level is 
broadly consistent with what might have been inferred from a variety of 
sources, including opinion polls after adjusting for their known underes-
timation, of the level of national support for the BNP over the past year 
at times when there was no particular public sensitivity to it.
The electoral performance of the BNP in the 2010 general election was 
widely interpreted by commentators as a setback because nowhere did it 
achieve any really signifi cant result, let alone win any of its target seats 
– although it fared considerably better than the closest relevant compari-
son, the general-election performance of the NF thirty-one years earlier, 
which was a mere 1.3 percent in 303 constituencies fought. Still, the in-
crease to 3.8 percent may be partly attributable to the continuing decline 
of partisan electoral alignment to the mainstream political parties, a phe-
nomenon that has been a much-discussed feature of the political sociol-
ogy of Great Britain for more than four decades.3
3 For one of many standard discussions of the phenomenon, see Denver, D (2007), Elections and 
Voters in Britain (2nd ed; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 72-4.
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What is interesting, however, is where BNP support has persisted, where 
it has declined, and where it has emerged over recent years. The inner 
London East End constituencies, where the traditional heartland of the 
extreme right was historically based, have become much more multicul-
tural and tolerant. Instead, this extreme-right support has migrated to 
certain outer London working-class suburbs and is now to be seen in 
constituencies such as Barking, which was the BNP’s prime target seat 
where Griffi n stood as candidate, and its neighbouring Dagenham and 
Rainham. These were in fact the BNP’s best constituency performances in 
2010 with 14.6 and 11.2 percent of votes cast respectively. Support in 
nearby Thurrock (7.9 percent) and Hornchurch & Upminster (6.4 per-
cent) also refl ects this migration from inner east London.
Looking elsewhere, there remains some BNP support in parts of the West 
Midlands, where there has long been some proclivity for racist politics. 
West Bromwich West and Walsall North constituencies (9.4 and 8.1 per-
cent respectively) are examples of this. In recent years the BNP has also 
built up a base in Stoke-on-Trent, formerly famous as Britain’s foremost 
potteries town, and it had earlier won a number of local council seats 
there. It had expectations, if not of winning, then of performing impres-
sively there, especially in the Stoke-on-Trent Central and South constitu-
encies; its eventual 7.7 and 9.4 percent were well above the national aver-
age, but less than what it had hoped. Long-time areas of support in 
Lancashire also remain relative strongholds, though less so than some 
years ago. Ashton under Lyne (7.6 percent), Blackley & Broughton (7.2 
percent), Burnley (9.0 percent), Heywood & Middleton (7.0 percent), 
Makerfi eld (7.4 percent), and Oldham West & Royton (7.1 percent) are 
the most signifi cant examples of support in this area. In West Yorkshire, 
formerly the basis of Britain’s woollen industry and where the NF had 
earlier done well, are also examples of relative BNP strength: Batley & 
Spen (7.1 percent), Hemsworth (7.0 percent), Leeds Central (8.2 percent), 
Leeds East (7.8 percent), and Morley & Outwood (7.2 percent).
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What is perhaps most noticeable about the 2010 results is, however, the 
emergence to prominence of parts of South Yorkshire as some of the 
BNP’s areas of very highest support. A string of parliamentary constituen-
cies in this area saw some of the BNP’s best performances: Barnsley Cen-
tral (8.9 percent), Barnsley East (8.6 percent), Normanton, Pontefract & 
Castleford (8.4 percent), Rotherham (10.4 percent), Rother Valley (7.7 
percent), Sheffi eld Brightside & Hillsborough (7.8 percent), and Went-
worth & Dearne (7.6 percent). This is precisely the part of the country 
probably hit hardest in the longest term by the fallout from economic 
restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s, having been the heart of the British 
coal and also steel industries till the extensive mine-closure programme 
and deindustrialization processes of those years.
The BNP’s most public successes in the past decade have been its ability 
to win seats on local authority councils in elections fought on a ward 
basis, the ‘ward’ being a geographical unit electing one (or sometimes 
more) local councillors. Before the recent round of local-authority elec-
tions, also held on 6 May 2010, the BNP’s overall tally had been 57 local-
authority councillors (all of them in England). This represented a far 
more impressive achievement than that by any previous extreme-right 
party, but it is still a minuscule fraction of the more than 22,000 of all 
such seats. The BNP also has just three councillors at the next highest 
level, the county – in Lancashire, Leicestershire and Hertfordshire (the 
last north of London). These local elections on 6 May 2010 were all con-
ducted on the fi rst-past-the-post principle, which works against smaller 
parties. However, of the 28 local council seats (out of the total of 57) be-
ing defended by the BNP in May 2010, all but two were lost, leaving the 
party with a current tally of 31 such seats. In Barking & Dagenham, where 
the party had previously held 12 seats won in 2006, it had even hoped to 
capture the council but in the event lost all its 12 councillors.
It is not diffi cult to point to some factors that contributed to this setback 
by the BNP – even if it is not easy to assess their respective relative impor-
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4 For details, see Lowles, N (June 2010), ‘Routed’, Searchlight, 420, 4 -7, and generally at www.
hopenothate.org.uk.
tance. There was a very strong anti-fascist campaign against the BNP, es-
pecially in Barking & Dagenham and this mobilization of anti-fascist ac-
tivists must have made a difference.4 However, one should not discount 
other factors – the local elections and the general election were held on 
the same day, meaning that their electorates were conterminous and so 
local-election participation was higher than normal for such elections; 
the lower turnout in local elections has historically assisted extreme-right 
parties in terms of vote share, even if only when the local or national 
mood runs in their favour. There is also the simple matter of voters’ disil-
lusion; although some BNP elected offi cials were undoubtedly conscien-
tious in their duties, others were not – failing to attend council meetings 
or to respond to the individual concerns of their constituents. Former 
voters were then disappointed that their earlier vote, albeit having led to 
the election of their chosen candidate, did nonetheless not lead to any 
noticeable improvement in the circumstances that determined their vote 
in the fi rst place. 
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The BNP and the media response
The BNP’s Euro-victories in 2009 and the fact that it is now in England 
still clearly the fi fth largest party (after the three traditional parties, plus 
the United Kingdom Independence Party) threw into disarray the usual 
past policy of mainstream political parties and the mainstream media of 
‘outcasting’ the BNP. Amid much controversy in October 2009 the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) invited Griffi n on to ‘Question Time’, a 
premier weekly television current affairs programme with a studio audi-
ence (members of an interested public in a different locality each week 
ask questions on topical political issues to a panel of celebrities, usually 
senior politicians from the major parties or other public fi gures). Griffi n 
duly appeared on Thursday 22 October 2009 amid much media contro-
versy and was forced to face some diffi cult questions from the chairper-
son and from other panel members. Although there were polling reports 
of increased support for the BNP immediately after the programme and 
the BNP was variously claiming 3,000 to 4,000 requests for new member-
ship, it was generally agreed – including latterly within the BNP itself – 
that the performance was not helpful for the party’s image.
It is the socio-political environment of its areas of support that has as-
sisted the BNP, which has relied variously on anti-immigrant, anti-asy-
lum-seeker, anti-Muslim and anti-Asian appeals, depending on time and 
context. The Lancashire and Yorkshire towns where it has made an im-
pact have experiences earlier in the decade of white/Asian confl icts, and 
tend also to have had high levels of segregation and little contact be-
tween whites and other ethnic groups. However, the spread of BNP sup-
port seen in the 2009 Euro-elections may have meant that, at least on 
that occasion, the normal degree of social determinism of BNP support 
was lessened, as those with these phobic views across wider sections of 
society were drawn to the BNP. Still, the more distinctive geographical 
pattern of BNP support in the 2010 general election suggests that a de-
gree of social determinism in its support has been restored.
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The danger to democratic politics posed by the extreme right in Great 
Britain is the risk of the banalization of support for it – the view of a part 
of the electorate that voting for the extreme right is a normal, even if a 
risqué or ‘daring’ or unconventional demonstration of hostility to the 
political system. It is that sentiment against which some Labour politi-
cians, especially those seeing a strong extreme-right sentiment in their 
locality, have been warning for some time, although it would be very 
wrong to suggest that the banality of extreme-right sympathy is a na-
tional phenomenon. However, it can undoubtedly be a local factor in 
those places where the BNP has established a foothold.
Other extreme-right phenomena in Great Britain
The BNP has been the only recent signifi cant political party on the Brit-
ish extreme right. However, the NF – with its heyday in the 1970s – con-
tinues to exist, even if it has long ago been thoroughly eclipsed by the 
BNP. In the May 2010 general election the NF had initially intended to 
run a candidate in 25 constituencies but, in the event, managed only 17, 
distributed quite widely across the country and averaging only 1.4 per-
cent in these constituencies fought. There has been a suggestion that 
some disaffected former BNP supporters have gravitated into the NF, 
though that is largely only an activist phenomenon.
There are also some niche activities that attract a few who are sympa-
thetic to the extreme right, including some football club support and 
White Power rock music, but these phenomena do not obtrude upon the 
wider society – except that a group calling itself the English Defence League 
(EDL) (with a small Welsh companion group, the Welsh Defence League) 
has since the summer of 2009 been making a signifi cant public impres-
sion in the media, with marches usually in cities and towns with large 
Muslim populations. It has not contested elections but has confi ned its 
activities to controversial marches, which have now occurred in Birming-
ham, London, Leeds and other places, and which have often been asso-
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ciated with violence between its members and its opponents. It and the 
BNP have mutually sought publicly to distance themselves from each 
other but there is much evidence of EDL activists in some locations who 
have also been active in the BNP, as well as active in football hooliganism. 
Despite its claim to be against only Islamist extremism, critics accuse it of 
general Islamophobia. The alleged precipitating event for EDL’s formation 
was a small but vocal demonstration by a few Islamist extremists against the 
2nd Battalion of the Royal Anglian Regiment when it publicly celebrated its 
return from Iraq with a march through the town of Luton on 10 March 
2009. As discussed below, this organization may assume a greater public 
prominence in the light of the BNP’s electoral setback in 2010. Several 
other extreme-right groups do exist but are wholly marginal.
The structure of extreme-right support
Formal political parties of the extreme right seek to mobilize support 
principally on the basis of ethnic expulsionism or exclusionism (though 
also adhering to other, traditional, right-wing concerns), and there is a 
hierarchy of commitment to any such party – ranging from a core of ac-
tivism to a penumbra of less-committed support.5
• Extreme-right activism by individuals who attends meetings, go on 
marches, assist in elections, and even stand as candidates
• Passive membership by those who sympathize but do not become 
involved in any actual activism
• Persistent and loyal voters for such parties
• Occasional, intermittent or one-off voters for such parties
• Sympathisers with such parties who do not actually vote for the parties
• Sympathisers with some or all of such parties’ policies who do not 
otherwise support these parties
Great Britain
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The fi rst four categories would, for example, encompass those 22 percent 
who, in the earlier poll discussed above, would seriously consider BNP 
voting. The last category might be the 43 percent who shared some of the 
BNP’s concerns but would never vote for it.
However, there are reasons to argue that the British population, whatever 
its temporary temptations may be, is not generally signifi cantly disposed 
to ethnic exclusionism. Survey data can be dismissed as only a superfi cial 
refl ection of the true views of the adult population, but nonetheless 
should not be discounted. A Citizenship Survey conducted in 2007- 08 
reported that 82 percent of people in England perceived their community 
as cohesive, agreeing that their local area was a place where people from 
different backgrounds got on well together. Eighty (80) percent of re-
spondents reported regular meaningful interactions with people from 
different ethnic or religious backgrounds.6
Even so, the evidence that does exist within the British population of 
some specifi c hostility, or at least uneasiness, with respect to Asian and 
Muslim people cannot be wholly discounted. The best and most recently 
available reliable data on such attitudes come from the annual British 
Social Attitudes survey, in this case the one conducted between June and 
November 2008.7 The survey asked respondents about their feelings to-
wards a number of different ethnic and religious groups, using to do so a 
so-called ‘feeling thermometer’ ranging from 0 to 100 as its measuring 
instrument. A value of 50 indicated supposed indifference to the group 
concerned, although this response was undoubtedly also used by many 
who felt merely no prejudice against that particular group. Zero indicated 
extreme adverse feeling and anything else below 50, some varying level 
of adverse feeling. Complementarily, the values of 51 to 100 indicated 
increasing levels of positive feeling. Unsurprisingly, ‘white people’ were 
6 Lloyd, C (2009), Citizenship Survey (London: National Centre for Social Research); http://
www.natcen.ac.uk/study/citizenship-survey-2007-08/fi ndings#chapter1.
7 Calculated from National Centre for Social Research (2010), British Social Attitudes Survey 
2008; http://www.britsocat.com.
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most favourably assessed; only 2 percent of respondents gave any level of 
adverse feeling score to that group, and 42 percent were at the midpoint 
of indifference.8 Black and Jewish people attracted some limited levels of 
adverse feeling, at 11 and 14 percent respectively, with midpoint indiffer-
ence percentages both of 49 percent. However, for ‘Asian people’ and 
specifi cally ‘Muslim people’ percentages of negative feelings were notice-
ably higher and would be slightly more so if Asians were excluded from 
the percentage denominator; 21 percent of all respondents expressed 
some level of negative feeling towards Asian people and for Muslim peo-
ple it was as high as 35 percent; the respective midpoints of indifference 
were 46 and 41 percent. Thus, almost two-fi fths of non-Muslim respond-
ents had some degree of negative feeling about Muslim people but, 
although this fi nding is undoubtedly a social fact, past experience has 
shown that the ability of the BNP to convert this into support on any-
thing but a local level has generally been very limited.
The interaction between the extreme right, the state and 
 organizations of civil society
The core of extreme-right support is clearly less numerous – its penumbra 
of support most numerous. Whilst there may be policy initiatives that 
are targeted to reduce pro-extreme-right sympathy in the penumbra (e.g., 
in national immigration policy or initiatives on matters such as urban 
regeneration that can be targeted at localities), most activities by the  state 
that directly combat the extreme-right focus on the core alone and have 
little effect upon the much larger numbers of passive supporters and 
sympathizers. Indeed, in the last analysis the options available to the 
constitutional state to deal with a party such as the BNP are rather lim-
8 These and the following data of this paragraph cover all ethnic-group respondents in the sam-
ple, whose percentages of self-assessed ethnicity were: of some type of white origin, 91 per cent; 
of some type of black origin, 2 per cent; of some type of Asian origin, 5 per cent; and of mixed 
or other origin, 2 per cent.
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schung, 4(1), 52–73 (Link: www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/jkg/1-2002/husbands.pdf).
ited and it is correspondingly diffi cult for the state, by its own actions, 
actually to reduce extreme-right voter support. Of course, activists who 
break the law may be prosecuted as appropriate using the criminal or 
civil law. However, such state actions are largely irrelevant to the issue of 
how to reduce large-scale voter support. The scope of the state’s actions 
in this respect is further circumscribed by the fact that most of the poli-
cies that extreme-right supporters might want to see implemented for 
their benefi t (such as ethnic preference in favour of whites in the alloca-
tion of local resources such as social housing or state-school places) would 
simply be unlawful. Even the use of a criterion such as length of time as 
a local resident to be a surrogate for an ethnic criterion may in certain 
circumstances be unlawful for being indirectly discriminatory.9
We can examine the societal position of the BNP by looking at how the 
state and its civil-society organizations interact with it, and vice versa.
Above was discussed one instance of quasi-state interaction with the BNP, 
viz., Griffi n’s appearance on a television programme, but in general the 
instances where the BNP has been integrated into the organs of the state 
are few and of little consequence. There was some controversy when in 
2009 the BNP member of the London Assembly and in 2010 the two BNP 
MEPs were invited to a Buckingham Palace garden party. As it happened, 
the 2010 invitation to Griffi n to the garden party was withdrawn after he 
had used it in the media to claim that it showed the acceptance of those 
who had voted BNP. Andrew Brons, his MEP colleague, did attend the 
garden party but was reportedly shunned by the other guests. Instead, 
most initiatives in volving the BNP by the state and its organizations, or 
by agents of civil society such as trade unions, are directed against the 
BNP.
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Initiatives by agents of the national state against the BNP
Initiatives against the extreme right by the state have been principally by 
statute or based upon the criminal law. Although the Home Offi ce does 
have a monitoring unit, state surveillance and monitoring has, at least 
until relatively recently, been largely incident-driven and not proactive, 
unlike the state’s longer-term interest in potential Islamist terrorists. 
Legislative provision against incitement to racial hatred (and, since 
October 2007, incitement of hatred based on religious belief) is the prin-
cipal means used by the state against the more overt expressions taken by 
extreme-right sentiment. However, prosecutions have been few, limited 
to the most notorious examples and taken only against individual 
offenders. There have been no proscriptive actions against extreme-right 
parties or organizations per se, although a substantial number of organi-
zations alleged to support Islamist terror have been banned.
Members of the police are explicitly banned from being members of the 
BNP and similar right-wing groups. A leak of the BNP membership list on 
to the Internet in 2009 nonetheless revealed the odd policeman who was 
a member. The ban may have deterred some police from joining, or per-
haps even deterred persons sympathetic to the BNP from joining the 
police, but little more. Prison offi cers are also forbidden from member-
ship, although there has often been strong suspicion of extreme-right-
wing sympathy among some of this group. There has been some discus-
sion among teachers as to whether membership of the BNP should be 
forbidden, although that has not so far happened. However, these issues 
are scarcely even an irritant to the appeals of the BNP, and for some may 
increase its appeal.
There has been another and recent action by an organ of the British state 
against the BNP. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 
the UK’s body with the statutory duty to enforce equality legislation, 
wrote to the BNP on 22 June 2009 demanding under race-equality legisla-
tion that it altered provisions of its constitution concerning its whites-
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only membership criteria, which were seen as racially discriminatory, as 
defi ned in terms of statute. The BNP then sought a brief extension, which 
was granted. When its ultimate response was considered inadequate, the 
Commission issued legal proceedings on 24 August 2009 in respect of the 
party’s constitution and membership criteria. The Commission won on 
the point that the BNP’s then membership criteria were directly racially 
discriminatory. The BNP realized that an amendment to these criteria 
would be needed and Griffi n’s proposed draft change was put to a special 
meeting of the party’s membership at an extraordinary general meeting 
held on 14 February 2010. However, in March this revised version, which 
also required a long vetting interview of intending new members, was 
then ruled by the Court as indirectly racially discriminatory (i.e., setting 
up a criterion that members of one ethnic group would fi nd it much 
more easy to satisfy than members of other ethnic groups). The new ver-
sion required applicants for membership to oppose ‘any form of integra-
tion or assimilation’, which was seen as less likely to be an option for 
those in mixed-race relationships. Whilst apparent indirect discrimina-
tion, unlike direct discrimination, can in English law be allowed if it can 
be objectively justifi ed, the BNP was unable to provide any such justifi ca-
tion. Griffi n’s further attempts at revising the constitution of the party 
have been seen as cosmetic and not in the spirit of the Court’s ruling. The 
matter remains without settlement, with legal action against Griffi n for 
disregarding a Court order being a possibility.10
This action by the EHRC undoubtedly had some impact in that it har-
assed the BNP, which had been obliged to commit funds to argue its case. 
However, its overall and longer-term effect is arguable. Despite the pub-
licity, there remains little evidence or prognosis that it will really hurt the 
BNP, which is never going to become a racially diverse organization. The 
constitutional change, whatever its fi nal form turns out to be, will clearly 
have been reluctantly accepted and its most public effect so far has been 
10 Walker, P, and Taylor, M (9 May 2010), ‘BNP faces legal threat amid new racism claims over 
redrafted constitution’, The Guardian online, www.guardian.co.uk, accessed 17 June 2010.
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that one or two older and embittered anti-Muslim Asian Britons, still 
upset about the massacres associated with the partition of India in 1947, 
are likely to become members, to be merely tolerated by the general 
membership. This sort of formal action is probably the most intrusive 
available to the state to intervene in the affairs of a party such as the BNP, 
for which – whatever its general odious features – actual proscription is 
not a viable policy option.
Actions against the BNP by trade unions and the local state: 
‘Outcasting’ by the legal process
In 2007 the trade union for train-drivers, the Association of Locomotive 
Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), successfully won a decision from the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights did not oblige it to accept into member-
ship those who belonged to extreme-right parties that publicly espoused 
policies and views that were hostile to its own union policies and posi-
tions on multicultural issues.11 The British government responded to this 
by changing the legislation inherited from the era of previous Conserva-
tive government that prohibited the use of political-party membership or 
affi liation as a criterion by which a trade union might determine who 
was allowed to join it. However, the manner in which this decision was 
transposed into English law by section 19 of the Employment Act 2008 
was so circumscribed by exceptions and derogations that critics argue it is 
effectively inoperable; this measure will hardly have signifi cant impact.
Exclusion of BNP activists is a matter in which both trade unions and some 
employers may have an interest. Even before the 2007 ECHR judgment, 
the civil law had occasionally been conditionally willing to support trade 
unions who wished to exclude BNP activists on the ground that their po-
litical beliefs opposed the declared aims and policies of the trade union.
11 The case reference is: Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen v United King-
dom (2007) EHRR, App No 11002/05, (2007) All ER (D) 438 (Feb).
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Also, in particular specifi ed circumstances the law upholds the right of 
employers to dismiss extreme-right employees whose political beliefs or 
activities interfere with the full and proper execution of their job. The 
most signifi cant case concerned a local authority that successfully dis-
missed a publicly known BNP activist who had been employed as a bus 
driver often driving ethnic-minority children to and from school.12 Eng-
lish case law on dismissals from employment evaluates the question of 
fairness according to a ‘range of reasonable responses’ open to the em-
ployer – thus, the courts have accepted that dismissal of a publicly known 
BNP activist whose job brings him into regular contact with those whom 
he might not wish to see in the country is, on that basis, ‘reasonable’.
However, ‘outcasting’ of the BNP by organs and agents of the state can-
not always be effectively done, especially in local authorities where BNP 
councillors have been elected. Having been legally elected, such council-
lors are entitled to certain prerogatives from the state in order to do their 
job. They are expected to represent the interests of those who did not 
vote for them as well as those who did. A policy to deny them access to 
the facilities needed to act as councillors would be counter-productive 
and certainly unlawful.
The BNP in international context
The BNP’s attitude on international matters is interestingly ambivalent. 
Far less than some other West European extreme-right parties has it 
 established itself as part of a European ethnic project. That may be partly 
because what now disturbs some of its supporters is less immigration 
from former British colonies than does immigration from parts of eastern 
Europe. Also, there persists a strong suspicion among many on the 
 extreme right about the UK’s inclusion in Europe.
12 The case reference is: Redfearn v Serco Ltd trading as West Yorkshire Transport Service (2006) 
Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ 659, (2006) IRLR 623.
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Certainly, Griffi n is far more at home in dealing with non-European ex-
treme-right groups. He has well-attested relationships with leaders of 
some of the more unsavory parts of the American extreme right, for ex-
ample. The BNP is reportedly sending a representative in August 2010 
with members of other extreme-right European groups on a visit to Japan 
to make contacts with a Japanese extreme-right group.13
On the other hand, Griffi n himself as an MEP seeks to place himself at 
the centre of the European extreme right, even as successor in this role to 
Jean-Marie Le Pen. The Alliance of European National Movements (AENM) 
is an umbrella group of the non-aligned extreme-right MEPs, who are 
hampered by now having only 8 MEPs in the European Parliament from 
three different countries, but Griffi n reportedly seeks the vice-presidency 
of this group.14
Discussion and Conclusion
The setback suffered by the BNP in the 2010 local and general elections 
may be a false dawn for any prediction of the long-term decline of the 
extreme right in Great Britain. True, it had led to some consequences; 
Griffi n announced his intention to step down from the leadership in 
2013, although that was almost certainly largely to preempt the possibil-
ity of a leadership challenge from one of several contending factions 
within the BNP. Even so, there has been such a challenge and in August 
2010 a leadership election process was supposedly ongoing, although 
Griffi n had been attempting to place impediments in the way of the cam-
paign of his most serious contender.15
However, the reason for a generally more precautionary prognosis on the 
future of the extreme right in Britain is the possibility that, whilst some 
13 Williams, D (August 2010), ‘BNP joins far-right junket to Japan’, Searchlight, 422, 20-1.
14 Williams, D (August 2010), ‘Griffi n looks to Europe’, Searchlight, 422, 11.
15 Gable, S (August 2010), ‘Griffi n plays dirty to cling on to BNP leadership’, Searchlight, 422, 4-10.
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of those who may have more marginally supported the extreme right 
have fallen away, committed extreme-right activists (albeit a much small-
er number of individuals) may be motivated by the setbacks suffered by 
the BNP to transfer their energy into alternative, and more militant, types 
of extreme-right activity.
That was one outcome from the electoral rejection of the earlier NF after 
the 1979 general election won by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Par-
ty. The NF disintegrated into several different groupings and some of 
those seriously committed to the extreme right then focused their atten-
tion instead on more extreme, and (usually) non-electoral, organizations 
of the 1980s, such as the British Movement and Column 88.
There is certainly some preliminary evidence that this pattern may be 
going to repeat itself since the 2010 election. More than ever, the BNP 
may teeter on the brink of factional disintegration and Griffi n’s position 
and status may have been weakened.16 Now the possible vehicle for disaf-
fection on this occasion is the English Defence League (EDL) mentioned 
above, the organization formed only in March 2009 purportedly to cam-
paign, usually by means of street demonstrations, against ‘militant Islam’ 
in Great Britain. This organization differs to an extent from the British 
Movement of the 1980s, and certainly from the deliberately clandestine 
Column 88, in the very public nature of its activities, specifi cally marches 
and demonstrations in cities around England and Wales with signifi cant 
Muslim populations.17 Locations such as Bradford (in West Yorkshire), 
Dudley (in the West Midlands), Cardiff (in Wales), and Tower Hamlets (a 
borough in London’s East End) all have signifi cant Muslim minorities 
and are being targeted in 2010 for EDL demonstrations, although one 
intended in east London in June 2010 was in the event cancelled. As 
stated before, the EDL and the BNP have earlier sought each independ-
16 Lowles, N (June 2010), ‘Defeated’, Searchlight, 420, 8-12.
17 There was even a verifi ed report on a BBC television report about a group of football support-
ers, albeit a very small one, at the World Cup in South Africa, who were brazen enough to sport 
EDL-motif T-shirts.
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ently to declare that the one is not related to the other, but there can be 
little doubt that there is overlap of support among EDL activists. A recent 
report suggests a support base of the EDL of some thousands of activists 
in the country willing to participate in marches and demonstrations 
when these are organized in various cities. Convicted football hooligans 
and supporters of militant extreme-right groups are reportedly being 
attracted to its cause. It is also reported that there is strong support among 
serving army personnel.18 It remains to be seen whether the EDL can 
establish a signifi cance presence, either on the streets of particular loca-
tions or even as a pressure group baiting the Establishment, but there is 
every indication from its present activities that it seeks to attract the sort 
of people who were BNP activists and supporters and that it is likely to be 
around at least for several years.
Also, although extreme-right expression specifi cally through the BNP 
may have declined, this does not mean that the BNP could not recover, 
nor (even if like the NF of the 1970s it does collapse to insignifi cance) 
that some similar organization could not emerge to take advantage of a 
situation propitious to mobilizing racist electoral support.
True, the BNP is far more inserted into mainstream politics than the NF 
ever was. The BNP may now have fewer local councillors than before May 
2010, but it still has a member in the London Assembly and two mem-
bers of the European Parliament. Moreover, British electoral politics is 
now in fl ux in the light of the coalition outcome of the 2010 general elec-
tion in the United Kingdom. The junior partner in the governing coali-
tion, the Liberal Democrats, have long been committed to a constitu-
tional change in the national electoral system to some form of 
proportional representation. Clearly, any extreme form of proportional 
representation if implemented, operating on a national or regional level, 
Great Britain
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might well see the BNP winning a few parliamentary seats, despite its 
recent setback and the expressed intention of Griffi n to stand down as 
leader in 2013. However, the form of alternative voting system most like-
ly to be adopted if the promised referendum on the matter agrees to 
change, viz., the alternative-vote system within individual constituencies, 
whilst giving some weight to voters’ second-vote preferences, is not 
likely to be a system from which any small extreme-right party would 
gain much benefi t.
Thus, major electoral breakthrough by the BNP or any similar party 
remains unlikely, but extreme-right activity may be manifested in other 
ways. Great Britain may seem likely to have a pattern of future longer-
term extreme-right support continuing the historical ebb and fl ow of 
the phenomenon over past decades. The BNP may succumb to the 
factionalism that has been the fate of some of its predecessors, although 
there are indications that the BNP may be longer-lasting than previous 
examples. Since 2000 it has survived much opposition and till 2010 suf-
fered no serious setbacks. Whatever its fate may turn out to be, the issues 
that assisted its rise are as likely to persist and intensify as to mitigate – 
the long-term prognosis for the economy is not optimistic and anti-Islam 
feeling and general Islamophobia are likely to remain powerful mobiliz-
ing factors for the foreseeable future.
Great Britain
122 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
The Netherlands
123IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
Right-wing extremism and populism in the 
Netherlands – Lessons not learned
Imagine a pamphlet announcing that the “Muslim Fifth Column is tak-
ing over Europe. We will soon be living in Eurabia under sharia law.” Or 
imagine a pamphlet saying that the “world conspiracy of Jews, this dirty 
vermin that keeps on returning to pollute our societies, has taken control 
of the banks and industry again.” In the Netherlands, both pamphlets 
would provoke public outcry against the authors, since the year is 1989 
and we have just stepped out of our time machine to witness the ensuing 
protest marches and the imminent arrest of the neo-Nazis who distrib-
uted these pamphlets. Those were the good old days when the extreme 
right was small, when mainstream racism and anti-Semitism did not 
openly exist, and any word or sign of discrimination was immediately 
attacked by anti-racists, anti-fascist groups and all loyal democrats. In 
those days, support for the rights of economic immigrants, or guest work-
ers, as they were called back then, was the norm and not the exception. 
In Western Europe everybody on the left side of the political spectrum 
had faith in a future of equality and freedom from discrimination, while 
those on the right who kept silent were branded as racists, or at least 
apologists. During the 1980s, anti-racist and anti-fascist groups built up 
considerable popular support, to the extent that anti-racism in the Neth-
erlands became the norm and any dissenting voice was immediately la-
belled racist or fascist.
Time shift
Imagine a website with the announcement: “The Muslim Fifth Column 
is taking over Europe. We will soon be living in Eurabia under sharia 
law.” Or imagine a weblog or forum saying that the “world conspiracy of 
Ronald Eissens & Suzette Bronkhorst
The Netherlands
124 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
Jews, this dirty vermin that keeps on returning to pollute our societies, 
has taken control of the banks and industry again.” Many people would 
agree with the fi rst statement or at least would not be offended by it, 
while the second statement would no longer provoke the outrage it used 
to do. Jewish community groups and remnants of anti-racist organiza-
tions would try to take action, and the rest of the population would just 
shrug their shoulders and ignore it. On this occasion we are not using our 
time machine – it is the present day, the year 2010, it is the era after 9/11, 
the Madrid and London bombings and the murder of Theo van Gogh. 
Today we are living with with fear of terrorism by Muslim extremists. 
Islam in Europe is increasingly seen as a threat, not only by the resurgent 
extreme right but also by populist parties and a section of the mainstream. 
Development of the extreme right: The 1980s and ‘90s
The recent history of right-wing extremism in the Netherlands starts in 
the latter part of the 1980s. In the late eighties and early nineties the 
Netherlands saw a new revival of right-wing extremist groups, and al-
though most of them had political aspirations, the only one that seri-
ously attempted to participate in elections was the Centrum Partij (Centre 
Party – CP). It was led by Hans Janmaat, a disaffected social studies teach-
er who set it up after being a member of most of the mainstream parties 
in the Netherlands. The Centrum Partij agenda was a simple racist one: 
blaming foreigners for all the ills of the country. The CP soon ran into 
trouble since it tried to ‘unite’ the entire spectrum of right-wing extrem-
ists, from hard-core neo-Nazis to ‘moderate’ Muslim haters and xeno-
phobes. A rift was unavoidable. The fi rst split-off formed a new party, the 
Centrum Partij 86 (CP ‘86), with a membership of radical-right-wingers, 
protagonists of violence and thinly disguised neo-Nazi sympathisers. The 
more extreme CP ‘86 won four seats in Dutch municipal elections in 
1990, and fi ve seats in 1994, but collapsed due to internal radicalisation. 
It was offi cially banned as a criminal organization by a court verdict of 
1998. 
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Those sections of the party that remained more moderate developed into 
the Centrum Democraten (Centre Democrats), trying to gain public trust 
by pursuing a milder agenda that was xenophobic, chauvinistic, anti-
Black and at times anti-Semitic. Although the voter-base of the Centrum 
Democraten was rather small, they succeeded in getting elected to a 
number of Dutch city councils. At the height of their popularity in 1994 
they had a total of 77 seats throughout the country, and won three seats 
in parliament in the general election the same year. Interestingly, in the 
run-up to both the council elections and the general elections, several 
investigative journalists infi ltrated Centrum Democraten. This resulted in 
a fl ood of newspaper and magazine articles and even a TV documentary 
on the Amsterdam chapter of the party, in which one of the candidate 
council members boasted about setting fi re to an aid centre for Suri-
namese drug addicts. Although he was elected, he had no opportunity to 
take up his seat: he was arrested for arson, convicted and sent to jail. 
Before the 1994 elections the media hardly ever reported on right-wing 
extremists. This situation changed slightly after 1994, but as the initial 
shock of having a racist party in parliament wore off, the media lost 
interest and stopped reporting. The media then effectively operated a 
news blackout on the extreme right, which resulted in the Centrum 
Democraten  losing all their seats in the general elections of 1998; they 
have never been able to recover from this setback.1
Hard-core extremists: Without public support but winning
Between 1998 and 2007 the Dutch extreme right failed to make any 
headway. It was a small, incestuous group of around 500 hard-core 
extremists who constantly fought each other and were successfully har-
assed by Dutch anti-racist and anti-fascist groups. No charismatic leader 
1 ‘De Centrumdemocraten (CD) electoraal’. Kroniek extreemrechts 1945-2003. 
 Anne Frank Foundation, Amsterdam. 
 http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?PID=182&LID=1.
 Jaap van Donselaar. Monitor Racisme en Extreemrechts, 3rd report (Leiden: Universiteit Leiden 
2000) 43.
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or classic strong man emerged at that time. The visible hard-core activ-
ists, mostly of the “Sieg Heil” skinhead type, were not attractive, to say 
the least, for a Dutch public guilt-ridden about the Holocaust. A few small 
splinter groups re-formed into new political parties and won some seats 
in local councils, but the aspired breakthrough never happened. Instead, 
the diehards completely abandoned the idea of getting elected into dem-
ocratic structures, and started concentrating on forming radical activist 
movements. By now they have succeeded in creating a group of young 
followers, mainly through the Internet. This involves around 1000 hard-
core young neo-Nazis and some 10,000 sympathizers – not very signifi -
cant, given that the Dutch population numbers 17 million. It is still a 
cause for concern, however, because the young extremists seem to be 
becoming radicalised quickly, as a number of academic and governmen-
tal studies show, and there is a rise in the number of hate crime incidents 
with a neo-Nazi background and targeted against individuals.2 In addi-
tion, part of the hard core, united in the “action group Nationale Volks 
Unie” (NVU) has successfully challenged the old policy of the majority of 
Dutch mayors of not allowing extreme-right demonstrations in their 
towns. By taking mayors to court over the issue of freedom of speech and 
actually winning, the NVU has changed the whole dynamic; now mayors 
allow all extreme-right demonstrations and all counter-demonstrations, 
but try to keep protesters apart, in terms of both time and location, focus-
ing increasingly on public order rather than content or ideology.3 
2 Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs. Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007 – 2011. 4, 5.
 Anne Frank Foundation, Amsterdam. Kroniek racistisch en extreemrechts geweld 1945 – 2008 – 
Toename en verharding, http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?PID=316&LID=1 and Anne 
Frank Foundation, Amsterdam. Kroniek racistisch en extreemrechts geweld 1945 – 2008 - Respons 
op racistisch geweld. http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?PID=307&LID=1.
 Landelijk expertisecentrum van Art.1, Anne Frank Stichting. Universiteit LeidenMonitor Rassend-
iscriminatie 2009. 143 – 149. http://www.art1.nl/scripts/download.php?document=843.
3 Anne Frank Foundation, Amsterdam. “Jurisprudence demonstrations extreme-right in the 
Netherlands”. http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?PID=230&LID=1.
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The new arena: It’s the mainstream, of course! 
Meanwhile, populism has fared much better. The Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), 
led by the fl amboyant, charismatic Pim Fortuyn, was a populist party 
with a strand of xenophobia and anti-Islamic attitudes. Mr. Fortuyn, a 
full professor, a journalist and openly gay, had already been a member of 
most Dutch political parties. In 2002 he was invited to become leader of 
the Leefbaar party, a new, mildly populist movement. Fortuyn accepted, 
and rapidly gained success by offering people classically simple solutions 
to complicated issues. However, when he gave an interview stating that 
he intended to abolish the fi rst article of the Dutch constitution – the 
article guaranteeing equality and non-discrimination – the Leefbaar 
leadership expelled him. Undeterred, within a few days Fortuyn started 
his own party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), taking with him most of the 
Leefbaar constituency and publicly declaring that he was going to be 
prime minister. On May 6, a few days before the general elections of 
2002, an extremist animal-rights activist murdered Pim Fortuyn. Despite 
this, the government decided to let the elections take place as planned, 
and the LPF won 26 parliamentary seats. The newly formed coalition of 
LPF, Conservative Liberals and Christian Democrats lasted only 86 days be-
fore it collapsed. After numerous internal LPF problems, the Christian 
Democrats and the Conservative Liberals resigned from the cabinet, which led 
to new elections. The LPF returned with only eight seats in parliament, and 
fi nally disappeared completely from the political map in 2006. 
The tone had been set, however. Xenophobic populism was no longer 
taboo, and although extreme-right groups have not been elected again, 
in the past 10 years support for right-wing ideas has grown, especially 
among young people who are becoming radicalised under the infl uence 
of the Internet and neo-Nazi recruitment. At the same time, there is 
growing support for racism and xenophobia in the mainstream, and this 
is actually more dangerous. 
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Wilders, a “success story”
The major newcomer on the populist front in the Netherlands is Geert 
Wilders, former member of the Conservative-Liberal People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy, which he left in 2004 because of the party’s posi-
tive stance on Turkey’s proposed European Union membership. Since be-
coming a one-person ‘group’ in parliament, Wilders has voiced anti-Islam 
and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Initially he did this as a lone member, but 
since the 2006 elections his new party, the Party For Freedom (PVV), has 
been represented in parliament with nine seats. Wilders is outspoken on 
a number of issues such as immigration, freedom of speech, the funda-
mental beliefs of Islam, and the behaviour of young Moroccans in the 
cities. His relatively tame 2008 fi lm about Islam in the Netherlands, Fitna, 
caused controversy all over the world. On 21 January 2009 the Amster-
dam Court of Appeal ordered Wilders’ prosecution for “incitement to 
hatred and discrimination”. The case is due to be tried before a judge in 
the autumn of 2010. 
Wilders was also banned from entering the United Kingdom on 12 Febru-
ary 2009,, on the grounds that the UK Home Offi ce viewed his presence 
as a “threat to one of the fundamental interests of society”. The ban was 
lifted after Wilders appealed. He visited the UK on October 16, 2009. 
Riding the wave of post 9/11 anti-Muslim feelings in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, Wilders’ popularity increased rapidly almost by the month. 
His standard operating procedure is simple. He never engages in any 
debate. He launches sound bites, both inside and outside parliament: for 
The Netherlands
Geert Wilders
129IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
example, he asserts that the Koran is a fascist book that should be banned; 
or he demands an end to Muslim immigration and says that he wants 
to delete all anti-discrimination articles from the Dutch penal code 
(“Because I WANT to discriminate.”).
Wilders’ rhetoric and ways of debating are highly reminiscent of the Nazi 
era. He thinks Muslims should clean the streets with toothbrushes, as 
Jews in Vienna were made to clean the streets with small brushes shortly 
after the Anschluss of 1938. If Wilders is challenged on this, if people try 
to argue with him on any point, he will refuse to debate but will assert 
that his opponent is talking rubbish, or is mentally ill or a member of 
“the left-wing church”. He publicly accused his major opponent in par-
liament, Alexander Pechthold, leader of D66, the Liberal Democratic 
Party, of being an accomplice of Theo van Gogh’s murderer. He called
the minister of integration “stark raving mad”. With his storm-trooper 
rhetoric and odd bleached haircut, he could be the offspring of a bizarre 
marriage between Mozart and Joseph Goebbels. 
From the moment Wilders’ popularity started to rise, he strongly denied 
any association with the extreme right; he presents himself as a staunch 
supporter of Israel, asserts that he does not want any contact with neo-
Nazis, and calls himself a “friend of the Jewish people”. Wilders travels to 
Israel regularly and unfailingly visits friends like the ultra-right politician 
Avigdor Liebermann or right-wing West Bank settlers.  For years it was 
generally thought that his pro-Israel and pro-Jewish stance was mere 
posturing, a convenient way to keep the skinheads out of his party, but it 
seems Wilders is playing a double game: MEPs from his party are known 
to have attended a meeting of unaffi liated extreme right-wing members 
of the European Parliament at which Holocaust deniers like Jean-Marie 
Le Pen, Nick Griffi n and others were also present.4
Wilders’ PVV is not a political party in the usual sense of the term. The 
party has no members and no party structure; it is simply a foundation 
The Netherlands
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with Geert Wilders himself as the sole member of the board. His parlia-
mentarians are all hand picked and were invited to run by Wilders him-
self. Wilders does not want a democratic party structure since he sees this 
as too big a risk for his leadership. The media are not allowed to attend 
party meetings; people present at the meetings are not allowed to speak 
about them. In common with other populist leaders, Wilders sees a need 
for total leadership and total control.  
Wilders and the media
Wilders and his gang thrive on attention and claims of victimisation 
while constantly trying to prove that “they are slandered, demonized 
and ignored” by the other parties and by those he labels as “members of 
the left-wing church”, which ultimately includes anyone who criticizes 
him. He has succeeded in elevating the “extreme sound bite” to an art 
form, and the Dutch media has lavished him with attention. Geert 
Wilders operates as follows: he sends an SMS or Twitter message saying 
that Muslims are the cause of the traffi c jam problem in the country. The 
media will publish this ludicrous claim and invite politicians and experts 
to comment on it. The item will thus dominate the media for some days. 
Naturally, Geert Wilders will refuse to give any interviews or to debate 
this idea on television. Then he will follow this up with a new message 
asserting that everybody who criticizes his ideas is trying to demonize 
The Netherlands
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him and deprive him of freedom of speech. The result is maximal atten-
tion for Geert Wilders and his party, and growing popular support. To 
many, Geert Wilders appears as the “man of the people” who dares to 
publicly express what nobody else dares to say: the “truth about the Mus-
lims who are trying to take over the country.” 
Wilders’ impact on politics
For some time the other Dutch political parties in parliament tried either 
to ignore Wilders or to take him seriously and debate with him. After four 
years, as these approaches had hardly worked, the other parties belatedly 
decided to try a full frontal attack, analysing and challenging every 
 remark uttered by the Party for Freedom (PVV) to expose the total lack of 
any real ideas, plans or solutions on the part of Wilders and his party. 
Un fortunately this seems to have had no effect. As so often, part of the 
 support for populism or extremism is not related to logic or debate; it is 
emotional. 
A signifi cant section of Dutch society feels that Wilders is right, that Mus-
lims are a danger to society, that the left controls the media, and that any 
measures to integrate migrants into society are just “a left-wing hobby”. 
Research shows that 16 percent of the PVV voters have higher education 
qualifi cations; most of them are male and atheist. Surveys show that they 
are disappointed in politics5 or “hedonistic and conservative, only self-
interested”.6 These voters do not trust what is called “the multi-cultural 
establishment” because they blame the establishment for all the ills of 
society, and above all for the presence of what they see as the main cul-
prit: the Muslims.  
More seriously, after the government and politicians saw the polls in 
mid-2009 which projected that the PVV would become the biggest party 
The Netherlands
5 http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article1152465.ece/Wilders_scoort_bij_hoger_opgeleide_
kiezer
6 http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article1152465.ece/Wilders_scoort_bij_hoger_opgeleide_
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in the country with 32 seats in parliament, they started to toughen up 
their rhetoric on immigration and security – two major PVV issues – and 
to quietly advise government-funded anti-racism organizations to tone 
down on the issues of populism, the LPF, Pim Fortuyn, Wilders and the 
PVV. The Ministry of Internal Affairs commissioned Jaap van Donselaar, 
a prominent extreme-right expert and anthropologist from the Univer-
sity of Leiden, terrorism expert Professor Bob de Graaff (University of 
Leiden) and Hans Moors (an expert on radicalisation from the University 
of Tilburg) to update a 2006 research report on radicalisation.7 In the 
report, Geert Wilders’ PVV was described as a “radical party of the new 
right wing”. When the report was published, not only did it infuriate 
Wilders and his supporters, but it also emerged that the civil servants 
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who had commissioned the academ-
ics were not entirely happy with this conclusion.8 A media storm devel-
oped in which half of the country rejoiced that Wilders had fi nally been 
unmasked as an extreme-right-winger, while the other half protested that 
the report was “unscientifi c”. Politicians pussyfooted, reluctant to be ac-
cused of what Wilders calls “demonisation”. Only D66 leader Alexander 
Pechtold, who had been openly saying for years that Geert Wilders was a 
right-wing extremist, outspokenly claimed that the report had proven 
him right.9 The message was clear: morality was abandoned and the les-
sons of the past were forgotten; the hunt was on for the PVV voter. 
Local elections 2010
On March 3 local elections were held for the Dutch City Councils. The 
PVV ran in only two cities, Almere and The Hague. Unwilling to repeat 
the mistake the LPF had made in 2002 when they rushed to put people 
on their list who were patently unqualifi ed on the whole, Geert Wilders 
7 Drs. Hans Moors en Mr. drs. Lenke Balogh (IVA), Dr. Jaap van Donselaar en Prof.dr. Bob de 
Graaff (CDH), IVA/University of Tilburg, 27-01-2010 – Polarisatie en radicalisering in Neder-
land. http://www.nuansa.nl/uploads/eb/a0/eba0dd6c540e2e2785a204a38eb0aef6/verkenning-
polarisatie-en-radicalisering.pdf
8 http://www.mareonline.nl/categorie/achtergrond/artikel/0910/19/06/
9 http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief_gratis/article1344282.ece/We_konden_niet_om_Wilders_
heen
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decided to hand-pick only a small number of candidates, led by two of 
his aides from the PVV parliamentary faction. Wilders organized work-
shops for the candidates, schooling them personally and hoping to re-
tain enough control to crush any possible dissent. On March 3, the PVV 
won nine seats on the Almere City council and eight in The Hague. 
Wilders and his associates were euphoric. Sietse Fritsma, leader of the 
PVV The Hague faction, asserted, “Now we’re going to drive the other 
parties crazy”. Despite all the boasting and promises of change, neither 
in The Hague nor in Almere did the PVV succeed in forming a coalition 
with the other parties. The ban on headscarves as propagated by Wilders 
was just one of the many problems. True to populist form, the PVV did 
not want to compromise at this stage of the game, certainly not in view 
of the upcoming general election in June. However, when the PVV’s poll 
ratings fell because people thought Wilders didn’t really want to be in 
government, he changed his stance, claiming it was a misunderstanding.
Meanwhile, Wilders had been working hard to fi nalise his list for the 
general elections, and although the vetting of candidates was rumoured 
to be quite stringent, several problems emerged. One of the PVV can-
didates, a former security guard for the Dutch Jewish community, had 
previously been fi ned for carrying a concealed weapon, a minor offence. 
However, the media soon broke the story that he had petitioned the Jew-
ish Community Council to “exclude Jews who agree with the UN Gold-
stone report”.10 In an e-mail apparently leaked to the press, he described 
them as “despicable little Jews”. Within a few days he had withdrawn as 
a PVV candidate, declaring that “he did not want to live under a magni-
fying glass for the next four years”. Another two candidates dropped out 
shortly afterwards, one for falsifying biographical information, the other 
for fraud. Raymond van Roon, leader of the PVV Almere fraction, also 
came under attack when an anti-fascist research group published texts he 
had written as a young man in 1971 expressing his admiration for the 
fascist regime of the Greek colonels and toying with the idea of a military 
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putsch in the Netherlands. He was also briefl y a member of the extreme-
right-wing National Security Brigade. In the summer of 1971 he advertised 
in the press, calling for the formation of an “extreme-right vigilante 
patrol against disorder and subversion”. De Roon and Wilders down-
played these incidents as youthful errors, and De Roon was able to keep 
his council seat and his candidacy for parliament on the PVV list. It is 
interesting, however, that in January 2010 De Roon launched a proposal 
for creating “city commando groups to maintain public order”. 
PVV candidates: A problematic bunch
During the long haul between the two elections, Geert Wilders had to 
work hard to keep his candidates on track. All was not well, even in his 
close circle. Hero Brinkman, a former policeman and one of Wilders’ 
aides, had a drinking problem that caused several scandals, including a 
fi st fi ght in Nieuwspoort, the Dutch Parliament’s bar, news centre and 
journalists’ haunt, where Brinkman tried to hit a barman because he was 
refused further drinks. It earned him the nickname “Drinkman”. The sec-
ond scandal was about threats against the co-owner of his house, a build-
ing contractor who had moved in with Brinkman and was living in one 
half of the house while working on renovating it. There were money 
quarrels and mutual threats, and the police had to intervene several times 
a week. It was another publicity disaster for the PVV. The situation fi nally 
calmed down and Hero Brinkman announced that he was renouncing 
alcohol completely – but then came another bombshell. Breaking the 
PVV code of a permanent media boycott, a week before the general elec-
tions Brinkman appeared on TV to announce that he was concerned that 
the PVV was not a democratic party, that it actually had no members and 
that he wanted a real party structure and a “PVV youth movement” as 
well. Everybody was in suspense. It seemed this would be the end of Hero 
Brinkman. It is known that Geert Wilders does not tolerate dissent and 
does not tolerate competition for the leadership of the PVV. But Brink-
man stated quite clearly that Geert Wilders would create no problems for 
him (although he did wait to grant his interview until it was too late to 
remove him from the list of candidates). Indeed, since it was just a week 
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before the elections, Geert Wilders simply decided to keep up appear-
ances. The day after Brinkman’s stunt, Wilders, suddenly very willing to 
talk to the press, stated that all was well inside the party and that Brink-
man naturally had a right to speak his mind. He even added that “the 
idea of a democratic structure for the PVV” would be discussed internally 
after the elections. 
For the moment, another problem for the PVV had been defused. It is 
widely thought that after the elections Hero Brinkman will not serve long 
as a PVV parliamentarian. 
General election of 2010
Finally came the day that some people in the Netherlands, especially 
Muslims, had dreaded: the general election of 9 June 2010. A glance at 
the PVV election programme provided ample reasons for anxiety: among 
other things, it called for banning the Koran, ethnic registration of all 
citizens and a tax on wearing “head rags” (headscarves). Perhaps it was a 
momentary lapse of reason that prompted Mark Rutte, leader of the Con-
servative Liberal VVD to comment: “the PVV is just a normal party”. 
After midnight on election day it became clear that there would be a 
landslide for Wilders. This was confi rmed by the results on the morning 
of 10 June: 24 parliamentary seats for the PVV. The Christian Democratic 
Party, led by outgoing prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende, lost half its 
seats, a reduction from 41 to only 21 seats. The Social Democrats of the 
PvdA ended up with 30 seats, a close call on the major winner, the Con-
servative Liberals of the VVD, which rose from 22 to 31 seats, becoming 
the largest party in parliament. Negotiations for a coalition started im-
mediately. Throughout the election campaign VVD leader Mark Rutte 
had said that “it would be wrong to ignore the PVV”, thus recycling an 
earlier attitude in parliament: “Don’t ignore PVV voters, they have genu-
ine issues.” The former was a thinly veiled attempt to win back “desert-
ing” VVD voters, the latter a half-hearted attempt to sideline the PVV by 
indulging voter complaints about Islam, integration and security, wheth-
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er or not these complaints were justifi ed. Other parties such as the Social 
Democrats, the Left-Greens and the Liberal Democrats of D66 openly 
ruled out a coalition with the PVV. Only the Christian Democrats and the 
radical Socialist Party announced they would keep all options open. VVD 
leader Mark Rutte, however, did not beat around the bush. Repeating his 
description of the PVV as “a normal party”, he stated his preference for a 
coalition with Wilders and the Christian Democrats, which would result 
in a narrow majority of 76 of the 150 seats in Parliament. The PVV and 
VVD were not very far apart on social and economic issues; in fact, Geert 
Wilders was once a VVD member. Apparently power-hungry, Wilders al-
ready decided the morning after the election to drop one of his main 
differences with the VVD on tax benefi ts for home owners, an issue he 
had been defending up until the night before. This classic turnabout, 
which Wilders claimed his voters would agree to, marked an initial crack 
in the PVV’s populist armour. Suddenly the PVV was displaying behav-
iour it had always vociferously objected to: compromise, the despised 
modus operandi of democracy. 
 
The VVD, suddenly the largest party in parliament, appointed a senator 
and VVD party member to explore possible new coalitions, with a coali-
tion of VVD-PVV-CDA as fi rst preference. Talks were held, but the Chris-
tian Democrats of the CDA, having lost half their seats, were reluctant to 
join. What is more, a large part of their Christian constituency is ada-
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mant about the Wilders issue and will not tolerate any coalition with the 
PVV. To quote a local party baron, “This man and his party do not fi t with 
our way of viewing the world.”
 
Further developments
Much of the month of July 2010 was spent in an attempt to form a 
“ Purple-plus” coalition between the Social Democrats, the Green-Left 
party, the Liberal Democrats of D66 and the VVD, with Mark Rutte still 
sulking because he would have preferred a Black-Blue-Christian coalition. 
On 20 July the negotiations broke down over fi nancial issues. The VVD 
wanted to make huge fi nancial cuts, while the Social Democrats wanted 
moderate ones. At that juncture Queen Beatrix called in Ruud Lubbers, a 
former Christian Democrat prime minister11, UNHCHR High Commis-
sioner and serving Dutch minister of state, to mediate and report on the 
possibility of a majority coalition.  Surprisingly, Lubbers, who had spo-
ken out in the past against the PVV (and even published a booklet to that 
effect12), examined the possibilities of a VVD, CDA and PVV coalition or 
even a minority coalition schema with the PVV supporting the Liberals 
and Christians without offi cially being part of the government. Next, the 
Queen appointed Ivo Opstelten, the leader of the VVD, to explore the 
feasibility of this. Negotiations were set for Monday, 9 August, and it was 
already clear that the parties would aim for the minority coalition op-
tion. Geert Wilders, who had periodically referred to his party’s wish to 
support the government in this way, was particularly enthusiastic. In this 
constellation he would enjoy all the benefi ts of government without the 
responsibility, as his much-admired friends from the Danish Volksparty 
had been doing since 2000. He proposed to support most of the CDA and 
VVD policies, but already stated that on issues those parties could not 
agree with, particularly the PVV’s anti-Islam rhetoric, there was an agree-
ment to disagree, while Wilders would be permitted to continue making 
anti-Muslim statements in parliament.
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The country seemed to be holding its breath. It became clear that a gov-
ernment of this kind would be bad news not only for Dutch Muslims 
but also for the population at large. The VVD and CDA were proposing 
huge cuts that would have an impact mainly on the lower and mid-
income groups, still the largest section of the population. Wilders would 
probably not oppose this, but his voters would not be happy. The worst 
of all options seemed to be in prospect here. Of course there was always 
a possibility that negotiations would break down. While the VVD seemed 
to have no problem any longer with Geert Wilders, the Christian 
Democrat CDA members were still not all convinced, despite the fact 
that CDA leader Maxime Verhagen transformed most of his earlier con-
cerns about the PVV into a rather hypocritical approach. He let it be known 
that “since there will be no formal coalition with the PVV, only support 
from the PVV, the CDA can uphold its principles”, but within the CDA 
there was renewed and growing dissent over Verhagen’s position and the 
possible ‘quasi-coalition’ with the PVV. The fi nal decision was to be made 
by the CDA congress due to be convened after the conclusion of the negotia-
tions, so there was still a chance that Geert Wilders would be left empty-
handed.  
Perspectives
What can we learn from all this? One thing is that Mark Rutte and his 
VVD have become completely shameless. They were the only party to 
strongly favour a coalition with Wilders right from the start. As Rutte 
now claims, that was because of the election programme similarities on 
the subject of migrants and security. It is true that most of the election 
campaign concerned the crisis and the economy, but “integration” and 
“Islam” were always hovering in the background. Stating that a xeno-
phobic and extreme-right wing party, an undemocratic party, is normal 
reveals a lot about one’s position. The only prominent VVD member who 
openly protested against Rutte’s fl irtation with Wilders was Frans Weis-
glas, former speaker of the house, who spoke out on two occasions13.  
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The second lesson to be learned is that the left wing is not united enough 
to stop a coalition with the PVV. The Social Democrats of the PvdA, 
the Socialist Party SP, the Green-Left and the Left/Liberal D66 had enough 
seats together (65 of the 150) to make an approach to the Christian 
Democrats (21) and keep both the PVV and VVD out of government. 
Sadly, PvdA-leader Job Cohen showed no interest in ruling again with the 
Christian Democrats – the wounds from the previous coalition were still 
too fresh – and D66 leader Alexander Pechtold regarded the Socialist 
Party SP as “too radical”. The Social Democrats and the other left-wing par-
ties were unable to jump over their own shadow – a situation that seems 
to have become a tradition on an international level.
The third lesson to be learned is that the Netherlands, which has persist-
ently tended to deny its role during the Second World War in voluntarily 
assisting the Nazis with the “fi nal solution to the Jewish question”, has 
now totally broken free from the “politically correct” chains of the past. 
The PVV, CDA and the VVD are not the only parties guilty of this. The 
other parties have also decided that it is easier to be a supermarket and 
satisfy voters’ demands. They are ignoring the fact that the social con-
tract also implies that at times it is morally right to disagree with voters, 
argue with them, and educate them. However, our political elite does not 
want to be seen as an elite, but instead wants the voters to put a coin in 
their particular slot every four years. What about the warnings of the 
past? Uplifting the masses? Creating a better world? According to this 
perspective, those are corny old socialist ideas!
By now, the Netherlands has completely abandoned its aspirations to be 
a guiding light for human rights, equality and anti-racism. We can step 
back into our time machine and shut the door fi rmly. Some might argue 
that the next stop could be Berlin, Weimar Republic, 1932… Yet hope-
fully there is a very long way to go before we reach that – if ever. Let us 
make sure we don’t! 
The Netherlands
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The extreme right in Italy
The extreme right in Italy exhibits very special characteristics, both ideo-
logically and with respect to its politics, and even as to how it defi nes it-
self on the scale between right and left. 
Italy, in fact, is the only Western democracy in which a political force 
that unmistakably harks back to fascism can be observed in the institu-
tions of the state as a whole as well as those of the periphery. This situa-
tion pertained without a break in the entire period from 1945 to 1994. 
What is more, the country is proud of this. For half a century (and more), 
the Right was synonymous with fascism, although without people hav-
ing made any distinction between the extreme and moderate Right, let 
alone between its parliamentary and extra-parliamentary manifestations. 
The Right as such has always presented itself as a force that was not only 
against the system but also refused to pledge loyalty to the institutions of 
democracy.
It was hostile to the system, because it represented a concept of state and 
society radically different from the existing order: it rejected building 
parliamentary institutions and favoured a presidential regime; it rejected 
the political system, which it regarded as party rule and therefore dis-
qualifi ed, and it opposed the capitalist economic order; instead, it wanted 
a corporative “third way” based on “complete cooperation between the 
different factors of production”, between workers and employers.
It was disloyal in the sense that it discredited the republican order as the 
direct result of the dishonourable “betrayal” of the nation on 8 Novem-
ber 1943. Moreover, it pursued a political initiative aimed at denying 
recognition to the leadership class that developed from the anti-fascist 
Roberto Chiarini
Italy
142 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
parties. It also refused to accept the institutions of parliamentary democ-
racy because it suspected them from the start of having surrendered the 
original vision of the nation as an organic, integral whole as defi ned by 
fascism, and not reducible to an individualist or class concept of society.
This had two consequences. Firstly, the term “Right” could not be used in 
democratic speech, with the result that none of the parties of the so-
called “constitutional arch”1 on which the anti-fascist republic was 
founded were ever prepared to describe themselves as “right wing”.  Even 
the Christian Democrat party (DC), which had become established as a 
stable bulwark against the communist threat and in practice had fulfi lled 
the function of a right-wing pole in the system, always refused to 
describe itself as right wing. It claimed to see its mission in terms of the 
famous defi nition by its founder, Alcide De Gasperi, as “the centre look-
ing towards the left”.  On the other hand, the Right was constantly under 
suspicion of promoting ideas – and often initiatives as well – aimed at 
overthrowing the government, or planning a putsch or conspiring in ter-
rorist attacks. This started in 1964 with the controversial “Plan Solo” in 
which the military branch of the carabinieri would have been prepared 
to secure military control of the state by occupying the so-called “neural 
centres”, and especially by arresting and quickly removing prominent 
persons they defi ned as “most dangerous” politically, and continued up 
to the famous “strategy of tension” in the mid-1960s that ended by 
threatening the stability and possibly even the maintenance of the insti-
tutions of democracy. It is no coincidence that up until the 1980s, no 
democratic (or anti-fascist) party was ever prepared to accept even a pub-
lic encounter – let alone any form of cooperation – with the MSI. The DC 
1 The term “constitutional arch” refers to the parties that drew up and jointly enacted the Con-
stitution of the Italian Republic in 1948: Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party 
– DC), Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party  – PCI), Partito Socialista Italiano 
(Italian Socialist Party – PSI), Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Social Democratic 
Party – PSDI), Partito Liberale Italiano (Italian Liberal Party – PLI), Partito Repubblicano Ital-
iano (Italian Republican Party– PRI). In fact, the only party after the Second World War to be 
excluded from the “constitutional arch” was the neo-fascist party Movimento Sociale Italieno 
(MSI) – translator‘s note. See also, “List of Abbreviations” at the end of this essay. 
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never took a step that would have contributed to legitimating the neo-
fascist party in any form, although it benefi ted happily throughout the 
1950s from parliamentary support from the right, both from the MSI and 
from the monarchists (merely tolerated support, it must be said, and not 
based on any formal agreement), in order to fi rm up its shaky govern-
ment majorities. This was the same DC that operated numerous forms of 
administrative cooperation on the local level across half of Italy. Even the 
PLI, which remained bitterly opposed to any kind of opening to the left 
after Giovanni Malagodi took over as chairman (1954-1972), never suc-
cumbed to the temptation to accept support from the neo-fascist party at 
local level. The general public perceived the MSI as the right wing of the 
political spectrum (but still loyal towards state institutions) – and it has 
behaved accordingly.
From the old neo-fascist right to the new neo-populist right
The beginning of the 1980s saw the acceleration of the “long march of 
Italian neo-fascism through the institutions” – though it could be de-
scribed as a constant process of “stop and go”. The fi rst concrete results 
began to emerge. Up until then the neo-fascists wavered between the 
 attempt zealously to preserve their own nostalgic identity, and the effort 
to come out of the ghetto of illegitimate existence by entering the 
 de mocratic game in some way. The party diluted its real and symbolic 
relationship to fascism. At the same time the democratic forces stopped 
 excluding it from the democratic framework – even the left (PRI, PSI, PCI) 
and several institutional offi ce holders (from designated prime minister 
Bettino Craxi, who held exploratory talks with the MSI in the process of 
formation of his fi rst government in 1983, up to Italian president Pertini 
who, again in 1983, visited the deathbed of the young murdered MSI 
supporter, Paolo di Nella, in Rome). Although the ideological temperature 
sank, however, the ideological distance from the other parties remained. 
 
This was the basis for a development in the course of around a decade 
that led slowly but irrevocably to the extremists becoming a moderate 
Italy
144 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
right wing that was no longer disloyal but acknowledged the institutions 
of democracy, and no longer thought in nationalist, but in European 
terms. The process of renewal changed their ideological heritage and 
political programme, and even their self-classifi cation on a left-right 
spectrum increasingly shifted toward the centre. As the “original goals” 
of its identity began to crumble and even its historical role as an alterna-
tive force in relation to the “constitutional arch” parties vanished, the 
MSI sought to compensate with new alliances and trends, initially in the 
only arena that seemed to offer it some opportunities for a new start 
beyond the traditional path of neo-fascism: in Europe, towards the New 
Right that was beginning successfully to take up the theme of “anti-poli-
tics” in the old continent, and the issue of protest against party domina-
tion and foreign immigrants, and for increased security. For a period of 
around a decade, the old neo-fascist right seemed to rediscover itself by 
modernisation and to become the neo-populist New Right. The MSI’s 
discovery of Le Pen’s Front National is convincing proof of this. After Le 
Pen’s rise to stardom in the European New Right fi rmament, the MSI 
welcomed him jubilantly on several occasions. 
The topic of “immigration”: A reminder of fascism and 
critique of the system?
The process of the Right’s complete conjunction on democratic tracks 
ran into problems when it came to the thorniest topic, the immigration 
issue. The newly founded Right endeavoured to achieve a new evalua-
tion, away from being seen as anti-system and towards a version of con-
formity with the system. To a large extent it retained the logic of its previ-
ous argumentation. All it omitted was talk of the typical “other” 
tendencies that it had used until shortly before to maintain its emphasis 
on “otherness”. What remained were the references to the “big streams 
of migrations from the African, Middle Eastern and Balkan coasts”, the 
“very sharp rise in the birth rate” and the “large degree of economic un-
Italy
145IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
Italy
derdevelopment” of these peoples. The difference is that these references 
no longer served to put on trial the “culture of materialism” that fed on 
the “new Enlightenment”, but were now introduced in a project to 
preserve the “development model” that existed in “our country” and 
that was “so special” despite “numerous persisting contradictions”.  
The new groupings did not deviate from this line in the following four 
years. They tried their best to win the maximum level of agreement with-
in public opinion for their ideas, particularly in highly dramatic mo-
ments, as in December 1997 when the immigration issue entered a new 
phase after the landing of thousands of Kurds on the Calabrian coast, 
which was seen as the fearsome harbinger of further uncontrollable waves 
of “desperados”. The threat from illegal immigration no longer served 
only as a specifi c reference point in internal party discussion, but became 
one of the many arguments with which people tried to fi ght the centre-
left majority. Emphasis was placed on the “collapse of public order”, on 
the relation between the presence of “illegals” and criminality, on the 
instrumental character of what was now an advanced government plan 
to grant for immigrants (which was denounced as blatant vote-getting), 
and on the “protection of the weakest”, to which the Right laid claim.
The new Right no longer goes into the streets to oppose the government’s 
policies on these issues, and usually eschews the arsenal of xenophobic 
protest. Basically it appeals to European norms. At least, this is the case 
when immigration law is discussed in the Senate. The main argument 
against the government is that it “does not implement European Union 
norms” and that it has been forgotten that the European authorities re-
cently requested again that the member states “be cautious in granting 
right of asylum” and simultaneously recommended that “people who 
have immigrated from countries outside the Community and who have 
no right of stay in the territory of the Community” should be “expelled 
immediately”. If we are looking for an example for Italy, it can be found 
in France – no longer the France of Le Pen, but of Juppé. 
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Even in cases of “angry protest” against the presence of migrants, Gian-
franco Fini’s party, the Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance – AN), which 
emerged from the MSI in 1995, avoids being swept along on the wave of 
protest, as it still was only a few years ago. This is shown by incidents 
such as the riots in San Salvario in Turin, or in the Via Meda in Milan.  The 
AN’s party newspaper did not make this front-page news, but consigned 
it to an inside page in the regional news section. Moreover, the paper 
even avoided judgements that could be confused with calls for protest, 
and opted instead for quoting the representatives of the angry residents. 
It also made an effort to present “non-agitated reporting”. It argued that 
the protest was aimed not at foreigners from non-EU countries, but 
against drug dealing and criminality; anyway, this was proven by the fact 
that the demonstrators also invited properly registered immigrants to 
join the protest. It was really the government that stood accused. “We’re 
fed up with illegality,” declared the chairman of the committee from San 
Salvario. “We’re tired of being victims of break-ins and violence that we 
report to the authorities without anybody taking any notice of us.” (…) 
“The state is not available.” 
Italy
Election poster of the Alleanza Nazionale 
(National Alliance): 
“Defend your values, your culture, 
your district”
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Fini’s party offered further evidence of goodwill when an ordinance on 
legalising illegal immigrants, the “Sanatoria Dini”, was due to be enacted. 
The AN complained about the Prodi government’s obvious lack of will to 
cooperate with regard to the opposition’s proposals, as it showed it was 
not prepared to accept a certain suggested textual change in the law by 
immediately tying this to a vote of confi dence. The new strategy of argu-
mentation is halfway between a (sharp) reference to the dissatisfaction of 
anti-foreigner public opinion, and a (weak) disposition to a policy for 
integration. It is aptly expressed in the slogan published in November 
1996, “As much solidarity as possible, as much security as necessary.” In 
the end, the integrational power of the political system seems to have 
triumphed over the instrumentalisation of anti-immigrant protests as a 
means of fi ghting against the system.
Election poster of the Forza Nuova (FN):
“Certain people want our 
residential districts to fall into the hands 
of non-natives and drug dealers
Others want order and safety 
Closing our borders. 
Aliens‘ deportation Special acts“
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From opposition to the system to entry into government: 
Italy’s fi rst party of the centre right
The AN continued to develop rapidly, notwithstanding the opposition of 
numerous incorrigible nostalgists, the intellectual objections of many 
people and the confused ideological worldviews of their intellectual sur-
roundings. It succeeded in appearing credible as a genuine democratic 
force, and fi nally achieved the merger with Berlusconi’s party, Forza Ita-
lia, which resulted in March 2009 in the emergence of a single party of 
the centre right (for the fi rst time in the history of the Republic): the 
Popolo della libertà (“People of Freedom”). As we have indicated, its path 
was not without contradictions and there were some stubborn attempts 
to defend convictions that had held up until then. In the summer of 
1993, in the midst of the astonishing turn towards liberal democratic 
shores, the party emphasised “the impossibility of communal life be-
tween the disenfranchised from non-EU countries and those who try […] 
to defend their own resources.” The party newspaper wrote, “It took the 
popular rebellions of Genua, of Stornara (in the province of Foggia in 
Puglia), and of Villa Literno (in the province of Caserta in Campania) to 
persuade all the ‘do-gooders’ that the open door policy is no longer the 
correct means of channelling the stream of immigrants.”   
In any event, democracy has been so convincingly adopted by the heirs 
of the Italian extreme right that some of the best-known exponents of 
the old neo-fascist party excel as spokesmen for a right wing that has 
cleaned out the old infl uences from the fascist era (nationalism, corpora-
tivism, the “third way”, between capitalism and socialism, etc.). The PDL 
has even unmistakably rejected the latest key issues adopted by the popu-
list right in Europe: protest against immigrants, threats to security, criti-
cism of parties, rejection of European bureaucracy and the banks, etc. 
The last party boss of the MSI, Gianfranco Fini, has placed himself at its 
head, installed as the successor of the historical MSI leader Giorgio Almi-
rante, who never apologised for his errors in the period of the Repubblica 
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Sociale Italiana (1943-1945). In 1990 this same man, Fini, went as far as to 
threaten a petition campaign to repeal the so-called Martelli Law (legge 
Martelli). For the fi rst time, the law had opened the possibility for illegal 
immigrants living in Italy to legalise their status. At the same time, Fini 
proposed a plebiscite on abolishing the law in case parliament did not 
revoke it.
The ideological change was so radical that the same former MSI members 
campaigned – from their operational base, the “Fare Futuro” (Shape the 
Future) Foundation – for a constitutional amendment in concord with 
the left opposition. The goals were: a society that appreciated people’s 
merits, a bioethical policy that would respect the right of the individual 
more than hitherto, an immigration policy aimed at integrating new 
arrivals – instead of marginalising them, let alone deporting them as a 
recently enacted law of Berlusconi’s prescribed – by awarding them citi-
zenship after just fi ve years residency (instead of the usual waiting period 
of 10 years), and automatically giving an Italian passport to those born in 
the country. Within the AN there was no lack of voices and movers (es-
pecially at the grass roots and in many areas of the periphery) who adopt-
ed the new causes for protest, partly because the mood in the political 
debate began to swing powerfully against immigrants. This led the AN 
spokesman, Maurizio Gasparri, to demand “increased toughness in de-
porting” illegal immigrants, and to describe the proposal to give voting 
rights to migrant residents as “a nonsensical hypothesis”, while other 
party comrades of his – we are harking back to the period 1995-1996 – 
spoke of “reverse racism”.  Some of them even demanded the installation 
of “an emergency telephone to defend white people”. But the former MSI 
people had neither the intention nor the strength to set themselves up as 
spokesmen for the growing protest on this issue, because they were afraid 
that this wave could pull them in a direction they do not want to take. In 
any case, the extreme left has been in search of its own identity since the 
dissolution of the MSI. 
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Where is the extreme right?
It seems there is not a single acknowledged player (such as MSI in the 
past), either within the political system or in public opinion, which 
stands for the extreme-right-wing arena and its political tendency, a ten-
dency that has important adherents in Italy as well as other countries. 
Nobody wants to take on this role, while the Left has diffi culty in identi-
fying the extreme right. In turn, it has suspected the new representatives 
of the right in each of the three parties that made up the centre right 
until the PDL was founded. First it spotlighted the Lega Nord (for its 
 xenophobia), then the AN (because it never really renounced its fascist 
history), and fi nally Forza Italia (on account of its populism).
Unlike the other democratic countries in Europe, Italy is incapable of 
translating these causes of social unease into clear political issues. Conse-
quently, they do not lead to revival of a fascist-type right wing – aside 
from minorities that fail to get into parliament, such as Movimento Sociale 
– Fiamma Tricolore, the grouping led by Pino Rauti, former member of 
Repubblica Sociale Italiana (1943-1945), who split from the old MSI when 
the AN was set up, or Forza nuova, headed by Roberto Fiore and Massimo 
Morsello, to mention only the more representative, along with the neo-
Nazi group, Naziskin. This unease, however, has also not helped in the 
emergence of a right wing of a post-materialist kind. None of the parties 
takes it up specifi cally as a key political issue; it does not reach the level 
of important topics on the national political agenda.  As is often empha-
sised, the main reason why this unease is not openly given political 
weight is that in Italy there is a kind of refl ex reaction that automatically 
results in any attitude and/or any political group being disqualifi ed if it 
can be linked with the historical legacy of fascism.
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2 The term “devolution” means transfer of competencies from the central state to the regions, 
provinces and municipalities; since 1997 the term has been used in the UK to describe the 
transfer of central parliamentary powers to the new Scottish Parliament – translator‘s note.
The Lega Nord
Over time, the party led by Umberto Bossi increasingly developed strength 
as a political enterprise in one of the most important fi elds of combat of 
the extreme right in Europe. In fact, there is no doubt that the Lega Nord 
has made anti-immigrant politics into its main campaigning issue – along 
with protests against taxation and security policy. At the same time it is 
clear that, from the start, rejection of foreigners played a major role in 
the electoral decisions of Lega voters. Yet Bossi’s party did not make anti-
foreigner attitudes the primary goal and trademark of the movement 
from the very beginning. In the past it has frequently changed its chosen 
key issues to win at the polls. However, it has never inclined towards neo-
fascism or anti-Semitism; and it has never given its conception of com-
munity a biological ethos.
The Lega Nord arose in the northern part of Italy and in the most highly 
developed and modernised regions of the country, where it has (almost) 
exclusively maintained its voter base. Its main demands from the start 
included conserving this territory and its material prosperity and the 
 traditional values still found there. It has always presented itself as the 
political expression of the people of the Po Valley, for whom it generously 
“invents their own tradition”. This issue has been a guiding thread in its 
development. After initially supporting federalist reform of the state 
(1992-1993), the party later radicalised its demands by calling for an open 
split-off by the north (1996), only to reappear as a pioneer of decentrali-
sation (1997-1998), and more recently to demand devolution,2 before 
returning to federalism when it re-entered the government (2001– 2006 
and again from 2008).  
152 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
A revealing passage in the fi rst issue of the monthly journal “Lombardia 
Autonomista” spoke for the “Padani” (the inhabitants of the Po area) 
even before Bossi’s party was founded. For many years the journal was 
the sole means of communication for the members of this new political 
formation:
“Lombardi, [...] It doesn’t matter how old you are, what job you do and 
what your political opinions are. What counts is that you – like all of us 
– are Lombardi. This is the only really important thing, and the time has 
come to remember this and give it a political voice [...] today Lombardy 
no longer belongs to the Lombardi; Padania (the Po Valley) no longer be-
longs to its residents. It is only a geographical term without political 
meaning, a territory devoid of rights in the face of fl ooding by strangers. 
Its population is a mass of people without political identity, anonymously 
organized into a failed nation state that is dragging us down with it into 
the abyss, without a way out and without hope.” 
The leaders of the Lega are well aware that it is one thing to defend “Pada-
nia”, but quite another to be accused of xenophobia. They have always 
been careful to redefi ne their xenophobia from a principle issue to one of 
opportunity. Aware of the pitfalls of disqualifi cation and irresponsibility, 
they have consistently used clever rhetorical phrases in the attempt to 
bat the accusation of hiding anti-democratic behaviour behind the prac-
tical screen of anti-fascism back at their critics – to whom this now ap-
plies, in fact. According to the Lega, the real culprits in the destruction of 
the basic principles of civil intercourse are the supporters of an “open 
door” policy for people from outside the EU. “Immigration from the 
Third World subverts society and leads to fascism.” “Autonomy is […] the 
purest form of taking sides.” These are just two slogans that illustrate 
vividly how the Lega has always endeavoured to rid itself of the obstruc-
tive reputation of the neo-fascist Right, or in any case, of racism. 
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Most importantly, we have to examine the language used by the Lega 
Nord. In this context we can quote the statements of some leading Lega 
fi gures. To illustrate our point, we shall pick out a mayor of a big city and 
two members of the European Parliament. In a public speech in the year 
2000, the mayor of Treviso, Giancarlo Gentilini, dared to compare im-
migrants from “Third World” countries with “bunnies” (…) “for hunters 
to practise shooting on”. This invitation to hunt down foreigners landed 
him with penal charges, but he was subsequently acquitted.
Another Lega representative, Erminio Boso, is responsible for equally 
hair-raising statements. Boso came to fame for his shocking proposal to 
take Black people’s footprints and send them to Mont Blanc for the elec-
tion. We should not omit two other calls to persecute foreigners: the 
game “Rimbalza il clandestine” (“Bounce the illegal immigrant”), that 
Bossi’s son, the future regional council member for Lombardy, suggested 
on Facebook to “scare off” illegal immigrants, and the call, “Illegal im-
migrants: Torture them! It’s self-defence!” printed on a fl yer produced by 
the Lega that also appeared in Facebook. 
Election poster of the Lega Nord:
“Guess who’s last?
For the right to housing, education, 
employment, and health
Let’s yield right of way to Monregalesi“
 (Lega Nord and Padanian Youth 
 Organization) 
Monregalese is the name of the region 
around Mondovi (Piedmont, Cuneo Province)
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Measures against illegal immigrants from outside Europe
Aside from the rallying calls, the facts also count. On the national level, 
at least two measures for discriminating against migrants from outside 
Europe were enacted following urgent demands by the Lega: the Bossi-
Fini law and the Directive on Security. The law bearing the name of its 
fi rst signatories, that of the head of the Lega and the then chairman of 
Alleanza nazionale (AN), was passed in 2002. It prescribes that permission 
to stay, permits for place of residence and Italian citizenship should be 
issued only to foreigners who can provide evidence of fi xed employment 
or an income suffi cient for their economic needs. Additionally, this regu-
lation allows expulsion of a person by public legal authority by escorting 
them to the border, as well as deportation to their country of origin in 
international waters. The so-called “Security Pact” passed this year results 
in the statutory offence of clandestinità, illegal residence, being written 
into the penal code. Equally discriminatory are measures to exclude un-
employed immigrants from outside Europe from “any form of support 
for subsistence”. 
On the periphery, individual local authorities have frequently introduced 
particularly obnoxious provisions. These range from the “battle against 
spitting” which is actually explained as “a type of behaviour common 
among Bengalis” (Monfalcone in Friaul), to the requirement for an ap-
plication for a housing permit to be accompanied by a police clearance 
certifi cate (Ospitaletto, Brescia), and from inspection of the apartments 
of “fi ancés” (Cernobbio, Como) to refusal of support for the unemployed 
(Brignano, Gera d’Adda), and from strict denial of accommodation for 
foreigners in public institutions (Prato) to “Operation White Christmas”, 
so called because it was proposed to check foreigners in the city area on 
Christmas Day to determine whether they had valid permits of stay 
(Coccaglio, Brescia); and fi nally, to the introduction of night-time patrols 
– and these are only some of the most recent measures.
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Italy
A special Italian way?
Do we have to conclude that the Lega is the Italian version of the extreme 
right in Europe? It is diffi cult to answer this question clearly. The case of 
Italy exhibits certain special features that cannot merely be traced back to 
the classical model of xenophobic parties. The Italian peninsula indubi-
tably shows clear tendencies toward neo-populism, against immigrants, 
and towards xenophobia and law and order; but it is also true that no 
party to date has claimed or explicitly occupied this political space for 
itself; nor has any party made these demands as a whole into its own 
special trademark. Only the Lega Nord displays a sharply anti-immigrant 
attitude with openly xenophobic peaks, and it also has a clear tendency 
to stress the issue of security. Nevertheless, to ease the pressure, the far-
right parties seem to take note of political realism as soon as they have 
government responsibility (at the time of writing, one of their exponents, 
Maroni, holds the post of interior minister), and to emphasise the op-
portunist rather than the ideological side of their struggle.  Bossi’s party 
originated as a regional party, and has remained as such, both in terms of 
its territorial affi liation and its political identity. Its party headquarters, 
its members, its supporters and voters are (almost) exclusively rooted in 
the north (especially in Veneto, Lombardy and Piedmont). At the same 
time, its deepest desire remains the defence of the material and ideal in-
terests of the “Padanic people”. This is a vague category that has no his-
torical basis, if you will, yet it raises a “northern question”. It presup-
poses a situation of suffering for a part of the country and the party has 
committed itself to its liberation as its true task.
The Lega Nord is an ideological party when it comes to strengthening its 
supporters’ “we-feeling” and stimulating their campaigning spirit, as be-
fi ts a mass party (the only one that still exists in Italy). Yet it is capable of 
becoming a realist, and even opportunist, party when it assumes respon-
sibility in local town halls, even to the extent of poaching voters from 
the right and the left. This works, because the Lega Nord – as has been 
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sharply observed – “knows how to use a language that is xenophobic and 
aggressive when it is an opposition party, but operates a reformist strate-
gy when it is part of the government.” As a minority on the national 
level, wherever it gains a foothold it develops a “majority power of attrac-
tion”. In other words, it succeeds in being competitive on the right wing 
to the point of a superior position in relation to the PDL in the north  (in 
the regional elections in 2010 in Veneto it won 35 percent of the vote, a 
good 10 percent more than Berlusconi’s party); but also on the left wing, 
and particularly because of its pronounced success in local communities. 
For this reason, too, it evokes interest – and almost envy – even among 
the left, which sees itself deprived in the north not only of its voters but 
also of the political virtues that once constituted the PCI’s capital: in 
other words, being both “a campaigning party and a government party”. 
It is precisely this quality that has enabled the Lega Nord to reach beyond 
the borders of the Po Valley in recent elections and into the traditional 
“red” areas where other political camps stood no chance against the forc-
es of the left in the past. In the elections last March, the Lega Nord won 
over 13 percent of the vote in Emilia Romagna and even registered suc-
cess in Tuscany and in Le Marche, where they won an honourable 6 per-
cent of the vote. As (almost) the dominant power in the north, and com-
petitive in central Italy, at the start of the 2010s the Lega is turning out to 
be respected and infl uential in national government as well.  
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List of Abbreviations:
MSI Movimento sociale italiano (Italian Social Movement)
AN Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)
FI Forza Italia! (Forward Italy!)
PDL Popolo della libertà (People of Freedom)
DC Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy)
PCI Partito comunista italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI Partito socialista italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PDSI Partito socialista democratico italiano (Italian Social 
 Democratic Party)
PRI Partito repubblicano italiano (Italian Republican Party)
PLI Partito liberale italiano (Italian Liberal Party)
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Transformations and “direct” successes on the 
right-wing fringe: Switzerland as a model for Europe?
In a nationwide referendum in Switzerland on 29 November 2009, 57.5 
percent of voters approved the ban proposed by the Swiss popular initia-
tive against the construction of new minarets. This meant amending the 
Swiss constitution to prohibit the building of any further minarets in 
Switzerland. The referendum result made headlines in the international 
media and was criticised as exclusionary, discriminatory and xenopho-
bic.1 “A vote for intolerance” was the verdict of the New York Times, 
which went on to describe it as “a strong and urgent message […] for all 
Western nations where Islamic minorities have been growing in numbers 
and visibility, and where fear and resentment of Muslim immigrants and 
their religion have become increasingly strident and widespread.”2 The 
campaign operated  even before the vote, and provoked outrage particu-
larly with a poster depicting rocket-shaped minarets on a Swiss fl ag with 
a woman in the foreground wearing a niqab (facial veil). Conversely, 
 Europe’s right-wing populist parties greeted the referendum result enthu-
siastically and called for similar votes in their own countries.3 They also 
praised the anti-minaret poster, and some parties, such as the Front 
 National in France and the small party Pro-NRW in Germany, even copied 
it for their own campaigns. 
Damir Skenderovic
1 See e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30 Nov. 2009; Süddeutsche Zeitung 30 Nov. 2009; Der 
Standard 30 Nov. 2009; Libération 30 Nov. 2009; Le Monde 1 Dec. 2009.
2 New York Times 30 Nov. 2009. 
3 NZZ am Sonntag 13 Dec. 2009.
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Looking at the long tradition of right-wing populism in Switzerland, the 
signal importance of direct democracy for right-wing populist mobilisa-
tion and the regular recurrence of xenophobic argumentation in debates 
about immigration policy, it is clear that the minaret initiative is not an 
exception. It should rather be seen in the context of historical continuity. 
The leading players on the initiative committee came from the Schwei-
zerischen Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party – SVP) and the Eidgenössisch-
Demo kratische Union (Swiss Democratic Union of Switzerland – EDU); 
both belong to the right-wing populist party camp that has existed in 
Switzerland since the 1960s. Slogans used in the anti-minaret debate, 
such as the “creeping Islamisation of Switzerland”, are reminiscent of the 
“fl ooding” theses of right-wing populist parties in the 1960s and ‘70s 
against im migration from Italy. Both graphically and in terms of content, 
the anti-minaret poster was also within the tradition of the type of 
political campaigns run by the SVP since the 1990s – campaigns that 
have regularly aroused public controversy due to their provocative style 
and xeno phobic content.4 
4 E.g., the “Little Sheep” poster of 2007. See the article by Minkenberg in the present volume 
(fi g. 1).
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The extent to which right-wing populist campaigns infl uence the climate 
of attitudes in the population and the behaviour of voters in decision-
making is shown by the analysis of the vote on the minaret ban. When 
asked the major reason for their decision, 38 percent of respondents 
repeated arguments put forward by the initiators, such as that minarets 
are “symbols of Islamisation”, and that the issue was about “defending 
the Christian faith”. Some 81 percent  of “Yes” voters agreed that the 
initiative would set a trend against the increasing spread of Islam in 
Switzerland and Western Europe.5
As the present article will show, all the tendencies on the right-wing mar-
gin can look back on a long history, especially the new right, which is 
active on the level of cultural and discourse. As in other West European 
countries, it emerged in Switzerland at the end of the 1960s and its devel-
opment has repeatedly intersected with that of right-wing populist par-
ties. The beginnings of extreme-right groups date back to the immediate 
postwar period, although they continued to be typifi ed by their under-
ground character until the 1980s, and were barely perceived by the 
 general public. Since then the extreme right has become established as a 
subculture that exhibits dimensions of youth culture on the one hand 
and is structured through individual organizations, ideologies and publi-
cations on the other. With their exclusionary, anti-egalitarian ideas, the 
right-wing populist parties, the New Right and the extreme right feed on 
similar ideological sources. There are differences, however, in terms of 
the activities and strategies they employ to achieve their political and 
ideological goals, as well as in the positions they adopt in society and in 
the political system in Switzerland.
5 Hirter, Hans, and Vatter, Adrian. Analyse der eidg. Abstimmung vom 29. September 2009. 
(Bern 2009) 31, 33.
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Right-wing populist outsider parties and the power of 
direct democracy
On 2 June 1970, 46 percent of eligible Swiss citizens voted for the popular 
initiative against foreign infi ltration calling for the percentage of foreign-
ers to be restricted to 10 percent – which would have resulted in one-
third of the foreign population having to leave the country. The debate 
preceding the vote was very acrimonious, and resulted in the highest 
voter participation since 1947 (74.1 percent), even though women were 
still not eligible to vote in Switzerland at that time. The initiative was 
submitted by the Nationalen Aktion gegen die Überfremdung von Volk und 
Heimat (National Action against Overforeignization of People and Home-
land – NA), a citizens‘ action committee set up in 1961 that had devel-
oped into a political party with a stable organization during the 1960s 
and still exists in the Swiss party arena up to the present day. The NA won 
its fi rst seat in the national parliament in 1967 with James Schwarzen-
bach, one of the fi rst prominent right-wing populist leaders in postwar 
Europe. The NA’s main goal was to stem immigration and reduce the pro-
portion of foreigners because, as its party newspaper alleged in 1968, Swit-
zerland was being “fl ooded by foreign workers”, and the high birth rate 
among migrants resulted in the country being buried under “an avalanche 
of foreign births”.6
The 1970 referendum is regarded as the political starting point for right-
wing populism in Switzerland. Firstly, it enabled this kind of politics to 
take root in the Swiss party arena, even if it remained weak in electoral 
terms. Secondly, right-wing populist players discovered the power of di-
rect democracy in relation to migration policy issues. Aside from the NA, 
the right-wing populist camp included Vigilance from Geneva, which 
presented itself as an anti-establishment party from 1964 on, and the Sch-
weizerische Republikanische Bewegung (Swiss Republican Movement – SRB), 
founded by James Schwarzenbach in 1971 as a split-off from the NA. In 
1975 they were joined by the EDU (“Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union”), 
6 Volk + Heimat 7 (July 1968) 3.
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which mutated into a fundamentalist Protestant party in the 1980s and 
increasingly spoke out against Muslim migrants and Islam.7
The splintering of the right-wing populist party camp increased further 
with the founding of the Autopartei Schweiz (Car Party of Switzerland – 
APS) in 1985 and the Lega dei Ticinesi (Ticino League) in 1991. While the 
parties shared the characteristics of anti-establishment attitudes, radical 
criticism of government migration policy and rejection of Switzerland’s 
accession to supranational organizations, they were each distinguished 
by particular programmatic points. The APS, for instance, focused on 
anti-environmentalist issues, the EDU wanted to increasingly incorpo-
rate religious Christian values into politics and society, and the Lega oper-
ated regionalist-based politics of identity. The right-wing populist camp 
achieved its best electoral result to date in the 1991 National Council 
elections when the four parties, the APS, Lega, EDU and NA, which were 
renamed Schweizer Demokraten (Swiss Democrats – SD) in 1990, won an 
electoral share of 10.9 percent, with 16 seats in the 200-strong National 
Council.
The right-wing populist splinter parties compensated for their outsider 
role in the parliamentary landscape by regularly using the instruments of 
direct democracy. Despite their marginal position in party politics, they 
succeeded in creating widespread debate on specifi c topics, and making 
large sections of the population aware of their demands, while engaging 
in agenda setting and simultaneously exercising pressure on political 
decision-making processes. Activities in the fi eld of direct democracy 
were also moments of mobilisation that led to strengthening the parties’ 
identity and internal cohesion. In addition, they fostered cooperation 
within the party camp, which was important for the small parties with their 
relatively weak party organization and restricted circle of party activists.
 
7 In 1990, during the referendum on liberalising church law in the Canton of Bern, the EDU 
party president warned that it would be “really dangerous to play down the Islamic threat to 
our country”; EDU-Standpunkt 5 (May 1990) 1. See also, Skenderovic, Damir. “Feindbild Mus-
lime: Islamophobie in der radikalen Rechten.” Der Islam in Europa. Zwischen Weltpolitik und 
Alltag. Eds. Altermatt, Urs, Delgado, Mariano, and Vergauwen, Guido (Munich 2006) 79-95.
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In the period from 1968 to 1990, the right-wing populist parties alone 
launched nine popular initiatives on issues of migration policy, of which 
six culminated in referenda. Although they were all rejected at the polls, 
in some cases with overwhelmingly large majorities, they certainly in-
fl uenced Swiss immigration policy – as evidenced, for instance, by the 
popular initiative of 1970 that contributed to the government making 
the transition from a rather liberal rotation policy to a more restrictive 
policy of stabilisation.8 
Transformation and rise of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
The right-wing populist camp in Switzerland has seen fundamental 
changes since the beginning of the 1990s. The dominance of the SVP 
testifi es to a high level of party political cohesion for the fi rst time. Hav-
ing operated since the 1910s as a right-wing conservative force in the 
Swiss party system, from 1991/2 the party went through  a structural and 
programmatic change comparable to that of the Freiheitlichen Partei Öster-
reichs (Aus trian Freedom Party – FPÖ) after Jörg Haider took power in 1986.9 
The SVP’s extraordinary rise to become Switzerland’s electorally strongest 
party by far makes it a model of success for the new right-wing populism 
in Europe.
After 50 years of stagnation, the SVP increased its share of the vote in the 
National Council elections from 11.9 percent (25 seats) in 1991 to 28.9 
percent (62 seats) in 2007 – an increase unique in Swiss electoral history 
after 1919. The SVP also doubled the number of its seats in cantonal par-
liamentary elections from 297 (1991) to 554 (2010). The gains in the 
8 Mahnig, Hans and Piguet, Etienne. “Die Immigrationspolitik der Schweiz von 1948 bis 1998. 
Entwicklung und Auswirkungen.” Migration und die Schweiz. Ergebnisse des Nationalen Forsc-
hungsprogramms “Migration und interkulturelle Beziehungen”. Ed. Wicker, Hans-Rudolf, Fibbi, 
Rosita and Haug Werner (Zürich 2003) 65-108, esp. 78ff. 
9 On the development of the SVP since the beginning of the 1990s, see Mazzoleni, Oscar. Nation-
alisme et populisme en Suisse. La radicalisation de la “nouvelle” UDC. 2nd revised ed. (Lausanne 
2008); Skenderovic, Damir. The Radical Right in Switzerland. Continuity and Change, 1945-2000 
(New York/Oxford 2009) 123-172.
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National Council elections were at the cost of two centre-right parties, 
Freisinnig-Demokratischen Partei (FDP) and the Christlichdemokratischen 
Volkspartei (CVP), whose combined vote had fallen by 8,7 percent since 
1991, as well as the SD, APS and Lega, whose total electoral strength was 
also reduced by 8.7 percent and which were largely ousted by the SVP. In 
addition, most of the leadership of the Freiheits-Partei Schweiz (Freedom 
Party of Switzerland – FPS), as the APS has been called since 1994, de-
fected to the SVP in the late 1990s.  In view of these electoral successes, 
in 2003 the SVP temporarily gained a second seat on the Federal Council, 
blasting the “magic form ula” that had held sway since 1959, and that 
determined a fi xed governmental apportioning between the four major 
parties, the FDP, CVP, SVP and Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz 
(SPS). It is true that there was regular internal party opposition in the SVP, 
particularly from the cantons of Bern and Graubünden, against the right-
wing populist course that the party was adopting under the auspices of 
Christoph Blocher and the Zurich Cantonal Party. However, this was pri-
marily about issues of style and image, and less about political content 
and the new ideological direction of the party. An internal regrouping 
took place with the founding of the Bürgerlich-Demokratischen Partei (Con-
servative Democratic Party of Switzerland – BDP) in 2008, which was 
joined by dissident SVP members and is currently represented in 14 of 
the 26 cantons.
Compared with the splinter parties, the SVP had much better precondi-
tions in terms of organizational structure, internal party cohesion and 
capacity for mobilisation. Since the SVP was not a newly established par-
ty, at the start of its transformation process it already had a stable party 
structure that it was able to build up to strength. Alongside numerous 
newcomer local party sections, they set up 12 new cantonal parties be-
tween 1991 and 2001, which meant they were represented in every can-
ton. The party, whose roots were particularly in the Protestant regions of 
German-speaking Switzerland, expanded to Catholic areas and western 
Switzerland. In contrast to the splinter parties, which are often weakened 
by internal quarrels, the SVP succeeded in overcoming internal party dif-
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ferences by running the party strictly, with the top party leaders occa-
sionally resorting to an authoritarian leadership style. They could also 
rely on signifi cant fi nancial resources, far exceeding those of the other 
major parties, and deployed these to professionalize the running of their 
campaigns and their political marketing.10 With strongly media-oriented 
political communication and provocative campaigns, the party also fol-
lowed the trend of increasing media infl uence in politics that occurred 
later in Switzerland compared with the other Western democracies. In 
all, the SVP succeeded in achieving a “nationalisation” of the party that 
is unusual for the Swiss federalist political system. It did so by strengthen-
ing the national party organization, profi ling a common political agenda 
and unifying the federal Swiss electoral and referendum campaigns.  
As with the splinter parties, direct democracy also represented an impor-
tant opportunity for the SVP. In 1992 it launched a national petition 
for a referendum for the fi rst time with the popular initiative “Against 
Illegal Immigration” and, as a result, actually started developing into a 
“plebiscite party”.11 On the one hand, the SVP used the political and dis-
cursive scope for action provided by the instruments of direct democracy. 
This enabled the party to publicise arguments and interpretations on 
specifi c topics and to present proposals for legal solutions. This approach 
proved especially successful in immigration policy. On the other hand, 
the system of direct democracy offers considerable potential for opposi-
tional politics. It allows social and political groups to register their op-
10 Between 1996 and 1998 the SVP spent 8.8 million Swiss francs on its campaigns; comparable 
fi gures for the other major parties were: FDP 5.8 million, SPS 4.6 million and CVP 2.8 million. 
According to estimates, the SVP spent 10 million Swiss francs alone for the 2007 election cam-
paign for the National Council, far more than the other parties spent; see Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
22 March 2000; Udris, Linards. “Medienwahlkampf 2007. Alles drehte sich um die SVP.” Me-
dienheft 28 Dec. 2007.
11 In addition there were the following four federal Swiss initiatives to date: “Surplus of Gold 
Reserves to the AHV-Fund  – Gold Initiative“ (referendum 2002), “Against Abuse of Law on 
Asylum” (2002), “For Democratic Naturalisation” (2008), “For the Expulsion of Convicted For-
eigners (Expulsion Initiative)”. 2010 Aside from this, the SVP played a leading role in several 
referendum campaigns such as the two Naturalisation Reforms (2004), the Treaty of Schengen 
(2005) and the extension to Romania and Bulgaria of the Treaty on Freedom of Movement of 
Persons (2009). 
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position selectively and purposefully, but without mounting fundamen-
tal opposition to the system. This allows the SVP to play a double role as 
a party of opposition and of government, by using referenda as symbolic 
moments to present itself as the critic of the “political class” and the 
trustworthy representative of the “people”, while simultaneously partici-
pating in political power as a National Council party. Even the openly 
declared “move into the opposition” after Christoph Blocher was voted 
out of offi ce as National Councillor in 2007 proved to be temporary and 
not principled – by 2008 the SVP had already re-entered the Fed eral 
Council with the election of Ueli Maurer, one of the main movers in the 
transformation of the party.12
SVP agenda and voters
As with other right-wing populist parties, the SVP’s “winning formula” 
consists of linking up a programme for immigration and European policy 
based on the politics of nationalism and identity with neo-liberal positions 
in economic and taxation policy. Its appeal to the “people” and to a “we-
feeling”, along with persistent attacks on social elites such as politicians, 
intellectuals and academics, is characteristic of populism and part of the 
SVP’s strategic repertoire that helps to distinguish it from the so-called 
“establishment” and present itself as the only true representative of the 
people. From the beginning of the 1990s the SVP focused particularly on 
immigration, a topic for which it previously showed little interest.13 
Aside from the classic themes of migration policy such as regulation and 
limits on immigration, it focused mainly on asylum and refugee policy 
and questions of integration. The SVP’s forays on asylum and asylum 
seekers aim at presenting the issue solely as problematic and confl ict-
laden, as illustrated by the constant use of the metaphor of “abuse”. 
12 Clive H. Church, Adrian Vatter. “Opposition in Consensual Switzerland: A Short but Signifi -
cant Experiment.” Government and Opposition 44/4 (2009), 412–437.
13 On the SVP‘s migration agenda, see Skenderovic, Damir and D’Amato, Gianni. Mit dem Fremden 
politisieren. Rechtspopulismus und Migrationspolitik in der Schweiz seit den 1960er Jahren. (Zurich 
2008).
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14 Since the late 1990s the SVP has used culturalist argumentation particularly in connection with 
Muslim immigration.  See, e.g., the programmatic publication by the SVP in the City of Zurich, 
“Konzept für eine Zürcher Ausländerpolitik“ – 1999. 
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Moreover, it operates with culturalist patterns of argumentation and in-
terpretation that highlight the incompatibility of different cultural and 
religious identities in order to warn against cultural confl ict and empha-
sise the inability of particular immigrant groups to integrate.14 
Various surveys conducted since the 1990s confi rm the growing impor-
tance of real or supposed differences in the way migrants are perceived by 
the Swiss population. In a poll in 1994, for example, 34 percent of re-
spondents thought that foreigners from Serbia and 32 percent of respond-
ents thought that foreigners from Bosnia were “actually out of place in 
Switzerland”. By 1997 the fi gures had risen to 43 percent and 42 percent. 
A survey published in 2000 recorded that 40 percent of Swiss citizens 
questioned did not want to have a Kosovo Albanian as a neighbour. In a 
2007 poll, 45 percent of respondents said they would prefer not to have 
a Kosovo Albanian as a family member. These indications of widespread 
culturally based attitudes to migration are also refl ected in the results of 
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a survey from 2006: 66 percent of female and 59 percent of male respond-
ents were sceptical that a modus vivendi could be achieved with migrants 
from a different cultural background.15 Since the 1990s there has also 
been an overall rise in sceptical attitudes to migration – which is related 
not least to the growing strength of the SVP and its anti-immigration 
campaigns. Whereas 33 percent of respondents in a poll in 1994 de-
manded measures to reduce the proportion of foreigners in Switzerland, 
46 percent of respondents took this position in 1997. In a survey pub-
lished in 2006, 59 percent of respondents alleged that the present-day 
numbers of foreigners in Switzerland were reaching the limits.  In the 
same survey, 43 percent voiced the opinion that foreigners were exploit-
ing the welfare state in Switzerland – an indicator mirroring the above-
men tioned “abuse” rhetoric of the SVP.16
Looking at the studies on SVP voters, we can see that their social profi le 
became signifi cantly more varied during the 1990s and 2000s; its massive 
gains in votes have won the party grass-roots supporters from almost 
every social group.17 While the SVP could continue to rely on its tradi-
tional voters living in rural regions, who were mostly male, belonged to 
the old middle class and tended to be self-employed workers, it also reg-
istered considerable growth among the labour force, voters in lower and 
middle income groups and those with a low or average level of formal 
education, as well as among residents of urban areas and Catholics. An-
15 Nef, Rolf. UNIVOX-Kultur I E-97 (Zurich 1997) 3f.; Longchamp, Claude, Dumont, Jeannine 
and Leuenberger, Petra. Einstellungen der SchweizerInnen gegenüber Jüdinnen und Juden und dem 
Holocaust (Bern 2000) 11; Longchamp, Claude et al. Kritik an Israel nicht deckungsgleich mit 
antisemitischen Haltungen. Antisemitismus-Potenzial neuartig bestimmt (Bern 2007) 24; Cattacin, 
Sandro et al. Monitoring Misanthropy and Rightwing Extremist Attitudes in Switzerland (Geneva 
2006) 31.
16 Nef 1997: 10ff.; Cattacin et al. 2006: 27.
17 On the change in SVP voter support, see e.g., Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. (ed.) Der Aufstieg der 
SVP. Acht Kantone im Vergleich. Zurich 2005; Blanchard, Philippe. “‘Nouvelle‘ UDC: nouvelle 
électeurs? Évolution de 1995 à 2003.” L’Union démocratique du centre: un parti, son action et ses 
soutiens. Ed. Mazzoleni, Oscar et al. (Lausanne 2007) 155-180; Seitz, Werner and Schneider, 
Madeleine. Die Wählerinnen und Wähler unter der Lupe. Eine Analyse anhand der Befragungsdaten 
der Schweizer Wahlstudie “SELECTS” (Nationalratswahlen 1995–2003) (Neuenburg 2007).
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other striking feature is the relatively even distribution of income groups 
among SVP voters, indicating that the profi le of so-called “modernisation 
losers” and socio-economically disadvantaged social groups has only lim-
ited validity. Instead, the SVP’s electoral successes clearly show that the 
link, also made by other European right-wing populist parties, between 
neo-liberal positions and nationalist and exclusionist demands appeals 
both to well-off and less well-off voters. 
The new right: from culture to politics
In Switzerland, as in other West European countries, a new right has 
emerged since the 1960s. It has gathered together a variety of intellectu-
als, authors and journalists grouped around circles, periodicals and pub-
lishing houses.18 Unlike in France or Germany, however, the new right in 
Switzerland has barely been able to get established as an independent 
and theoretically innovative philosophical current and to infl uence de-
bate in the cultural pages of the press or academic circles. Embedded in 
the transnational transfer of ideas and interpretations, the Swiss new 
right has confi ned itself primarily to adopting arguments and concepts 
from Western Europe’s new right and adapting them for the conditions 
and debates in Switzerland. This import of ideas has had an effect on the 
political agenda of right-wing populist parties particularly in German-
speaking Switzerland, where the new right is increasingly trying to link 
up party politics and intellectual work and the political and journalistic 
public arena.
A clear example of the party political commitment of the new right in 
German-speaking Switzerland is the newspaper “Schweizerzeit”, which 
was founded in 1979 as the successor to James Schwarzenbach’s paper, 
“Der Republikaner”, and belongs to the new right’s neo-conservative 
strand. The paper has been closely linked to the Zurich wing of the SVP 
18 On the new right in Switzerland, see Skenderovic 2009, 173-273.
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since the end of the 1980s, and supports its programme on migration 
and foreign policy. Its editor in chief was one of the driving forces behind 
the minaret initiative; in the run-up to the referendum he published 
numerous articles in Schweizerzeit that used anti-Islamic stereotypes and 
clichés and stirred up anti-Muslim feeling. As early as 2004, before the 
referenda on two civil rights proposals on naturalisation policy, he 
declared that he had proof of “rapid Muslimisation of Switzerland that 
was taking place via forced naturalisation”.19 The “Schweizerzeit” has 
also played an important part as a bridge to the New Right in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Authors of German magazines such as “Junge Frei-
heit”, “Criticòn” and “Mut” wrote in “Schweizerzeit”, and conversely, 
staff journalists and writers from “Schweizerzeit” authored articles in 
Federal German New Right publications, particularly in “Junge Freiheit”.
Another force in the neo-conservative current is the Stiftung für abend-
ländische Besinnung (Foundation for Occidental Consciousness – STAB). 
Founded in 1968, its activities are concentrated mainly in intellectual 
and cultural life, such as the publication of written works and the award 
of a highly paid prize, the STAB Prize. In 1997, for instance, the prize was 
awarded to Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, a controversial behavioural researcher 
from Germany who is a former disciple of Konrad Lorenz. The founder 
and long-serving chairman of STAB argued in a cultural differentiatialist 
way when he wrote that in the Foundation’s view, “the nurturing of cul-
tural identity is a means of preserving ethnic variety”, and that people 
should recognise that “particularly immigrants from Islamic countries” 
are not ready “to give up their own peculiarities or even their faith.”20
Aside from the neo-conservatives, the New Right in German-speaking 
Switzerland comprises two other tendencies, the environmentalists and 
the nationalists. The ecological current that emerged in the 1970s is also 
close to the right-wing populist parties, in particular the original  Nationale 
19 Schweizerzeit 19, 3 Sept. 2004, 1.
20 Jenny, Hans. Um was es geht. Refl exionen zum Gedankengut der Stiftung für Abendländische Besin-
nung (STAB). (Zurich 1998) 50, 87.
Switzerland
172 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
Aktion, with which it shared nationalist environmentalist arguments 
prioritising protection of the national community’s “living space” and 
linking demands on population policy to restrictive positions in migra-
tion policy.21 The nationalist current ultimately concentrates on foreign 
policy issues; it has represented isolationist positions and identity poli-
tics since the mid-1980s and collaborated with right-wing populist par-
ties in direct democracy campaigns.22
In French-speaking Switzerland the New Right has long pursued the strat-
egy known as “metapolitics”, as interpreted by the French Nouvelle droite 
in its “cultural struggle from the right”. This follows the argument that it 
is the right time to change the thinking of the people with cultural and 
intellectual work, which would then necessarily have an impact on po-
litical and social relations.23 This approach also corresponds to the classi-
cal view of the tasks of an intellectual – not focusing on the institutional 
methods of politics but dedicated to the work of debate and publishing 
instead. Consequently, up until the 1990s the New Right in French-speak-
ing Switzerland concentrated its interests on cultural, intellectual and aca-
demic areas.  
Aside from the counter-revolutionary strand that regards the Enlighten-
ment, the French Revolution and the “Cultural Revolution of 1968” as 
responsible for the erroneous ways of modern society, there are also the 
Integrists who are not solely concerned with theological questions and 
internal Church affairs. Instead, their supporters see religion, politics, 
and society as closely interlinked areas in which hierarchy, authority and 
tradition have to be fi rmly established as principles. Switzerland is the 
21 One example is the environmental association Umwelt und Bevölkerung/Association Ecologie 
et Population (ECOPOP), which was founded in 1971 and is active on population policy issues. 
It declared that “from an environmental perspective Switzerland [should not] continue to be a 
country of immigration.”; see  ECOPOP. Thesen zur schweizerischen Migrationspolitik (Bern 1992)10.
22 Among the most infl uential groups is the Aktion für eine unabhängige und neutrale Schweiz 
(AUNS), which has a large membership and is closely interlinked with the SVP. It has played an 
important role in several plebiscite campaigns against Switzerland‘s membership of suprana-
tional organizations. 
23 Taguieff, Pierre-André. Sur la Nouvelle droite. Jalons d’une analyse critique (Paris 1994).
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centre for international Integrism, embodied in the Priestly Society of Saint 
Pius X and its seminary for priests in the village of Ecône in the Canton 
of Wallis.24 The Society attracted international attention in 2009 when 
one of its four bishops publicly denied the existence of gas chambers in 
the Nazi concentration camps. It has over 100,000 fol lowers worldwide, 
and has infl uenced numerous groups, publications and publishers in the 
French-speaking part of Switzerland over the past 40 years with its au-
thoritarian and anti-egalitarian ideology. It has also regularly taken posi-
tions on social issues: for example, the Swiss section of the Society issued 
a communiqué in 2009 calling for support for the minaret initiative in 
order to prevent the further propagation of Islamic doctrine.25
The last strand of the New Right in French-speaking Switzerland we 
should mention is the Nouvelle droite. It has links with the current of the 
same name in France around the Groupement de recherche et d’études pour 
la civilisation européenne (GRECE), and with its leading ideologue, Alain 
de Benoist, and has tried since the early 1980s to revitalise the Indo-
European heritage by propagating neo-pagan ideas. Its goal is to offer a 
hierarchically structured model of society as an alternative to the egali-
tarian and universalistic European traditions based on Judaeo-Christian 
principles. For a long period the Nouvelle droite was publicly associated 
with circles like the Cercle Thule, Cercle Proudhon and Association des Amis 
de Robert Brasillach, which published New Right literature, organized 
events with representatives from the European New Right, and produced 
newspapers and periodicals. Since the end of the 1990s, supporters of the 
Nouvelle droite have also got closer to the right-wing populist party camp, 
and some began to play an active role in party political work.26
24 Schifferle, Alois. Die Pius-Bruderschaft. Informationen – Positionen – Perspektiven (Kevelaer 2009).
25 For excerpts from the communiqué, see the Internet website of the Priestly Society of Saint 
Pius X : DICI. Documentation – Information – Catholiques – Internationales. http://www.dici.org/
actualites/suisse-la-construction-de-minarets-desormais-interdite-constitutionnellement 
 (accessed 1 Jul. 2010).
26 A prominent example is the leading representative of the Nouvelle droite in the French-Speaking 
part of Switzerland who operated as general secretary of the Geneva SVP and stood as a can-
didate for the National Council on the cantonal party list in 1999. After fi erce criticism in the 
media, the national Swiss SVP succeeded in getting him expelled from the Geneva section; see 
e.g., Le Temps, 3 Sept. 1999 and 13 Sept. 1999
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The extreme right: On the margin of politics and society 
In contrast to the experience in other West European countries such as 
Germany and Italy, extreme-right parties were unable to gain a footing in 
the Swiss party system after the Second World War.27 The few isolated 
parties that contested local and national parliamentary elections did not 
achieve any signifi cant electoral successes. In fact, the political infl uence 
of the extreme right in Switzerland has remained extremely minor right 
up to the present. The extreme-right consists of a diffuse, mostly loosely 
organized subculture; public authorities estimate its membership at 
around 1,200 persons.28 Around 700 people participated in the largest 
recorded extreme-right rally to date, in 2005. 
These fi gures contrast with the results of a 2005 survey of around 3,000 
young people aged between 16 and 20 and on voluntary post-school 
training courses. Some 9.6 percent of the respondents claimed to sympa-
thise with extreme-right groups or regarded themselves as members of 
these groups. In ad dition, one in ten of the respondents had previously 
been a victim of extreme-right violence.29 The striking discrepancy 
between the fi gures indicates that aside from the organized extreme right 
there is a consid erable number of young people who have various points 
of contact with right-wing extremism. This applies in the fi rst place to 
their lifestyle, which is expressed in fashion styles, codes and musical 
tastes. The young people’s attitudes, which are characterised by exclusion 
with regard to the migrant population and by pronounced nationalism, 
exhibit shared features with the extreme right. These young people, who 
are only loosely connected with the extreme right, often call themselves 
27 For a historical overview of the organized extreme right in Switzerland after 1945, see Sken-
derovic, Damir. “Organized Right-Wing Extremism in Switzerland: An Overview Since 1945.” 
Right-wing Extremism in Switzerland. National and International Perspectives. Ed. Marcel Alexander 
Niggli (Baden-Baden 2009) 28-38.
28 Bundesamt für Polizei. Bericht Innere Sicherheit 2008 (Bern 2009) 41.
29 Schmid, Martin and Storni, Marco. Jugendliche im Dunkelfeld rechtsextremer Gewalt. Viktimis-
ierungsprozesse und Bewältigungsstrategien (Zurich 2009).
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“patriots”. To date there has been a general lack of research on this phe-
nomenon, and a lack of more precise data on its dimensions.30
The extreme right in Switzerland ranges from internationally linked Ne-
gationists through well-organized groups typifi ed by authoritarian lead-
ership to barely structured skinhead scenes mainly infl uenced by young 
men. This diffuse picture began in the 1980s and developed similarly in 
most West European countries. Its main distinguishing features include 
the sharp fall in age of the right-wing extremist camp, which began in 
the mid-1980s and was infl uenced by the rise of the racist skinhead move-
ment. The extreme right went on to develop into a diffuse subculture 
that became part of global right-wing extremism through new communi-
cation methods like the Internet, and has become commercialised in 
recent years with the growing sale of CDs, clothing and propaganda 
material. Finally, we can observe a heightened tendency to violence. 
Attacks on accommodation for asylum seekers and against Jewish insti-
tutions, and violence against migrants and political opponents have 
become elements of extreme-right mobilisation.
In Switzerland, as in other West European countries, there are repeated 
discussions on the relationship of right-wing populist parties to the 
 extreme right. Whereas attention primarily focused on the Nationale Aktion 
during the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, from the second half 
of the 1990s there was growing public interest in the SVP.31 Critics accuse 
the party of insuffi cient demarcation from extreme-right actors, while 
exponents of the SVP counter that the party explicitly demarcates itself 
from the extreme right, and argue that it is precisely the SVP that is 
Switzerland
30 Overall, the situation of data on the extreme right in Switzerland is weak, as the authorities 
and the public barely see right-wing extremism as a long-term problem; see Skenderovic, Dam-
ir. Strategien gegen Rechtsextremismus in der Schweiz: Akteure, Massnahmen und Debatten (Bern 
2010).
31 Udris, Linards, Imhof, Kurt and Ettinger, Patrik. “New Chances for Attracting Attention. The 
Extreme Right and Radical Right in Swiss Public Communication. 1960-2005.” Right-wing Ex-
tremism in Switzerland: National and International Perspectives. Ed. Marcel A. Niggli (Baden-Baden 
2009) 41-57.
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helping considerably to stem right-wing extremism because, they say, it 
raises questions the population is concerned with. The perspective on 
linkages between right-wing populist parties and the extreme right in the 
past 40 years shows, fi rstly, that both strands, as members of the political 
family of the radical right, feature similar ideological reference points 
and socio-political ideas. Secondly, they are interlinked in the sense of a 
collective actor, which is expressed in organizational and structural 
networks and personal interactions. These mostly take the form of 
topical relationships that seldom develop into continuous, structurally 
consolidated cooperation. 
Conclusion: 
The dominance and integration of right-wing populism 
The right-wing populists in Switzerland occupy a dominant position on 
the right margin of the political spectrum. Whereas the groupings and 
scenes of the extreme right adopt blatant outsider positions in society 
and politics, and the parties active in parliamentary politics explicitly 
dissociate themselves from them, right-wing populist parties are accepted 
as participants in the party contest and the political system, and – in the 
case of the SVP – are even integrated into the ruling coalition. The rela-
tionship between the New Right and the right-wing populists is much 
more permeable and characterised by cooperation. In this situation what 
is most signifi cant is the New Right’s ideological function in supplying 
formulations of right-wing populist argumentation and interpretation of 
social questions. 
Swiss right-wing populism is assuming a pioneering role in Europe. Aside 
from France, where the Poujade movement emerged briefl y in the mid-
1950s, Switzerland was the only European country so early after the Sec-
ond World War to exhibit such consistency in the formation of move-
ments on the margin of right-wing politics but not directly derived from 
fascist models. Since then, seven right-wing populist parties have suc-
ceeded in entering the national parliament – more than in any other 
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European country. Moreover, Switzerland has the right-wing populist 
party with the largest electoral share in Western Europe – the SVP. 
The sharp rise in support for right-wing populism among the Swiss popu-
lation from the 1990s, as expressed in the SVP’s electoral successes, can 
be explained by the widespread thesis from electoral research that in 
Switzerland, as in other Western democracies, the traditional socio-struc-
tural lines of confl ict have noticeably diminished. In the 1990s they were 
replaced by a new phenomenon, the “opening-demarcation” confl ict 
that increasingly infl uences the electoral behaviour of voters.  In this re-
spect the SVP has succeeded in appealing to the supposed losers in the 
processes of globalisation and modernisation with anti-Europe and anti-
foreigner policies. On the other hand, we should remember that a large 
segment of SVP voters do not belong to the group of economically disad-
vantaged persons. Moreover, parties play a key role in the perception of 
social confl icts, and consequently have sustained infl uence on the mo-
tivations for voter decisions. With its identity politics on questions of 
European integration and migration, the SVP itself has correspondingly 
made a major contribution to the infl uence of the new “opening-demar-
cation” confl ict. 
The strength of right-wing populism in Switzerland depends above all on 
the openness of the political system. On the one hand, the country’s 
right-wing populist parties are very active in using the institutional op-
portunity structure of direct democracy. Between the 1960s and 2010 
they submitted 18 popular initiatives on the national federal level and 
achieved calls for 15 referenda. It is hardly surprising that other right-
wing populist parties in Europe extol direct democracy as the ideal 
political system and, in doing so, express their basic mistrust of  interme-
diary forms of representative democracy. In their view, direct democratic 
de cisions are not merely the only genuine declaration of will of the 
“sovereign people” and therefore the unequivocal expression of the 
volonté générale, but also a clear majority decision not based on compro-
mises negotiated by the political elite.
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On the other hand, the traditional system of Swiss consociational de-
mocracy, in which the integration of political and social forces is central 
to the decision-making process, is the basis for the integrative strategy 
towards the SVP, which is different from the demarcation strategy of a 
cordon sanitaire. The SVP, as a member of numerous cantonal and local 
executive committees and of the National Council since 1929, has long 
since proved its governmental responsibility and is treated accordingly 
by the established parties. It is not perceived as a pariah party. Although 
the other main parties occasionally criticise the SVP’s confrontational 
style, strategy of polarisation and obstructive politics, to date neither the 
two centre-right parties, the FDP and CVP, nor the Social Democrats have 
seriously doubted the modalities of consociational  democracy. However, 
given the smouldering political and ideological divergences, the question 
arises to what extent the call for adherence to concordance and consen-
sus primarily serves the purpose of retaining party political power at the 
cost of principles of anti-discrimination in the Swiss migration society.
Switzerland
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Right-wing extremism in Spain: Between parliamentary 
insignifi cance, far-right populism and racist violence
The charges: incitement to racial hatred, unauthorised possession of 
 weapons and setting up an illegal organization (Associación Ilicitá). In 
early June 2010, 14 members of the Spanish skinhead section Blood and 
Honour (B&H) received prison sentences from one to three-and-a-half 
years. The judge also ordered the dissolution of the organization. This 
was the third time a neo-Nazi organization was sentenced in Spain as an 
illegal association. Although the penalties imposed by the court were less 
severe than those demanded by the public prosecutor, this was a signal 
verdict. Experts hope the judgement will be used as a precedent in future.1 
To date, there has been a low level of public awareness about the presence 
of extreme-right-wing organizations in Spain – and they have operated with 
impunity.
The present face and extent of right-wing extremism
“Nobody is interested in the topic. There is no kind of preventive policy.” 
This is the view of journalist Xavier Vinader. Looking at the issue of 
present-day right-wing extremism, he reached the surprising conclusion, 
“They are a danger, they are present, but fortunately they are not impor-
tant at all right now.”2 In the last general election to the Spanish parlia-
ment, the extreme-right-wing parties combined won only 0.2 percent of 
the vote.3 Yet for left-wingers, migrants, homosexuals, homeless people 
Frauke Büttner
1 “Entrevista Esteban Ibarra, Movimiento contra la Intolerancia.” El Pais 06.07.2010. 
 www.elpais.com, last accessed 06.07.2010.
2 Interview by Frauke Büttner with Xavier Vinader, 09.06.2010 in Barcelona.
3 Büttner, Frauke. “Wahlschlappe in Spanien.” Der Rechte Rand 112, May/June 2008.
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and others, racist and extreme-right-wing violence are part of everyday 
life in many places in Spain. The non-governmental organization Mov-
imiento contra la Intolerancia (MCI) has been working in the fi eld of pre-
vention of right-wing extremism and fostering of tolerance for the past 
eight years. It has reported over 80 deaths caused by extreme-right-wing 
violence since 1991. It estimates the number of incidents and attacks 
motivated by racism, right-wing extremism, homophobia and anti-
Semitism at 4,000 annually.4
 
The Spanish authorities keep no systematic records on extreme-right-
wing organizations and their members and voters. Observers estimate 
around 70 groupings, of which 20 are political parties. According to po-
lice fi gures, their total membership numbers 10,000. MCI regards this 
fi gure as a minimum.5 Its chairman, Esteban Ibarra, thinks 15,000 would 
be more realistic. Female participation in the far-right scene is estimated 
at around 20 percent. To date, however, there have been no gender-spe-
cifi c analyses on the functions and dimensions of women in the far-right 
movement in Spain.
Networking and agitation on the Internet have developed a considerable 
dynamic over the past few years. Extreme right-wing and racist content 
is disseminated on over 200 websites; national Internet mail-order fi rms 
distribute clothing, books and music. There are currently over 60 active 
Spanish far-right rock bands, and at least 20 known concerts a year, some 
of them openly publicised on the Internet.6
4 Movimiento contra la Intolerancia. Informe Raxen Especial 2010. Ofensiva Xenófoba durante la 
crisis económica. (Madrid: Movimiento contra la Intolerancia, 2010) 52, 58. On the work of the 
MCI, see Büttner, Frauke. “Handeln für Toleranz und gegen Rechtsextremismus in Spanien – 
Ansätze des ‚Movimiento contra la Intolerancia’”. Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland und Europa 
ed. Spöhl, Holger and Kolls, Sarah (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010) 177 ff.
5 Duva, Jesús. “10,000 ‘ultras’ unidos por la xenofobia.” El Pais 08.10.2006, last accessed 
02.07.2010; and Movimiento contra la Intolerancia 2010, 58. 
6 Movimiento contra la Intolerancia 2010, 39
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Forms of far-right organizations
Spain‘s extreme-right scene can be divided into four spectrums, although 
in some cases their boundaries are fl uid in terms of membership: (1) nos-
talgic Franquist, Falangist and ultra-religious organizations; (2) right-
wing populist parties with various degrees of radicalism; (3) neo-Nazi and 
nationalist revolutionary organizations; (4) forces with party alignments 
and extreme-right-wing football fans.7 
One of the main nostalgic Falangist organizations is Falange Española de 
las JONS (FE de las JONS); founded in 1933, this is Spain‘s oldest far-right 
party and at present the majority of extreme-right votes in general elec-
tions. In real terms, in the 2008 elections for the Spanish senate and 
parliament, its share of the vote was marginal, some 0.05 percent. The 
only extreme-right party represented in parliament after the death of dic-
tator Francisco Franco was Fuerza Nueva, which won a single seat in 1979 
under the leadership of the fascist Blas Piñar. Fuerza Nueva was a con-
7 See also Cantarero, Joan. La huella de la bota. De los nazis del franquismo a la nueva ultraderecha 
(Madrid: Ediciones Planeta, 2010) 91 ff.
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glomerate of several ultra-right Falangist tendencies that banded together 
after the government decreed the dissolution of the Franquist unity par-
ty, Movimiento Nacional8. In the early parliamentary elections of 1982 
Blas Piñar lost a large number of voters to Alianza Popular, the right-wing 
conservative party.  
Today there are 13 Falangist splinter groups9 harking back to Falange 
founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera and the ideology of National Syn-
dicalism, the idea of a single national hierarchically-structured trade un-
ion representing both employers and employees. Other nostalgic far-
right groups include Confederación National de Combatientes (National 
Confederation of Ex-Veterans) and foundations such as Fundación Fran-
cisco Franco, which are based on Franquism. Parties like Alternativa 
Española and Movimiento  Católico Español link up with the Catholic-fun-
damentalist spectrum. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, right-wing populist, neo-Nazi and nationalist 
revolutionary parties emerged, with youth organizations and affi liated 
forces. Their common denominator is massive rabble-rousing and polari-
sation against migrants.
The association Circulo Español de Amigos de Europa (Spanish Circle of 
Friends of Europe, CEDADE), was infl uential in the emergence and ideo-
logical alignment of many ultra-right groups in Spain. CEDADE fi rst be-
came active in 1966, when Franco still ruled Spain. It provided an um-
brella for Falangists and former veterans of the División Azul, ex-SS and 
Gestapo offi cers, and neo-Nazis, who built up this infl uential European 
neo-Nazi organization; it dissolved in 1993. Journalist and author Joan 
Cantarero sees its demise “not as the end, but as the beginning of the 
most active neo-Nazism in Spain.”10 In the mid-1990s, former CEDADE 
  8 Bernecker, Walther L. Spaniens Geschichte seit dem Bürgerkrieg (Munich: Beck‘sche Reihe 1997) 
226.
  9 http://servicio.mir.es/registro-partidos/index.htm, last accessed 24.11.2009.
10 Cantarero, Joan 2010, 24.
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activists were involved in neo-Nazi parties such as Democracia Nacional 
(DN) and Alianza por la Unidad Nacional, now Alianza Nacional (AN). 
Other ex-CEDADE cadres like Pedro Varela Geiss focussed their energy on 
supra-party ideological work. Geiss founded a bookshop in Barcelona, 
Liberia Europa, which sells literature glorifying the Nazis.
One of the newer parties is Movimiento Social Republicano (Social Republi-
can Movement, MSR), which describes itself as patriotic-socialist; to some 
extent it copies the image of the Autonomous Nationalists and integrates 
the most radical segment of the neo-Nazi scene. The close interlinking of 
these groups was demonstrated in the B&H trial in June 2010: 17 of the 
18 accused had been candidates on MSR electoral tickets some years pre-
viously.11 In September 2009, MSR chairman Juan Antonio Llopart was 
sentenced as managing director of the publishing house, Ediciones Nueva 
Republica, for justifying the Nazi genocide.12 The MSR has an electoral al-
liance with the right-wing populist party España 2000 and with Frente 
Nacional (National Front, FN), which was founded in 2006. This alliance 
11 “El líder de la organización nazi Blood & Honour, condenado a tres años de cárcel.” El Pais 
05.07.2010, last accessed 06.07.2010; and Peris, Joana. “Juicio a un brazo político de los neona-
zis.” 12.06.2010. http://www.diagonalperiodico.net, last accessed 07.06.2010
12 Amical de Mauthausen y altres camps, SOS Racisme-Catalunya, Comunicat davant la sentència de 
la Secció X de l’Audiència Provincial de Barcelona del procés judicial de la Llibreria Kalki, 08.10.2010, 
http://www.sosracisme.org/accions/comunicat.php?doc=185&cat=0, last accessed 15.06.2010; 
and La Vanguardia 08.10.2009, lavanguardia.es, last accessed 15.06.2010.
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is the second attempt to create a common electoral platform; the fi rst 
 attempt, in 2000 – when the neo-Nazi DN participated instead of the FN 
– was a miserable failure.
Groups similar to España 2000 on the far-right spectrum include FN and 
several splinter groups from the Catalonian Plataforma de Catalunya 
(PxC), which tried to present a profi le outside the left-right discourse. 
The PxC was founded in 2002 by Josep Anglada i Ruis, who was previ-
ously active in several groups including the extreme-right-wing Fuerza 
Nueva (New Force). In the 2007 elections the PxC managed to treble its 
share of the vote and won 17 seats in municipal assemblies.13
 
Aside from the organized parties of the extreme right, there is a wide 
spectrum of non-aligned far-right forces in Spain, ranging from national-
ist revolutionary and patriotic organizations to extreme-right-wing skin-
heads and cultural-political groups and their networks. An array of far-
right activities is available in the youth culture sphere; these events are 
usually hardly visible and are held in semi-public or private spaces. Con-
certs and demonstrations foster – sometimes close – links with the neo-
Nazi, national-revolutionary parties MSR, DN and AN. In addition, ultra-
right football fans have been an acute problem for years: they are 
responsible for many of the 4,000 hate crimes committed annually.14
13 Fernandez, David. “Ultras europeos fi nancian la lista de Plataforma de Catalunya.” Diagonal 
124, 23.04.2010; Casals Meseguer, Xavier. “La Plataforma per Catalunya: la eclosión de un 
nacional-populismo catalán (2003-2009).” WP 274 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Politiques I 
Socials 2009). 
14 Cantarero, Joan 2010, 95; Movimiento contra la Intolerancia. Racismo y violencia ultra en el 
futbol (Madrid 2005) 7 ff.
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Target groups, key topics and strategies
The conservative, nationalist and ultra-Catholic spectrum is a target 
group for the nostalgic and Falangist extreme right. The slogans of the 
national-syndicalist orientated Falangist groups are predictably aimed at 
workers as well. The right-wing populists also target workers on the la-
bour market issue but, like the neo-Nazi and nationalist revolutionary 
groups, the populists focus carefully and concentratedly on the young. 
Concerts, demonstrations and football stadiums are important recruiting 
grounds. The right-wing populist PxC has evidently succeeded in making 
a breakthrough from the usual clientele of extreme-right parties and win-
ning voter support from a wide range of political areas.15
The Franquist, ultra-religious and Falangist far right frequently highlight 
the maintenance of traditional values such as the family and the Chris-
tian religion. Clear positions on abortion and homosexuality are evident 
throughout the extreme-right spectrums. For example, FE des las JONS 
ran a counter-campaign at the time of the liberalisation of the abortion 
law, while AN tried to polarise public opinion with an anti-homosexual-
ity poster on International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia.
The glorifi cation of the Franco regime peaks every year around 20 No-
vember, the anniversary of the death of Francisco Franco and of Falange 
founder José Antonio Primo de Riveras. Memorial processions and Cath-
olic masses, often accompanied by fascist symbols, are held in the Valley 
of the Fallen cemetery, near Madrid. Because such activities have been 
prohibited on the site itself since the Law on Historical Remembrance16 
came into force, in November 2009 activists raised their arms in the fas-
cist salute in front of the entrance. Reports on the commemorative events 
can be found on the Internet on the websites of organizations from the 
15 Erra, Miquel/Serra, Joan 2008, 13.
16 For the debate on the law and commemorative policy, see Bernecker, Walther L. and Brink-
mann, Sören. Kampf der Erinnerungen. Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg in Politik und Gesellschaft 1936-
2008 (Nettersheim: Verlag Graswurzelrevolution 2008) 339-355.
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fringe far-right spectrum. However, participation from these circles is not 
particularly high: younger organizations like the MSR, which focus on 
anti-capitalist and environmental issues, no longer relate to Franquism.
In the spectrum of neo-Nazi parties and non-aligned forces, massive anti-
Semitic agitation is an integral part of the programme. Surfi ng the Inter-
net yields numerous examples of relevant caricatures, boycott calls 
against Israel, and links to anti-Semitic events and readings. There is top-
ical reference to Nazism in the scene, such as the eulogies to Adolf Hitler 
and Rudolf Hess in the publications of the Spanish section of B&H, the 
group that was sentenced in June 2010.
Almost all the parties agree on defence of “Spanish national unity”. The 
Falange website features statements against the Catalonian Statute of Au-
tonomy and in favour of the political unity of Spain. The neo-Nazi party 
AN put out stickers in Catalonia with the legend, “Don‘t let them force 
you into silence. Speak Spanish. Rebel!”17 By contrast, the programme of 
the MSR – España 2000‘s partner in the new electoral alliance – demands 
recognition of the “peoples” that “make up Spain” and their different 
traditions, languages and cultures.18 
“Social justice” is another important issue for the extreme-right wing in 
Spain. It is usually linked with presenting the far right as a political alter-
native to the government. In the 2008 elections, parties such as Falange 
Auténtica demanded “more democracy” and “more solidarity and patri-
otism”. Whereas most of the Falangist parties avoid, or even reject, racist 
patterns of argumentation, La Falange (FE), which incorporates the most 
radical forces in the spectrum, describes immigration as a threat to the 
“national identity”.19
17 Alianca Nacional, 
http://www.lostuyos.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=187:
ino-te-calles&catid=58:campanas&Itemid=2, last accessed 18.11.2009.
18 Movimiento Social Republicano. MSR. La alternativa para el siglo XXI (Molins de Rei: Ediciones 
Nueva República 2008) 22.
19 Cf. Cantarero, Joan 2010, 92; and FE/La Falange Ideas aprobadas en el Congreso Nacional Ex-
traordinario de FE-La Falange el 7 de Junio del 2008, 07.06.2008, www.lafalange.org, last accessed 
07.07.2010.
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Aggressive, covert and open racist agitation is characteristic of Spain‘s 
right-wing populist and neo-Nazi scene. Social and economic problems are 
given an ethnic cast, and the issue is more acrimonious than ever in a period 
of economic crisis and high unemployment.  “Solutions” are propagated in 
the form of more or less extensive exclusion of migrants from the labour 
market and social or health care, with the slogan, “Spaniards fi rst!”
In the run-up to the forthcoming local and general elections, the MSR, 
España 2000 and FN have announced a joint campaign intended to 
present their proposals for dealing with the crisis and “its connection 
with the corruption of the system and with immigration”.20 This was 
clearly shown at an FN demonstration in April 2010 when España 2000 
demanded the resignation of prime minister Zapatero on the grounds 
that he was responsible for corruption and “mass immigration”.21 In the 
past ten years the far right has held several demonstrations in working-
class areas with a high migrant population, for example in Valencia and 
Madrid. This strategy aims to mobilise new supporters and, at the same 
time, to intimidate residents from migrant backgrounds. 
 
The far right also treats the topic of criminality in ethnic terms by portray-
ing migrants and Muslims as a threat to security. Mobilisation against the 
building of mosques is currently one of the key issues for the different 
groups, from right-wing populists to neo-Nazis. PxC says it is not against 
immigration but only “against the installation of Muslim immigrants in 
our country”. Yet the Catalonian party made restrictions on migration and 
social services for migrants one of its key themes from the very start. 
Experts see a risk in this far-right strategy of exploiting popular issues.22   
20 See declaration of 23.05.2010 on website España 2000, 31.05.2010. Comunicado conjunto 
de España 2000, Frente Nacional y Movimiento Social Republicano, http://www.esp2000.org/
comunicados/1133-comunicado-conjunto-de-espana-2000-frente-nacional-y-movimiento-
social-republican.html, last accessed 07.07.2010.
21 Erra, Miquel and Serra, Joan. Tota la veritat sobre Plataforma per Catalunya. L´ultradretà Josep 
Anglada al descobert (Badalona: Ara Llibres S.L. 2008) 74, 7879 f.
22 Casals Meseguer, Xavier. “La Plataforma per Catalunya: la eclosión de un nacional-populismo 
catalàn (2003-2009)”, WP 274 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials, Barcelona, 
2009) 23/24; and interview with Vinader, Xavier 2010. 
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Campaigns against Islam borrow motifs from other European parties. 
DN, for example, used the motif of the anti-minaret campaign from the 
referendum in Switzerland in 2009. The parties are positioning their 
campaigns to strategic advantage at a juncture when the discussion on 
the approach to Muslim fellow citizens is on the public agenda. The anti-
Muslim discourse is also gaining momentum through activities of other 
parties, such as a petition by the mainstream Partido Popular (PP) against 
the building of a mosque in Badalona.23
Europe continues to be an important point of reference for many of the 
parties from the extreme-right-wing scene. The MSR, for instance, uses 
the so-called “Europe of nations” as a political reference; cultivating a 
rebellious image with its black-and-red fl ame, the party advocates an 
“Indo-European” Europe based on “blood right”.24 Turkey is explicitly 
rejected as an EU member state. Several parties from the far-right spec-
trum campaigned in the last EU parliamentary elections. Despite their 
fundamental rejection of the EU as an institution, their goal is to achieve 
institutional representation on the national or European level. At present 
a strategy of normalisation can be observed in the spectrum whose mem-
bers are organized in parties, even if some, like the MSR, hold strongly 
divisive, radical positions.
 
Electoral success and political attitudes within the population
At present, Spain‘s right-wing extremists are far from gaining parliamen-
tary representation. In the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, 
neo-Nazis, ultra-Catholic and Falangist parties received only around 
23 Marín, Angel. ABC: El PP de Badalona promueve una campaña contra una mezquita. 11.02.2009, 
http://www.abc.es/20090211/catalunya-catalunya/badalona-promueve-campana-contra-
20090211.html, last accessed 07.06.2010; and Garcia, Jesus 14.09.2009. “Sin mezquitas en mi 
barrio.” El Pais, www.elpais.com, last accessed 06.07.2010.
24 MSR. “Ponencia sobre Europa.” http://www.msr.org.es/, last accessed 18.11.2009.
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25 Cf. Elecciones Parlamento Europeo 2009. 08.06.2009. 
 http://elecciones.mir.es/resultados2009/99PE/DPE99999TO.htm last accessed 18.11.2009; and 
antifeixistes org  09.06.2009 http://www.antifeixistes.org/3271_lextrema-dreta-puja-europa-
60000-vots-lestat-noves-estrategies-dels-ultres-espanyols.htm, last accessed 18.11.2009.
26 Ministerio de Trabajo y Inmigración (ed.), Cea Dáncona, Maria Angeles and Vales Martínez, 
Miguel S. Evolución del racismo y la xenofobia en España. Informe 2008 (Madrid 2008) 290.
27 See http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2008/02/espana/elecciones2008/resultados/congreso/
globales/ last accessed 06.07.2010; Fernandez, David. “Ultras europeos fi nancian la lista de 
Plataforma de Catalunya.” Diagonal 124 (23.04.2010).  
28 Movimiento contra la Intolerancia 2010, 3.
29 Ministerio de Trabajo y Inmigración (ed.), Cea Dáncona, Maria Angeles and Vales Martínez, 
Miguel S. Evolución del racismo y la xenofobia en España. Informe 2009 (Madrid, 2009) 44, 74.
60,000 votes.25 The results were similar in the Spanish parliamentary 
elections in March 2008, when nine far-right parties altogether gained a 
total of 50,000 votes (0.2 percent). Top of the list was the FE de las JONS 
(13,000), closely followed by the DN with just over 12,500 votes. In the 
local elections of 2007, around 50 far-right representatives succeeded in 
entering various town halls as deputies,26 of whom 17 were from the 
PxC, which received 12,400 votes.27 At a conference in Barcelona-Sants in 
March 2010, Anglada announced to an audience of around 700 people of 
various ages and from different segments of the far-right spectrum that the 
party would be running in the Catalonian elections in autumn 2010.
 
There is no doubt that 0.2 percent of the vote on a national level is mar-
ginal. However, the signifi cance of right-wing extremism should also be 
seen in terms of so-called hate crime and attitudes among the popula-
tion. It is a cause for serious concern, fi rstly, that there is a persistently 
high number of violent attacks with an extreme-right-wing or racist back-
ground. Recently MCI detected a new quality of extreme-right agitation 
and spoke of a “xenophobic offensive in the context of the economic 
crisis”.28
 
Secondly, opinion polls register growing rejection of immigration. Ac-
cording to the last survey by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas 
C.I.S (Centre for Sociological Studies) 77 percent of respondents in 2008 
agreed that too many immigrants were living in Spain. In the year 2008 
the level of agreement was 60 percent. The same survey recorded that 42 
percent of respondents regarded the immigration laws as too tolerant.29 
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There is also growing rejection of the building of mosques, or sympathy 
with such rejection. In the C.I.S poll in 2007, 39 percent of respondents 
already thought it acceptable for protests to be made against building a 
mosque in their neighbourhood. Two years previously, 30 percent agreed 
to this statement. All the same, in 2007, 29 percent of the population 
could imagine acceptance of a party that argued that immigrants of a dif-
ferent ethnic origin or religion caused social problems.30
A survey of 23,000 Spanish secondary school pupils and 6,000 teachers 
revealed alarming results: almost two-thirds of the respondents refused 
to work with Moroccans and Roma. Over half of those questioned would 
not want to share a desk with pupils of Jewish faith, and 8 percent sym-
pathised with extreme-right/racist groups. However, it should be 
noted that 90 percent spoke out clearly against these groups.31
On the international scale, in a survey conducted in spring 2008 by the 
Pew Research Centre, Spain heads the list in relation to anti-Semitic and 
Islamophobic attitudes: 46 percent of Spanish respondents expressed dis-
like of Jews, and the fi gure for Muslims was even higher, at 52 percent.32 
International networking in the context of improved 
 European cooperation
Over the years, Spanish fascists have cooperated with people such as old 
Nazis who lived undisturbed in Spain, and with Italian neo-fascists. Since 
1994 there has been cooperation between the German NPD and the 
Spanish FE/La Falange, which was affi rmed by the establishment of the 
30 Ministerio de Trabajo y Inmigración 2008, 30, 35, 183, 165, 293.
31 Movimiento contra la Intolerancia. Informe Raxen 39 (Madrid, September 2008) 46 ff.
32 Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe http://pewglobal.org/
reports/cache.php?ReportID=262, 17.09.08, last accessed 24.11.2009.
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Internet platform European National Front33. NPD representatives travel 
regularly to Madrid for the memorial ceremonies around 20 November, 
and Spanish neo-Nazis to demonstrations and conferences abroad. In 
Germany, some of the Spaniards sentenced in the H&M trial took part in 
the Hees March in Wunsiedel in 2004, representatives of AN were present 
at an attempted procession by right-wing extremists in Dresden in 
February 2009, and members of FE/La Falange travelled to the neo-Nazi 
march in Berlin on 1 May 2010. 
It is notable that in recent years the leadership echelons of right-wing 
populist and neo-Nazi parties have increasingly concentrated on interna-
tional networking. In November 2009, NPD chairman Udo Voigt dined 
in Madrid with leading activists from España 2000, FN and MSR. That 
same weekend, a public meeting was held in a Madrid hotel with Manuel 
33 Grumke, Thomas. “Die transnationale Infrastruktur der extremistischen Rechten.” Europa im 
Visier der Rechtsextremen, ed. Angelika Beer (Berlin: Die Grünen/Europäische Allianz im Eu-
ropäischen Parlament, 2009) 15.
Alianza Nacional at a 
Demonstration on 
February 13, 2009 
in Dresden: 
“You may destroy 
the walls but never 
the hearts”. 
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Canduela from Democracia Nacional, Roberto Fiore from the Italian party 
Fuorza Nuova and Nick Griffi n from the British National Party; MSR mem-
bers broke up the meeting. DN has been a member of the European plat-
form Euronat since 2005, and evidently in fairly close contact with the 
European National Movement (ENB) founded in Budapest in October 
2009.34 In 2008 the DN chairman travelled to the Anti-Islam Congress 
organized by Pro Cologne, which was shut down by counter-demons tra-
tions. In spring 2010 PxC representatives participated in the Anti- Minaret 
Conference in Gelsenkirchen; shortly afterwards Josep Anglada made 
agreements with the FPÖ in Vienna, and it was reported that he was 
hoping for support from the Lega Nord, Front National and the Swedish 
multi-millionaire Patrick Brinkmann.35 The expansion of international 
contacts with a view to logistic and political support is undoubtedly very 
important for Spain‘s right-wing extremists. The increased activity in this 
area indicates that these contacts will be signifi cantly expanded in the 
coming years.
Conclusions
To date, Spain‘s far right is barely represented at the parliamentary level 
and this is unlikely to change quickly in the near future – aside from 
possible regional success for right-wing populists in the Catalonian 
elections and local elections. However, we should refl ect that there are 
various underlying causes infl uencing the present weakness of the 
extreme-right-wing party spectrum, and these causes are susceptible to 
change. They include lack of adequate staff and internal quarrels. We can 
Spain
34 Eurorex.info. “Europa: Rechtsextremes Netzwerk in Budapest gegründet.” http://www.eu-
rorex.info/2009/10/24/europa-rechtsextremes-netzwerk-in-budapest-gegrundet/ last accessed 
24.11.2009.
35 Fernandez, David. “Ultras Europeos fi nancian la Lista de Plataforma de Catalunya.” diagonalp-
eriodico.net, 23.04.2010, last accessed 06.07.10; and Cantarero, Joan and Gayo, Alberto “Los 
que pagan a los Ultras españoles.” interview.es, 10.05.2010.
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also assume that right-wing voters are committed to the mainstream 
party Partido Popular as the strongest parliamentary force on the right. 
These, and other factors, could conceal the real potential of extreme-
right-wing and racist political concepts. Recent research shows the 
existence of corresponding attitude patterns in the population.
The greatest threat at the moment certainly comes from the right-wing 
populist spectrum in all its dimensions. With its hostility to Islam and its 
covert and open racist political concepts it could connect up with these 
attitude patterns.  
The parties and organizations from the nostalgic groups oriented towards 
Franco, and those from the Falange spectrum, are not politically relevant 
factors in present-day Spain. We can assume that their signifi cance will 
continue to diminish, especially as many of their members die off. How-
ever, there are repeatedly campaigns and issues which the Catholic spec-
trum in particular can take up, as shown by the mass demonstrations 
against abortion and homosexual marriage. In addition, newer parties 
like the MSR are perpetuating the concept of Falangism.
The parties and non-aligned organizations from the neo-Nazi and na-
tionalist revolutionary spectrum are developing a dangerous dynamic with 
their racist agitations and activities; up until now this has mainly been 
expressed through propaganda, various kinds of attacks, and exclusion.
It is necessary to make a clear analysis and defi nition of the forms in 
which right-wing extremism is manifested and to work for the consistent 
development and application of existing and new state and civil meas-
ures against them. To stem the tide of these phenomena that threaten 
democracy and to halt the increasing strategic interlinking on the inter-
national level, both inside Spain and beyond its borders, it is essential to 
improve exchange on the European level in relation to analysis, inter-
vention and preven tion.
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The radical right in Bulgaria: ATAKA – rise, fall and 
aftermath
New phase: Nationalist and social demands
In view of how relations between ethnic Turks and Bulgarians developed 
in the wake of the changes after 1989, Bulgarians believe they are gen-
erally a very tolerant society. Bulgaria succeeded in developing a model 
very different from its close westerly neighbours, which experienced far 
 greater tensions. Bulgaria was able to develop a very tolerant ethnic  model, 
without real tension between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks. In view of his-
torical relations and the fact that Bulgaria is a country not only of different 
ethnicities but also of different religions, with a large Muslim population, 
many observers, among them Western politicians and social scientists, 
followed these positive developments with interest. 
Until 2005, almost 15 years after the post-Communist changes in Bul-
garia, there was no party or signifi cant political movement in the coun-
try that based its activity and ideology on hatred, exclusion, or non-ac-
ceptance of different population groups. Consequently, the fi rst electoral 
success of the Ataka Party came as a major surprise to most Bulgarians. It 
is interesting to note that the main ideological points of the Ataka Party‘s 
political programme were a mixture of nationalist and social demands. 
Attempts are often made to generalise about the extreme-right wing in 
Europe, but in fact, the roots of the various far-right movements in differ-
ent countries vary greatly. Maybe this differences partly explains why it 
is diffi cult to fi nd a general response to these movements – it is not really 
possible to apply the same counter-actions in every country.
Kristian Vigenin, MEP
Bulgaria
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ATAKA: A project of ethnic aggression
In the Bulgarian case, there was a mixture of strong nationalist demands 
and an ideology based on the disappointment many people felt about 
the changes in Bulgaria. This was shown by the unexpected success of 
Ataka, whose rise – interestingly enough – began only around three weeks 
before the elections. No opinion poll managed to spot this trend from 
the start. It was only a week before the elections that several pollsters 
predicted for the fi rst time that Ataka would succeed in entering parlia-
ment. It actually managed much more than that – it won more than 
8 percent of the votes. 
Bulgaria
ATAKA 
emblem and map
ATAKA protest in front 
of the Turkish embassy.
ATAKA Poster: 
“136 years since the 
assassination of 
Vassil Levski by the 
Turkish spawn”. 
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This was something of a shock for the democratic parties in Bulgaria, 
fi rstly because it caught them all by surprise. Secondly, the language 
 Ataka introduced into Bulgarian politics was shocking. Ataka has pio-
neered an aggressive manner of speech, especially in relation to Roma, 
homosexuals and politicians. Typical Ataka slogans involve assertions 
like: “All Roma are criminals”, “Homosexuals are sick”, and “Politicians 
grunt like pigs”.  This is very brutal language, the like of which had not 
been seen in all the previous 15 years of Bulgarian democracy. Today the 
Bulgarian population is no longer shocked – it has become accustomed to 
this type of language.  However, one effect of using such rough expres-
sions to begin with was that it created the impression that Ataka and its 
leaders were the only ones who talked about reality, who spoke in a way 
that was understan d able; that everybody else was lying, simply because 
they used over-polite language, whereas the leaders of Ataka alone were 
sincere towards the public.
 
This kind of behaviour, which became much more evident after Ataka 
entered parliament, succeeding in gaining ever wider infl uence. The par-
ty leader Volen Siderov came second in the fi rst round of the presidential 
elections in 2006, a situation very similar to that in France when Jean-
Marie Le Pen was able to reach the second round of the presidential elec-
tions. In Bulgaria it was a clear sign that the traditional parties, not only 
the right-wing but also the left-wing parties, failed to counter the Ataka 
movement directly and effectively.
Fortunately, Ataka‘s infl uence has remained on the margins, reaching 
around 8 - 9  percent of the electorate. One reason for this was the major 
internal confl icts within the party: there were serious tensions, both per-
sonal and political, because of the way the party operated – similarly to 
any party of this kind. The actual infl uence of the party has always been 
largely based on the popularity of its leader, Volen Siderov. Without him, 
Ataka would be considerably weaker. Siderov belonged to the democratic 
forces in the early years after the post-Communist changes, until he 
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launched the Ataka party. His current political behaviour totally contra-
dicts what he stood for in the early 1990s. 
The following Table 2 shows which groups were particularly attracted by 
the party and its leader in the parliamentary elections in 2009. Briefl y 
summarized, the voters for Ataka were overrepresented among the male 
Bulgarians older than 61 years of age. They were underrepresented in 
Sofi a, among the voters having higher education, among the women and 
among the voters of Turkish and Roma ethnic origin.
The Ataka Party has also been able to play a relatively important role on 
the European level since the fi rst elections for the European Parliament 
in Bulgaria. The Ataka Party gained three seats out of a total of 18, and 
Bulgaria
Electoral results of the major political parties in Bulgaria 
(Parliamentary elections 1990-2009, % of the valid votes) Table 1
Party June 
1990
Oct. 
1991
Dec. 
1994
April 
1997
June 
2001
June 
2005
July 
2009
Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP) and electoral 
alliances
47.15 33.14 43.58 22.07 17.15 30.95 17.70
Union of Democratic 
Forces (SDS) and electoral 
alliances
36.20 34.36 24.17 52.26 18.18 7.68 6.76
Bulgarian Agrarian 
People’s Union (BZNS)
8.0 3.9 - - - - -
Movement for Rights and 
Liberties (DPS)
6.03 7.55 5.43 7.60 7.45 12.81 14.50
National Movement 
Simeon II (NDSV, NMSP)
- - - - 42.74 19.88 3.02
Ataka - - - - - 8.14 9.36
Democrats for Strong 
Bulgaria (DSB)
- - - - - 6.44 -
Bulgarian National Union 
Alliance (BNS)
- - - - - 5.19 -
Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria 
(GERB)
 - - - - - - 39.70
Order, Legality and Justice - - - - - - 4.13
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was a founding member of the parliamentary group, “Identity, Tradition, 
Sovereignty” in the European Parliament. Today, Ataka holds two of Bul-
garia‘s 17 MEP seats in the European Parliament.
Alliance with a TV station 
Another reason for Ataka‘s success is that it had the backing of one par-
ticular TV station from the earliest days of the party. Indeed, the party‘s 
popularity has been closely linked to the success of this TV station. Here 
we see an example of the power of the media in Bulgaria: this touches on 
the issue of media freedom and the extent of this freedom in relation to 
the dissemination of Ataka‘s particular kind of attitude, language and 
ideas. The TV station in question is a cable channel with a fairly exten-
sive network. In the electoral district where I was fi rst elected as a Mem-
Bulgaria
Votes for Ataka (in %)3 Table 2
a) By type of settlement
Sofi a Regional Town Small Town Village
4.7 10.0 10.0 10.0
b) By age
18-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61+
8.7 7.7 8.6 9.3 11.5
c) By education
Higher/University High School Primary and Lower
6.2 10.9 10.0
d) By gender
Male Female
11.8 7.0
e) By ethnic group
Bulgarian Turk Roma Other
10.7 0.8 1.7 7.8
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ber of Parliament, for example – this was in 2005 – this channel had 
widespread coverage in part of the region. To estimate its infl uence, it 
makes sense to examine two neighbouring villages. One of the villages 
could receive this TV station, while the neighbouring village could not. 
When the election results were announced, it was evident that in the vil-
lage which received this TV channel there was a high percentage of votes 
for Ataka – as much as 15 to 20 percent. The neighbouring village re-
corded just a few isolated votes for the party. This example shows the 
interrelation between the media and an extreme-right-wing party, and 
demonstrates its powerful effect in those elections in particular. 
Overall impact of the extreme right on government and 
society 
Another issue that is certainly important in many countries is the link 
between the extreme-right and populist right-wing movements. Here 
you can see very clearly that both types of movement cover a certain sec-
tor of the electorate that sometimes votes for the populist right wing, and 
sometimes for the extreme right. This interaction is evident in many oth-
er countries as well. In the specifi c case of Bulgaria, the far-right party, 
Ataka, is offi cially  not in the government, and not in a formal coalition 
with the party in power – yet they maintain that they fully support the 
government and are actually part of the ruling majority without  offi -
cially being in the coalition. This is a new development which implies 
that the party is able to play its own role in the national parliament. 
While it is not part of the government, it still fully supports it. The party 
therefore exerts infl uence on current governmental affairs, but can also 
act visibly and assertively in the public arena. As a result, this extreme-
right party has been able to infl uence political life as a whole in Bulgaria 
since 2005. This is not just in the past: Ataka still has an infl uence on 
policy and it will now be diffi cult to reverse this completely. However, as 
a result of its support of the government Ataka ceased to be the only and 
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genuine opposition to “the system” in the eyes of its voters and is pro-
gressively losing support. Such a trend is not a surprise and refl ects simi-
lar developments in other countries – once they become a parliamentary 
force and particularly when they take governmental positions, such par-
ties are not able to implement in practice their easy answers to diffi cult 
 questions, and this has a lethal impact on them.
Bulgaria
Volen Siderov 
formally backs 
the future 
government of 
Boyko Borisov 
and his party 
(July 2009)
Regarding the use of aggressive speech, it is interesting to note that after 
this style of language was introduced by this extreme-right-wing party, 
political discourse has never returned to normal. The present governing 
party in Bulgaria, GERB, is a member of the European People’s Party (the 
centre-right grouping in the European Parliament – ed. note), yet the 
 leader of this governing party and Prime Minister Borisov uses a similar 
kind of aggressive speech himself. In fact, his way of speaking closely 
 resembles the brutal mode of expression fi rst introduced by Siderov, 
the extreme-right-wing leader of Ataka. This is another reason for the 
 dissolving support for Siderov – there is a new hero in political life and 
Ataka‘s more moderate supporters are simply shifting their backing to 
Borisov. Ataka is fading out, but the scars will remain on Bulgaria‘s 
 political system.
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Identity and bigotry: Nationalist populism and the 
extreme right in contemporary Poland
National identity
Polish national identity oscillates between the opposing alternatives of 
inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, the 1997 Polish Constitution 
and the bulk of legislation affi rm equal rights for all citizens, irrespective 
of ethnicity or religion. On the other, there have been reports of Polish 
state agencies informally applying the test of religious identity. For exam-
ple, there are cases of people applying for offi cial status as certifi ed Poles 
in the territories of the former Soviet Union being asked to recite Catho-
lic prayers to prove their affi liation to Polish culture, or being required to 
demonstrate detailed knowledge of Catholic holidays and the biography 
of Pope John Paul II.1 
‘Polish means Catholic’
“Polish identity has always been associated with the Church, and the 
language of conversation with God has been Polish.” This statement was 
made by Alicja Grzes´kowiak, the Speaker of the Polish Senate, in an offi -
cial speech about Polish exiles in Kazakhstan.2 This quasi-offi cial perspec-
tive on national identity might be seen as a symbolic triumph for the 
idea of the ‘Catholic Pole’. The exclusionary notion of the ‘Catholic Pole’ 
was the backbone of the political ideology of Roman Dmowski, the 
founder of the pre-war National Democratic movement.
Rafal Pankowski
1 Kowalczyk, B. Nie wiesz, od kiedy JP II był papieżem, nie będziesz Polakiem  
 <http://www.pardon.pl/artykul/6858/nie_wiesz_od_kiedy_jp_ii_byl_papiezem_nie_bedziesz_
polakiem> accessed 16 November 2008.
2 “Kronika senacka.” Diariusz Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 47 (5 October 1999). 
 <http://www.senat.gov.pl/K4/DOK/DIAR/47/4707.htm> accessed 20 August 2008.
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On 7 January 1999, a resolution in the Polish parliament extolling 
Dmowski’s political heritage was carried by a vast majority (311 votes for, 
35 against, 54 abstentions). The resolution made no mention of anti- 
Semitism or any other controversial issues that might have tainted the 
idealised image of the nationalist leader. Even more signifi cantly, repre-
sentatives of all parliamentary factions, including the centrist and left-
wing parties, seconded the resolution. Józef Oleksy, a former prime min-
ister and a key leader of the post-communist Social Democrats, spoke in 
favour of the resolution. Oleksy emphasised that he represented the 
 collective view of his party.3 This incident refl ected the weakness – in 
fact, the absence – of the Polish Social Democrats’ own historical narra-
tive. They even went so far as to accept Dmowski’s exclusionary ethno-
religious defi nition of Polish identity.
Meanwhile, social protest has frequently been expressed through radical- 
right and nationalist rhetoric.4 For example, Zygmunt Wrzodak , leader 
of the Solidarity trade union, framed the social confl ict radically in terms 
of identity:
“We are witnessing a great battle for Poland. The united forces of the left 
are fi ghting fi ercely against the Catholic Polish nation. The nihilists‘ aim 
is to eliminate our pride and national aspirations from the hearts and 
minds of Poles. Our fatherland was born of holy baptism, our understand-
ing of Polishness is permanently linked with our Catholic faith. This is 
why the mighty forces of red evil that are trying to destroy Poland and the 
Poles attack our Church and holy faith.”5
Wrzodak went on to become a key leader of the Liga Polskich Rodzin 
(League of Polish Families – LPR) and was elected to parliament on the LPR 
ticket in 2001, and again in 2005.
3 Pankowski, R. “Sejm mówi ‘tak’.” Nigdy więcej 10 (1999).
4 Ost, D. “The Radical Right in Poland: Rationality of the Irrational.” The Radical Right in Central 
and Eastern Europe Since 1989 ed. Ramet, S. P. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1999) 106.
5 Wrzodak, Z. Wrzodak (Poznan´: Wydawnictwo Wers, 1997) 5.
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The National Rebirth of Poland (NOP): 
Violence and the swastika – no anathema for the right
Violent extreme-right groups have benefi ted from similar rhetoric. The most 
notable is the National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski – 
NOP), which has been one of the most dynamic extreme-right organiza-
tions active on the street and in the youth scene since the late 1990s.6 At 
that time it began to infi ltrate skinhead groups, inciting them to attack 
political enemies. The NOP recruited several hundred activists through-
out Poland; in 1999 Szymon Rudnicki quoted estimates of 1000 – 1500 
members,7 mostly from the Nazi skinhead scene. The majority of mem-
bers were in their twenties, and included both young working-class males 
and university students. The organization often recruited its members at 
football stadiums. The NOP drew its strength from the anti-Semitic cul-
ture that came to dominate many sports stadiums in Poland, with rival 
gangs routinely labelling each other’s clubs ‘Jewish’ as a term of abuse. 
Many NOP activities took place on the street, frequently resulting in vio-
lence and physical attacks on alleged enemies of the movement.8
The NOP adopted a fascist-style symbol, ‘the hand with the sword’, also 
known as the ‘Phalange’. The NOP announced its main programmatic 
goal to be ‘national revolution’, implying a violent seizure of power. Ac-
cording to one programmatic statement, the national radical takeover 
“will be violent – you can expect blood”.9 The group promised the prohi-
bition of any political organizations it deemed ‘anti-national’, including 
those who supported Polish membership in the EU and NATO. The party 
publication “Szczerbiec” suggested the use of guerrilla methods against 
NATO troops in Poland. It also called for Polish volunteers to fi ght on the 
6 Pankowski, R. and Kornak, M. “Poland.” Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe ed. Cas 
Mudde (London-New York: Routledge, 2005) 161-163.
7 Rudnicki, S. “Nationalismus und Extremismus im Polen von heute und ihre historischen Wur-
zeln.” Transodra 21 (November 2000) 17.
8 Kornak, M. Brunatna Ksiega (Warszawa: Collegium Civitas and Stowarzyszenie Nigdy Wiecej, 
2009).
9 Sitnik, K. “Zasady Rewolucji Narodowej.” Szczerbiec 11 (1994).
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side of the Serbian military against NATO intervention.10 In the late 1990s 
the NOP aroused attention for its specifi c focus on Holocaust denial. It 
published and distributed several books espousing so-called historical 
revisionism.
The NOP is offi cially registered as a political party and enjoys all the  benefi ts 
of state support provided by the law on political parties, despite repeated 
calls from the general public and the media for it to be banned. 
Most signifi cantly, the NOP became the Polish branch of the International 
Third Position (ITP, later renamed European National Front – ENF), an inter-
national alliance of European neo-fascist organizations led by Roberto 
Fiore, the founder of its Italian wing, Forza Nuova (New Force – FN). Ac-
cording to an editorial in “Searchlight”, the international monthly maga-
zine monitoring neo-fascism throughout Europe, “Of all the extra-parlia-
mentary far-right extremists across Europe, it is the political soldiers of 
the FN and ITP that now pose the greatest danger”.11 The NOP organized 
international ideological and paramilitary trainings for member groups 
of the ITP/ENF, including the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deut-
schlands (National Democratic Party – NPD). An NPD representative ex-
pressed his satisfaction that, “for the fi rst time since 1936, German and 
Polish nationalists are sitting at the same table”. In a bid to relativise the 
war guilt of the Nazi Reich, he added that during the Second World War 
“both sides made mistakes”.12 The NOP’s nationalist credibility was badly 
tarnished after the anti-fascist magazine “Nigdy Wiecej” publicised this 
cooperation. The NOP subsequently fell out with the NPD over issues 
such as Polish control of former East German territories, and even went 
on to provoke a split in the ENF.13
According to its own statements, the NOP was an anti-Semitic and racist 
revolutionary group dedicated to violent overthrow of democracy and 
10 Pankowski, R. “Myślałem wtedy: Dawniej Polacy walczyli w zbrojach,dzisiaj walczą w glanach 
– wywiad z Pawłem Bolkiem.” Nigdy Więcej 17 (2009).
11 “Editorial.” Searchlight (January 2000).
12 Pankowski, R. “NOP, patrioci i folksdojcze.” Nigdy Więcej 12 (2000/2001).
13 Mieśnik, P. “Oni już tu są!” Trybuna (21 September 2006).
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prone to political violence in its everyday activities. Despite this, it had 
links to the political mainstream. The example of the NOP could be read 
as an early sign that even the most radical expression of revolutionary 
nationalism was no anathema for the Polish right. For instance, Michal 
Kamin´ski, an NOP member in 1989 – 90, later became a mainstream right-
wing activist known for his unabashed use of the slogan “Poland for the 
Polish” while campaigning in the ethnically diverse Białystok region. He 
gained further notoriety for his trip to London to pay homage to Augusto 
Pinochet when the latter was being held in custody there. Kamiński later 
became an MP and then MEP for Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice – 
PiS), and fi nally, in 2009, chairman of the European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group in the European Parliament.
The new millennium: The rise of the extreme right as a 
political force
The Polish extreme right was almost completely insignifi cant in the 
mainstream political arena until 2001. By that time, however, it had devel-
oped sizeable cultural bases and pockets of social legitimacy that could be 
used to build political organizations. These cultural resources proved very 
useful in allowing nationalist populism to enter the political mainstream 
in 2001, when it won its fi rst parliamentary seats, and even more pro-
foundly in 2005 when it came to dominate the Polish political landscape.
Radio Maryja: Creating a broader movement 
The Catholic-nationalist Radio Maryja was created by Father Tadeusz Ry-
dzyk, a member of the Redemptorist order. A nationwide broadcasting 
licence enabled it to reach an audience of millions, making it one of the 
largest national media outlets. Most of them were elderly pensioners, 
many of them living in the countryside. In addition to being a platform 
for religious messages, Radio Maryja established itself as an important 
 political force with a clear xenophobic and anti-Semitic agenda. Since its 
inception, Radio Maryja has propagated a narrative based on nationalist 
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extremism, anti-Semitism and conspiracy theory, both coded and open. 
According to one assessment, “Anti-Semitic content broadcast on Radio 
Maryja includes ugly stereotyping, conspiracy theories, claims that Jews 
were responsible for communist-era repression and accusations that Jews 
are using the Holocaust as leverage for compensation payments from Po-
land.”14 Radio Maryja directly supported a variety of extreme-right groups, 
and this support culminated in calls to vote for the League of Polish Fami-
lies in 2001 and, since 2005, for Law and Justice. On another level, its role 
was equally important in terms of agenda setting, i.e., legitimising the 
extreme-right discourse on various issues and disseminating it widely.
Radio Maryja empowered for the extreme right in Poland. It provided an 
invaluable outlet for the movement to express itself, as well as a forum 
for internal and external communication and a space for mobilising 
 cultural resources. Ultimately it achieved a watershed in creating the 
 culture of a broader movement. Led by the charismatic Father Rydzyk, 
Radio Maryja has eventually become a genuine social movement in its 
own right, with a powerful political infl uence. Radio Maryja‘s rise to 
prominence within the Church has been similar in character. It has risen 
from a relatively marginal position to become a leading voice in the 
Polish Catholic Church. 
Polish politics – Tabloid-style
A further cultural change occurred up to the mid-2000s and has undoubt-
edly infl uenced the outcome of political events. Due to increasing com-
petition in the media market, a qualitatively new format for mass com-
munication emerged in Poland in the form of the tabloid press. The 
appearance of “Fakt”, a daily newspaper owned by the Axel Springer Cor-
poration and modelled on its German counterpart “Bild”, altered the me-
dia landscape. “Fakt” rapidly became Poland’s biggest-selling paper. In-
terestingly, although it is German-owned, “Fakt” had no compunction 
14 Anti-Defamation League. Poland: Democracy and the Challenge of Extremism (New York: Anti-
Defamation League, 2006) 4.
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about inciting nationalist, and especially anti-German, feeling. This sim-
plifi ed, aggressive journalistic style has since been described as the ‘tab-
loidisation’ of Polish politics. As Cas Mudde has pointed out, changing 
media landscapes have had an impact on the rise of populism across the 
Western world, not least due to increasing commercialization, “which 
has led to a struggle for readers and viewers and, consequently, a focus on 
the more extreme and scandalous aspects of politics.”15 It has been ar-
gued that the tabloid-style coverage of politics was an important factor in 
the electoral success of the populist parties in 2005.
15 Mudde, C. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition 39:4 (2004) 553.
Electoral results of right-wing political parties (parliamentary elections) Table 1
2001 2005 2007 2009
(European 
Parliament election)
LPR
8.30 % 7.97 % 1.30 %
(as Libertas) 
1.14 %
PiS 9.50 % 26.99 % 32.11 % 27.40 %
Self-Defence 10.50 % 11.41 % 1.53 % 1.46 %
Year
Party
Extremists enter the political mainstream
Subsequently, two nationalist-populist parties, the League of Polish Fami-
lies (LPR) and Self-Defence, entered a coalition government with the right-
wing conservative Law and Justice Party. The fi nal composition of the 
coalition was announced on 5 May 2006. Self-Defence leader Andrzej Lep-
per and LPR leader Roman Giertych became joint deputy prime ministers 
and ministers of agriculture and education respectively. Self-Defence 
members also received the housing and social policy portfolios, and the 
LPR was given the newly created Ministry of Maritime Economy, where 
the ministerial post went to 28-year old Rafał Wiechecki, an LPR youth 
activist with a record of football hooliganism. There was a widespread 
perception that extremists were entering the political mainstream. 
212 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
It was Giertych’s nomination as Minister of Education, however, which 
provoked the strongest protests. Ad hoc demonstrations were called and 
open letters protesting against the nomination gathered hundreds of 
thousands of signatories, including many members of the country’s in-
tellectual elite. In an interview following the extremist parties‘ offi cial 
entry into the coalition, Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz, talking to a jour-
nalist from “Corriere della Sera”, cited Austria’s co-optation of the Free-
dom Party into the government, claiming it had helped to “civilise” that 
extremist party: 
“It is not the fi rst time that parties with populist ideas have entered the 
government of a European country. I am thinking of Austria. Our situation 
is identical.”16
Radio Maryja provided the main symbolic framework for the coalition 
and Father Tadeusz Rydzyk was instrumental in bringing the partners 
together. By 2006, the PiS-LPR-Self-Defence coalition was able to appear as 
a natural refl ection of ideological convergence. It was arguably no longer 
an issue of two extremist parties entering a coalition with a mainstream 
democratic party, but rather of three parties of different shades of nation-
alist populism joining forces for a shared vision of a radical anti-liberal 
transformation. The PiS-LPR-Self-Defence coalition lasted barely more 
than a year, until the summer of 2007. During this brief period it did not 
fundamentally change the country’s outlook. For example, it did not 
command enough votes in parliament to effect constitutional change. 
Much of its time in offi ce was occupied with internal tensions and con-
fl icts that eventually led to its downfall.
Nevertheless, the Kaczyński government left its mark on Poland. Its im-
mediate effect can be observed in the rhetorical climate it created, rather 
than in any actual policies or institutional changes it succeeded in intro-
ducing. In his capacity as prime minister and PiS leader, Jarosław Kaczyński 
16 “Wywiad z premierem Kazimierzem Marcinkiewiczem w ‚Corriere della Sera’ ” (14 June 2006). Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/Wywiad,z,premierem,Kazimierze
m,Marcinkiewiczem,w,Corriere,della,Sera,6441.html> accessed 28 January 2009.
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made it clear he identifi ed with the version of Polish identity promoted by 
Radio Maryja. The kind of intimacy that existed between the country’s 
leadership and the social movement fostered by Radio Maryja was unprec-
edented. During this period Radio Maryja did nothing to tone down its 
radical na tionalist and – particularly – anti-Semitic ideology. For example, 
on 27 March 2006, Radio Maryja’s regular commentator, Stanisław Michalk-
iewicz, who had been an LPR parliamentary candidate, read out a vehe-
mently anti-Semitic speech on air that included the following statement:
“We have had Jews making scenes in Auschwitz concentration camp, the 
exaggeration of the incident in Jedwabne and now the preparations for the 
propaganda event in Kielce to commemorate the anniversary of the 
so-called ‘pogrom’. (…) The US press [is] controlled by the Holocaust in-
dustry (…). ‘Tolerance’ means, in fact, accepting the Jewish point of view, 
while ‘dialogue’ means indulging every whim of the Holocaust industry. 
‘Gazeta Wyborcza’ plays a crucial role in this process of taming – it is a 
unique example of the Jewish fi fth column in Poland. (…) the managers 
of the Holocaust industry are trying to extort dollars from the Polish 
state.”17
One of the earliest decisions of the PiS in power was to abolish the gov-
ernment commissioner for equal rights for men and women – an author-
ity that had overseen state anti-discrimination policies in various fi elds, 
including ethnicity, race and sexual orientation. The move was in clear 
contradiction to obligations imposed by the European Union Race Equal-
ity Directive.18
The contents of Polish foreign policy changed as well: bombastic anti-
Russian and anti-German attitudes became the rule, accompanied by a 
17 Michalkiewicz, S. Full Text of Radio Maryja March Radio Broadcast, European Jewish Congress 
website (2004) <http://www.eurojewcong.org/ejc/news.php?id_article=538> accessed 28 Janu-
ary 2009.
18 Vermeersch, P. “Ethnic Minority Protection and Anti-discrimination in Central Europe Before 
and After EU Accession: the Case of Poland.” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 
1 (2007).
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staunch pro-American position on issues such as the continuing war in 
Iraq. Signifi cantly, Mariusz Muszyński, a notorious anti-German right-
wing publicist, became the government’s offi cial plenipotentiary for rela-
tions with Germany. In a widely reported gesture, President Kaczyński 
cancelled his participation in a Polish-German-French summit after a sa-
tirical article in the German left-wing daily “Tageszeitung” likened him 
to a potato.19 The Polish public prosecutor even launched a formal inves-
tigation into the newspaper‘s alleged defamation of the president.20
Another disturbing feature of the government’s policy was the wide re-
cruitment of members of right-wing extremist organizations into the ad-
ministration, including top positions in various civil service spheres and 
state-controlled sectors of the economy. This occurred on such a scale 
that it went beyond isolated cases and began to assume systemic dimen-
19  Smith, C. G. “Poles Fear Political Twins Will Double Drift to the Right.” New York Times 
(19 July 2006) 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/world/europe/19poland.html> accessed 29 January 2009.
20 Agence France Press. “Poland: ‘Potato’ Case Dropped.” New York Times (19 July 2006) 
 <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E3DE1131F93BA35751C1A9619C8
B63> accessed 29 January 2009.
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Never Again 
Association protests 
against right-wing 
extremism and 
racism: “No more 
Nazism on Allegro”. 
Allegro is the 
biggest Internet 
sales company 
in East-Central 
Europe and often 
used by neo-Nazis.
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21 Kornak, M. “Młodzież Wszechpolska u władzy.” Nigdy Więcej 15 (2006).
22 Amnesty International. Poland: School bill would violate students’ and teachers’ rights and reinforce 
homophobia (20 March 2007) <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR37/001/2007/en/
dom-EUR370012007en.html> accessed 29 January 2009.
23 Janecki, S., Kania, D., and Dzierżanowski M. “Nie mam konta.” Wprost 20 (2007).
24 “Historia tylko nasza”. Monitor Edukacji (6 May 2007) <http://www.monitor.edu.pl/newsy/
historia-tylko-nasza.html> accessed 27 January 2009.
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sions. In many cases it involved young, highly inexperienced individuals 
whose main claim to fame had been as leaders of skinhead groups or 
publishers of extremist fanzines.21
The government’s educational policy became, predictably, another fi eld 
of huge public controversy. One of Giertych’s fi rst steps as education 
minister was the sacking of the director of a national teacher training 
centre for publishing the Polish edition of “Compass”, a human rights 
manual published by the Council of Europe, because it contained a sec-
tion on homophobia. Giertych repeatedly vowed not to allow any kind 
of “promotion of homosexuality” in schools under his control, and even 
proposed making this a specifi c criminal offence.22 In fact, politicised 
homophobia was not confi ned to the LPR, but also very much in evi-
dence in the discourse of the PiS. To quote Prime Minister Kaczyński: 
“I guarantee that if a member of the PiS were to become Minister of  Education, 
he would take the same position as Giertych. (…) I want to make it clear – 
I am also against the promotion of homosexuality in schools. (…)  I don’t see 
any reason to support the fashion for promoting homosexuality.”23
The Polish delegation led by Giertych refused to sign a joint declaration 
by all the Council of Europe’s education ministers encouraging common 
approaches to teaching history. Giertych was reported as saying, “There 
is no agreement with [the Council of Europe’s] interference in our teach-
ing of history and religion.”24 At a meeting of EU education ministers in 
Heidelberg, Germany, in March 2007, Giertych shocked his European 
counterparts by calling for an introduction of a pan-European ‘Charter of 
the Rights of Nations’, which would include a complete ban on abortion 
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and ‘homosexual propaganda’. A Kaczyński government spokesman sub-
sequently had to explain that this particular proposal by Giertych was 
not an offi cial position of the Polish cabinet – but Giertych nevertheless 
retained his ministerial post.25
Giertych provoked yet another barrage of criticism after he announced 
his decision to change the required reading list for school pupils. Works 
by foreign authors such as Kafka, Goethe and Dostoyevsky, as well as 
‘unpatriotic’ Polish authors including Witold Gombrowicz, Bruno Schulz, 
Stanisław Witkiewicz and Joseph Conrad, were to be removed from the 
curriculum.26 Giertych’s position was reinforced by Ewa Sowińska’s ap-
pointment by parliament as offi cial spokesperson for children’s rights, a 
constitutional post established in the 1990s to safeguard human rights 
for children and youth. An LPR activist and Radio Maryja protégée, 
Sowińska achieved international notoriety for supporting the demand to 
scrutinise the popular children’s TV series “Teletubbies” to determine 
whether it promoted homosexuality.27
The reaction of democratic players: The end of the extreme 
right in power
Demonstrations by students and teachers, along with other forms of pro-
test against Giertych’s policies, were a common feature during the Kaczyński 
government. Opposition formations included a coalition of civic groups 
under the banner “Giertych Musi Odejść” (Giertych Must Go! – GMO). In 
addition, the media constantly published highly damaging information 
on the neo-Nazi connections and behaviour of members of the LPR, 
which attracted increasing public attention because these activities now 
involved the inner circle of a ruling party.28 Public indifference to the is-
sue of extreme-right infi ltration into political life seemed to be reaching 
an end, or at least diminishing.
25 “Education Minister‘s ‚scandalous‘ address at EU meeting.” Warsaw Business Journal (5 March 
2007).
26 Pezda, A. “Na indeksie Giertycha.” Gazeta Wyborcza (31 May 2007).
27 Dzierżanowski, M. and Nowicka, K. “Sowińska: sprawdzimy, czy teletubisie nie promują homo-
seksualizmu”. Wprost (27 May 2007).
28 A selection of quotes can be found in “Z prasy.” Nigdy Więcej 16 (2008).
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Mass emigration, especially of educated young people, coincided with 
the PiS-led government. In the period 2004 – 2007 it was estimated that 
over a million people left Poland for other countries such as the UK and 
Ireland. According to offi cial statistics, 2.27 million Polish citizens were 
living abroad by 2007.29 The main reason for this massive migration was 
the high unemployment rate, which later fell from around 18 percent of 
the workforce in 2006 to 11 percent in 2008;30 other reasons mentioned 
included dissatisfaction with the general direction of the country. For 
some groups, such as gay people, emigration was a way to break out of a 
climate of intolerance that found its offi cial expression in the homo-
phobic policies under the Kaczyński administration.31 Emigration was a 
 demonstrative form of protest, but it also weakened the home-grown 
 opposition to nationalist-populist authority. It looked as if the PiS’s grip 
on power was fi rmly consolidated, and even some of its critics predicted 
two full terms under Kaczyński’s rule, especially as the economic situa-
tion was seen to be improving – not least thanks to the generous injec-
tion of EU funds. 
However, history took a very different course. The Kaczyński government 
collapsed much sooner than expected. An early election called on 21 
October 2007 resulted in a surprising defeat for the populist right and a 
resounding victory for the liberal democratic opposition. In this emo-
tionally charged election, the PO received 41.5 percent of the vote com-
pared to only 32.1 percent for the PiS. The once-mighty LPR with its bloc 
of several far-right allies received only 1.3 percent and failed to win a 
single seat in parliament. Self-Defence fared equally badly, with 1.5 per-
cent. The poor results for the LPR and Self-Defence meant that they even 
failed to qualify for state funding, which is reserved for parties that win 
at least 3 percent of the vote. 
Poland
29 Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach emigracji z Polski w latach 2004 
– 2007 <http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_Informacja_o_rozmiarach_i_kierunk_
emigra_z_Polski_w_latach_2004_2007.pdf> accessed 29 January 2009.
30 Macierewicz, P. “Polska przestała być liderem bezrobocia.” Gazeta Wyborcza (2 March 2008).
31 Graham, C. “Gay Poles head for UK to escape state crackdown.” The Observer (1 July 2007).
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Mass mobilisation of young voters in particular was the key to the gov-
ernment’s defeat. There was a widespread sense of urgency, and as the 
results came in the country’s youth exploded in celebration. In the words 
of a British observer, Poles were “celebrating the demise of the two-year 
experiment in isolationism, nationalism, and intolerance.”32 This did not 
result, however, in the extreme right completely disappearing from the 
parliamentary landscape. A number of activists known for their far-right 
attitudes were elected on the PiS ticket, which again derived a large part 
of its support from its strategic alliance with Radio Maryja. 
Although the dynamic of internal confl ict was the immediate cause of 
the government’s collapse, other factors contributed to its subsequent 
electoral defeat. The increasingly critical stance of the independent me-
dia and the mobilisation of civil society were hugely important in deny-
ing social respectability to nationalist ideology. Parallel to the rise of the 
extreme right, the anti-fascist and anti-discrimination movement had 
been building up its own cultural resources since the mid-1990s, with its 
own sources of legitimacy and its own support bases in vital cultural cir-
cuits such as popular music. The successful campaign Music Against 
Racism, is a prime example.33 As a result, the extreme right was confront-
ed with a powerful and variegated counter-movement.
Conclusion and further discussion
In 2007 the forces of the liberal opposition managed to break through 
the political apathy that had previously been predominant in Polish so-
ciety – at least to some extent. Donald Tusk, the leader of the opposition, 
inspired voters with his positive message of ‘the politics of love’ as a sym-
bolic alternative to the politics of hate propagated by the alliance of the 
PiS, LPR and Self-Defence in the fi nal days of the campaign. 
32 Traynor, I. “Poland rejects populism and xenophobia in favour of pro-Europe liberal conserva-
tives.” The Guardian (23 October 2007).
33 Pankowski, R. “Muzyka przeciwko rasizmowi.” Kultura w procesie zmiany. Z badań nad kulturą w 
Polsce lat dziewięćdziesiątych ed. Jawłowska. A. and Woroniecka G. (Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Uni-
wersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, 2003); Kornak, M. “Muzyka przeciwko rasizmowi.” Lewą 
nogą 12 (2000).
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It is noteworthy that solidarity from abroad played a relatively negligible 
role in the victory of democratic politics over the extreme right in Poland. 
In fact, opposition largely came from young people, civic organizations 
and the country‘s media. On this occasion, international reactions to the 
extreme-right’s participation in the government of an EU member state 
were extremely low-key, particularly compared to the EU’s response when 
Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party entered the Austrian government in 2000. 
In 2010 both the LPR and Self-Defence were still in existence as extra-
parliamentary political parties. Nevertheless, the bulk of these parties’ 
previous electoral support, and a large part of their former activist base, 
had found an enduring political home in Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and 
Justice party. Radio Maryja has continued to provide a symbolic frame-
work for PiS political culture, and the party, once considered centrist, has 
established itself fi rmly at the far right end of the spectrum, with occa-
sional forays into the political middle ground. The PiS absorbed the ex-
treme right surge through its appeal to non-liberal democracy, and its 
position as the main opposition force against the liberal government re-
mained unchallenged.
On 10 April 2010 Polish President Lech Kaczyński and his wife, with al-
most 100 members of the Polish political elite and other persons, died in 
a plane crash in Smolensk, Russia. Shortly before, support for Law and 
Justice had fallen to around 20 percent in the polls, and it was set to lose 
the forthcoming presidential election. After the tragic accident, however, 
PiS support rose again. Various conspiracy theories about the accident 
were circulated by far-right players, including Radio Maryja, which has 
remained closely linked with the PiS. There were fears of renewed social 
polarisation and a revived right-wing populist campaign in the wake of the 
presidential election of 20 June 2010, in which Lech Kaczynski’s twin 
brother, Jaroslaw, ran for the presidency as a standard bearer for the hard 
right.
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The radical right in Hungary: 
A threat to democracy?
In terms of its language, ideological outlook, images of enemies, the ter-
minology used by its leaders and its patterns of social perception, the Hun-
garian radical right is a movement strongly embedded in specifi c tradi-
tions. It has more historical roots than its critics are willing to admit.
Evolution
The radical-right tradition played an important role in 20th-century 
Hungarian political history. Although not continuous in its physical or 
organizational forms and frameworks, it was rather organic, despite 
extended breaks in intensity and major ideological focuses. In the period 
from 1919 to 22, and again from 1944 to 45, it was a mainstream political 
and ideological force in the country and actively participated in govern-
ment. All the main topics of the radical right emerged in those years: 
the isolation of Hungary in the region, the “injustice of Trianon” (the new 
borders established in the post-1918 period), political and economic anti-
Semitism and the left as extra-national, excluded from the “national 
body”. 
A well-known writer, Istvan Csurka, was responsible for the re-establish-
ment of the radical right in Hungary after 1989. Csurka was then deputy 
chairman of the governing Hungarian Democratic Forum, but was expelled 
from the party due to nationalist radicalism and created his own move-
ment, a political party (MIEP) and a monthly journal (“Magyar  Forum”). 
In the 1998 elections MIEP received 248,000 votes and won seats in the 
Hungarian parliament. In 2002 it received only 243,000 votes and failed 
to cross the parliamentary threshold. In 2006 signifi cant segments of the 
Pal Tamas
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radical vote went to Fidesz, while MIEP (in coalition with a new radical 
party, Jobbik) received only 119,000 votes. In political terms, at this time 
MIEP was a one-man show run by the aging Csurka. As he grew older, the 
party’s infl uence and previously intense media presence declined. Mean-
while, the other radical-right party, Jobbik, set up by young university 
graduates, has been fairly successful. In 2009 it entered the European 
Parliament and in 2010 it won seats in the Hungarian Parliament as the 
third biggest party in numerical terms, with more than 700,000 votes 
totalling 12.18 percent of the vote. In the current parliament, Jobbik is in 
opposition, but it is close to the governing party, Fidesz, on many issues. 
However, the radical-right scene is rather fragmented: aside from the two 
parties mentioned above, there are a dozen smaller, but visible, inde-
pendent groups competing for media attention and potential support-
ers.
Ideological baggage
The main political themes of the period from the 1920s to the 1940s have 
remained dominant elements of today’s radical right in Hungary. There 
is no genuine innovation – unless one regards the discovery of anti-Roma 
feeling for mobilising the masses as an innovation. However, the Roma 
population was much smaller before the Second World War than it is 
today, and demographic extrapolations were not as fashionable in the 
Carpathian Basin as they are now (at least in relation to the Roma popu-
lation). In fact, old ideological baggage was reassembled in new organiza-
tional forms in the mid-1990s. Some of the most important elements of 
this process were:
a.  Preserving the way Hungarians felt about the world in the 1920s and 
early ‘30s. In this sense, though the Hungarian radical right was party 
to the pro-Hitler coalitions, it was not a simple refl ection of them. The 
ideologies that could be seen as closely related to the more recent 
anti-immigrant, somewhat isolationist, European fears about living 
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space for Europeans are also merely incidental elements. Ultimately 
the radical right in Hungary represents a highly peculiar and wholly 
outmoded yet persistent fear originating from the 1920s, but without 
the specifi c social carriers of the original fear. Back in the 1920s, civil 
servants and army offi cers (though not only these groups, of course) 
were most directly affected by the collapse of the traditional Hungar-
ian state. Some of them were also representatives of the national radi-
cal right, often in contrast to conservative offi cers and offi cials from 
that milieu. Today the same messages are being repeated by a radical 
right that is fundamentally different from that milieu in terms of so-
cial origin and labour market opportunities, in an international envi-
ronment that is entirely different from that of the past.
b.  In the period from 1918 to 1919, disintegration was a fundamental 
experience for numerous groups in Hungarian society, even if they 
did not agree with the radical-right’s interpretation of events. The 
 system in power from 1919 to 1945 generally accepted only one of 
many possible interpretations: that of grievance. “A mutilated Hun-
gary is no country at all” was the lament that children at school had 
to chant every day for decades. A more deeply analytical interpreta-
tion was simply out of the question. This was the dominant approach 
to every important issue. The radical right played a major role in 1919-
1920 (its offi cer squadrons commanded or organized hangings and 
pogroms); but it was then practically forced out of power, partly under 
international pressure and partly out of consideration for good taste 
(aristocrats and survivors from the old elites also comprised the 
majority of the new elites). Nonetheless, a permeable border between 
the conservative right and radical right persisted in this fi rst genera-
tion. Well-known politicians and public intellectuals crossed this 
borderline, switching directions depending on changes of era or major 
events. A less well-qualifi ed, more plebeian branch of the radical right 
appeared towards the late 1930s, and the conservative elite made this 
branch rather unwelcome, mainly for social rather than ideological 
reasons. 
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c.  Essentially, a similar system was created when the political centre-
right in Hungary reorganized in the second half of the 1990s. The 
“new” radical right was devoid of ideological innovations, and the 
clean slate introduced in 1945 had removed radical-right literature 
from circulation. Cautious anti-US campaigns, anti-globalisation slo-
gans or EU scepticism are not among the prime ideas of the Hungarian 
radical right. It even has problems with leftovers from the past, as 
Hungarian proponents of the radical right could not rely on them as 
a system: a kind of new ideological system is being assembled from 
shreds of memories and scaremongering based on hearsay. Numerous 
groups hoped to continue where they had left off in 1944. Since there 
is a system of interconnected vessels in place, the sewage pouring out 
of the radical-right vessels is causing more serious ideological con-
tamination throughout the system than the radical right in the old 
pipeline network back in the 1930s. Other analysts, however, disagree 
strongly with this viewpoint. They argue that Csurka learned a lot 
from Jean-Marie Le Pen about mixing leftist political interests with 
rightist ideologies, and during the past two years there have been a 
few – unsuccessful – attempts at a movement modelled on Sinn Fein. 
Moreover, 2008 saw the initial organization of some kind of “parallel 
Hungary” cells, which also ended in failure. What we witnessed was 
social demagogy similar to that of the Hungarian movements of the 
1930s, even without Le Pen, and there was no sign of ideological in-
novation in the above organizational models – which, incidentally, 
also failed.
d.  Naturally, the radical right has an anti-communist dimension, but in-
terestingly, it is not nearly as dominant as might be assumed. Besides, 
the most prominent representatives of anti-communism back in 1989 
were not the national conservatives but the liberal dissidents (which 
explains why they lost the fi rst free election after the system changes). 
The fi rst radical-right formation to detach itself from the conserva-
tives – István Csurka’s MIEP – was, perhaps, verbally confrontational, 
but by the time the radical right regrouped again in the 1990s it saw 
Hungary
225IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
its main enemies not as much in the pre-1989 system as in the liberal 
middle class that it regarded as the winners in the change of system. 
Even then, they were only able to apply ready-made ideological sche-
mas and the only thing readily available was anti-Semitism, which 
they simply rehashed. This fi rst generation of the radical-right ini-
tially proved to be a political failure with its ideology of “protecting 
the Hungarian nation against cosmopolitan Jews” – which the right-
ists considered very topical. This made no sense to people below the 
middle classes, or in small towns and villages (which were left in a 
kind of a ideological vacuum in political terms). With the entry of a 
new party, Jobbik, in the mid-2000s, the second wave of the radical 
right discovered the Roma issue as the major social topic for small 
towns and villages in Hungary. However, although the fi rst genera-
tion of the radical right was relegated to the background, its themes 
were not abandoned.
Public opinion
Many contemporary observers describe the radical right as a special sub-
culture isolated from mainstream opinions and the institutions of the 
dominant political culture. However, in the case of the radical right in 
contemporary Hungary (as with many cases in other countries) this state-
ment is simply not valid. In more general or more specifi c forms, the 
radical right expresses a concentration of views that already exist in the 
mainstream, and are present in fragments or more hidden forms. The Hun-
garian radical right is presently unable to generate original worldviews, 
concepts or cultural icons, but it can be quite effective in using available 
concepts and presenting them for public discussion. In a sense, its strength 
lies in agenda setting and proposing explanations of social problems, 
mostly for the poorly educated and frustrated segments of the population 
in times of crisis when the political order loses legitimacy. From the mid-
2000s, support for the post-1989 order has been decisively weaker in 
Hungary than in the other new democracies of Eastern Europe.
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In 2008 we developed an indicator system for monitoring the political 
radicalisation of Hungary. This system was used in 2008-2010 to study 
changes in public opinion. (It involves annual surveys with personal in-
terviews in representative national samples of 1500 persons.) The three-
part questionnaire investigates the popularity of cultural icons of the 
radical right (historical revisionism, anti-Semitism, anti-Roma attitudes, 
popularity of authoritarian political solutions, etc.), mapping perceptions 
about dynamics of national confl icts and investigating the society’s cur-
rent capacity for protest. The major conclusion is that radical-right opin-
ions are obviously more pronounced on those issues, but do not show 
fundamental differences  from mainstream views in their direction and 
form. This means that large sections of public opinion would not be pre-
pared to accept the political programme of the radical right, but are not 
at all hostile to its arguments. In the given period, there was a growth in 
the level of support for the radical right (according to respondents’ own 
defi nitions, from 1 – 7 on left-right axes).1
In Hungary in the period under study, the popularity of the democratic 
order in terms of crisis management was low, and its support continued 
to decline until early March 2010. The majority of the sample was pre-
pared to support a one-party solution and the concept of a strong leader 
to solve the nation’s problems.
1 Data from surveys by the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
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Value statements in the Hungarian society, 2010 Fig. 2
The communist system represents Soviet 
occupation and ignores Hungarian 
interests (N=1338)
The Arpad banner (symbol of the 
1944 – 45 Hungarian fascists) mainly 
represents the medieval Hungarian history, 
therefore adapt it (N=1311) 
The major goal of Hungarian politics 
should be the reconstruction of Hungarian 
dominance among the Carpathians (in 
Central Europe) (N=1310)
Jews are too infl uential in Hungarian 
public life and politics (N=1274)
The Roma only misuse social welfare and 
state aid (N=1434)
Contemporary Hungary needs a single 
strong party representing the whole 
society (N=1389)
0 %          20 %         40 %         60 %         80 %        100 %
1 2 3 4 5
Hungary
Traditional elements of national radicalism remain popular for between 
one-third and one-fi fth of the left (but are more vocally supported by the 
supporters of Fidesz and Jobbik). Ideas about Hungarian geopolitical dom-
inance in the region and the popularity of the Arpad fl ag, the traditional 
insignia of the Hungarian fascists, are more typical right-wing attitudes, 
but do not simply separate the radical right from other segments of soci-
ety. Negative stereotypes of Roma are widespread throughout Hungarian 
Source: Data from surveys by the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
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society. A major difference between the left and the right can be dis-
cerned in the intensity of anti-Semitic opinions. The radical right is anti-
Semitic in open, clearly defi ned forms without any linguistic codes, de-
veloped in the past few years among right-wing hardliners. 
Organizational structures
By the late 2000s, the system of the Hungarian radical right comprised 
three main elements:
a.  Firstly, the political parties of the radical right. There are currently two 
parties: MIEP from the 1990s, which we have referred to as a fi rst-
generation party (established in 1993), and Jobbik, established in 2003 
and now the leading radical-right formation. According to typological 
analyses by political scientists, in Parliament these parties play the 
role of internally criticising democratic policy-making, or amplifying 
the radical external critique and rejecting the existing system. Like-
wise, they take up varying ideological issues and should accordingly 
be divided into different ideological sub-types, such as neo-fascist, re-
ligious, ultra-conservative, neo-populist, etc. Radical-right-wing par-
ties in Hungary do not fi t ideologically to these categories, and there 
are no signs of their undertaking any “internal reorganization” that 
would enable categorisation. In line with the above description of 
their historical evolution, it is certain that neither of the two radical-
right Hungarian parties has adopted the option of religion (leaving 
aside some centre-right trends). However, some elements of the other 
trends can defi nitely be found in the parties and, in even more pro-
nounced forms, in the underlying movements. During its single term 
in Parliament in the 1990s, MIEP generated no major scandals and 
since then it has realised that it will not succeed in entering Parlia-
ment again, but as a recognised political force it is entitled to certain 
state subsidies and – rather less frequently – to some media attention 
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as well. MIEP is well content with this: apparently it has no particular 
intention of conforming to any external model. The issue of “democ-
ratisation”, which is a necessary step towards entry into Parliament, 
seems to be more diffi cult for Jobbik. Some analyses already regard Job-
bik as a democratic party by virtue of its successful participation in 
elections.2 Given the party’s current state, we take a radically different 
view. Jobbik’s leaders, such as Gábor Vona, head of Jobbik, regularly 
make statements to a very wide public that democratic politicians 
would never make. Since the party was elected to Parliament, I regard 
parliament as containing non-democratic MPs.
b.  The second element – radical-right discourse – consists of politicians 
and politically active groups positioning themselves in the parliamen-
tary system, not in a radical-right-wing party but in another political 
party (currently this means almost entirely on the right wing of 
Fidesz). Recent analyses of the Hungarian radical right even fail to take 
these groups and leaders into account. We will do so here without 
classifying Fidesz as a radical party. However, we know from a number 
of surveys that in 2008 – 2009 around a third of respondents who iden-
tifi ed themselves in opinion polls as sympathisers of Fidesz were also 
attracted to various radical-right ideologies. As the only umbrella 
 party for the centre-right, Fidesz had relied on their votes since 2002. 
Binding these voters to the party requires disseminating radical mes-
sages and the active involvement of genuine politicians. Today Fidesz 
has to compete for radical votes with Jobbik and perhaps with MIEP – 
this will probably lead to further escalation of extremist declarations.
2 Republikon Intezet: “Fasiszta veszely”, vagy demokratikus radikalizmus? A jobbik programjanak 
elemzese [“Fascist danger” or democratic radicalism? On the political program of the Jobbik 
Party] (Budapest: Republikon 2009).
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c.  The radical-right movement is rather fragmented in terms of ideology, 
culturally, and in the leadership techniques it employs. Researchers 
have been able to discover little about personal affi liations, coopera-
tion between the three radical-right sectors, the fl ow of political resources 
or any possible distribution of operations. At the same time, the above-
mentioned three sectors compete for subsidies, funds and various re-
sources. Interviews and websites occasionally reveal details about tactical 
differences or personal confl icts, but we know almost nothing about the 
veracity of these morsels of information, however carefully they are 
garnered. No publicly available information can be found to reveal the 
nature of cooperation between the relevant organizations.
Youth subculture
In the last 3 – 4 years, radical-right-wing groups have been re-established 
as part of youth subculture. Similar trends could be observed on the 
western European radical-right-wing scene. In Hungary, however, the 
roots of this trend are partly local. Even in the period of transition to 
democracy, Hungarian youth had a rather low level of interest in politics. 
The leaders back then were not the young, but people in their forties who 
entered politics or public life in or after 1968. In 1989 – 91 they entirely 
infl uenced the dominant cultural style and the media discourse of trans-
formation; the generation in its twenties had no share in this. In the 
early or mid-1990s university reforms began, and student numbers start-
ed to rise dramatically. But the jobs available in the late 1990s did not 
cor respond to the growing supply of graduates. Distrust in the transfor-
mation, in politics and in the dominant forms of public discourse among 
the young (and in some way educated) was an almost direct outcome of 
this disparity. The young became fundamentally alienated from politics, 
or the political forms developed by their elders.
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The only exception was the campaign in 2002 by Fidesz, the right-wing 
governing party, to mobilise support from important urban youth groups. 
After the defeat of Fidesz at the general election, a relatively small but 
signifi cant section of these young people became radicalised and estab-
lished various websites, projects and networks for future activities. Jobbik, 
the new political party on the scene, initially emerged as a student 
organization. The structures it developed, with “patriotic rock bands”, 
youth camps and other projects, soon began to involve senior high 
school pupils and other non-student groups. This radical-right scene 
offered its members communal lifestyles, local solidarity cells and a feel-
ing of belonging that is quite rare in contemporary student life. 
Ethnic tensions and manipulation of public attention
The traditional ethnic inclusion strategy of the Hungarian radical right 
after 1918 deployed different forms of anti-Semitism. In 1944-45 the 
Hungarian far right was very deeply involved in the Holocaust in the 
country. Major strands of anti-Semitism are also present, both histori-
cally and today, albeit in milder or merely symbolic forms, in ideologies 
of other, non-radical-right-wing milieus. Statements on this issue are of-
ten hidden, well “coded”, because the scene wants to avoid international 
scandals on this topic, but among the far right it remains a matter for 
emotional debates and calls for renewed exclusion. Jobbik’s major politi-
cal innovation has been to re-focus the ethnic agenda onto identity poli-
tics and to attempt to substitute the hostile image (or at least, the threat) 
of the Jew, for that of another ethnic group, the Roma. In today’s Hun-
gary, prejudices against Roma are more intense and acute than against 
Jews. At the same time, Roma are less visible and less readily defended by 
the international public than Jews since the Holocaust. The liberal code 
of political correctness in public speech after the changes of 1989 made 
it impossible for the political elites, both from the left and the right, to 
process the frequent confl icts on issues of Roma-Hungarian cohabitation 
which were very clearly evident in the public arena, although in sup-
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pressed forms. Jobbik had almost no political competitors when it set the 
agenda publicly with its labelling of Roma as criminals. In October 2006 
in the small town of Olaszliszka, local Roma lynched a Hungarian by-
stander whom they accused of being involved in a car accident. After this 
killing, despite grim forecasts of inter-ethnic confl icts, there was no for-
mal revenge by the majority populace. However, the public arena was 
reshaped, with the Roma topic becoming a key issue in the national so-
cial and political debate. In August 2007 Jobbik established a paramilitary 
organization, the Magyar Garda (“Hungarian Guards”) ostensibly for “re-
storing public order” and “dealing with Roma crime”. The Garda became 
especially active in smaller villages with a mixed Hungarian and Roma 
population where political parties, and even governmental agencies, are 
not really present. Media focus on the Garda helped Jobbik to build a 
stronger presence in the national media. In 2009 the Garda was banned 
by court order, but re-established immediately by Jobbik. Following this, 
their paramilitary uniform was banned, but was displayed again in public 
when Jobbik’s leadership entered the Hungarian parliament in May 2010. 
Public image management
In the 1990s, MIEP used the most traditional forms of political commu-
nication and mobilisation: mass meetings (Csurka succeeded in gather-
ing around 100,000 people at his annual rally in Heroes’ Square in Buda-
pest), lengthy speeches, television as the major political medium, and 
long articles in the press. The radical scene of the 2000s employed shorter 
articles, networks to organize street actions, the Internet as the major 
channel for intra-group communication, shorter timelines for mobilisa-
tion, and the dominance of symbolic actions (i.e., attacks on the Soviet 
monument in Budapest). However, the major targets of this new far-right 
communication are not members of the far right but the national audience 
of broader news media (this has similarities with the media strategies of ter-
rorists). In this way, relatively small and fragmented groups have estab-
lished themselves as important political players with the general public.
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Starting from the events of September-October 2006, radical-right-wing-
ers have try to arrange violent illegal mass street incidents in Budapest 
twice or three times a year. Today there is a heated debate on the websites 
of radical groups about the effectiveness and impact of such actions. Where-
as some people believe in the symbolic and media importance of these 
“revolutionary” events, more and more groups in this milieu see them as 
counterproductive, alienating the broader right wing from the movements. 
In fact, in 2008 - 9 such activities declined very sharply in terms of popular-
ity and support, both in radical and more centrist right-wing milieus.
Public perception of the radical-right scene
Broader social perceptions of the radical right and its public treatment in 
the last two decades can be divided into four phases. The agenda and 
rhetoric of these phases differ signifi cantly.
a.  Gestation period up to autumn 2006: In this phase, the public paid 
little attention to the radical right. Over time, the peculiar fervour 
with which left-liberal intellectuals reacted to the emergence of the 
radical right as represented by Csurka around 1992, the creation of 
the party’s profi le and rapid expansion of their weekly “Magyar 
Fórum”, largely subsided, at least superfi cially. From 1992 to 1996 this 
was still a signifi cant issue in internal affairs,  giving rise to an associa-
tion of political parties and movements (such as Democratic Charta). 
Thousands – and on some occasions, tens of thousands – of intellectu-
als organized mass meetings, and to some extent laid the foundations 
for the left-liberal coalition government of 1994. Offi cially, the Charta 
was a civic movement. In reality it was run by the intellectual repre-
sentatives of left-liberal parties, and its inner core certainly came from 
party politics. Although there were active opponents who rejected the 
various radical-right agendas, they rarely linked up and were by no 
means united in a defi nable movement: distinct groups addressed the 
issue of minorities and the Roma question, while others reacted vehe-
mently to anti-Semitism. There were points of contact between these 
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groups. Their sympathisers numbered tens of thousands (with a much 
smaller highly active core for mobilisation). The small liberal parties 
were typically of an urban character, and more sensitive to human 
rights issues due to their experiences and relations with defectors from 
the period before 1989. Their sympathisers in Budapest included a 
relatively high proportion of people of Jewish origin who were espe-
cially sensitive to anti-Semitism. It was this political wing that was 
more concerned with an anti-fascist stance and with guaranteeing the 
protection of civil rights and minorities within the country (in 
 Hungary the left was far less inclined to see this issue as requiring 
rapid and decisive action). In a certain sense, the Liberal Party consid-
ered and treated this issue as its own, and took care always to be the 
fi rst to send the relevant messages to the media, to be the one to iden-
tify the genuine adversary, to determine whom to fi ght and whom to 
treat as merely “errant” people who happened to make a “mistake”. 
Many observers think that anti-fascist posing was part of this small 
party’s identity. The conservative right distanced itself from radical-
ism much more decisively than it did subsequently – it actually 
 expelled Csurka from the party, which gave rise to the creation of a 
series of independent radical-right parties. However, they did not fi ght 
more vigorously because they assigned little signifi cance to the far 
right. Meanwhile, on a social scale the pre-1945 rightist ideologies 
were actively reconstructed under the banner of doing historical jus-
tice to the nation; newspapers and periodicals were started and book 
publishing and distribution organized for the radical right without 
any systematic opposition. Opponents of the radical right occasion-
ally pointed out conspicuous cases, but this remained intermittent. 
Criticism of the radical right was random, reactive and received with 
disinterest by the masses. During the Socialist government the core 
members of the Charta also calmed down and began to feel quite 
 secure. At the end of the 1990s, confl icts with groups of Roma  increased 
(but were only occasionally manifested in violent local action). 
 However, they were not met with mass expressions of solidarity in 
support of non-Roma people.
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b.  Between the movements of autumn 2006 and the establishment of 
the Magyar Gárda (“Hungarian Guard”): In the autumn of 2006, the 
radical right took to the streets with violent mass demonstrations, 
serious street clashes, riots, and barricades. At the end of September, 
they temporarily occupied Hungary’s national TV station. The protest 
movement enjoyed the support of the entire right, and seemed to rely 
on it to get into full swing. It is still unclear whether it really aimed to 
overthrow the government or simply to blackmail it with the threat 
of an alternative. In the end, it opted for the latter, and subsequently 
a gap developed between the direct programme of the parliamentary 
right and the burgeoning movement supporting it. This was really the 
moment of birth for the radical right as it exists today. In the autumn 
of 2006, Csurka – heavily marginalised by then – played a more minor 
role in street mobilisations. The government and the police were as-
sertive, the leftist-liberal press was outraged, and the parliamentary 
right openly supported the radicals in many respects, although it did 
not adopt its objectives. However, no counter-movements took root; 
there were no organized political counter-measures. There might have 
been individual ad-hoc objections, and debate was slowly beginning 
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on the possibilities of curbing hate speech. Solidarity with the Roma 
and opposition to anti-Semitism was merely marginal, and always fo-
cused on some particular event.
c.  Struggle with the Hungarian Guard up to Jobbik’s success in 2009 
elections to the European Parliament: The establishment of the Hun-
garian Guard and other early Jobbik activities mobilised the groups 
targeted by the radical right’s hate speech. Budapest’s liberal intellec-
tual milieu initiated public counter-demonstrations taking a clear 
stand against the radical right. With a base of activists now 15 years 
older than in the 1990s, and with weakened party support, the Demo-
cratic Charta was also activated. The Roma also started to organize 
some self-defence groups. The leftist liberal government was strug-
gling against growing racism to the best of its ability. Yet it was unable 
to make progress in enforcing harsher regulations on hate speech be-
cause its liberal faction was not prepared to accept stricter measures. 
Direct solidarity with groups targeted by the radical right was at a low 
level, limited to proclamations by a few hundred people willing to 
sign manifestos. No matter what the objections, the signatories tend 
to resemble a kind of post-dissident opposition culture surviving in a 
reserve. However, the blatant activities of the Hungarian Guard gener-
ated some counter-publicity; yet compared with the radical right, the 
target of its objections, this was pale, lacking in numerical strength, 
and enervated. The frustration provoked by the Guard was more 
 extensive and people expected the government to impose harsher 
constraints; but to the surprise of the public, in a democracy defi ned 
in very broad terms in 1989, the government could do very little. It 
was still unable to initiate a well-organized and forceful counter- 
offensive. Although in theory it might actually want to, it had no means, 
no mandate and no experience to impose prohibitive measures in a 
democratic framework.
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d.  2009 – April 2010: from Jobbik’s growth in popularity to the party’s 
entry to the Hungarian Parliament: In the eyes of the leftist liberal 
groups, up to this point Fidesz and Jobbik were one and the same – and 
understandably so. After the European Parliamentary elections, Jobbik 
became the main opponent. However, Jobbik was organized and run 
by young people; its social base was growing week by week. Its liberal 
opposition comprised older people who were less mobile and had 
minimal political support. The leftist government was struggling to 
survive and the Liberals were practically eradicated. The growth of 
Jobbik increased the uncertainty over what counter-measures could 
and should be proposed and enacted. Opponents of the radical right 
saw themselves as a minority in the process of being marginalised, 
and the April 2010 elections completely disarmed them. They do not 
even know whom to support and whom to fi ght against. Was it Jobbik 
alone? Or Jobbik and Fidesz combined?
A national debate about the radical right
The major questions of national debate about the radical-right scene 
have changed signifi cantly. The most signifi cant elements are:
a. “What shall I call you?” This debate is about whether the radical right-
ists in Hungary are neo-fascists or not. It also questions whether they 
are consciously using a political language reminiscent of the thirties 
in order to boost their audience, or if they use it automatically and 
instinctively because of deeper, inherent traits. In the second and 
third phases of development, the majority of public opinion hostile 
to the radical right was inclined to view them as some type of neo-
fascists, but by phase (d) they had too many followers, and were now 
seen as a misguided bunch. Many people believed that if the radical 
right was stigmatised as neo-fascists, its masses of supporters could no 
longer be easily controlled and channelled into democratic politics.
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b. The boundaries of hate speech, i.e. the limits of democracy: In 1989, 
freedom of speech was modelled on the broadest interpretation of 
Anglo-Saxon liberalism by Hungarian legislation. Since then, an in-
creasing number of groups have considered it far too lenient – not only 
in its interpretation of radicalism – and would have liked to change it. 
Different liberal philosophies, however, from fundamen talists to 
 solicitous constitutional legal experts, prevented any real tightening 
of the law.
c. What is the government’s duty? In the majority view, dealing with 
radicals is primarily the government’s duty, since it is responsible for 
the integrity of the state structure. Civic movements may supplement 
this on occasion. However, despite all the hopes raised in the after-
math of 1989, civic movements have remained extremely weak in 
Hungary – a slight change among groups victimised by racism has 
been discernible only in the last 18 months. But even in these circles, 
change is very slight and can be traced only in secondary ranks.
d. Can a democratic united front against extremists be set up between 
the centre-left and the centre-right?3 In practice the answer is clearly 
negative. In the left-liberal view, the extreme right is undoubtedly an 
inseparable part of the mainstream right that created and nurtures it. 
Before the 2010 general elections the right may have been a trifl e 
scared of extremists, but nevertheless they are interrelated by in-
numerable underground ties. They will defi nitely not cut these ties 
and look to the centre-left for democratic elements of some mutually 
shared view of life. They cannot be convinced to do so, and it is not 
worth the effort of trying to persuade them.
Hungary
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e. Can radicals be turned into a “civic” party by allowing them to par-
ticipate in government? There are no theoretical foundations for 
 either a positive or negative answer to this question. Socialists in op-
position in Parliament are primarily fi ghting the governing centre-right 
parties. Despite the fact that both parties are reluctant to admit it, at 
numerous points they share tactical interests with Jobbik, which is 
proving quick to learn Parliamentary ethics. Presently, the civil spheres 
of these two political fi elds are not in combat with each other.
Is democracy in danger?
Public opinion in Hungary is dominated by two distinct views on this 
topic. One describes the radical right as a world of marginal movements 
with generally modest support, citing election statistics and the games 
displayed by forces in Parliament so far. These political groups are rather 
vocal, since radicalism and verbal extremism are related by their very 
nature and as a consequence of their basic mode of operation. In any 
case, according to this view, the majority of voters are centrist. The argu-
ment goes that proponents of extremes dissociate themselves from the 
majority, so there is no need to bother with them. Should the centre pick 
them out as its enemies, indeed, should the centre even take action 
against them, it would only serve to strengthen their infl uence and raise 
their self-esteem. In any case, in a country characterised by a process of 
individualisation, and a hunger for consumption, which has accepted 
the EU’s political and public law frameworks, the views formulated by 
extremists cannot be adopted by the majority in Parliament. Accordingly, 
even in the longer term these forces cannot endanger the democratic 
order set up after 1989. People who hold such views partially sympathise 
with the political right. Along with numerous others who share this way 
of thinking without belonging to the political right, they tend to point to 
recent events in Hungary and in western Europe (Austria, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands). A radical-right party – MIEP – was already elected to 
Parliament in 1998, and radical-right parties also have representatives on 
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municipal councils. They have never endangered democracy anywhere 
in those municipalities or  offi cial posts. They adapt to the rules of the 
game just like the above-mentioned neo-radical parties in other Europe-
an political systems. 
Another approach leads to a starkly different view of the same processes. 
People with this erception see historical parallels: they have the feeling of 
a return to the 1930s. What we can observe here is the formation of 
slightly differing opinions. Some commentators say they have a feeling 
that the vocabulary and frameworks used by the Hungarian radical-right 
show the revival of the political culture that dominated Hungary in dif-
ferent forms during the decades between the two world wars, and which 
had been prohibited in Hungary not only from 1949, but already from 
the spring of 1945. For these people, the undesirable changes began sym-
bolically as far back as the early 1990s, when the then conservative prime 
minister decided to stage the reburial in Hungary of the remains of Mik-
lós Horthy, the head of the political system in Hungary between 1919 
and 1944, who died in exile. From then on, the most important themes 
of that era gradually began to reappear in the public arena. Others believe 
they are witnessing a repeat of the “end of Weimar” in relation to the 
1930s. Finally, some believe that today’s radical-right represents the reap-
pearance of the plebeian extreme right of the pre-1945 system. Which-
ever variant we consider, the radical-right parties, movements and groups 
are seriously endangering the new democracy by reference to historical 
analogies. Quite often these fears are not even rationalised; cultural pat-
terns believed long forgotten are beginning to re-emerge, suggesting a 
kind of “neo-apocalypse”.
The present author does not share these new “visions of the end of Wei-
mar”. (Incidentally, I fi rst heard this metaphor of the end of Weimar in 
contemporary Hungarian political discourse in 1991 when liberals, be-
hind the shield of a civil disobedience campaign, the so-called cabbies’ 
strike, wanted to take revenge on the street on the conservatives who had 
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won the elections.) At the same time, I do not believe that the presence 
of the radical right in the political system will always be proportional to 
its weight in Parliament.
Education for democracy, which at this point would effectively entail an 
ideological showdown with historical Hungarian radical-right traditions, 
is almost entirely lacking in the present political system in Hungary. 
There are no national programmes for this, the political left is timid and, 
moreover, as a consequence of systematic right-wing indoctrination it 
feels forced out of the national discourse. The popularity of anti-fascist 
protest demonstrations is rapidly declining. Apart from the Roma and 
descendants of Holocaust survivors who feel personally attacked, by 2010 
the number of participants in such actions had fallen signifi cantly. In 
these circumstances, the ideologically mobilised radical right has become 
a dominant element of the political agenda even for other parties in the 
system, almost independently of its current level of support. The radical 
right is where the questions raised in public debate come from; of course, 
these questions are rejected by the political left, which refuses to respond, 
and are further diluted by the large centre-right party, Fidesz, for its own 
use. This indirect effect is extremely strong and has not declined with the 
new government-opposition constellation since the 2010 elections. In 
this sense, without any external intervention the questions and themes 
determined by the radical right will distort the spaces of democratic dis-
course in the Hungarian political system; in fact, they are unfortunately 
already distorting it. It seems that Hungary’s elites have no viable con-
cept for tackling this phenomenon. 
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From the margins to the mainstream? 
The development of the radical right in Denmark
The Scandinavian context
The extreme right in the Scandinavian countries represents a relatively 
new phenomenon with no direct historical precursors since the Second 
World War. This is also one of the reasons why the term “extreme-right 
wing” is not frequently used when referring to the Scandinavian context. 
The “many worlds” approach in these countries is generally preferred to 
the “one world” approach, as Michael Minkenberg has appropriately 
 described the attempt to postulate a generic phenomenon of the extreme/
radical right in Europe.1 New words and phrases often  replace single defi -
nitions, signalling some dissatisfaction with traditional categories, but 
also suggesting that the phenomenon continues in a process of dynamic 
development and transformation. In the Danish scholarly  literature we 
therefore fi nd defi nitions such as: radical right wing populist parties;2 anti-
immigration parties;3 nationalist right;4 new right parties,5 etc. These 
Susi Meret
1 Minkenberg, M. The Radical Right in Europe: An Overview (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2008).
2 Goul Andersen, J. and Bjørklund, T. “Radical right wing populism in Scandinavia: from tax 
revolt to neo-liberalism and xenophobia.” The Politics of the Extreme Right. From the margins to 
the Mainstream ed. Hainsworth, P. (London and New York: Pinter, 2008), 193-223 and Rydgren, 
J., 2004, “Explaining the emergence of radical right wing populist parties: the case of Den-
mark.“ West European Politics, (27: 3) 474-502.
3 Goul Andersen, J. and Bjørklund, T., “Anti-immigration parties in Denmark and Norway: the 
Progress Parties and the Danish People‘s Party.”, Shadows over Europe: The Development and Im-
pact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe ed. Schain M. Zolberg, A. and Hossay P. (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002) 107-136. 
4 Betz, H.-G., “Culture, Identity and the Question of Islam: the Nativist Agenda of the Radical 
Right.”, The Far Right in Europe. An Encyclopedia ed. Davis P., Jackson P. (Oxford: Greenwood 
Press 2009); and Betz, H.-G. and Meret, S., “Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilisation 
against Islam in contemporary Western Europe.” Patterns of Prejudice (43: 3-4) 2009.
5 Andersen, J. “Højrefl øjen og kritikken af de fremmede i Danmark.” Arbejdspapirer fra Institut for 
Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning, Aalborg Universitet 10 (1999).
 Andersen, J., “Dansk Folkeparti, demokratiet og de fremmede.” Arbejdspapirer fra Institut for 
Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning, Aalborg Universitet 6 (2000). Aalborg University 2009.
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terms suggest a dynamic development that highlights: 1) the emphasis 
on anti-immigration and on ethno-nationalism6 as issues giving these 
parties a specifi c content and profi le; 2) the populist and anti-establish-
ment components used to distinguish the party from the political main-
stream; and 3) the relationship of the phenomenon to the recent macro-
structural transformation of contemporary societies. 
Although the anti-immigration nexus alone is insuffi cient explanation 
for the support gained by the extreme right in Denmark7, this issue is 
undoubtedly at the core of the party programmes and dominates voters’ 
image of the Parties.  
In recent years, grievances about immigration and attitudes focused on 
cultural factors and the question of identity have become more wide-
spread in Europe. In this context, Islam is often perceived as a threat to 
the culture and identity of the host societies. Surveys report that an over-
whelming majority of interviewees in Europe believes that greater inter-
action between the West and the Muslim world is more of a threat than 
a positive gain for society. This indicates “a growing fear among Europe-
ans” partly caused by rising immigration from predominantly Muslim 
regions8. In Denmark a recent poll confi rms these concerns, indicating 
that while the majority of the respondents consider immigration a posi-
tive factor for Danish society, about 55 percent sees Islam as a threat to 
the unity of Danish society.9 In this sense, it is hardly surprising that the 
extreme right has increasingly focused on questions of culture and iden-
tity (and particularly on the question of Islam) rather than on economic 
issues. This highlights how successful extreme-right-wing populist mobi-
lisation follows patterns defi ned by cultural, value and identity cleavages. 
6 Rydgren, J. Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party fam-
ily.  European Journal of Political Research 44 (2005) 413-437.
7 Meret, S. “The Danish People’s Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom 
Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party ideology and Electoral Profi le.“ Ph.D. dissertation, 
Aalborg University 2009.
8 The study was commissioned for the leaders of the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, 
Switzerland, 2008.
9 “Indvandring og Islam splitter Danskerne” [Immigration and Islam divide the Danes]. 
Politiken 17.08.2010, http://politiken.dk/indland/article1038188.ece, accessed 25.08.2010.
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The paragraphs below sketch an introductory analysis of the develop-
ment of the extreme right in Denmark, starting from its emergence at the 
parliamentary level. This enables discussion of some of the main devel-
opments and organizational strategies of the extreme-right wing in Den-
mark and a brief consideration of the strategies used to achieve electoral 
support and political infl uence. In fact, this Scandinavian country has 
one of the most successful parties in electoral terms, the Danish People’s 
Party (DPP). Since 2001 the DPP has played a crucial role as supporting 
partner to the Liberal and Conservative coalition government. This raises 
the question as to how the DPP has targeted the electorate: what is the 
agenda of the party and what developments have taken place over time? 
And has the infl uential role achieved since 2001 contributed to changing 
the position of the party? This implies also the need to look at the voter 
profi le of the DPP supporters and at the way Danish voters relate to some 
of the main issues on the party agenda, in particular their attitudes 
towards refugees and immigrants, and Islam. Our brief analysis of the 
Danish case ends by considering extra-parliamentary forms of right-wing 
extremism in terms of sub-cultural milieus, networks and players, and 
fi nally refl ects whether this manifestation of the phenomenon is affected 
by the developments that have taken place at the political level. 
History and background of the extreme right in Denmark
In Denmark, the wave of tax revolt at the beginning of the Seventies re-
sulted in the emergence of an electorally signifi cant populist and radical-
right-wing party: the Fremskridtsparti ( Danish Progress Party– FrP).10 
The Progress Party fi rst entered parliament after an unforeseen landslide 
victory in the elections of 1973, in which it received almost 16 percent of 
the votes (see Table 1 below). The Danish Progress Party profi led itself as 
an ultra-liberal tax-protest party with strong anti-establishment and pop-
10 von Beyme, K. “Right wing extremism in post-war Europe.” West European Politics11: 2 (1988) 
1-17.
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ulist components. The Progress Party managed to mobilise important 
 segments of the Danish electorate until around the mid-1980s.11
11 Goul Andersen, J. and Bjørklund, T. “Scandinavia and the far right.” The Far Right in Europe. An 
Encyclopedia ed. Davis P. and Jackson, P. (Oxford: Greenwood Press 2009) 1: 147-163.
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Electoral support and parliamentary mandates for the FrP and the DPP 
(1973-2007). Percentages. Table 1
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007
FrP 15.9 
(28)
13.6 
(24)
14.6 
(26)
11 
(20)
8.9 
(16)
3.6 
(6)
4.8 
(9)
9 
(16)
6.4 
(12)
6.4 
(11)
2.4 
(4)
0.6 
(0)
. .
DPP . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 
(13)
12 
(22)
13.3 
(24)
13.9 
(25)
Tot 15.9 13.6 14.6 11 8.9 3.6 4.8 9 6.4 6.4 9.8 12.6 13.3 13.9
Source: Danish statistical yearbooks.
The electoral support lasted until the beginning of the 1980s, when the 
role of neo-liberal harbingers focused on tax protest started to decline. 
Many observers regarded the party as politically outdated, and the party 
leadership realised that they would have to fi nd another political strategy 
if the party wanted to survive.
From the mid-1980s, voters became interested in other issues than those 
linked to the socio-economic area; in particular, immigration became a 
much-discussed and polarising issue in Danish politics. The Progress Party 
was the fi rst political force in parliament to take up and develop a clear 
anti-immigration position. This gave voice to growing concerns and 
anti-immigration attitudes that already existed among segments of the 
Danish electorate. 
Signifi cantly, before the 1980s the immigration issue was basically non-
existent in Progress Party programmes and manifestos and in the offi cial 
party literature. It was only after 1986 that immigration started to occupy 
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a more signifi cant place on the party’s agenda.12 Similarly, in electoral 
terms, while in attitudes towards immigration the voters for the Progress 
Party in 1979 did not differ from the electorate of the other mainstream 
parties, from the mid-1980s an increasing number of the party supporters 
started to express anti-immigration attitudes. 
In the same period, Denmark experienced increasing waves of immi-
gration. The fi rst important infl ux took place in the late 1960s and 1970s 
and consisted of (male) manual workers, primarily from Turkey, Pakistan, 
former Yugoslavia and Morocco, who were employed in the industrial 
sector, meeting Denmark’s increasing labour demand. The economic 
upturn was followed by a period of stagnation and growing unemploy-
ment. The Danish government responded by introducing a law enacted 
at the end of 1973 that closed the Danish borders to further foreign 
immigration.13 But this did not halt immigration. Similarly to events in 
the other Scandinavian countries, a second immigration wave occurred 
from around the mid-1970s to 1985, mostly involving family reunifi ca-
tion of spouses and children of those “guest” workers who had decided 
to settle permanently in the country. The third immigration wave 
mainly consisted of asylum seekers, who came from the 1970s onward in 
various waves of differing intensity and periodicity – following geopoliti-
cal patterns infl uenced by wars and international crises. Their number 
increased exponentially during the 1980s and 1990s.14  
12 See Meret, S. op. cit. 2009.
13 See Bak Jørgensen, M. and Meret, S. “Irregular migration from a comparative Scandinavian mi-
gration policy perspective.” Irregular Migration in a Scandinavian Perspective, ed. Lund Thomsen, 
T., Bak Jørgensen, M., Meret, S., Hviid, K. and Stenum, H. (Maastricht: Shaker 2009) 121-152.
14 A recent fourth wave can also be distinguished, again characterised by labour migration, but 
this time of a different kind than in the 1970s. It is related structure created by the Danish 
 migration regime, attracting skilled labour and service providers from the new European  Union 
and Baltic countries and highly educated and specialised migrants from the non- Western 
countries (see Lund Thomsen et. al. 2010).
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Signifi cantly, the percentage of Danish voters mentioning immigration 
as one of the most important problems politicians should deal with rose 
from 7 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2001 and fell again to 17 percent 
in 2005.15 Particularly in 2001, the electoral campaign was strongly infl u-
enced by the immigration question, which was clearly among the most 
important issues for many Danish voters,16 regardless of their political 
position and attitudes on this matter. 
If the Progress Party undoubtedly contributed to raising anti-immigration 
issues and giving voice to the most critical positions, it was the DPP that, 
from the late 1990s on, fully developed an ideology and discourse based 
on opposition to immigration and to the prospect of a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural society. 
It is signifi cant that the people who launched the DPP in 1995 came from 
the Progress Party parliamentary group; they included Pia Kjærsgaard, 
who is still the undisputed leader of the DPP. 
The Danish People’s Party (DPP)
The DPP is now among the most successful examples in electoral terms 
of the extreme or radical right wing in Western Europe. Since the mid-
1990s the party has gained increasing support among Danish voters (see 
Table 1 above) and its parliamentary infl uence has grown signifi cantly. 
The clear electoral breakthrough occurred at the 1998 parliamentary elec-
tion, where the DPP obtained 7 percent of the votes and won thirteen par-
liamentary seats. From the beginning, this positive electoral support gave 
the new party a solid parliamentary representation that required consoli-
dation. This demanded a different party organization and leadership 
15 Van der Brugge, J. and Voss, H. “Årsager til de socialistiske partiers tilbagegang i perioden 
1990-2005.” Det nye politiske landskab. Folketingsvalget 2005 i perspektiv ed. Goul Andersen, J., 
Andersen, J., Borre, O., Hansen Møller K., Nielsen H. J. (Aarhus: Systime Academica 2007) 
127–152.
16 Goul Andersen, J., “Vælgernes nye politiske dagsorden.” Politisk Forandring. Værdipolitik og nye 
skillelinjer ved folketingsvalget 2001 ed. Goul Andersen Jørgen, Borre Ole (Aarhus, Systime Aca-
demic 2003), 135-150.
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than that which had characterised the Progress Party: a strategy of politi-
cal normalisation and consolidation of the party’s electoral support.
From the start, the DPP clearly asserted the party’s intention of gaining 
infl uence in Danish politics. For example, the 1996 party declaration of 
intent already stated that the aim of the party was “to give the Danish 
voters a real alternative to the politics pursued by the existing political 
parties”, but also that such an alternative “can play an active role in par-
liamentary life” and achieve “political results through collaboration with 
other parties [because] a political party must never be a goal in itself. (…) 
The DPP therefore sees its goal in realising the party’s politics to the max-
imum possible.”17 
If we view the strategic and organizational development of the party 
within a dynamic time span,18 we can anticipate that the stage of party 
formation and breakthrough would be followed by a phase of consolida-
tion and stabilisation of the party within the Danish political system.  
  
For the party to achieve the political reliability that could advance the 
“normalisation” process and achievement of political responsibility, it 
was necessary to pursue order and unity within the party’s own ranks. 
To promote the DPP as a politically credible alternative, the party leader-
ship (and in particular Pia Kjærsgaard) made it clear from the start that 
internal confl icts and disagreements with key party strategy would not be 
tolerated. In a newsletter published in the party paper, Dansk Folkeblad, 
and blatantly titled “Control from the top? Yes, of course” (Topstyring? – 
Ja, naturligvis), Pia Kjærsgaard explained that a highly centralised party 
leadership represented the necessary condition to prevent chaotic situa-
tions and internal political dissent that could threaten to split the party, 
as in the case of the Progress Party.  
17 Dansk Folkepartis Folketingsgruppe, Dansk Folkepartis 10-punkts program [The Danish People’s 
Party 10-points program] 1996,
18 For an in-depth analysis of this approach in relation to the Danish People’s Party see my Ph.D. 
dissertation: “The Danish People’s Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom 
Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support”, SPIRIT series, Aal-
borg University 2009.
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This strategy was pursued clearly and determinedly. Contrary to the im-
age of populist right-wing parties as unstable and inexperienced organi-
zations, the DPP proved to be “the best example of a modern and success-
ful top-directed market party.”19 Over the years, severe sanctions have 
been used against party members who fl outed the rules and norms set by 
party leadership. A large number of party members were expelled from 
the organization, mostly due to disagreements with the leadership, but 
also because of statements and standpoints considered too extreme and 
damaging for the party image. Control by the DPP leadership is, in fact, 
not limited to the parliamentary group, but extends to all levels of the 
party organization. This means that due democratic process and  dialogue 
within the party is very limited and that the leadership is able to control 
all aspects of the party organization, including at local level. However, 
this has enabled the leadership to simplify and speed up the decision-
making process within the party, as few members challenge the guide-
lines set by the leadership. The result is an image of a strongly  united 
party which is often capable of communicating and promoting the party 
message very effectively, and can sustain a reputation as a reliable partner 
in Danish politics. The electoral success of the DPP at the subsequent 
elections in 2001 has thus to be considered in the context of the strategy 
of consolidation and development implemented by the  party during that 
period.     
At the November 2001 elections, the DPP received 13 percent of the votes 
and won 22 parliamentary seats, nine more than in 1998 (see Table 1, 
above). Most signifi cantly, it was after these elections that the main-
stream parties decided to benefi t from the support of the DPP. From 2001 
the party became the key supporter of the Liberal and Conservative par-
ties in government. The newly-formed government lacked some of the 
necessary mandates to obtain the majority of the 90 seats in the Danish 
Parliament. The two parties have therefore become highly dependent on 
the support of a partner outside the governing coalition to enable them 
19 Knudsen, T. Fra folkestyre til markedsdemokrati. Dansk demokratihistorie efter 1973 (Køben-
havn: Akademisk Forlag 2007) 140-148.
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to enact government policy. From the start, the DPP was the favourite 
candidate, after clearly declaring its support during the election cam-
paign for the Liberal candidate and future prime minister, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen (2001 – 2009). 
In this way, the parties in government contributed to the political legiti-
misation of the DPP, putting an end to a situation in which the party was 
treated as a pariah in Danish politics and votes for the radical right were 
effectively wasted.20 At the same time, the government parties could ben-
efi t from some of the “vote-catching” issues that were DPP hallmarks, 
such as more restrictive immigration rules, tightening up law and order, 
and measures to prevent welfare state abuse. 
The new position as supporting partner to the government achieved in 
2001 implied an active, more direct engagement of the DPP in policy 
making and decision-making processes. This was a unique opportunity 
for the party to exert relevant political infl uence at several socio-econom-
ic levels of Danish society. At the same time, the party had to carefully 
weigh up the possible negative consequences of this new and infl uential 
position.21
As with many other populist variants on the extreme right, the identity 
of the DPP is strongly related to its ability to distinguish itself as a politi-
cal alternative to mainstream politics. Different elements and features 
have contributed to creating this image. These include the strong na-
tional profi le that the DPP has always emphasised in relation to the par-
ty’s origins and commitment. This was clearly and unmistakably ex-
20 Bale, T., “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in Europe’s bipo-
larising party systems.” West European Politics23:3 (2003) 67–90.
21 However, strengthened by this experience, the Danish People’s Party leadership has recently 
demanded a clear statement from Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen confi rming that the 
party will be given government responsibility after the next elections if it requests. This indi-
cates the infl uence achieved by the party during the last decade. See, “Pia K.: Løkke skal sige ja til 
DF i regering.“ [Pia K.: Løkke must say yes to the Danish People’s Party in government]. Politiken 
05.09.2010.
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pressed in the choice of the party name, which highlights both the 
“Danishness” and “popular” (Folkelig) character of the party. The name 
chosen for the new party (Danish People’s Party) accentuated this idea of 
ethnic identity and belonging (a Danish party for the Danish people), and 
the commitment to safeguard existing conditions from internal and exter-
nal threats to the Danish nation. 
In the ideology of the DPP, the concept of the nation and its people is 
inextricably linked to the threat that immigration represents for the sur-
vival of Danish identity and culture as we know it. Multiculturalism and 
the development of a multi-ethnic society therefore represent the worst 
possible scenario for the DPP. However, despite the centrality given to 
national identity, national belonging and culture, there are only vague 
assertions about what this means in practice for the party. References to 
the Danish nation and Danish national identity are invariably encapsu-
lated in vague terms such as culture, Danish heritage, Danish history and 
the Danish community. On the contrary, the DPP leaves little doubt as to 
what is threatening the freedom and independence of the country: fi rst-
ly, immigration and the development of a multi-ethnic society, and sec-
ondly, the European Union. 
Compared to other parties, the DPP has never feared accusations of strong 
nationalist sentiments, nor criticism for its conservative and traditional-
ist views or for being old-fashioned or kitsch when celebrating traditional 
habits and commonplace aspects of Danish culture and way of life. The 
DPP leadership has explicitly defi ned the party as “a red and white party, 
a Danish party”,22 and has striven to establish this image. The party makes 
extensive use of national symbols such as the Danish fl ag (Dannebrog) to 
emphasise its distinctiveness in relation to the other mainstream par-
ties. 
22 Kjærsgaard, P., “Et program i rødt og hvidt.” Dansk Folkeblad 5:3 (1997).
Denmark
253IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
Naturalisation policy quickly became a means for the DPP to emphasise 
an organic view of the Danish community. Belonging and identity in 
terms of shared values, principles, history and culture are considered em-
bedded attributes that can be transmitted almost exclusively by birth or 
mother’s milk, as one outstanding prominent member of the party once 
tried to express it. 
Some scholars regard the contemporary radical-right ideology as a fusion 
of nationalism and populism, where the “struggle for the survival of the 
nation as a culturally distinct entity and against multiculturalism has 
become pivotal for the ideological development of radical-right-wing 
populist discourse.”23 In the case of the DPP, the ideological development 
towards the nationalist discourse was gradual. Particularly after 2001, the 
party started to focus on this kind of approach. Signifi cantly, one of the 
fi rst restrictions implemented in the Danish Aliens Act strongly demand-
ed by the DPP, passed in spring 2002 concerned the terms and conditions 
for obtaining Danish citizenship. Since then, the number of foreigners 
becoming Danish citizens has signifi cantly diminished; the party has 
frequently cited this fact to demonstrate that when given responsibility, 
the DPP is able to deliver concrete results.
The DPP also engaged very early on in the role of guardian of the achieve-
ments of Danish society in fi elds such as welfare, democratic values, in-
dividual and collective freedom, work ethic and diligence, community 
responsibility and so forth. Over time, this task has become increas ingly 
and explicitly emphasised, as successive party programmes show.24 
In particular, from 2001 the party increasingly started highlighting cult-
ural issues and questions of values, interpreting immigration within a 
paradigm of cultural diversity and opposition. This is expressed in terms 
23 See Betz, H.-G. 2009 and Betz, H.-G. and Meret 2009, op. cit. 
24 See Dansk Folkeparti Fælles værdier – Fælles ansvar. Arbejdsprogram 2007 [Common values – 
Common responsibilities. Working program] http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Arbejdsprogram.
asp, accessed 28.06.2010.
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of a “clash of cultures” between the two dominant cultures in the world: 
modernity and Islam. From this perspective, Western Judaeo-Christian 
civilisation and culture is seen as fostering progressive, open and tolerant 
values such as democracy and freedom of speech and religion, whereas 
Islam is often portrayed as a “backward culture”, transmitting a medieval, 
rigid and intolerant view of the world.25 Immigration in general is pre-
sented in a framework of “national catastrophe”,26 whose consequences 
are directly compared to dramatic historic events that threatened Den-
mark’s existence in the past. Within this picture the party has framed the 
socio-economic and cultural threats that Denmark will face if the fl ow of 
immigration – particularly from non-Western countries – continues. 
Since 2001 the party has taken an increasingly tough position against 
Islam, frequently catering to popular concerns about the threat posed by 
Muslim countries and Muslims generally. The view of Islam as a funda-
mental threat to Western values and culture has become a key issue for 
the DPP’s perspective. International events such as the terrorist attacks 
on 11 September 2001 and the Muhammad cartoon crisis have contrib-
uted additionally to strengthening the notion that Islam and Islamist 
extremism are the same thing. 
The DPP considers Islam to be incompatible with Western liberal democ-
racy and Western principles and values. Assimilating to these principles 
entails not only the wish, but also the ability of the immigrant to absorb 
the values and principles that characterise the receiving society. For the 
DPP, Muslim immigrants lack both the basic ability and the necessary 
will to assimilate, for the simple reason that Islam itself is considered al-
most entirely incompatible with what are seen as Western principles. 
25 Dansk Folkeparti Folketingsgruppe Danmarks Fremtid. Dit Land – Dit Valg… (Copenhagen: Form 
& tryk ApS 2001).
26 Kjærsgaard, P., “Udvisning af kriminelle kernefamilier kan skabe tryghed.” Dansk Folkeblad 1999. 
http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/pictures_org/DanskFolkebladnr_5_1999.pdf, accessed 28.06.2010.
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In recent years, and particularly since 2001, a number of concrete issues 
have taken centre stage in the policies and discourses of the DPP. These 
are issues that are generally not considered as integral to the radical-right 
profi le and agenda – for instance, they refer to basic human rights such 
as gender equality, freedom of speech and the media, liberal family val-
ues, etc. This development sometimes seems diffi cult to reconcile with 
the image of a materialist, authoritarian and traditionalist view of the 
world often ascribed to the extreme right. In this sense, I would argue 
that these issues have actually been emphasised by the DPP particularly 
since it achieved greater political infl uence. Portraying minority ethnic 
groups in gender terms with the focus on describing Muslim women as 
“oppressed” victims of their culture, wearing headscarves and subjected 
to discriminating practices, while depicting Muslim young men as 
 arrogant and violence-prone, can help the party to promote its image 
as custodian of the democratic, libertarian and egalitarian rights and 
principles on which Western culture is based. This approach allows the 
party to emphasise aspects of the supposed clash of cultures and values 
between the West and Islam.  
In common with most other extreme-right-wing parties in Europe, in the 
past few years the DPP has developed a discourse in which the Muslim 
veil is described as the visible symbol of Islam’s refusal to accept some 
of the basic values and principles underlying Western societies, such as 
gender equality. The party stands for the prohibition of the Muslim veil 
in the public administration system. Like other similar parties in Europe, 
the DPP considers aloowing to build big mosques with minarets on 
 Danish soil as enabling a symbol of the “conquest” of the West by Islam, 
on fostering the creation of a parallel society that promotes the radicali-
sation of the Muslim community (see Fig. 1). 
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European Networks
These issues have contributed to drawing the Danish party closer to the 
positions on the place of Islam in society expressed by the far right in 
other European countries. Parties as diverse as the FPÖ in Austria, the 
Lega Nord in Italy, the SVP in Switzerland, the Dutch Freedom Party 
(PVV) – to mention only a few – have developed very similar programmes 
on the question of Islam. However, up until now, these similarities, and 
the parties’ shared scepticism towards the EU, have not resulted in the 
formation of a larger political group at the European Parliament. At this 
level, the different parties’ political interests are still divided and appar-
ently infl uenced by tactical aspects that seem to prevent closer coopera-
tion among the extreme right at the European level. Following the last EP 
elections in 2009, the DPP joined the new Europe of Freedom and De-
mocracy group, whose members include the Italian Lega Nord. The Dan-
ish party had earlier expressed an interest in the group of European Con-
servatives and Reformists, but was resolutely refused membership. The 
rejection was led by the British Conservative Party. The Tories considered 
it counterproductive to cooperate with the DPP at the European Parlia-
Danish People’s Party campaign against the 
building of big mosques in Denmark (2009)
“No to large mosques in Danish cities!“ 
“(…) We give you a guarantee: the more represent-
atives from the Danish People’s Party are voted in at 
the municipal election on Nevember 17th, the more 
opposition against Islamism’s strongholds  in your 
town. Vote Danish locally also.“
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ment. This illustrates how diffi cult it is to achieve a mainstream profi le at 
the European level as well. In fact, in this case the DPP is a victim of the 
same strategy it applies to other parties and groups, avoiding association 
with “bad company” that could damage the reputation of the party.27
The political infl uence and the position of responsibility that the DPP 
has achieved in the course of the last decade have affected the party’s 
ideology, discourse and organizational strategies. For example, as indi-
cated above, the party has developed a different approach to the immi-
gration question by focusing on the position of Islam in Western Euro-
pean societies and by relating this approach to a specifi c discussion of 
values and principles such as gender equality, freedom of speech, solidar-
ity and tolerance. This can be seen as a new and much less controversial 
approach that the Danish party can use for critical examination of the 
immigration question. We have also emphasised the various strategies 
that have characterised the different phases of the party as it worked to-
wards normalising its position in Danish politics, highlighting how the 
passage from extreme to mainstream is highly dependent on internal 
decision-making and organizational solutions. 
DPP voters 
The socio-economic profi le of DPP voters shares several features with the 
electoral segments that support parties with similar agendas in Western 
Europe. The general profi le of the DPP voter is: male, manual worker and 
with a low educational level(see Table 2). 
27 The exception is the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokrater), which the Danish People’s Party 
clearly supports, arguing that parliamentary representation of this party in Sweden is the only 
way to change the political debate about issues such as immigration and integration in this 
neighbouring country (see Pia Kjærsgaard’s newsletter 16.08.2010). 
Denmark
258 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
Denmark
Support for DPP (Danish People‘s Party) by gender, 
main occupational sectors and education. Table 2
DF 19941 1998 2001 2005 2007
Gender
Male 8 9 15 15 14
Female 5 6 9 11 13
N 906 1002 983 1138 627
862 832 894 921 694
Occupation
Manual workers 8 9 18 20 19
Private salariat 4 5 9 9 9
Public salariat 1 5 6 6 4
Self-employed 10 13 10 7 9
Outside labour market 8 7 13 16 18
N 373 411 393 445 277
294 319 354 398 285
327 318 356 334 224
128 115 124 145 84
648 645 652 736 431
Education
Low (up to 9yrs) 10 9 17 19 26
Middle (10-11yrs) 4 9 11 15 14
High (12+ yrs) 2 2 6 5 5
N 785 683 681 732 367
600 611 620 632 409
383 531 576 690 494
1 Progress Party in 1994.
N = in thousands, numbers represent percentage of total votes.
Sources: Danish election surveys 1994 -2007.
Compared to other countries, where parties of the extreme right or those 
with similar programmes still can attract other socio-economic groups 
such as small entrepreneurs and the self-employed, the DPP is character-
ised by strong support among manual workers. The DPP is in fact the 
most clearly defi ned working-class party in Danish politics today (see 
Table 3 below). This development has largely occurred at the expense of 
the traditional working-class parties – primarily the Social Democratic 
Party (now Social Democrats, S) – which have lost considerable support 
among manual workers over the years. As shown in Table 3, from the 
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mid-1990s the share of manual workers has continued to move away 
from S and the socialist parties, fi rst towards the Progress Party and then 
to the DPP.
Interestingly, this socio-economic profi le is a specifi c feature of electoral 
support for the extreme and populist right wing in Scandinavia, and can 
therefore also be observed in relation to the electorate of the Norwegian 
Progress Party and the Swedish Democrats. This has several explanations: 
at the macro-structural level, it was infl uenced by the emergence of a new 
dimension of political cleavage based on issues of values and culture, 
which strongly affected traditional voting patterns that had previously 
been driven by a class voting logic. This also applies to Denmark. Social 
and political transformations contributed to the emergence of new 
 political issues that could be explored by new political players; these 
 included immigration. The growing levels of concern among Danish 
 voters about issues related to immigration can be seen in Table 4 below.  
The view that immigrants represent a threat to the survival of the Danish 
nation and to its culture and identity has become increasingly signifi cant. 
Denmark
Share of manual workers within main Danish parties and party groups 
(1994 - 2007). Difference from the average/all in percentage points. Table 3
19941 1998 2001 2005 2007
DF +18 +9 +20 +25 +24
Non-socialist parties -10 -10 -7 -10 -7
S +13 +11 +9 +12 +7
Other left-wing parties -3 -2 -11 -2 -10
All 33 36 32 33 33
N
DF 112 136 225 273 188
Non-socialist parties 842 802 898 1055 586
S 612 658 547 532 350
Other left-wing parties 185 187 165 193 208
Source: Danish election surveys (1994 -2007). Political weight.
1 Progress Party in 1994.
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Table 4 above shows the position of the DPP voters on two questions re-
lated to immigration as a threat to Danish national culture and security. 
The major concern of DPP is undoubtedly the impact of immigration on 
Danish culture and identity. More than 70 percent of DPP supporters 
since the 1990s agreed with the statement that immigration represents a 
threat to Danish culture. Compared to the DPP, the Social Liberals (RV) 
and the Socialist People’s Party voters (SF) showed an opposite attitude. 
The position among the Liberal party (V) voters on this issue is also inter-
esting; in 2001 about 9  percent more voters saw immigration as a threat 
to the national culture and those who did not; six years later this had risen 
to about 20 percent. A different development can be observed among the 
Conservatives (K), whose attitudes have moved in the opposite direction 
(from -6  percent in 2001 to -15  percent in 2007). 
Over the past decade, another issue has gained increasing consensus 
among voters for the DPP and other parties: that Muslim countries repre-
sent a threat to national security. Particularly DPP supporters, but also 
Denmark
Attitudes towards immigration among the DPP (Danish People‘s Party) and other 
Danish party voters. PDI (percentage difference index: strongly agree/agree – 
strongly disagree/disagree). Percentages. Table 4
SF S RV V K DF¹ All
Immigration a threat against national culture
1994 -56 -1 -49 8 8 74 -2
1998 -62 -9 -70 15 -1 73 -5
2001 -66 -15 -81 9 -6 73 -5
2005 -60 -17 -66 16 -6 76 -3
2007 -55 -24 -81 20 -15 69 -9
Muslim countries a security threat
1994 -40 -12 -9 -2 -21 35 -11
1998 -42 2 -57 18 10 65 3
2001 -64 -7 -62 17 3 64 0
2005 -48 -1 -54 32 -3 74 8
2007 -28 4 -36 53 34 81 21
1 Progress Party in 1994.
Legend: DDP= Danish People’s Party; Non-socialist parties= Liberals (V), Conservatives (K), Social Liberals (RV), Centrum 
Democrats (CD), Christian Democrats (KrD); S= Social democrats; Other left-wing= Socialist People’s Party (SF); Unity List (Enh.).
261IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
people who support the two government parties, expressed serious con-
cern about this perceived national security threat. This position was un-
doubtedly fuelled by events such as 9/11 and its aftermath, as well as by 
what has come to be known as the “Muhammad cartoons crisis”; this 
started with twelve cartoons, most of them depicting the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad, published by the Danish broadsheet Jyllands Posten in Sep-
tember 2005. Their publication subsequently sparked fi erce protest and 
serious incidents of political riots and social unrest, particularly in some 
Muslim countries. However, concerns about Islam had already been on 
the agenda of certain segments of the electorate since at least the 1990s, 
and they were clearly more pronounced among DPP voters. 
As mentioned above, in the last decade the DPP has been able to con-
solidate its present, and very likely its future, position in Danish politics, 
largely by catering to these concerns and offering an agenda that has 
privileged a welfare state approach to the economic dimension – albeit 
limited to “those who have contributed to it over the generations”. 
Danish racism and neo-Nazism: Extreme-right movements 
and subcultural milieus 
While the history, electoral support, transformations and development 
of the extreme-right wing parties at the parliamentary level are a rela-
tively well-studied fi eld in Denmark by now, there is still a general lack of 
more in-depth quantitative and qualitative research on right-wing ex-
tremist sub-cultural milieus, movements, networks, organizations and 
individuals. With a few exceptions,28 the study of racist sub-cultural mi-
Denmark
28 Karpantschof R. Nynazismen og dens modstandere i Danmark (Esbjerg: Sydjysk Universitetsforlag 
1999); see also, Karpantschof, R. and Mikkelsen F. Rise and fall of the racist right-wing movement 
in Denmark 1982-2000 (2004). http://www.amid.dk/ocs/viewpaper.php?id=141&cf=1, accessed 
31.08.2010. For a qualitative study, see, Lyng, J., “Højreradikale biografi er – Fortællinger om 
fremmedgørelse, vrede og modstand.” I samfundets sprækker - Studier i upassende sociologi II ed. 
Hviid Jacobsen, M. (Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag 2007).
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lieus and extreme-right-wing social movements remains a rather under- 
researched academic fi eld.29 This is due partly to the more marginal role 
of this phenomenon in Danish society, and partly to the diffi culties and 
suspicions encountered by researchers approaching these groups. 
At this level, two typologies of right-wing extremism can be distin gu-
ished: 1) xenophobic and militant extreme-right movements and net-
works that advocate street violence, directly use neo-Nazi symbols, ideol-
ogy and music (e.g. White Pride, the Danish National Front, Blood and 
Honour Denmark), and have a fairly well-developed international net-
work; and 2) movements and associations that rely on ethnocentric, na-
tionalist and anti-immigration rhetoric, patriotic feelings and anti-immi-
gration attitudes, but which are more deeply rooted in Danish political 
life and offi cially reject undemocratic practices and violence (e.g. the 
Danish Association; Stop the Islamisation of Denmark; Aarhus against the 
Mosque; Verderfølner). However, overlapping membership between the 
groups is not infrequent. 
Both types share the harsh critique of Islam and of the Muslim minority, 
whose cultural background, values and principles are considered to be 
irreconcilable with the fundamental ideas of the Western and Christian 
world since the Enlightenment. In fact, the principal target of these 
extreme-right groups today is Islam and Muslims, rather than – as was 
largely the case in the 1990s – immigration, immigrants and refugees in 
a broader sense.30
29 There are a few independent and non-academic organizations who study the mapping and 
transformation of the extreme-right wing movements and sub-cultural milieus in Denmark. 
See e.g. http://redox.dk/, accessed 31-08-2010 
30 See Svensson, P. and Togeby, L., Højrebølge? (Århus: Politica 1991); and Karpantschof, R. and 
Mikkelsen, F. 2004 op. cit.
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Serious incidents of racial hate characterised the 1990s in Denmark, and 
were fuelled by the anti-minority riots that took place in Germany. Today 
it is especially the clash with organized movements of the extreme and 
anti-racist left wing that engages the most extreme and militant right-
wing groups. From 2005 there was a signifi cant rise in violent episodes 
and physical attacks, particularly at the local level, for example in the 
major Danish cities of the Jutland peninsula. Over the past few years e
xtremist right-wing groups such as White Pride, Denmark’s National Front 
and Vederfølner have become more active here,31 and can exist relatively 
“undisturbed” because the anti-racist networks are much weaker and less 
active than those in Copenhagen and its surrounding area. 
It is empirically very diffi cult to establish how the specifi c political op-
portunity structure in Denmark and the presence of a party in parliament 
that played a major role in criticising immigration might have infl uenced 
the membership, organization and activities of the most extremist move-
ments and groups in Danish society. As part of its “normalisation” strat-
egy, the DPP leadership has clearly stated that militants from extremist 
and racist right-wing movements are not welcome in the party rank and 
fi le. The statement was necessary because in the period from the late 
1990s until around 2007, more than thirty local party members were 
excluded from the DPP because of their active affi liation whith the group 
Danish Front, at that time one of the largest and best organized extreme-
right-wing networks in Denmark, with sections in every big Danish city. 
The people behind the Danish Front came from the active Nazi milieu of 
White Pride, but included members with considerable political and or-
ganizational experience, for example in the DPP youth section. When 
the Danish Front was disbanded in 2007, due to internal confl icts over 
anti-Semitic positions and the use of violence by a section of Blood and 
31 Århus er de højreradikales hovedstad [Aarhus is the capital of the extreme right]. Information 
(07.03.2010). http://www.information.dk/226471, accessed 31.08.2010. 
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Honour Denmark, that same year some of the remaining members found-
ed a new association, Vederfølner.32 This group is presently the largest ex-
treme-right-wing movement in Denmark. It sees its main goal as uniting 
all “concerned Danes who think that the Danish immigration policies 
approved in the last thirty years constitute an unfortunate development 
for Denmark and have given rise to a multicultural society that is con-
trary to Denmark’s democratic organization, our right of free speech, and 
gender equality.”33 It is interesting how at this level, too, the emphasis is 
placed on patriotic, non-violent and democratic values and principles, 
perhaps signalling an effort to promote an image shift from violence, 
anti-Semitism and Nazi ideology towards anti-Islam and anti-Muslim 
positions. This political agenda is shared by several other groups such as 
Stop Islamisation of Denmark (SIAD) and Aarhus against the Mosque, indi-
cating that the mobilisation of extreme-right movements and milieus 
today is closely related to the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim issue.
Conclusions 
The question as to whether Denmark is on the “right path” can be answer-
ed in the affi rmative. In this contribution we have tried to outline how, 
over the years, this has been encouraged by various opportunities and by 
a social and political context that created some of the conditions and 
socio-political spaces for this development. Looking specifi cally at the 
Danish experience, one of the aspects of this “right wing turn” was the 
transition of the DPP from the margins to the mainstream of Danish 
politics. This was a dynamic process that involved different levels and 
phases of development of the party. In this sense, the favourable struc-
tural, societal and political conditions for the breakthrough and success-
32 The name originates from Nordic mythology: it was the hawk sitting on the beak of the eagle 
on the top of the tree Yggdrasil, which looked out over the world. From this the slogan of the 
group: “Vederfølner – keeps an eye on Denmark.”
33 See, Vederfølner’s homepage, http://www.modstand.nu
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ful mobilisation of the extreme-right wing created the preconditions for 
their successful mobilisation; however, this was also greatly infl uenced 
by the DPP and its strategies during the different phases of the party’s 
development to achieve political infl uence and consolidate electoral 
support.
Other interesting factors are the transformations and developments that 
have occurred among the extreme-right-wing subgroups, networks and 
movements, where the social and political context seems to have infl u-
enced the creation of their programmes and the way these groups choose 
to promote themselves today. 
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The extreme right in Sweden: Growing slowly
In most European countries we fi nd two phenomena: a racist subculture 
milieu which is a mixture of neo-Nazism, esoteric groups and social move-
ments inspired by American white supremacy ideology, and ethnocentric 
right-wing parties that exploit anti-establishment, anti-immigration and 
anti-Muslim feelings (in Western and Northern Europe) or target the 
Roma population with even deeper animosity (for instance, in Italy or 
Hungary). On the one hand Sweden fi ts this overall picture; on the other, 
the Swedish extreme right has its own history and political agenda. 
The structure of the extreme right in Sweden
The following contribution will address the question of the structure of 
the extreme right in Sweden. First, we will deal with extreme nationalist 
political parties, and then with the subculture of white supremacy groups. 
We will also discuss the electoral performance of the extreme right.   
The extreme nationalist parties
Sweden differs from the majority of European countries in that it was not 
until the late 1980s that an extreme nationalist party was created on a 
national level and developed much later than in many other European 
countries. Sverigedemokraterna (SD), the Swedish Democrats, the largest 
nationalist party at present, was founded in 1988.  SD started to grow 
 signifi cantly in 1989 – 90. There are a number of reasons for its initial 
growth aside from the referendum in the municipality of Sjöbo on re-
Heléne Lööw
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ception of refugees.1 First, the public debate reinforced SD‘s arguments. 
In this debate refugees were seen no longer as a resource, but as a prob-
lem. More restrictive legislation on political asylum (enacted in Decem-
ber 1989), and changes in public opinion towards a more restrictive han-
dling of refugees and immigrants, also contributed to legitimising SD.2    
In the 1991 election SD faced competition from Sjöbopartiet and Framsteg-
spartiet, whose anti-immigration programme strongly resembled SD‘s. 
Framstegspartietand Sjöbopartiet contested the election as a coalition 
and received 27,637 votes at local level. Framstegspartiet gained 12 seats 
in local councils, all in the south of Sweden. SD received 4,889 votes at 
the national level and two seats on local councils. During 1991 the 
activities of the parliamentary anti-immigration parties declined. There 
were two reasons for this: fi rstly, part of the recruitment base for the 
parliamentary parties was undermined by the rise of Ny Demokrati, a 
 populist party with anti-immigration tendencies. This party received 
6.7 percent of the vote in the general election in 1991 and the established 
political parties developed more restrictive attitudes on questions con-
cerning refugees and immigration. Secondly, younger members left the 
party to join revolutionary groups propagating racist ideology, which 
1 In 1988 the municipality of Sjöbo in the south of Sweden held a local referendum about recep-
tion of refugees. The background to the referendum was a change in offi cial Swedish refugee 
policy, according to which every municipality was obliged to receive refugees. Sjöbo refused to 
conclude an agreement with the immigration authorities and held a local referendum instead. 
The ‘No’ faction was represented by the local branch of Centerpartiet – a branch that was ex-
pelled from the party, and formed a new party, Sjöbopartiet. Despite a massive campaign by the 
‘Yes’ supporters, the ‘No’ faction won the referendum – 65 percent of Sjöbo‘s population voted 
‘No’. The referendum in Sjöbo was the fi rst time that a previously hidden public opinion won 
a public election – against the offi cial policy.  One of the results of the referendum was that 
it gave some degree of legitimacy to the anti-immigration position. Another result was that it 
proved it was possible to win within the parliamentary system.
2 For the change in public opinion see Lange, Anders und Westin, Charles. Ungdom om in-
vandring II; förhållningssätt till invandring och invandrare 1993 Youth on immigration II; views 
on immigration and immigrants (CEIFO Stockholm University 1993); Demker, Marie. “Stäng 
gränserna!? Svenskarnas åsikter om fl yktingmottagning.” Perspektiv på krisen Close the borders!? 
Swedish opinion on asylum seekers. Perspectives on the crisis ed. Sören Holmberg and Lennart 
 Weibull. SOM 9 (1992).  
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were considered more active and militant. The above-mentioned factors 
contributed to internal confl icts within the parliamentary groups, para-
lysing party activities. However, in 1993, when Ny Demokrati – also 
plagued by internal splits and scandals – increasingly began to lose po-
litical support, SD intensifi ed its activities and began to gain some sup-
port among the generation born in the 1960s and 1970s.3 In the 1994 
election SD won fi ve seats in local assemblies and received approximately 
14,000 votes in the general election. In the 1994 election Ny Demokrati 
received only 1.2  percent of the votes and lost its seats in parliament. 
There were several reasons for this: the severe deep economic crisis at the 
beginning of the 1990s, which caused voters to return to the traditional 
political parties; the internal confl icts within Ny Demokrati; and the 
 party‘s inability to fi nd a credible position between presenting itself as an 
anti- establishment party and yet being part of the  establishment and 
 acting as a supporting party for the conservative govern ment. After the 
collapse of Ny Demokrati, SD was the only re maining extreme-right-wing 
player on the national level. In the 1998 election SD received 20,000 
votes and eight seats on local councils. However, the party was plagued 
by internal confl icts, and in 2001 a splinter group emerged to form 
 Nationaldemokraterna, the National Democrats (ND). In the 2002 election 
SD improved its showing again, receiving 1.4  percent of the votes and 
winning 40 seats on local councils.4  
Sweden
3 Lööw, Heléne. “Racist Violence and Criminal Behaviour in Sweden: Myths and reality.” Terror 
from the extreme Right, ed. Tore Bjorgo (London: Frank Cass 1995). 
4 Populism och främlingsmisstro, Sverige i Europa, Integrationsverkets skriftserie VI, Integra-
tionsverket 2006. Populism and distrust of foreigners, Sweden in Europe, Bureau of Integration 
series VI, Bureau of Integration 2006.
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The SD experienced a big resurgence in the 2006 election: the party re-
ceived 2.9  percent of the votes in the general election, 282 seats on 144 
local councils and a total of 16 seats on three regional councils.5 In the 
opin ion polls during the election campaign in September 2010, the SD 
received more than 4  percent of the votes. If the results of the upcoming 
elections follow this prognosis, SD will be able to enter the national 
assembly for the fi rst time. In the election in September 2010 the SD 
received 5.7  percent of the votes and 20 seats in the national assembly. 
This meant the end of 22 years on the margins of Swedish politics for the 
SD – in fact, after the election  the SD found itself at the heart of the po-
litical debate. Not only did the party enter the national assembly, but the 
election result meant that neither the blue nor the green-red coalition 
gained a majority of the vote. The parliamentary situation is very unclear 
at the moment (early October 2010). The election 2010 meant that Swe-
den was no longer exceptional in Europe – and the SD‘s electoral success 
triggered off large anti-racist demonstrations in many cities, as well as a 
wave of violence directed against SD candidates and supposed support-
ers. In con trast to the SD‘s gradual success the ND has declined over the 
years: in the 2002 elections ND received approximately 9000 votes, and 
in the 2006 elections it lost about two-thirds of its support. In the 2010 
election ND lost further electoral support, but managed to keep the seats 
on local councils that it had gained in the 2006 election. The same pat-
Sweden
SD leafl et: 
“Let us together work for a 
society built on security 
and tradition!” and “Stop calling 
us xenophobic and start listening 
to what we have to say.”
5 Sverigedemokraterna – ett parti som alla andra? Swedish democrats – a party like all the rest? 
(Stockholm: ABF and EXPO 2007). 
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tern can be seen in the results of local elections to city councils. The 
 distribution of votes, seats in local councils and numbers of municipali-
ties where the SD, and to some extent ND, managed to take seats in the 
local councils shows that SD‘s strongholds are in the south and west of 
Sweden. These are the same regions that have historically been the 
strongholds for  Nazis, the religious right, populists and the xenophobic 
right since the 1930s. These are also some of the regions that were most 
affected by the economic depression in the 1990s.6 However, it is still too 
early to present a more detailed analysis of the election results of 2010.  
Sweden
White power: Political parties, social movements and 
 subculture
The 1990s saw not only the beginning of parties with anti-immigration 
programmes but also the rise of militant underground racist movements. 
The development towards  increasingly radical and violent groups started 
in the 1980s. It was at that time that a growing number of racist under-
Demonstrations 
in Stockholm 
against the SD 
during SD‘s 
last public rally 
before the 
2010 election 
6 Lööw, Heléne, Report on Sweden. In:  Strategies for Combating Right-wing Extremism in Europe, 
ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009).  
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ground groups – which harbour neo-Nazis, anti-Semites, racist occult 
groups and religious groups, among others – started to perceive society as 
the main enemy and viewed themselves as “warriors in a war against the 
Zionist Occupied Government”. Acting on the anti-Semitic attitudes that 
are still the core ideology of the racist ideological movement, attacks 
against groups or individuals – who “controlled the world”, in the view 
of the racist militants – started in the 1980s. Typical hate targets were 
Jews, homosexuals, communists and people who the activists believed 
had “betrayed their race” (i.e., law enforcement offi cials, journalists, 
 bureaucrats and anti-racists). In the late 1980s the underground started 
to fi nd an organizational form, not as political parties in a traditional 
sense but as loosely knit networks of activists. In the early 1990s the un-
derground racist groups became known to a wider  audience due to in-
creased propaganda and public activities as well as a number of criminal 
activities. New organizations came and went during the 1990s – however, 
the key fi gures behind them remained the same. Aside from organiza-
tions and loose networks, the 1990s were the period when the “white 
noise” music industry developed, as well as publishing companies, cult-
ural associations (such as Nordiska Förbundet) and clothing companies 
marketing outfi ts for right-wing militants. The technological advances of 
the Internet and e-mail opened up a whole new communications arena 
for the activists. The 1990s were also a period of signifi cant increase in 
 violence and criminal activities by activists and sympathisers of under-
ground racist groups.7 
One of the main players of the 1990s was the Nationalsocialistisk Front 
(NSF),a classic neo-Nazi party founded in 1994. In the 2002 election NSF 
decided to run locally for the city council of Karlskrona, and received ap-
proximately 200 votes.8 In the general election of 2006, NSF received 
Sweden
7 Lööw 2000, chapter on December 1999.
8 Lipponen, Sami. “Några främlingsfi entliga organizationers verksamhet under 2004.” Rasism 
och främlingsfi entlighet i Sverige; “Rapporter och delstudier om rasism och främlingsfi ent-
lighet i Sverige 2004.“ Integrationsverkets rapportserie 2005:02. “The activities of some xeno-
phobic organizations in Sweden during 2004.“ Reports and studies on racism and hostility towards 
foreigners in Sweden 2004, Bureau of Integration report, series 2005: 02.
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1417 votes. It also contested local council elections in six municipalities 
– but failed to win any seats. In 2008 the party changed its name to 
 Folkfronten (People‘s Front). In 2009 it changed its name yet again, this 
time to Svenskarnas parti, the Party of Swedes.9 During the last two years, 
however, the infl uence of Nazi ideology has gradually vanished from the 
party‘s public agenda and has been replaced by a more moderate ideo-
logy. In the September 2010 election the party stood on a national level, 
and in one constituency also on the regional level, as well as in a number 
of local municipalities.10 In the 2010 election the Party of Swedes gained 
one seat on a local councils – in the municipality of Grästorp on the west 
coast of Sweden. This was the fi rst time since the National Socialists lost 
their seats in local councils in the early 1940s that a party of Nazi origin 
entered a local council.  
Svenska Motståndsrörelsen (SMR), the Swedish resistance movement, is an-
other key player in the racist underground. SMR is not a political party in 
the traditional sense; it rather resembles a social movement. SMR is not 
an open organization and does not contest elections. It has very few 
 public spokesmen, and no offi cial addresses for any local branches. The 
organization was founded by some of the leading fi gures from the racist 
underground of the 1990s.11 It describes its goals as follows:  to “defend 
the Swedish people”; to “fi ght multiculturalism”; “the establishment of 
a national government” (i.e., a government founded on autocratic 
 prin ciples based on nationalism and socialism); “repatriation of all un-
des irable foreigners”; rejection of the EU; the unifi cation of the Nordic 
countries and the establishment of a Nordic Reich.”12 
Sweden
  9 Folkfronten blir svenskarnas parti. http://www.svenskarnasparti.se/2009/11/29/folkfronten-
blir-svenskarnas-parti-svp/ (04.10.2010). Folkfronten became the party of Swedes. 
10 http://www.svenskarnasparti.se/2010/04/19/val-2010-svenskarnas-roster-enas-i-svenskarnas-
parti/ (04.10.2010). The votes of Swedes united in the Party of Swedes. 
11 Jakobsson, Johannes and  Ekman, Mikael. “Med våld som vapen.” With violence as a weapon. 
Expo 2 (2007).  
12 Våra mål i korthet, www.patriot.nu; 
 http://www.patriot.nu/artikel.asp?artikelID=1061 (04.10.2010).
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Another important part of the subcultural milieu in Sweden is the net-
work surrounding the Internet site Info 14, which started as an independ-
ent racist magazine in 1995. Since 1999, Info 14 exists only on the Inter-
net as an independent news agency. Info 14 is also affi liated whith Gula 
Korset, the Yellow Cross, a sympathisers‘ organization for imprisoned far-
right activists,14 and a group called Salemfonden that organizes the annual 
commemoration march in Salem, a suburb of Stockholm, in memory of 
a 17-year-old activist who was killed there in 2000.15 The name Info 14 
refers to the so-called “14 words” of US American racist David Lane: We 
must secure the existence of our people and a future for White Children.16 
 Under the umbrella of Info 14, a network called Fria Nationalister (Free 
Nationalists), began developing in 2007.17 These developments led to a 
 signifi cant change in the structure of the racist underground, a shift from 
three main players towards independent, loosely organized local groups: 
the Free Nationalists. This shift is actually a return to the strategies of the 
1990s. The network lacks a single fi gurehead and prefers to organize 
 under several key protagonists who have been active in the racist under-
ground since the early 1980s. In 2007, Info 14 and the Free Nationalists 
mounted 88 public events – stressing the meaning of codes and their 
 relation to Nazism (in the Swedish scene, as elsewhere, 88 stands for “Heil 
Hitler!” ). Info 14 also runs an Internet radio station called Folkbildaren.18 
Moreover, leading members of the network organize lecture tours 
throughout Sweden.19  
Sweden
13 Lööw 2000:131ff. 
14 Lööw 2000:104.  
15 www.info14.com; http://www.salemfonden.info/ (04.10.2010).
16 Lööw 2000: 446. 
17 In December  2009, free nationalist groups existed in the following locations: Dalarna, Gotland, 
Göteborg, Stockholm, Västerås. Nyköping, aktionsgrupp roslagen, Fagerstas fria nationalister 
Fria nationalister Skåne, Värmlands oberoende. Action group Roslagen, Fagersta free national-
ists, free nationalists Skåne, the independents of Värmland. http://www.frianationalister.se/ 
(04.10.2010). 
18 Dalsbro, Anders. “Över tusen nazistiska aktiviteter under 2007.” Over one thousand activities 
from Nazis during the year 2007. Expo 1 (2008). 
19 See e.g., Föredrag i Västerås, 2007-01-27, Lecture in Västerås.
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Nordiska Förbundet is another player in the subcultural milieu. It runs 
websites and chat forums on the Internet, functions as a news agency, 
organizes concerts, lecture tours and cultural events,20 and runs the pub-
lishing company Nordiska Förlaget This publishes both Swedish and 
 foreign literature – new works and reprints of older literature from the 
1930s and 1940s – as well as music. In 2007 the organizations launched 
a writing competition that resulted in the anthology Swedish Voices. 
There are also a number of other companies that sell music, literature 
and  clothing. Some are independent and some are affi liated to Svenskar-
nas Parti, SMR or Info 14.21 One of the most important websites for the 
white supremacy groups should also be mentioned: Nordisk.nu. It in-
cludes blogs, games, music and chat rooms, and functions as a social 
network in cyberspace. The website was created by Nordiska Förbundet.22 
Another relevant website is antikap.nu, which is independent and propa-
gates anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist attitudes that it claims are 
based on “sound socialist and biologist-nationalist principles”.23   
Topics, strategies and ideology of the extreme right 
The key topic of the ethnocentric right, by contrast, is Islamophobia – 
which was part of the programme of these parties from the start, but has 
intensifi ed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. A key element of 
this rhetoric is the belief that there is an ongoing “Islamic invasion” of 
Sweden and Europe. ND and SD frequently refer to the “Islamisation of 
Sweden and Europe” and the creation of a “multicultural society based 
on ethnic and religious violence, high crime rates and growing Islamist 
terrorism”. This rhetoric presents Muslims as “evil invaders” – or simply 
as terrorists. Parties like SD and ND are not xenophobic in the generally 
understood sense – for instance, a number of the party offi cials are from 
Sweden
20 http://www.nordiskaforbundet.se/ (04.10.2010). 
21 http://www.kampboden.se/index.html (04.10.2010).
22 http://www.nordisk.nu/ (04.10.2010).
23 http://www.antikap.nu/vad-ar-antikap/ (04.10.2010).
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migrant backgrounds, and they have little or no objection to  migrants 
from European countries. In fact, these parties receive some support from 
among older migrant groups, i.e., European migrants who came to 
 Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s.24   
Another core issue is the spread of anti-establishment positions: SD and 
ND present themselves as distinct from other political parties and as the 
“voice of the ordinary people”. One characteristic SD slogan is, “We say 
what you think” – against the political and cultural establishment. 
Another key element of the anti-establishment stance is the idea of the 
homeland of betrayed people. SD and ND look back at the Sweden of the 
1950s and 1960s as the “dream country” with social welfare, high em-
ployment rates, progress and very few immigrants from non-European 
countries. The idea of the “people‘s home” – the myth of the folkhem – is 
a vision that played a central role in Swedish post-war history. During the 
post-war era the welfare state became a crucial part of Swedish identity. 
The welfare state was the fundamental element of the Swedish model – 
the Swedish way. During the depression of the 1990s the welfare state 
was no longer taken for granted, as economic crises led to high unem-
ployment and huge structural changes, with big cutbacks in industrial 
production. At the same time the national state and local councils dis-
missed tens of thousands of employees, and small businesses or family 
businesses went bankrupt. The crises also meant cutbacks in social 
benefi ts. The economic crises of the 1990s fuelled SD‘s argument that the 
established parties had “sold out” the welfare state in favour of multi-
culturalism, and “if it had not been for the migrants and the establish-
ment, the welfare state would have remained what it once was.” In the 
2006 election, SD‘s strongholds were the regions hardest hit by the eco-
nomic depression. It could be argued that large groups of people working 
in industry and the public sector, and those running small businesses or 
family businesses saw their lives changing radically: they lost their jobs 
and/or their social status. But what happened when the economy im-
proved? Did they regain their social status, or are they still marginalized? 
Sweden
24 Lecture by Dr. Ulla Ekström from Essen at Karlstad University, February 2008. 
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What happened to their children? What is happening now, during yet 
another period of economic diffi culties? In my view, some of these 
groups have turned, or will turn, to the SD. In the 2006 election, the SD 
took votes from all the political parties, but predominantly from the 
 Social Democrats and the Centre Party. However, the largest group 
 attracted to SD comprised people who had never voted before, or who 
had abstained: the people with no faith or interest in politics.25   
Another key issue is the combination of the topics of crime and im-
migration that the ND has strongly emphasised. The main target groups 
of SD and ND aggression are non-European immigrants, particularly 
Muslims and minority groups such as Roma members and, to some 
extent, migrants from the Balkans.26 There are, however, differences 
between SD and ND. The SD rhetoric does not include any anti-Semi-
tism: on the contrary, the party criticises the anti-Semitism within the 
Muslim community to reinforce their argument that Muslims pose a 
threat to Swedish society – in this case, towards Swedish Jews. ND, on 
the other hand, is anti-Muslim as well as anti-Semitic and homophobic. 
 
During the 1990s SD was politically marginalized, but the party has 
 gradually gained acceptance among the general public since then. In the 
1990s few people outside the party strongholds openly supported SD – 
not least for fear of becoming socially marginalized. This has changed: 
the social stigma seems to have evaporated since the 2006 election. In 
the case of ND, the social  stigma still exists to some extent, mainly 
 because ND is far more radical than SD and has links to the racist sub-
culture.27   
Sweden
25 Lööw 2009.
26 Lööw 2007, pp. 93ff. 
27 Lööw 2009.
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Differing ideology and strategies of the white supremacy 
movement
The key topics for the racist underground that bind the various parties, 
organizations, networks and social movements together are anti-
Semitism, racist ideology and homophobia. Anti-Semitism is the core 
ideology of the racist ideology underground – the component that binds 
the various sects and organizations together. It is as central for present-
day activists as it once was for the Nazis of the 1930s. Holocaust denial is 
one important aspect of present-day anti-Semitic propaganda. Since 
2006, NSF and SMR have mounted protest demonstrations on 27 January 
–  Holocaust Remembrance Day – with the slogan, “Stop the genocide of 
our people.” In 2007, NSF arranged a public discussion with the French 
Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson.28 Activists from the racist under-
ground believe that the world is controlled by an “international Jewish 
world conspiracy” or “the Zionist Occupied Government“ (ZOG). Ac-
cording to this demonology, ZOG includes the media, police, adminis-
trators, intellectuals, and others. It is ZOG, and not individual migrants, 
that represents the primary “enemy” of the racist counterculture. ZOG 
stands for the “corrupt society” which “poisons the white race through 
im migration of racially inferior elements, homosexuality and moral dis-
order“, in order to “destroy the white race”. The “members of ZOG” are 
referred to as “Jew lackeys” or “race traitors”. The idea of the history of 
mankind as a never-ending struggle between different races is as central 
to the ideology of the revolutionary racists as it was to the early Nazis. 
All the various belief systems within the racist counterculture are, in a 
sense, apocalyptic. Notions of the “fi nal battle”, “the judgment day” or 
“Ragnarök” (the “fi nal destiny of the gods” in Norse mythology) are to 
be found in the world of the Nazis and the neo-pagan world of racist 
Odin worship.29 The common enemies of the racist underground are 
 society as a whole and individuals from minority groups – such as Jews, 
Sweden
28 Lööw, Heléne, Report on Sweden. Strategies for Combating Right-wing Extremism in Europe, ed. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009). 
29 Kaplan, Jeffrey. Right Wing violence in North America, manuscript 1994. 
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homosexuals, and Blacks – as well as political opponents mainly on the 
extreme left. The attitude towards Muslims, however, is complex. Where-
as a section of the racist ideology underground is clearly anti-Muslim, 
 another segment sympathizes with radical Islamism because it shares the 
ideology of anti-Semitism.30   
The political strategy of the racist subculture in Sweden differs in a 
number of important aspects from the strategies employed by the Nazis 
of the interwar period in the 20th century. Firstly, the modern-day racists 
are not party builders. Their goal is not primarily to form strong political 
parties in order to gain power. Instead, they organize in loose networks of 
small independent groups. Secondly, the Führer cult – central to Nazism 
– is lacking in the modern groups, which are organized on the principle 
of leaderless resistance.31   
Sweden
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30 Lööw, Heléne. “Islamofobi och antisemitism efter den 11 september.” arbete, kultur, politik. 
En vänbok till Lennart K Persson, ed. Maria Cavallin Aijmer, Göran Malmstedt, Kenneth Ny-
berg, Adam Von Scheele  and Monica Weikert Skrifter från Historiska Institutionen i Göteborg 7 
(Göteborg 2007). “Islamophobia and anti-Semitism after 9/11.”: Work, culture, politics. A book 
dedicated to Lennart K. Persson.
31 Lööw 2000. 
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One important strategy of the subculture of white supremacy is to widen 
support by means of local and national campaigns, often around the 
 issue of crime. Over the years, SMR has launched a number of campaigns 
focused on sex crimes and rape incidents. These issues are a constant 
theme on the websites of both SMR and Info 14.32 For instance, in 2009 
individuals associated with SMR launched a campaign against paedo-
philes.33 Another phenomenon within this subculture is  anti-capitalist 
and anti-globalisation arguments. In 2009 these groupings launched 
anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation campaigns, following a pattern that 
can be observed in other European countries as well. white supremacy 
groups adopt the rhetoric and symbols of the left, but from a different 
ideological standpoint. Another important part of their strategy is to 
present themselves as victims of political oppression and harassment by 
the state and  political adversaries. A number of campaigns and demon-
strations have been mounted over the years to gain support for imprison-
ed activists and to draw attention to violent incidents involving political 
opponents.34 
The technological revolution triggered by the Internet and e-mail has 
opened up a whole new arena of communication both on the domestic 
and international level. The Internet has also substantially altered re-
cruitment of new members. It has become possible for the organizations 
and networks to reach out to ever-greater numbers of potential members 
and sympathisers. 
Sweden
32 See e.g., Dyrsch, Patrik. “Massmedias svenskfi entliga uthägningspolitik.” Nationellt Motstånd 4 
March 2007, http://www.patriot.nu/artikel.asp?artikelID=892 (04.10.2010), Vejdeland, Fred rik. 
“Aftonbladet – pedofi l försörjer sig på barnpornografi .” Nationellt Motstånd 14 February 2007; 
Gets his paycheck from child pornography, Pedofi ldömd Aftonbladet journalist släpper bok. 
Paedophile convicted Journalist on Aftonbladet publishes book http://www.info14.com/artik-
lar.php?id=232 (04.10.2010), Shan atci, kammar hem 60.000, Shan Atci gets 60,000 Swedish 
crowns http://www.info14.com/inrikes.php?id=1552 (04.10.2010). 
33 http://www.svenskapedofi ler.se/e107_plugins/locator/locator.php (04.10.2010). 
34 See, e.g., blind rättvisa i Nyköping, 2007-03-11, Blind justice in Nyköping  http://www.info14.
com/inrikes.php?id=1541 (04.10.2010), Tumult i nordstan, 2007-01-16, Trouble in Nordstan; 
Henrik Pihlström, trakasserier inför Salemarschen, Henrik Philström harrassed before the Sa-
lem demonstration Nationellt Motstånd, 11 December 2006, http://www.patriot.nu/artikel.
asp?artikelID=791 (04.10.2010). 
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In countries such as Sweden, white supremacy groups and the ethno-
centric far right were banned from the mainstream media for many 
years. Now they have started building alternative media structures on the 
Internet. Today, the Internet is the most important medium for commu-
nication, propaganda and campaigns. Like-minded activists from all over 
the globe are just a click away on a computer. It remains to be seen what 
the Internet communication revolution will mean in terms of organisa -
tional, tactical and ideological changes within the far-right subculture. 
But one thing is clear: there has been a substantial acceleration in the 
ideological shift from the nationalism of the Nazi movements of the 
1920s and ‘30s towards an internationally oriented ideology of “white 
power” – across borders and ideological differences between, for instance, 
Nazis and other white supremacy groups – that started in the 1950s.   
 
Sweden
Poster for the Nordland 
 magazine – the Nordland 
group were among the fi rst 
in the ‘90s to make full use 
of the new technology and 
ways of communication.
“The racist ideology under-
ground is marginalised in 
relation to the rest of the 
society – but their core ideas 
are shared by a much larger 
section of the population.“
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International contacts, exchange, and cooperation
ND is a member of the alliance of European National movements, a fed-
eration within the EU that includes the subculture of white supremacy 
groups. In the past, ND has enjoyed extensive international cooperation 
with extreme nationalist parties from France, Great Britain, Hungary, 
 Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal.35 ND also has close contacts with the 
German NPD.36 
During the postwar era, the white supremacy movement transformed it-
self from a basically nationalistic movement (although the interna tional 
aspect was present in the interwar Nazi parties), to an interna tional white 
power movement. Activists and ideas transcend national borders both in 
cyberspace and in the real world, creating an interna tional subculture of 
white supremacy. Swedish white supremacy groups and networks have 
had extensive international contacts for decades. For instance, members 
of the inner circle of Info 14 were present at far-right events in February 
2006 in Hungary, in May at an NDP rally in Rostock and in August at a 
veterans‘ meeting for former Waffen SS soldiers in  Sinimäed in Estonia.37 
In 2009, activists from Info14 took part in the “Fest der Völker” in Ger-
many, a far-right festival that attracts participants from a number of Eu-
ropean countries.38 In 2007 Info 14 also participated in a nationalist anti-
globalisation demonstration in Frankfurt, Germany. In May 2010 activists 
from Gothenburg‘s Free Nationalists launched a solidarity campaign for 
an imprisoned activist from the Czech Republic.39 These are just a few 
examples of international activities by white supremacy groups. SMR, for 
Sweden
35 http://www.nd.se/nyheter/dokument.asp?dokID=1205 (04.10.2010).
36 Chistoph Anderson, från gatan in i parlamenten: om extremhögerns väg mot politisk makt, 
Nordstedts förlag, From the streets to the parliaments; on the extreme right‘s road to political 
power (Stockholm 2010). 
37 En överblick av 2006, An overview of the year 2006. www.info14.com (04.10.2010). 
38 http://www.info14.com/2009-09-19-reportage_fran_fest_der_volker_2009.html (04.10.2010).
39 http://www.info14.com/2010-05-26-tjeckiens_sak_ar_var.html (04.10.2010). 
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Sweden
instance, has extensive contacts whith groups in Europe and the US, and 
 especially with so-called “brother organizations” in the Scandinavian 
 countries.40  
The modern world of white supremacy activists is a phenomenon without 
clearly defi nable borders; they travel around Europe to join in the con-
frontations that occur almost routinely during larger demonstrations or 
commemorative events staged by extreme nationalists or the militant 
racist ideology underground. An example is the aforementioned annual 
commemorative march in Salem in honour of the 17-year-old activist 
who was killed there in 2000.
40 http://www.patriot.nu/index.asp (04.10.2010). 
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The radical right in Norway:
The development of the Progress Party
The Norwegian Progress Party: Part of the radical right?
Right-wing extremism is usually associated with neo-Nazism and linked 
to racism and opposition to liberal democracy. In Norway, neo-Nazis 
have not been totally absent, but their numbers have been very low and 
the media attention they have received is disproportional to their politi-
cal strength and infl uence. Strong opposition to small organized groups 
on the political fringes of the extreme right has often resulted in their 
being shut down after a few years and disappearing. (The group Vigrid is 
an example of this.) Other groups have re-emerged in a new guise. So far, 
these groups have been politically insignifi cant. In the 1930s a Nazi party 
(Nasjonal Samling) was established in Norway, as elsewhere, but gained 
very little electoral support: at its height it received just over 2 percent of 
the vote. After the war any organization with a history of supporting or 
collaborating with Nazism was suppressed. Consequently, the neo-Nazis 
constituted a small group of potential supporters from former adherents 
of the Nazi regime. 
Labels such as extreme right and far right were also used to characterise a 
new type of party that emerged and grew during the latter half of the 
1980s. Today the most common name for this type of party is “radical 
right”. The Progress Party is currently an infl uential party of this type in 
Norway. However, there is a dispute as to whether this is a correct catego-
risation. In an infl uential book by Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony 
 McGann, the Norwegian Progress Party is characterized as “fairly close to the 
ideal type” of radical-right-wing party.1 Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National 
Tor Bjørklund
1 Kitschelt, Herbert and Anthony McGann. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1995) 121.
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is regarded as the archetype. Kitschelt argues that the winning formula of 
the new radical right is a combination of authoritarianism and neo-liber-
alism, a mixture of opposition to immigration with a free-market econo-
my and socio-cultural conservatism. However, in recent years many rad-
ical-right parties have moved away from outspoken free-market positions. 
In Cas Mudde’s book, Populist Radical-right Parties in Europe, the Progress 
Party is not included in the category “populist radical-right parties”. In-
stead, it is characterized as “a neo-liberal populist party”, which is closely 
related. The difference is in the emphasis on the free market and econom-
ic liberalism. Typical populist radical-right parties downplay neo-liberalism 
in the light of threats from globalisation.2 Paradoxically, whereas neo-lib-
eralism once made the Progress Party qualify as “fairly close to the ideal 
type” of the radical right, a few years later this trait had become a disqual-
ifying factor. This shows that the radical-right political party is always in 
the process of transformation. At the same time it is a reminder that the 
“winning formula” depends on the context. 
The Progress Party does not regard itself as a member of the radical-right 
spectrum. It denies any kinship with this category. The Norwegian party 
has endeavoured to maintain a “socially respectable” image and explic-
itly dissociates itself from racism, as well as from radical-right parties. In 
the 1997 election campaign, the mass media compared Carl I. Hagen, the 
long-serving leader of the Norwegian Progress Party (1978–2006), to Jean-
Marie Le Pen. Hagen was furious and declared, “Le Pen is a disgusting and 
real racist of whom I completely disapprove. His ideological attitudes are 
very far from what the Progress Party stands for.”3 In addition, in 2002 
the Progress Party refused an invitation from Jörg Haider to participate in 
a meeting of radical-right parties in Europe.4 The Progress Party even 
 refuses to be associated with the Danish People’s Party. Its preferred ally is 
Venstre, the Danish liberal conservative party. 
2 Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press  2007).
3 Aftenposten 15 Sep. 1997.
4 Aftenposten 6 Aug. 2002. 
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From Anders Lange to Carl I. Hagen 
Notwithstanding deviations from the ideal type, the Progress Party ex-
hibits many similarities with radical-right parties, in terms of both voters’ 
social and cultural profi les and party policy. The Progress Party may be 
regarded as a mild, or social democratic, version of the radical right. The 
party has gone through different phases. It began in 1973 as a tax revolt 
in the aftermath of the turbulent 1972 referendum campaign on Norwe-
gian membership in the European Community (EC). The rejection of EC 
membership was a blow to the political establishment that revealed a 
clash between the grass roots and the elite. Many voters rejected their 
party leaders’ advice. This weakened the bonds of loyalty between voters 
and their parties, which facilitated the breakthrough of new parties.
Anders Lange was the leader of one new party, an unusual political agita-
tor on the fringe of the established right wing. Before the Second World 
War he had connections to a far-right organization (Fedrelandslaget), 
which had some fascist sympathies. However, during the war he clearly 
belonged to the anti-Nazi camp. Anders Lange was inspired by the suc-
cess of Mogens Glistrup, who had not yet been elected as an MP because 
the Danish Progress Party had not campaigned in elections, but had im-
pressive opinion poll ratings. Anders Lange’s only political base was as a 
publisher and editor of a small newspaper that used to appear monthly. 
The paper expressed views affi liated with the far right. The newspaper as 
well as the party was connected with Lange’s name. The party was called 
Anders Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Inter-
vention. Few people expected the party to survive for long, not even the 
founder, who gave the party his own name and who was 68 years old. A 
year after the electoral breakthrough, Lange died suddenly and his depu-
ty, Carl I. Hagen, became an MP. At this point Hagen had left the party, 
which was riddled with internal confl icts, and was in the process of 
 establishing a new party. The major confl ict was whether the Anders 
Lange Party should be an ordinary party or more of a movement, with its 
MPs relatively free to follow their own impulses and not under direction 
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of a party organization. Anders Lange himself was a passionate opponent 
of strict party organization with party whips. He defended the concept of 
the free, independent politician. 
From a protest movement to a centralised party
Soon after taking up his seat in parliament, Hagen rejoined Anders 
Lange’s party, which was renamed the Progress Party in 1977 after the 
Danish party of the same name. The party emphasised fi rm leadership 
based on a strongly hierarchical and centralised party organization. Its 
centralised organization has made the party similar to other radical-right 
parties. In the Progress Party disobedience has been defi ned as “active 
dropping out” and can be penalised without a formal exclusion proce-
dure. According to the party statutes a member of the party can be ex-
pelled if he or she publicly harms the party or the party’s elected repre-
sentatives.5 Consequently, the party can easily rid itself of disobedient 
members. Members who have fraternised with right wing extremism 
have been expelled. In Norway, MPs have been forced to leave the Progress 
Party’s parliamentary group when they have overstepped the bounds of 
political acceptability, especially in relation to the immigration debate. 
Carl I. Hagen’s long-term plan has been to redefi ne the party in prepara-
tion for a position in government. In Hagen’s words, the party must be 
“responsible and predictable” in order to succeed. Particularly with  regard 
to the immigration question, this strategy implies that the outspoken 
elements of the party must be silenced or expelled. The Progress Party 
parliamentary group has been dogged by expulsions and resignations 
throughout its history.6
5 Paragraph 3 in the 2001 party statutes; see Heidar, Knut and Jo Saglie. Hva skjer med partiene? 
(Oslo: Gyldendal akademiske 2002) 62.
6 These have occurred in three out of fi ve parliamentary sessions (1973-77, 1981-2001).
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New party leader: Siv Jensen
As Carl I. Hagen and the Norwegian Progress Party were regarded as syn-
onymous, it was thought that maintaining the party would be extremely 
diffi cult for his successor. But the prognosis that Hagen’s retirement 
would cause the party to collapse has been proven totally wrong. With 
marginal differences, the two elections under the leadership of Siv Jensen 
(the 2007 local elections and the 2009 parliamentary elections) brought 
the best ever results for the party (see Table 1). 
After the 2005 election Hagen gradually began to retire from the party. 
Following his victory in the 2005 election, it was a personal triumph for 
him to hand over his position as leader of the parliamentary group to the 
aspiring new chairman, Siv Jensen. She was elected as new chairman of 
the party at the 2006 party conference. Having served 28 years as chair-
man, Carl I. Hagen was the longest-serving political party leader in Nor-
wegian history. He was even described as the “owner” of the party.
So far, Siv Jensen has failed in her plan to become a coalition partner in 
a government. But after the 2013 election, if the Progress Party and the 
Conservative Party together win a parliamentary majority (which is not 
wholly impossible from the present perspective), they may be able to se-
cure governmental positions.
Norway
Siv Jensen of the Progress Party: 
“We are ready to renew Norway.”
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Attracting votes: Anti-immigration positions 
and economic policy
Infl uential groups in the Conservative Party are clearly opposed to a coa-
lition government with the Progress Party, and point to diffi culties con-
cerning immigration policy as well as economic issues. For example, the 
question of whether to save or spend oil revenues has become an impor-
tant new confl ict. One slogan in the Progress Party’s election campaign 
is, “Use the oil revenues to benefi t the people”. Nearly all the other par-
ties followed the advice of the most infl uential economists that such a 
policy would be irresponsible and lead to over-heating the economy. As 
the economy was already operating close to capacity, this policy could 
result in serious infl ationary problems. These issues touch upon two 
central changes in the policy of the Progress Party since 1973, when it 
was launched. The party has moved to a pro-welfare party with oil 
revenues used to fi nance both welfare and tax cuts. Even more impor-
tant, from the second half of the 1980s the party succeeded in becoming 
the main opponent of offi cial immigration policy.
7 Bjørklund, Tor and Jørgen Goul Andersen. “Anti-immigration Parties in Denmark and Nor-
way.” Shadows over Europe. The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe 
ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 
111.
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The Progress Party: 
“For the ordinary people.”
Until the mid-1980s there were no political divisions on the issue of im-
migration. As late as 1985, attitudes towards immigration among Norwe-
gians voters did not vary much whichever party they preferred, and 
Progress Party voters did not deviate from the population at large in this 
respect.7 The issue was not politicised. The arrival of guest workers around 
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1970 did not make immigration an issue: their numbers were modest, 
they were not expected to stay, and there was nearly full employment. 
Few people objected to guest workers taking on the low-status jobs that 
the indigenous population left vacant. Nor was it a political issue when 
the decision was made in the early 1970s to stop immigration of guest 
workers – even the left wing supported this. But with the arrival of large 
numbers of refugees from the mid-1980s onwards, the issue was rede-
fi ned and became a salient question for voters. In Norway, the issue of 
immigration provided a second breakthrough for the Progress Party, 
whose share of the vote rose from 3.7 percent in the 1985 parliamentary 
election to 12.3 percent in the 1987 local elections (see Table 1). The 
party presented itself as the only political party opposing immigration 
and argued that money spent on asylum seekers should be used instead 
to care for the elderly and sick people of ethnic Norwegian background. 
This form of welfare chauvinism has been an important part of the po-
litical messages of the radical-right party ever since. 
The immigration issue emerged on the political agenda in the second 
half of the 1980s, at a time when the number of asylum seekers increased 
greatly. In Norway, the fi gures rose from 200 in 1983 to 8,613 in 1987. 
This happened in the middle of the 1987 local election campaign. In the 
subsequent parliamentary election (1989) the Progress Party achieved 
even better results, rising to become the third largest party in the parlia-
ment and a player that could no longer be ignored. 
In spite of the reorientation towards immigration as the rallying issue for 
the Progress Party, the party suffered a setback in the two subsequent 
elections. The main reason is that the anti-immigration line not only 
increased electoral support, but also led to a party split. A group of neo-
liberals who adhered to ideological doctrines such as the free movement 
of labour had left their mark on the party’s manifesto in the 1980s. 
 According to this, the party would favour unrestricted immigration in 
principle, provided that immigrants could manage without public fund-
ing. The notion of unrestricted immigration temporarily disappeared 
Norway
292 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
from the manifestos of the Norwegian party when the anti-immigration 
faction won out against the liberalists in 1994. Four out of ten MPs left 
the party, along with the youth organization, which was a neo-liberal 
stronghold. In spite of this dramatic split, the party won a convincing 
victory in the subsequent local elections in 1995, when immigration 
emerged as a central issue once again. In the 1995 election survey, half of 
those who voted for the Progress Party mentioned immigration as the 
Election results for the Progress Party 1973 – 2009 Table 1
Year 1973* 1975* 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
National / local N L N L N L N
Share of vote (%) 5.0 1.4 1.9 2.5 4.5 6.3 3.7
Deputies 4 13 0 23 4 63 2
Mayors - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Party leader Anders
Lange
Eivind
Eckbo
Arve
Lønnum
Hagen Hagen Hagen Hagen
Year 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
National / local L N L N L N L
Share of vote (%) 12,3 13,0 7,0 6,3 12,0 15,3 13,4
Deputies 124 22 65 10 65 25 103
Mayors 0 - 0 - 0 - 1
Party leader Hagen Hagen Hagen Hagen Hagen Hagen Hagen
Year 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
National / local N L N L N
Share of vote (%) 14,6 17,9 22,1 18,5 22,9
Deputies 26 127 38 140 41
Mayors - 13 - 18 -
Party leader Hagen Hagen Hagen Jensen Jensen
* name: "Anders Lange’s Party"
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most important issue for their choice of party.8 During the 1995 election 
many voters saw the party as a single-issue party. About 90 percent of 
voters who regarded the immigration question as the most important 
issue voted for the Progress Party. This illustrates the power of the anti-
immigration issue to attract voters. 
The importance of the immigration issue for the Progress Party resembles 
that of other radical-right parties. A comparative study of seven success-
ful far-right parties concluded, that “the appeal on immigration is the 
only issue that unites all successful populist right parties.”9 However, dis-
sension on the immigration issue is not the only reason for electoral 
setbacks. The 1993 parliamentary election was held a year before the ref-
erendum campaign on Norwegian membership in the European Union. 
The Progress Party was divided on the question and had a rather low pro-
fi le in the campaign.
Increase in immigrants: From economic to cultural arguments
Even though the fi gures remain relatively low, the number of “non-West-
ern” immigrants has increased rapidly in Norway. By 2010, “non-West-
ern” immigrants and descendants from countries in Asia (including Tur-
key), Africa and Latin America constituted around 6  percent of the 
population. This represents an increase from a few thousand at the be-
ginning of the 1970s to more than a quarter of a million in 2010. If we 
include migrants from countries in Eastern Europe outside the EU and 
the European Economic Area, the fi gure rises about one percentage point. 
It is also important to note that immigrants are not evenly distributed 
geographically. There is a large concentration in the capital, Oslo – around 
20 percent of the city’s residents. Further, the age distribution is skewed, 
with a much higher proportion of immigrants among school children 
8 Bjørklund, Tor. Et lokalvalg i perspektiv (Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug 1999) 183.
9 Ivarsfl aten, Elisabeth. “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining 
Grievance Mobilisation Models in Seven Successful Cases.” Comparative Political Studies 41: 
3 – 23 (2010) 3.  
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than in the population at large. Public attention has increasingly focused 
on social problems like ghettoisation, schooling, juvenile delinquency, 
language problems, unemployment, and welfare dependency – as well as 
prejudice and discrimination.
More generally, problems based on the contradictions between cultural 
demands and universal rights lead to confl icts, for example in cases of 
forced and arranged marriages and genital mutilation. There is an ongo-
ing clash between feminism and multiculturalism.10 Feminists have ar-
gued for human rights irrespective of culture. Multiculturalism, on the 
other hand, celebrates cultural diversity. New constellations have devel-
oped in the debate. Party leader Siv Jensen has attacked feminists on the 
left political fl ank for ignoring the suppression and suffering among im-
migrant women as a consequence of archaic sex roles.
Further, as Norway has traditionally been very homogeneous in religious 
and ethnic terms (with the exception of the Sami people in the far north), 
learning to live with cultural diversity has also proved rather diffi cult. 
This applies in particular to religion, which has become an important 
source of identity formation among immigrants. Within a few years Is-
lam has become the second largest religious denomination after state 
Protestantism combined with Christian denominations outside the na-
tional Church. It is diffi cult to fi nd reliable fi gures. According to offi cial 
statistics, there were 84,000 Muslims in Norway in 2008.11 However, not 
every Muslim is registered. A Norwegian expert on Muslims estimated 
the number to be between 120,000 and 150,000 (in 2008).12 As a conse-
quence of the concentration of immigrants in Oslo, around 10 percent of 
Oslo’s inhabitants can be counted as Muslims.
 
10  Hagelund, Anniken. “The Progress Party and the Problem of Culture: Immigration Politics and 
Right Wing Populism in Norway.” Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the 
Western World ed. Jens Rydgren (New York: Nova Science Publishers 2005).
11 Daugstad, Gunnlaug and Lars Østbye. “Et mangfold av tro og livssyn”, Samfunnsspeilet 23: 
14 – 21 (2009).
12 Vogt, Kari. Islam på norsk. Moskeer og islamske organisasjoner i Norge (Oslo: Cappelen Damm 
2008).
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In the manifestos of the Progress Party in the 1980s, immigration was 
discussed almost purely in economic terms. The party argued for support-
ing education in the Norwegian language, against subsidised housing, 
and against all sorts of affi rmative action policies that were seen as fa-
vouring immigrants and discriminating against Norwegians. Thus, the 
party presented itself as the only party that did not discriminate accord-
ing to ethnicity, religion and culture. However, its manifestos gradually 
began to reveal a shift from economic to cultural arguments, and was 
based on a critique of multiculturalism. The argument was that a multi-
cultural society generates confl icts, whereas an ethnically homogeneous 
society was seen as a precondition for peace and harmony. Following on 
from this, by 2006 the Progress Party was recommending a very restric-
tive policy towards new immigration, proposing a quota of only 1,000 
“non-Western” immigrants per year, including people seeking asylum 
and applying to reunite families. This proposal was strongly criticised 
and those who argued for excluding the party from governmental 
 negotiations pointed to this statement, which they claimed violated in-
ternational conventions such as the Geneva Human Rights Convention, 
to which Norway is a signatory. Finally, the party dropped the numerical 
specifi cation and advocated a restrictive policy of allowing a maximum 
number that can be integrated. 
The Progress Party has always argued against liberal rules for acquiring 
citizenship (which is granted almost automatically after seven years), and 
against the right of foreign citizens who can certify three years of legal 
residence to vote in local elections. Further, the party has demanded that 
the criteria for family reunifi cation should be tightened up, and that im-
migrants convicted of crimes should be expelled from the country. In 
Denmark, these demands have been met to a large extent since 2001. For 
the Norwegian Progress Party, Denmark has been the model for integra-
tion policy. “Look at Denmark” is the catchphrase. 
Norway
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The impact of anti-immigration policy on voters
When questioned about the most important issue in choosing a political 
party, only around 5 percent of responses in the last four Norwegian par-
liamentary elections (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009) have mentioned immigra-
tion (including those unable to single out any important issue).13 How-
ever, a large majority of those who mention immigration as the most 
important issue for party choice voted for the Progress Party.14 The 
Progress Party undoubtedly monopolises the issue of opposition to im-
migration. In addition, there is widespread and increasing support for 
the immigration policy advanced by the Progress Party. According to exit 
polls, a quarter of the voters in the 2001 parliamentary election sup-
ported the view that the Progress Party had the best policy on immigra-
tion and refugees. In the 2005 and 2009 parliamentary elections, this 
fi gure had risen to over one-third. 
Since the second half of the 1980s, anti-immigration has probably been 
the most important rallying fl ag for the Progress Party. The party has 
 endeavoured to maintain a socially respectable image. Its apparent goal 
is to go as far as possible in making anti-immigration statements without 
overstepping an invisible line. In 2009, when party leader Siv Jensen 
warned against a “dangerous crypto-Islamisation” of Norwegian society, 
many observers thought this line had been crossed.
 
13 The sources are exit polls conducted by MMI (1997, 2001, 2005) and Synovate (2009).
14 In the most recent parliamentary elections the share who voted for the Progress Party among 
those who pointed to immigration as the most important issue was (according to MMI’s/ Syn-
novates 2009 exit polls): 66% (1997), 64% (2001), 80% (2005), and 85% (2009). The corre-
sponding fi gures in the local elections are: 93% (1995), 76% (1999), 89% (2003) and 54% 
(2009). The local election surveys were conducted by Statistics Norway.
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Economic issues: Tax cuts and welfare 
Even if immigration is a core issue, the Progress Party is not a single-issue 
party. In its early days as a spontaneous anti-tax movement, the “ex-
travagance” of the welfare state was attacked to justify tax cuts. Those 
who allegedly abused various forms of social security, such as “irrespon-
sible single mothers”, were criticised and sometimes stigmatised. How-
ever, the party argued that those who really needed help – without speci-
fying exactly who – should be given better care. Today the party has 
become one of the most generous in terms of welfare, almost invariably 
protesting against proposals for welfare cuts such as raising the ceiling for 
prescription charges. The party has also argued for free dental care with-
out any additional charges.15 This is a more radical reform than any social 
democratic government has supported. 
 
In addition, the Progress Party wants to reform the public sector, but one 
thing is clear: the government should foot the bill. The reforms include a 
number of policy positions such as outsourcing, partial privatisation of 
hospitals and budgeting according to the “taxameter” principle, i.e., al-
locating money in proportion to production in schools, universities, hos-
pitals etc. Such principles have been increasingly implemented to a cer-
tain extent.
 
The Progress Party has especially emphasised the need for better care for 
the elderly, demanding that more money should be allocated to welfare 
programmes for the elderly. Indeed, the Progress Party has successfully 
created an image of being a party that promotes care for the elderly.  
According to its manifestos, the Progress Party continues to advocate 
 lower taxation, a policy that clearly favours wealthy people rather than 
Norway
15 2001 manifesto, cited by Skjørestad, Anne. “Et liberalistisk parti? Fremskrittspartiets politiske 
profi l fra 1989 til 2005”, master’s thesis in history, (Bergen: University of Bergen 2008), 50.
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ordinary workers. The message is that progressive taxation as well as in-
heritance tax should be abolished – a policy that contradicts the party’s 
image as a defender of the common people. However, the party’s anti-
taxation policy does not have the same impact as it did in the early 
years.16
In terms of economics, the Progress Party has moved somewhat toward 
the political centre. The party still defi nes itself as outspokenly liberal – 
but not as clearly as before. According to its manifestos, up to the begin-
ning of the 1990s the party argued fi ercely against state ownership of 
business. At the end of the 1990s the Progress Party even proposed that 
the government should act as an investor in the market, and argued for 
the establishment of large government funds to ensure that Norwegian 
business be kept in Norwegian hands, thus preventing acquisitions by 
foreign investors. But the most remarkable shift is the party’s new image 
as a pro-welfare party aiming to take up the legacy of the Social Demo-
crats. The party is proposing to play the same role in the current century 
as the Social Democratic Party played in the 20th century as the defender 
of the common people. However, the cleavage structure is different: it is 
no longer the working class against the employers in alliance with capi-
talists. In his speech to the 30th anniversary of the launching of the 
party, Carl I. Hagen declared that the political goal was to unite employ-
ees and employers against the greedy state.17 In addition, the party wants 
to decentralize negotiations by basing them in the individual workplace, 
thereby opposing the main strategy of the unions: centralised tariff nego-
tiations. Thus the traditional confl ict between the ordinary working class 
and capital apparently has no priority. In spite of this, the party enjoys 
considerable support among trade union members; in relative terms it is 
the strongest party among unskilled workers (see Table 2). 
Norway
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17 Flote, Erling Andre. “Framstegsrørsla: for fagorganiserte fl est? Framstegspartiet sitt syn på LO og 
arbeidslivspolitikk 1973-2007,” master thesis in history (Bergen: University of  Bergen 2008) 95.
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Social profi le and attitudes of Progress Party voters relative to other political parties Table 2
Socialist 
Left
Labour Liberals Centrist 
(CPP / C)3
Conservatives Progress 
Party
Total
Attitudinal profi le 20014
Left-Right 
(0 – 10)1
3.43 4.27 5.60 5,60 7.26 7.16 5.52
Economic 
left-right (1 – 5)2 
2.27 2.39 2.88 2,60 3.22 2.91 2.71
Value based 
left-right (1 – 5)2
2.86 3.41 2.85 3,33 3.53 4.08 3.39
Social profi le 2009 5
% men 34 45 56 42 53 62 49
% unskilled 
worker
7 8 3 10 5 19 9
% highest 
education
74 55 84 49 64 34 55
1 Self-placement from 0 (left-oriented) to 10 (right-oriented)
2 Additive index based on four statements (appendix) with an interval from 1 (left-oriented) to 5 (right-oriented).
3 CPP = Christian People’s Party  C = Centre Party
Sources: 4 Norwegian election survey 2001, 5 Synovates exit poll 2009
The Progress Party: a governmental partner?
Since the 1997 parliamentary elections the Progress Party has emerged 
from every election as the third- or second-largest party in parliament. In 
some opinion polls the party has even been the largest. This raises the 
inevitable questions: How to capture power? How to enter offi ce? The 
Progress Party has been eager to enter government, but has so far been 
rejected. For a period, the party was victim to the establishment’s cordon 
sanitaire. All doors were closed. Paradoxically, the establishment’s refusal 
to cooperate with the Progress Party in a government sustains the party’s 
position as an anti-establishment party and gives it in an underdog  image 
that readily attracts sympathy. This position fi ts well with the populist 
rhetoric about a split between people and elite.
 
Norway
300 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
Gradually, the Progress Party became acknowledged as a negotiation part-
ner. Local pressure could be observed among Conservative deputies in 
Norwegian municipal councils to adopt a more cooperative attitude to-
wards the Progress Party. The point is that the party’s local platform has 
gradually been strengthened. After the 2007 local elections the Progress 
Party won the position of mayor in 18 municipalities. Norway has more 
than 400 local councils, and the Progress Party had been represented on 
the majority of them for several decades. Many local politicians have 
experienced the party as a reliable cooperation partner.
 
The Progress Party’s long-term aim is to be a part of a non-socialist govern-
ment. The leaders of two small centre parties – the Christian People’s 
Party and Liberals – have fl atly refused to join a government with the 
Progress Party. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, has changed its 
position (though not without internal problems and strife), and opened 
a window of opportunity for joint government offi ce with the Progress 
Party. An important step towards a more conciliatory attitude to the 
Progress Party was a partial lifting of the cordon sanitaire after the 2001 
parliamentary election, when the centre government (Bondevik I) was 
established with a very weak parliamentary base and support from the 
Progress Party. It did not end there: four years later a centre-right govern-
ment (Bondevik II) came into offi ce, again with parliamentary support 
from the Progress Party. However, in the long term Carl I. Hagen and the 
Progress Party were unhappy with their role as a partner without govern-
mental positions. During the 2009 election campaign Hagen and his 
party surprisingly declared that they would no longer back Bondevik as 
prime minister unless the party could join the government.18 However, 
the scenario of a non-socialist majority did not materialise because the 
opposition – the Red-Green alliance – won a majority in parliament. 
Norway
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The Progress Party has still had no experience as a governmental partner. 
But the party is knocking on the governmental door, and under certain 
circumstances it may be invited in. 
New cleavages
The success of the Progress Party can be analysed in terms of a new, two-
dimensional cleavage structure: an economic or distributional left-right 
axis and a value-based left-right axis. Basically, the meaning of the terms 
“left” and “right” has changed since they were fi rst introduced during 
the French Revolution. At that time, the left-right dimension centred on 
a liberal fi ght for political rights, democracy and representative govern-
ment. The meaning has always been dependent on the context.
 
In Norway, the economic left-right axis dominated from the early 20th 
century onwards. For short periods, however, the centre-periphery cleavage 
has challenged this dominance (as in the dispute about Norwegian mem-
bership in the European Union and the controversy in the interwar 
 period over the ban on alcohol).19 The economic left-right axis dates back 
to industrial society and arose from the confl ict between labour and cap-
ital. This confl ict crystallised into two blocs of political parties, which 
were called the socialist and bourgeois parties for many years. The divisive 
issues were questions regarding economic distribution, taxes and welfare, 
and state control vs. markets. Such economic confl icts over distribution 
will always remain relevant, even though some issues of state ownership 
or state control have become obsolete. In addition, broad support for the 
welfare state with its safety net and wide range of legal rights has softened 
the economic left-right dispute. Nevertheless, this cleavage remained dom-
inant until it was challenged by a new value-based dimension.
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tics.” Party systems and voter alignment. Cross-national perspectives ed. Seymour M. Lipset and 
Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press 1967).
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With the emergence of the post-industrial society followed by globalisa-
tion, new issues such as environmentalism, gender equality and immi-
gration came to the fore. Even though these confl icts are conceptually 
different, they increasingly converge empirically into a new value-based 
left-right dimension. We use the terms of “left” and “right” for describing 
both the value-based and the economic-based dimension. The value-
based dimension approximates to what Ronald Inglehart has dubbed 
“materialism-post-materialism”.
The Progress Party voters are clearly located on the right fl ank when voters 
are asked to position themselves on the 0-10 left-right scale. In all 
election surveys run by the Norwegian Electoral Programme (with a suffi -
cient number of respondents from the Progress Party) Progress Party voters 
have been somewhat to the left of Conservative voters, but by a rather 
small margin.20 Self-placement is, however, a subjective measure. 
An alternative to self-placement is to use more objective yardsticks. On 
the basis of four statements, an additive index has been constructed re-
fl ecting the economic axis. The same is applied to the value-based index 
(see appendix). Roughly the same statements have been used as in Dan-
ish election studies.21 The empirical base is four election studies conduct-
ed by the Norwegian Electoral Programme (1989, 1993, 1997, 2001). The 
fi ndings are quite consistent. Table 2 displays related data from the most 
recent election survey. 
20 As the categorization of the left-right scale differs somewhat from survey to survey the average 
value for the whole sample is set to 100 and the higher the fi gure the further to the right. The 
fi rst fi gure refers to Conservative voters, the next to Progress Party voters (1981: 122 / 109; 1985: 
132 / 129; 1989: 136 / 133; 1993: 140 / 137; 1997: 143 / 135; 2001: 131 / 130; 2005: 140 / 133).
21 In addition the same categorisation is used ending with two additive indices running from 
1 to 5 with 1 as the most left-oriented standpoint and 5 as the most right-oriented. See Borre, 
Ole. “Issue voting i Danmark 2001-2005.” Det nye politiske landskab. Folketingsvalget 2005 
i perspektiv ed. Jørgen Goul Andersen et al. (Viborg: Academica 2007).
Norway
303IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
The Progress Party voters are still on the right fl ank on the economic axis 
but clearly to the left of the Conservatives. The party is not located in an 
extreme position. However, on the value-based axis the Progress Party is at 
the outermost right. The self-placement position is infl uenced by the 
value-based dimension, what may explain why the difference between 
the Conservatives and the Progress Party voters are less visible on the self-
placement axis than on the economic axis. 
The economic and value-based left-right axes have different social com-
positions. The economic left-right dimension reveals a well-known pat-
tern. At the left pole, we fi nd lower class, people with low levels of educa-
tion and people with low incomes, whereas the rich and well educated 
are located towards the right. Support for redistribution policies refl ects 
social class. Education can be interpreted both as a class and as a sociali-
sation variable. High education levels provide a better position in the 
class structure but also breed humanistic values that weigh towards the 
left on the value scale.
On the value axis, the left pole attracts people with high education and 
income, whereas less well-educated people tend to be attracted to the 
right. Consequently, the traditional working class is typically positioned 
on the right pole when it comes to values but to the left on economic 
issues. This cross-pressure, strengthened by the increasing impact of the 
value dimension, has alienated workers from their traditional parties. 
This has opened up opportunities for the Progress Party, as the party is 
closer to the average worker concerning the value-based dimension than 
socialist parties are in the Norway of today. The party is able to attract 
substantial numbers of working-class voters provided that its positions 
on the economic axis are not too far to the right.
 
As shown in Table 2, in relative terms the Progress Party attracts more un-
skilled workers than any other political party. Another characteristic is the 
weakness of support for it among people with high educational levels. A 
third feature is the party’s indisputable appeal to men rather than women. 
All this confi rms a social profi le typical of parties of the radical right. 
Norway
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The success of the Progress Party is partly dependent on the impact of the 
value-based axis. In periods of prosperity with low unemployment and a 
rising living standard it can be easier to ignore distributional questions 
and emphasise value issues or the social-cultural cleavage. Consequently, 
a good economic outlook and low unemployment are benefi cial to radi-
cal-right parties. The success of the Progress Party lends empirical support 
to such theses.22
Conclusions
The Progress Party is currently not an extreme-right party, and cannot be 
described more generally as an extremist party. It has been through a 
process of normalisation in different phases. The party’s history can be 
summed up by answers to the following question: where is the party of-
fi ce located? The fi rst party offi ce in 1973 was in the “Shipping Building” 
(Sjøfartsbygningen) in downtown Oslo. Eivind Eckbo, who succeeded 
Anders Lange as party leader after a short period, was one of the owners 
of the building. It is worth mentioning that Anders Lange himself had a 
special relationship to some rich ship-owners. His newspaper was funded 
by advertisements from shipping fi rms. The point is that an address at 
the “Shipping Building” had an aura of upper-class and right-wing poli-
tics. From the second half of the 1980s, the politicisation of the immigra-
tion issue heralded the Progress Party’s second breakthrough. After the 
1989 general election the party became the third largest party in parlia-
ment. It was time to expand the party offi ces. A new house was acquired 
at Youngstorget, the old assembly square for the traditional working class 
during the era of class struggle. The square has a long history of hosting 
the May Day celebrations. The party offi ce of the Progress Party was adja-
cent to Labour’s main offi ce, with the labour union’s headquarters just 
around the corner. According to the Progress Party’s self-image, the party 
Norway
22 Bjørklund, Tor. “Unemployment and the Radical Right in Scandinavia: Benefi cial or Non-Ben-
efi cial for Electoral Support?” Comparative European Politics 5: 245 – 263 (2007).
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had become a successor to the old Labour Party. Old parties meant old 
solutions. The Progress Party saw itself as representing an answer to new 
challenges. In 2006 the Progress Party left its headquarters in the tradi-
tional working-class area and moved into a building in Oslo’s main street 
(Karl Johans Gate) just opposite the parliament and with a view of the 
royal castle. The Progress Party had become a party with governmental 
ambitions, an anti-establishment party with the goal of conquering the 
establishment. The long haul from the margin to the mainstream seems 
to have come to an end.
The Progress Party has never held government offi ce, yet the party has 
undoubtedly exercised an infl uence on Norwegian policy. One obvious 
political effect is a more restrictive immigration policy. This can most 
easily be observed at local level. The municipal councils have the author-
ity to grant permission to refugees and asylum seekers to settle in the 
municipality. A study has documented that there is a direct relation 
 between a rising share of deputies from the Progress Party and a more 
restrictive policy resulting in refusal of permission to settle.23
The Progress Party has been analysed in relation to a new, two-dimen-
sional structure of political confl ict: an economic-based and a value-based 
axis. An extreme position can be observed for the Progress Party only on 
the value-based axis, but it is extreme only in relation to the political es-
tablishment. Around one-third of voters regard the Progress Party’s im-
migration policy as the best among all the political parties. In a broader 
perspective, the Progress Party has emerged as a result of the transforma-
tion from an industrial to a post-industrial society with new confl icts 
such as immigration and globalisation that have potential to supersede 
older confl icts such as labour versus capital.
Norway
23 Steen, Anton. “Hvorfor tar kommunene imot ‘de fremmede’? Eliter og lokal skepsis.” Det nære 
demokratiet – lokalvalg og lokal deltakelse ed. Jos Saglie (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag 2009). 
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Appendix:
The Economic Left-Right Axis 2001
1 High incomes should be taxed more heavily than they are presently 
(disagree – agree).
2 What is your opinion about social security expenditures: should they 
(a) be reduced in future, or should we (b) maintain them at the present 
level, or should they (c) be extended further (reduced – extended).
3 We should reduce governmental control of private business (agree – 
disagree).
4 In Norway economic differences have been suffi ciently reduced (agree – 
disagree).
The Value-based Left-Right axis 2001
1 Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national culture (agree – 
disagree).
2 Economic growth should be ensured by building up industry, even 
though this may be in confl ict with environmental interests (agree – 
disagree).
3 Foreign aid to developing countries should (a) be cut, (b) be main-
tained at the present level or (c) be increased (cut – increased). 
4 Criminal offences are better prevented through pre-emption and 
guidance than tougher punishment (agree – disagree). 
Source: Norwegian Electoral Programme
Norway
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Strategies against the radical right and for a 
 pluralist, forward-looking Europe
Taken as a whole, the contributions in the present volume clearly illus-
trate the common features and differences within the radical right in 
Europe. Analyses of the current phenomenon of the various radical-right 
movements and a differentiated analysis of their origins are fundamental 
for considering counter-strategies. Obviously, there is no single, generally 
valid strategy that guarantees an optimal way of combating the radical 
right. In fact, strategies can be successful only if they match up to the 
specifi c political and social context and if the maximum possible number 
of players from politics, the legal system, the media, educational institu-
tions and civil society are agreed upon them.
However, we can identify general requirements for strategies against 
right-wing extremism and xenophobia that form a framework broad 
enough to allow a European perspective. For concrete work in a particu-
lar place, this framework must be fi lled out with individual measures and 
activities specifi c to the situation and location. But for now, we shall now 
proceed to take a bird’s eye view and answer the basic questions as to 
what preconditions have to be created for maximum success in combat-
ing radical-right-wing attacks, parties and attitudes.
Britta Schellenberg
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1. A comprehensive approach: Identifying and naming 
 problems and strategically combating the radical right 
Considering the conditions of emergence of the radical right and coun-
tering them: The important thing is to understand how the radical right 
arose as a phenomenon, and particularly the current success of right-
wing populist parties in Europe in terms of its social origins, before we 
can develop meaningful counter-strategies. The introduction to the 
present volume includes a description of crisis situations in European 
societies that favour the radical right: a crisis of distribution and access, a 
crisis of politics (including a crisis of representation), and an identity 
crisis. It will not be possible to combat the radical right successfully with-
out tackling these crises and the current problems of European residents 
and their societies. Real problems such as existential fears arising from 
social transformation must be discussed, and problematic social develop-
ments have to be countered. Issues such as “social justice” should not be 
left to radical-right-wingers. Political parties and people in positions of 
responsibility should talk about present social and economic problems 
and fi nd constructive answers to them. It is also important to fi nd up-to-
date forms of political participation that reach out to groups which no 
longer feel represented by the political elite. 
Identifying different forms of the radical right: Comprehensive observa-
tion of the radical right is the basis for developing any potentially suc-
cessful strategy. To oppose the radical right effectively, we have to start 
with its present form. For example, it would be too short-sighted merely 
to focus on political parties or terrorist activities. The contributions in 
the present volume describe various manifestations of the radical right 
including political parties, organizations and the subcultural milieu. 
 Another essential point is not to focus solely on (violent) perpetrators or 
party members, but to examine the different groups (e.g. voters, sympa-
thisers) that support the radical right to various degrees. Varying counter-
strategies are required for different groups. In all, collecting current, dif-
ferentiated data, monitoring, and regular reporting are necessary for 
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developing a solid strategy. To achieve the most realistic picture possible, 
it is highly advisable to consult players from civil society as well as from 
government institutions.
Establishing spheres of competence and tasks, informing and publicis-
ing: Whether it concerns a small project, work in a locality, a supra-
regional initiative or national strategy, planning and coordination are 
indispensable. If spheres of responsibility and tasks are not clearly negoti-
ated and delineated, things are likely to go wrong. This also means think-
ing about the funding problems that frequently affect players in civil 
society, and fi nding ways to counteract them.  
Another important aspect is providing information about the radical 
right to the general public and to persons and institutions relevant for 
counter-strategies, so as to create a broad base of opposition. Information 
on counter-strategies should also be provided, and publicity created for 
them. In doing this, it is more convincing to stand up and argue for one’s 
own values and concepts (pluralism, democracy, individualism, equality, 
freedom, and do on). 
Firmly establishing quality und sustainability, enabling further develop-
ment: The development of quality criteria for work against right-wing 
radicalism, and the formulation of goals, can assist in promoting quality 
and developing effectiveness. In granting project funds, it is helpful to 
decide on the basis of clear guidelines. Sustained work against right-wing 
radicalism can only be achieved by players and projects working over the 
long term. Consequently, it is meaningful to integrate successful projects 
and measures into the core work of players from civil society or govern-
ment organizations, as a way of establishing a fi rm structure (including 
in schools).  Just as agreement on quality criteria or standards is essential 
for successful projects, it is useful to record new experiences or project 
work and make them fruitful for ongoing work. This can be done by 
 continual evaluation and further development of quality criteria and 
measures based on the results.
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2. Political involvement: Confront, don’t cooperate 
Non-cooperation: There is no easy answer to the question about how far 
to interact politically with the radical right. The extent of involvement 
with the radical right ranges from ignoring it or deliberately excluding it 
from political affairs to erecting a cordon sanitaire (as in Belgium or France), 
to partial cooperation (in Denmark the radical-right-wing Danish People’s 
Party tolerates the government and demands concessions in return), 
right up to full cooperation (such as with the FPÖ in Austria, which is 
part of the government, or the radical-right-wing parties Berlusconi has 
integrated into the government or into his own party). None of these op-
tions for dealing with the radical right has automatically led to a decline 
in right-wing radicalism. On the contrary: in Denmark, the far-right par-
ty has made gains through cooperation, while cooperation in Austria 
failed to prevent a comeback for the radical right. Political cooperation 
with the radical right has contributed to undermining funding and legal 
means of combating racism and fostering human rights. In Denmark, for 
instance, the operational scope of the National Institute for Human 
Rights has been reduced. Even if some radical-right-wing parties leave the 
political arena in the short term due to internal quarrels or other failings, 
if no critical debate with them has taken place they leave their mark on 
social discourse and national legislation (in relation to immigration, for 
example). In this respect, the strategy of debunking the radical right by 
giving them political responsibility fails to work, and instead leads to 
concessions to these parties and their ideologies.
Accepting political responsibility: It is also not very helpful when centrist 
players in positions of political responsibility think that they can control 
the radical right’s agenda by promoting a similar agenda themselves 
(such as tightening up on immigration or on people without legal docu-
ments). It is much more likely that this will render radical right opinions 
rather more acceptable to society as a whole – without overcoming really 
serious social problems. The democratic elites should bear the costs in-
curred by a genuine battle against right-wing radicalism. They should not 
allow themselves to be tempted by short-term gains, such as those appar-
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ently offered by racist election campaigns, but should take the offensive 
against Group Focused Enmity, and publicly discuss and criticise the de-
mands of the radical right. Debates on human rights and on attacks 
against specifi c groups (especially Roma, Jews, Muslims and homosexu-
als) are elementary for a sustained fi ght against right-wing radicalism. 
Politicians and citizens have a duty to prevent a “creeping spread” of 
radical-right-wing ideologies and the concomitant threat to our pluralist 
society.  
Democracy should not be restricted, but continually fought for: The cor-
don sanitaire policy – political exclusion of radical right-wing parties –, 
no longer works if the parties become so big that their overwhelming size 
makes them impossible to ignore. In this case there is no alternative: the 
cordon sanitaire has to be lifted and the democratic parties are forced to 
work with radical-right-wingers. Simply ignoring the radical right and its 
analysis of problems can lead to strengthening it, just as cooperation can, 
or adopting elements of its ideology. The democratic parties have to take 
an arduous but ultimately successful path: they have to go on the offen-
sive and argue openly with the radical right and its ideologies. This 
 strategy also means preventing the radical right from posing as the only 
true representative of the little man, as the honest voice of the nation, of 
the people who have been excluded from the political elite for dubious 
reasons. Of course it is useful to expose corruption and discrepancies 
 between the moral conduct of radical-right-wing politicians and their 
ideological demands. The focus of a direct debate, however, should be to 
expose radical-right-wing demands and take them to their absurd con-
clusions. Legal methods against extreme-right-wing parties – such as no-
protest zones, bans on using public assembly halls, bans on demonstra-
tions – are important means in the battle against the radical right. 
However, in each new case it is always important to fi nd the right level, 
so as not to infringe on rights that are necessary for life in a democracy. 
Instead of accepting restrictions on democratic rights, it is necessary to 
conduct debate consciously and, at the same time, not to accept the par-
ticipation of the radical right in political decision-making. 
314 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG
3. Determining the focus: Protection against discrimination,  
 and diversity and equality
Focus on protection against discrimination and protection of victims: 
The shared basis of the radical right is “group-focused enmity” (Wilhelm 
Heitmeyer). In radical right-wing thought, only one homogeneous eth-
nic group (that does not exist in reality) can form a “healthy nation” or 
an “intact national body”. Their ethnically defi ned “we-group” is consti-
tuted by demarcation from “foreign groups” (as defi ned by this concept). 
The alleged “foreigners” are supposed to be excluded, by violence if nec-
essary. A key element of strategies against right-wing radicalism is the 
protection of (potential) victims. The EU has shown that it is prepared to 
act in this area by issuing anti-discrimination directives and recommen-
dations against xenophobia and racism. The guidelines have been adapt-
ed on a national basis and implemented in the EU member countries so 
that changes could be made in national legislation. In some cases, how-
ever, there are diffi culties with implementation. One possibility of im-
proving this process would be to deploy commissioners or set up observer 
offi ces that could initiate reprimands if necessary. Aside from the Euro-
pean level, the national and local levels are also very important for coun-
tering discrimination and hate crime. In some countries, action at the 
local level may be easier than multilateral efforts. In the UK, for example, 
in the run-up to the 2010 general election, the three major parties were 
persuaded to agree not to use any racist argumentation in their campaigns. 
Another tactic for the sustained campaign against discrimination is to 
focus on developing anti-discrimination awareness among employees 
in government institutions (such as state administration and the execu-
tive).   
Counter-measures often concentrate too heavily on perpetrators and still 
too little on (potential) victims. Continual monitoring of hate crimes is 
indispensable for gathering information on this problem and making the 
public and politicians more aware of it. Whereas every government con-
demns hate-motivated violence, there is no unifi ed position on the topic 
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of hate speech. The most controversial issue is how to fi nd the right bal-
ance between the duty to grant citizens the right to free speech and the 
obligation to protect citizens from discrimination.
Focus on promoting diversity and equality: According to the radical-right 
worldview, heterogeneity, particularly ethnic and religious diversity, is re-
garded as the main culprit for problematic social and individual situa-
tions. This makes it all the more important for effective combating of 
right-wing radicalism to emphasise diversity and to foster a sense of re-
sponsibility and individual participation (in the sense of one’s own role in 
a democratic society). Not least, this includes improving political educa-
tion: to explain our society (of migration), based on the principle of diver-
sity, to take the individual and his/her needs seriously, and to strengthen 
his/her abilities – this is how heterogeneity can be made understandable 
as an individual and social statement of fact. Every individual must be 
able to demand equality or equal opportunity, regardless of social or cul-
tural background.
4. Allowing civil society to develop, and strengthening civic  
 commitment
Create strong players in civil society and strengthen civic commitment: 
These are indispensable partners in the battle against the radical right. 
Civic commitment in society often stems from grass-roots activity or 
anti-fascist or liberal-democratic groups. They keep watch on the radical-
right scene in their locality, organize protest campaigns, often in the 
form of demonstrations and concerts, or assist victims. These players 
strongly infl uence the mobilisation of the population against right-wing 
radicalism. Yet civic protest “in the streets” not only helps to mobilise 
people and form their opinions, it also greatly assists in pushing back 
radical-right-wingers for example, by breaking up no-go areas and show-
ing that radical-right-wingers and their ideas are unwelcome (in a locali-
ty, for instance).
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Civil society and state: Whereas the state should not yield up its mo-
nopoly on violence, and acts of violence and contraventions of human 
rights as a whole should be punished, it is still important that state insti-
tutions open up towards civil society and do not shy away from common 
activities on an equal basis with citizens. An important task of civic insti-
tutions is to support governments in monitoring and evaluating data 
(such as information on hate crime).   In this context, funding for NGOs 
is often a controversial issue – in some countries, civic activities against 
right-wing radicalism are state-funded. In particular, civic organizations 
operating in trouble spots and in structurally weak regions require atten-
tion and support. Basic conditions for successful work are shared com-
munication, enabling learning processes and free scope for their imple-
mentation. Cooperation and networking are important to prevent 
right-wing radicalism from various perspectives and to bring the maxi-
mum number of social forces onside. To achieve this, it is essential that 
governmental and civic players cooperate and implement joint measures.
5. Education for democracy and human rights  
Develop skills for a pluralist society: It is of fundamental importance to 
establish a political culture open to pluralism so as to form a shield 
against radical-right-wing, violent and inhuman attitudes. Education in 
school and in the family is vital for this. This is where we can show that 
foreigners or members of minorities are not to blame for social or indi-
vidual problems. Aside from purely factual knowledge, experience of di-
versity is important for people to be able to look beyond their own front 
door and fi nd their feet in a heterogeneous society. 
Institutions like nursery schools and schools can contribute to the devel-
opment and formation of social and emotional capacities. Emotional bal-
ance, the ability to see things through other people’s eyes, an appropriate 
sense of one’s own worth, the ability to cope with confl ict, openness and 
curiosity are skills that arm children and young people against the radical 
right. Early and continuous fostering of these social and emotional skills 
with the maximum possible degree of individual attention is a key issue. 
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Children and young people can be given the skills to fi nd their feet in a 
plural and diverse society and examine their environment critically. 
Transmit values and make democracy come alive: Preventive educational 
concepts should be oriented towards values like tolerance, human rights 
and diversity; their goal should be to encourage a democratic, participa-
tory, and motivating culture of teaching and learning. Prevention of vio-
lence and extremism are important elements in a broadly democratic 
school development. Programmes and coaching in schools, such as anti-
racist coaching or Holocaust education, are already underway in countries 
such as the UK, Denmark and France. However, there is a noticeable shift 
(at least semantically) in the educational perspective: today, less is said 
about combating racism and right-wing extremism, and the emphasis is 
more on promoting equality or equal opportunity.
Democracy can and should come alive. It should not be reduced to par-
liamentarism, but requires participation beyond the ballot box. In this 
sense, opportunities for participation, whether in school or the commu-
nity, should be fostered.1 
Conclusion
A multi-layered strategy against right-wing radicalism is the key to suc-
cess. There is no single method or rapid-fi re strategy that can neutralise 
the social and political threat posed by the radical right. These are the 
cornerstones of a strategy for a pluralist and forward-looking Europe: a 
thorough, differentiated analysis of the radical right and current social 
problems; a calm, consistent political struggle with the radical right; spe-
cial focus on protection against discrimination, and on promoting diver-
sity and equal opportunities; strengthening of civic commitment and 
players in civil society; and education for democracy and human rights.
1 Good examples of projects that encourage participation are the project initiated in Belgium, 
“School without racism – with courage”, and the Saxon project, “Show courage for democracy”. 
Both projects have developed into supraregional and transnational networks. 
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Seven theses to conclude with: 
Together against right-wing extremism in Europe 
The country analyses and articles in this book illustrate in a vivid but also 
alarming way how right-wing extremism threatens Europe’s democracies 
and societies. Together with the recent socio-political developments in 
Europe they emphasize that it is imperative to fi ght against right-wing 
extremism, xenophobia, racism, and exclusion in a common and decisive 
manner. Working and fi ghting for democracy do not only affect  politics, 
but require a continuous commitment of all players of society: Whether 
 entrepreneurs, scientists, church members, trade unionists, club mem-
bers, teachers, people committed to socio-political issues, or ordinary 
 citizens – everyone is called upon to stand up for human rights and 
 democratic principles. 
But what are the effective and creative ways to fi ght group-focused em-
nity and to create a coexistence based upon solidarity and democracy? 
Which players are needed, and which approaches have proved effective? 
What is being done in Europe to counter ostracism, denigration, and 
ideas of inequality? What roles do politics and society play, and what are 
the next steps to be taken? 
These are the questions examined by the previous article on strategies 
against the radical right and for a pluralistic, sustainable Europe from an 
academic point of view. They also guide the debates led within the frame-
work of the FES‘ work as a continuous dialogue between representatives 
of politics, science, and civil society. As a result of these discussions, 
seven core theses are briefl y summarised below in order to contribute to 
further political debate. These theses originate from the results of work-
ing groups of about 150 international experts that met in November 2010 
Nora Langenbacher
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in Berlin at a so-called “Open Space” (a participative conference format) 
for democracy, to exchange ideas on European synergies in the work 
against the extreme right, and on further steps for democracy. The sum-
mary therefore does not claim to be complete but focuses on some core 
aspects as a complement to the elaborations of the previous article. It is 
based on socio-political recommendations for action developed by seven 
working groups and discussed with high-ranking representatives of Euro-
pean politics and central players in the work for democracy – among 
others, representatives of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI), of the Network against Nationalism, Racism, and Fas-
cism, of UNITED for Intercultural Action, of the European Network against 
Racism (ENAR), and of the European Agency for Human Rights (FRA). 
1. Effi cient politics and work for democracy in Europe will succeed  
 only through cooperation of all players in European societies. 
 A European strategy against right-wing extremism is long overdue.
The will and the commitment to overcome barriers between different 
levels of action and social domains, to enter into an interdisciplinary 
dialogue or, if necessary, to coordinate with each other are fundamental 
prerequisites of effi cient social effort for democracy. Regarding the most 
necessary analysis of the extreme right scene, this particularly  applies to 
the urgently needed exchange between science, civil society practice, 
state enforcement agencies and politics. National and interna tional ap-
proaches have been heterogeneous so far and harbour a wealth of experi-
ence, but an effi cient fi ght against the extreme right requires a coordi-
nated and coherent procedure on a European level. Con sidering the 
respective political and social context, this is the only way to develop 
and implement a European strategy against right-wing extremism that is 
urgently required. Such a strategy should not only focus on organized 
right-wing extremism, i.e. on parties and extreme right party cadres, but 
must also aim at its manifestations in subculture and social movements. 
Furthermore, a sucessful approach must also concider extreme-right ideas 
321IS EUROPE ON THE “RIGHT” PATH?
“in the center of our societies”. The work for democracy must  focus on 
civil society initiatives on a local level, since they target anti-democratic 
attitudes in mainstream society, too. Institutio nalised and professional 
civil society commitment requires continuous, long-term  fi nancial sup-
port and development in terms of content. A further pre requisite for an 
expedient discussion on right-wing extremism is profound and con-
tinuous observation and research of the extreme right’s different mani-
festations across Europe. 
2. Using the law against the right wing – Exhaust all legal and   
 suppressive means.
Law and jurisdiction are crucial strategies for defending democracy. Pur-
posefully used, law and law enforcement can signifi cantly contribute to 
improving the situation in Europe. This applies fi rst of all to suppression 
through recognising, documenting, and prosecuting extreme-right 
crimes. After all, the 100,000 racist crimes committed in the European 
Union in one year are only the tip of the iceberg. Too often, courts and 
police lack the necessary expert knowledge and fail to adequately imple-
ment or apply existing methods. Embarking on a homogenous European 
procedure linked to the necessary documentation options with accessi-
bility for and cooperation with players working in victim care (see thesis 
1), for instance, is long overdue. 
Additionally, Europe should urgently send clear, humane signals against 
exclusion and discrimination by proactive policy measures for human 
rights, in particular in sensitive fi elds such as immigration, integration, 
and anti-discrimination. The fact that diversity is something positive for 
European societies should not be given only lip service but should be 
expressed in European legislation, too. A legal framework aiming at inte-
gration would counteract the often negative image of immigrants and 
would take the wind out of the extreme-right’s sails.
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3. The (new) media play a central role in fi ghting right-wing   
 extremism. Informed journalists and media competency are an  
 imperative.
The media are facing a central task for two reasons: First, it is the journal-
ists and reporters who pay attention to right-wing extremism, especially 
to its victims by disclosing violence and alarming developments to the 
public. Along with this task of informing, media reporting also infl u-
ences the attributions, values, and problem analyses that take root in the 
 whole of society. Thus, when it comes to the question whether socio-
political problems are considered a common challenge, and whether the 
extreme right will manage to exploit them for their own purposes, the 
media bear crucial responsibility when reporting on sensitive topics such 
as integration, crime, immigration, labour, or social policies. 
Meanwhile, a highly professional and broad-based spectrum of extreme-
right media has developed to this end. Particularly on the Internet, their 
presence and activities are diffi cult to contain or to prevent due to diverse 
legal positions. The most suitable protective factor for young media 
or Internet users when dealing with right-wing extremist webpages – 
often not apparent as such at fi rst glance, like pages that present histori-
cal revisionism – is media competence. Along with the necessary infor-
mation work, the Internet and the social networks, in particular, could be 
increasingly used as “counter-platforms” or for exchange and more 
effective communication in anti-racist work.
4.  It is up to the municipalities. 
Democracy is lived especially on the municipal level, and is easily threat-
ened there, too. Thus it is not surprising that this is the extreme right’s 
main level of action (see country analyses and introduction in this book) 
and it is at this level where – not only after cases of open violence – active 
and creative civil society commitment is required to defend our demo-
cratic culture. Commitment against right-wing extremism often means 
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conducting campaigns on the occasion of a specifi c event or develop-
ment, which can be designed in a number of different ways. It is impor-
tant to mobilise and involve as many different players and age groups as 
pos sible. Profound knowledge of local challenges and of the right-wing 
scene is also essential. When the action or the campaign is completed, 
the results should be consolidated as a continuous civil society awareness 
and commitment. The publication “Manual for dealing with right-wing 
 extremism on a municipal level” by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung provides 
 examples for municipal strategies of action (see list of FES publications in 
the appendix)1. 
5. Culture and sports are important and rewarding fi elds for the work  
 for democracy. 
Be it in football stadiums of professionals or in youth clubs of local sports 
teams, bands, music clubs, or theatre groups – inhumane symbols and 
slogans must be consistently revealed, banned, and prosecuted. With the 
help of a democratic art and fan culture, creative artists and sports clubs 
could assume exemplary socialisation functions here. Particularly celebri-
ties from the sports, fi lm, theatre, or music industries can serve as impor-
tant anti-racist idols by public advocacy. 
6. Support and involve minorities and marginalised groups: 
 Fight anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and anti-Ziganism.
Groups or minorities that face prejudice, exclusion, discrimination, or, in 
the worst case, radical violence on grounds of religion, ethnic origin, or 
other characteristics, must receive Europe’s support and solidarity. This is 
fi rst of all to be organized by respective protection schemes for victims 
and enhanced minority rights and associations. However, such support 
also affects regulations for participation and incentive mechanisms en-
1 “Handbuch für die kommunale Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtsextremismus” (available 
only in German).
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suring that people with heterogeneous backgrounds, religions, or appear-
ances equally participate in all spheres of society. A not only rhetorical 
European welcome culture for asylum-seekers or immigrants would be a 
good example of a democratic and humane step towards overcoming 
intercultural challenges, for which the extreme right has so far mono-
polised the prerogative of (negative) interpretation. Naturally, education 
and the media play a crucial role in preventing prejudices against “the 
other” (see theses 3 and 7). 
7.  Education is the no. 1 protective factor across Europe.
The higher people’s education, the less likely they are to support extreme 
right slogans and organizations. This fact is not only a result of 
scientifi c research but has proven itself in everyday life. Education in 
human rights, intercultural coexistence and democracy, as well as educa-
tion on the emergence and the logic of enemy stereotypes and exclusion 
ideologies must be part of the curricula of our so ciety’s instances of 
 socialisation. Children and students constitute the main target group of 
right-wing extremists. It is essential not only to learn democratic culture as 
a part of the curriculum in kindergartens and schools, but to experience 
it in everyday practice. It is obvious, however, that there is an enormous 
demand for action in out-of-school education and for adults, too. Further 
educational efforts and the capacity to deal with racism and discrimina-
tion are therefore urgently  required in companies, employers‘ associa-
tions, and for employees in justice and police authorities, administra-
tions, universities, churches, and trade unions.
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Worldwide goals of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
The Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES) was founded in 1925 as the political 
heritage of Friedrich Ebert, the fi rst democratically elected president 
of the  German Reich. As a private, cultural non-profi t institution it is 
 committed to the ideas of social democracy. It contributes to social 
 democracy by 
• political education enforcing its basic values,
• promoting young scholars committed to it,
• public dialogues paving new political ways for it
• development cooperation serving global justice,
• research and political counselling exploring and transmitting its 
fundaments, and
• bridges of international cooperation contributing to building world-
wide democracy.
The main branch offi ces are situated in Bonn and Berlin. Furthermore, 
there are federal state and regional offi ces operating within Germany and 
over 100 offi ces worldwide. Please fi nd more information about the FES 
on www.fes.de.
The work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for democracy and 
against right-wing extremism 
As a pressing challenge for democracy and human rights, right-wing 
extremism requires increasing and continuous commitment from all 
players in society. The work against right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism, 
and xenophobic and racist attitudes as well as for democracy is therefore 
The work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
for democracy and against right-wing extremism
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a core sphere of action for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Different working 
units of FES offer conferences, seminars, and exhibitions informing on 
the different forms of manifestation of right-wing extremism and high-
lighting diverse strategies for democracy and civil courage. This decen-
tralised approach is particularly important since right-wing extremism 
must be dealt with mainly on a local level. 
With its central Berlin project “Combating right-wing extremism”, 
 Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung underlines the need for continuous action against 
the extreme right. It accompanies current socio-political debates on this 
topic from a federal political perspective, regularly invites representatives 
from politics, civil society and research to conferences and its publica-
tions contribute to the professional dialogue. Further, the project serves 
FES as a main contact point on the topic of right-wing extremism. 
Please fi nd an overview on FES‘ activities on right-wing extremism on the 
internet portal www.fes-gegen-rechstextremismus.de. Here you can 
fi nd a list of all events throughout Germany as well as all materials of the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung on the topic of right-wing extremism for free 
download or order.
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